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Abstract: 
 
This thesis examines qiaowu [Overseas Chinese affairs] policies during the PRC’s first 
decade, and it argues that the CCP-controlled party-state’s approach to the governance of 
the huaqiao [Overseas Chinese] and their affairs was fundamentally a political economy. 
This was at base, a function of perceived huaqiao economic utility, especially for what 
their remittances offered to China’s foreign reserves, and hence the party-state’s qiaowu 
approach was a political practice to secure that economic utility. 
 
Through the early-to-mid-1950s, the perceived economic utility of the huaqiao and their 
remittances led to policies that systematically privileged the huaqiao (especially in China) 
and their interests, all in the name of securing, incentivising and increasing remittances 
back to China. This was even done at the expense of other CCP ideological impetuses, 
especially in terms of socialist transformation, as the party-state permitted contradictions 
between these youdai [favourable treatment] policies for the huaqiao, and its own vision 
for socialist transformation. 
 
Yet, by 1959, and after a series of crises brought the contradictions between qiaowu and 
socialist transformation to the fore, the CCP’s radical shift to the left led by Mao Zedong 
forced qiaowu to now conform with Mao’s demand to place ‘politics in command’. Thus 
qiaowu abandoned its prioritisation of economic utility and its past policies, for alignment 
with Mao’s revolutionary ideals, and in service to the Great Leap Forward.  
 
This thesis represents an original contribution to historiography on the PRC, the huaqiao, 
and qiaowu, both in terms of the new evidence from a wide range of Chinese archives 
that it utilises, but also because it revises existing narratives—and especially the pro-CCP 
conventionalisms—that gloss over the huaqiao experience of New China. Furthermore, 
this thesis also addresses the lacunae in the historiography on the PRC in the 1950s, and 
its silence on where qiaowu fits into the story of China’s socialist transformation. 
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Glossary of Chinese terms: 
 
This thesis uses hanyu pinyin romanisation for Chinese proper names and nouns, except 
in those few instances where their other (usually older) forms are more generally familiar, 
for instance: Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), Tan Kah Kee 
(Chen Jiageng), and etc. 
 
Citations of Chinese sources in the footnotes are in pinyin. The thesis bibliography lists 
the Chinese secondary sources consulted, and includes a title translation in English, pinyin 
transliteration, and the Chinese characters for each entry. 
 
Quotations from Chinese sources have been translated into English. 
 
The following is a glossary of some of the more common Chinese terms in the thesis. 
 
Pinyin English translation Characters Notes 
guiqiao Overseas Chinese 
returnee (to China) 
归侨 shorthand for 归国华侨 
[guiguo huaqiao] 
haiwai 
huaqiao 
Overseas Chinese 
(actually abroad) 
海外华侨 sometimes also 国外华侨 
[guowai huaqiao] 
huaqiao Overseas Chinese 华侨  
nanqiao Overseas Chinese refugee 难侨 shorthand for 归难华侨 
[guinan huaqiao] 
qiaobao Overseas Chinese 
compatriot 
侨胞 shorthand for 华侨同胞 
[huaqiao tongbao] 
qiaohui Overseas Chinese 
remittances 
侨汇 shorthand for 华侨汇款 
[huaqiao huikuan] 
qiaojuan Overseas Chinese 
dependent and/or relative 
侨眷 shorthand for 华侨眷属 
[huaqiao juanshu] 
qiaolian Overseas Chinese 
association 
侨联 from huaqiao friendship 
association, 华侨联谊会 
[huaqiao lianyihui]; or the 
All-China Federation of 
Returned Overseas 
Chinese, 中华全国归国
华侨联合会 [zhonghua 
quanguo guiguo huaqiao 
lianhehui] 
qiaoqu Overseas Chinese area 侨区 shorthand for 华侨地区 
[huaqiao diqu] 
qiaopi Overseas Chinese 
correspondence 
侨批 from a Hokkien (Minnan) 
pronunciation of letter, or
信 [xin] as 批 [pi]. 
qiaosheng Overseas Chinese student 侨生 shorthand for 华侨学生 
[huaqiao xuesheng] 
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qiaowu Overseas Chinese affairs 侨务 shorthand for 华侨事务 
[huaqiao shiwu] 
qiaoxiang Overseas Chinese 
hometown 
侨乡 shorthand for 华侨家乡 
[huaqiao jiaxiang] 
teshu special, or exceptional 特殊 as in huaqiao special 
circumstances, 华侨特殊
情况 [huaqiao teshu 
qingkuang] 
youdai favourable or preferential  
treatment 
优待 from 优良对待 [youliang 
duidai] or 优厚对待 
[youhou duidai] 
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List of Abbreviations: 
 
1949-1952 
duiwai maoyi 
juan 
1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: duwai maoyi juan 
1949-1952 中华人民共和国经
济档案资料选编: 对外贸易卷 
1949-1952 
gongshang 
tizhi juan 
1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: gongshang tizhi juan 
1949-1952 中华人民共和国经
济档案资料选编: 工商体制卷 
1949-1952 
jinrong juan 
1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: jinrong juan 
1949-1952 中华人民共和国经
济档案资料选编: 金融卷 
1949-1952 
nongcun 
jingji tizhi 
juan 
1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: nongcun jingji tizhi 
juan 
1949-1952 中华人民共和国经
济档案资料选编: 农村经济体
制卷 
1953-1957 
jinrong juan 
1953-1957 Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: jinrong juan 
1953-1957 中华人民共和国经
济档案资料选编: 金融卷 
1958-1965 
jinrong juan 
1958-1965 Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: jinrong juan 
1958-1965 中华人民共和国经
济档案资料选编: 金融卷 
AAPC Advanced Agricultural 
Producers’ Cooperative 
高级农业生产合作社 
ACFROC All-China Federation of Returned 
Overseas Chinese 
中华全国归国华侨联合会 
APC Agricultural Producers’ 
Cooperative 
农业生产合作社 
BMA Beijing Municipal Archives 北京市档案馆 
BPG Beijing People’s Government 北京市人民政府 
BOC Bank of China 中国银行 
CA Central Archives 中央档案馆 
CASS Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences 
中国社会科学院 
CC Central Committee 中央委员会 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 中国共产党 
CFEC Central Finance and Economics 
Commission, CPG 
中央人民政府财政经济委员会 
CKZL Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue 
cankao ziliao 
中共党史教学参考资料 
CNS China News Service 中国新闻社 
CPG Central People’s Government 中央人民政府 
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CPR China Political Reports  
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference 
中华人民政治协商会议 
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union 
 
CWIHP Cold War International History 
Project 
 
DDRS Declassified Documents 
Reference System 
 
DHGLR Dang he guojia lingdaoren lun 
qiaowu 
党和国家领导人论侨务 
DWGW Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
duiwai guanxi wenjian ji (1949-
1959) 
中华人民共和国对外关系文件
集 (1949-1959) 
ECFC East China Finance Committee 华东军政委员会财经委员会 
FPA Fujian Provincial Archives 福建省档案馆 
FPC Fujian CCP Committee 福建省共产党委员会 
FPG Fujian People’s Government 福建省人民政府 
GAC Government Administration 
Council 
中央人民政府政务院 
GBP Pound sterling  
GDQW Guangdong qiaowu 广东侨务 
GLF Great Leap Forward 大跃进 
GMD Guomindang 国民党 
GPC Guangdong CCP Committee 广东省共产党委员会 
GPPC Guangdong People’s Committee 广东省人民委员会 
HKD Hong Kong Dollar  
ISD Internal Security Department, 
Singapore 
 
JYMZ Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong 
wengao 
建国以来毛泽东文稿 
JYZW Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenjian 
xuanbian 
建国以来重要文件选编 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC 中华人民共和国外交部 
MFAA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Archive, PRC 
中华人民共和国外交部档案馆 
MOE Ministry of Education, PRC 中华人民共和国教育部 
NBCK Neibu cankao 内部参考 
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NPC National People’s Congress 全国人民代表大会 
OCAC Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Commission, CPG 
中央人民政府华侨事务委员会 
OCAO Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 
of the State Council 
国务院华侨事务办公室 
PBOC People’s Bank of China 中国人民银行 
PCC Political Consultative Conference 政治协商会议 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 中国人民解放军 
PRC People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国 
RIIA Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (Chatham House) 
 
RMB Renminbi 人民币 
QWB Qiaowu bao 侨务报 
QWTX Qiaowu gongzuo tongxun 侨务工作通讯 
Selected 
Works 
The Selected Works of Mao Tse-
tung 
 
SGD Singapore Dollar  
SMA Shanghai Municipal Archives 上海市档案馆 
SPC Shanghai CCP Committee 上海市共产党委员会 
SPG Shanghai People’s Government 上海市人民政府 
SSC Supreme State Conference 最高国务会议 
TNA The National Archives of the 
United Kingdom, London 
 
UFWD CCP CC United Front Work 
Department 
中国共产党中央委员会统一战
线工作部 
USD United States Dollar  
WCDA Wilson Center Digital Archive  
Xinhua Xinhua News Agency 新华通讯社 
YPG Yunnan People’s Government 云南省人民政府 
ZZJZ Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang 
zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian 
wenjian xuanbian 
中共中央解放战争时期统一战
线文件选编 
ZZKM Zhonggong zhongyang kangri 
minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian 
xuanbian 
中共中央抗日民族统一战线文
件选编 
ZZWX Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian 
xuanji 
中共中央文件选集 
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Introduction 
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 While on a visit to Bangkok in November 1978, and just over a year after he had 
been restored to political ascendancy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central 
Committee (CC) vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping gave a speech to some huaqiao [华侨  
Overseas Chinese].1 Deng declared that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) sought 
‘reaffirmation and restoration of the past policies that Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou 
had formulated while they were alive’.2 This, in the realm of qiaowu [侨务 Overseas 
Chinese affairs] policies, broadly meant that the haiwai huaqiao [海外华侨 Overseas 
Chinese abroad] should be law-abiding, adopt local citizenship, and integrate with local 
peoples. Yet, Deng also admitted that for the huaqiao in China, ‘Lin Biao and the ‘Gang 
of Four’ had interfered with Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou’s qiaowu policies’, and 
had thus caused the huaqiao to suffer during the dark years of the Cultural Revolution.3 
But Deng promised them a restoration; he pointed to the State Council’s new Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office as a veritable temple to qiaowu, and to Liao Chengzhi’s return to 
the guardianship of qiaowu as like the return of a benevolent Bodhisattva to the temple.4 
Liao had headed the older Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) until it had 
been shuttered during the Cultural Revolution.5 Thus the return of Liao, the long-serving, 
                                                
1 While huaqiao translates as ‘Overseas Chinese’, it means ‘Chinese sojourners’. Thus ‘Overseas Chinese’ 
does not differentiate between permanent and temporary sojourning, especially since huaqiao identity could 
mean persons either in, or outside China. Today, huaqiao identity is linked to Chinese nationality and 
foreign residence, but in the period framed by this thesis, that distinction was very rarely made. Back then, 
huaqiao identity could include: huaqiao juanshu [shortened to 侨眷 qiaojuan] or the huaqiao dependents 
or relatives in China; huaqiao xuesheng [侨生 qiaosheng] or the huaqiao students who returned to China; 
guiguo huaqiao [归侨 guiqiao] or returnees; and the haiwai huaqiao [海外华侨] were those actually abroad. 
In the interests of analytical specificity, this thesis prefers to transliterate huaqiao as a general reference to 
all identities, and use the specific terms (i.e. guiqiao) where necessary. See ‘A Note on the Origins of Hua-
ch’iao’, in Wang Gungwu, Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese, selected by 
Anthony Reid (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1981), 118-127; Glen Peterson, Overseas 
Chinese in the People’s Republic of China (New York: Routledge, 2012), 2-3. 
2  Deng Xiaoping, ‘Jiejian taiguo huaqiao, huaren daibiao de jianghua’, 09/11/1978, in State Council 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (ed.), Dang he guojia lingdaoren lun qiaowu [hereafter, DHGLR] (Beijing: 
Guowuyuan qiaoban, 1992), 335-337 (336). 
3 Ibid., 337. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Liao Chengzhi was the son of Liao Zhongkai and He Xiangning—who were close friends of Sun Yat-sen. 
He rose in the CCP in the 1930s, and became an alternate member of the CCP CC at the Seventh Party 
Congress (1945). Liao was appointed OCAC vice-Chairman in 1949—with his mother as titular 
Chairperson—but was de facto head since he ran its Party Group [党组 dangzu]. He became a full CCP CC 
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enlightened guardian of qiaowu, spoke to Deng’s apparent intention to restore qiaowu to 
its previous benevolence and correctness. Yet, this view of the past—this ‘Deng version’ 
of history—was an attempt to whitewash the darker episodes of the preceding years, 
which went far beyond the iniquities of the Cultural Revolution.6 
 Contrary to the narrative of benevolence, correctness and a general positivity as 
the characteristics of the CCP’s pre-Cultural Revolution qiaowu policies, this thesis views 
qiaowu as a tragic failure even before the Cultural Revolution. This thesis is thus first and 
foremost a revision of the CCP narrative on its past approach to qiaowu. More 
specifically, this thesis focuses on the first decade of the PRC (1949–1959) to analyse the 
history of policies towards the huaqiao in China, from the very beginning of the new 
state. To that end, this thesis asks three main questions. What was the CCP’s approach to 
qiaowu? How was qiaowu practiced, and how did it correlate with other policy contexts 
and circumstances in the PRC? And where did qiaowu end up by 1960—and why? In 
answer to the questions above, and based on mainly heretofore unused archival evidence, 
this thesis argues for an analysis of the CCP’s qiaowu as a political economy; a locus of 
contradiction; and ultimately, as the site of paradoxical failure and broken promises. Thus 
this thesis sets out to offer a new history of qiaowu in the PRC that will also provide 
insights on the first ten years of New China and its political economy. 
 The following pages will discuss the thesis’ main arguments, before summarising 
its structure and scope. This will include a discussion of the historiographical lacunae—
both in terms of the histories of the PRC, and of ‘Overseas Chinese affairs’—that this 
thesis seeks to fill. Finally, after an overview of the evidentiary sources that this thesis 
                                                
member at the Eighth Party Congress (1956), and OCAC Chairman in 1959. He vanished from public life 
during the Cultural Revolution, but was later restored to the CCP CC at the Tenth Party Congress (1973). 
See ‘Liao Chengzhi’, in Wolfgang Bartke, Who’s Who in the People’s Republic of China (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1981), 209-210. 
For the attacks on Liao and qiaowu in the Cultural Revolution, see Shanghai Returned Overseas Chinese 
Cultural Revolution Liaison Station, and Shanghai Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Revolutionary Rebels 
Third Corps (eds), Zalan Liao Chengzhi de ‘xiao guowuyuan’ (Shanghai, 1967). 
6 Deng was not alone in this. See also Xi Zhongxun, ‘Zai sheng, zizhi qu, zhixia shi qiaoban zhuren huiyi 
shang de jianghua (zhai yao)’, 21/04/1984, DHGLR, 364-368 (364). 
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employs, an introduction to pre-1949 CCP approaches to the huaqiao (and also to qiaowu) 
will offer a prologue to the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
 
The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy: 
 This thesis closely examines qiaowu policy, to construct a narrative of the ideas, 
discourses, events, and contexts that were formative to qiaowu, and to thus analyse its 
development and implementation in the PRC’s first decade. In that sense, this thesis seeks 
to contextualise the huaqiao place in PRC history by first looking at how the huaqiao 
were placed into the various contexts (political, economic, and etc.) of the new Chinese 
party-state and its qiaowu.7 Moreover, this thesis frames a chronology of New China’s 
first decade that is bounded by two seminal events: it begins around the birth of the PRC 
(1949), and it ends just after the Lushan Conference (1959) had fixed China on the path 
of the Great Leap Forward (GLF)—basically, the epicentre of the Maoist era.8 
 The crux of this thesis’ argument is that qiaowu in the PRC (1949–1959) was a 
political economy. In other words, qiaowu was a political practice by the Chinese party-
state in service of economic objectives, wherein policies towards and regarding the 
governance of the huaqiao were defined by both a perception of huaqiao economic utility, 
and the imperative to capitalise on that utility. Indeed, given this thesis’ identification and 
analysis of the continual interplay through the 1950s between economics and politics in 
qiaowu, political economy is not just a characterisation of the CCP’s approach to qiaowu, 
but also a paradigm for analysing and proving other supplementary arguments.9 
                                                
7 In the PRC, the CCP has supreme authority over the government and exercise of state power. Thus there 
was (and is) no meaningful separation between Party and State, hence ‘party-state’ refers ‘not only to the 
party itself but also the government, legislature, and other hierarchies’. See Susan H. Whiting, ‘Growth, 
Governance and Institutions: The Internal Institutions of the Party-State in China’ (Institute for Policy 
Studies, Singapore, and the World Bank, Washington, DC: 2006), 17. 
8 ‘The pivotal event in the history of the People’s Republic of China was the Great Leap Forward. Any 
attempt to understand what happened in communist China must start by placing it squarely at the very 
centre of the entire Maoist period.’ See Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most 
Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962 (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), xiv. 
9 ‘Political economy, in sum, regards economic ideas and behaviour not as frameworks for analysis, but as 
beliefs and actions that must themselves be explained. They are contingent and problematic; that is, they 
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 First, this thesis argues that the political economy of qiaowu (especially in 1950–
1956) was derived from the huaqiao’s inclusion in the New Democracy of New China, 
as a function of the CCP’s rationalisations about its economic interests, huaqiao 
economic utility, and what huaqiao remittances meant for its foreign reserves. This was 
the meaning of the huaqiao place in the New Democracy, and the qiaowu of the new 
party-state was premised on this definition of huaqiao utility, and given an imperative to 
secure remittances. Yet, qiaowu practitioners (led by the OCAC) soon realised that the 
reality of remittances was that they were a manifestation of the transnationality of 
huaqiao interests, because they reflected the interests of both haiwai huaqiao remitters, 
and their recipients in China, like the guiqiao [归侨 huaqiao returnees], or the qiaojuan 
[侨眷  huaqiao dependents and relatives]. For the recipients, remittances were their 
livelihood. But for remitters, remittances fulfilled traditional relationships, commercial 
interests, and most of all, familial responsibilities. For qiaowu, this entailed the 
recognition that securing remittances required the satisfaction of huaqiao interests; and 
that since the focus of interests (for remitters and recipients) lay in China, incentivising 
remittances should have a domestic centre of gravity. Thus qiaowu embraced the 
‘favourable treatment’ [优待 youdai] of the huaqiao (mainly in China), in political, 
economic, and social policy. This preferential treatment was regularly justified by a 
discourse of huaqiao ‘specialness’, but in reality, it was pragmatism that rationalised the 
youdai approach as the most efficient way of incentivising and securing remittances. 
 Yet, as this thesis argues, the youdai in qiaowu was contradictory to the CCP’s 
agenda for socialist transformation. The youdai policies appeared to privilege the huaqiao 
                                                
might have been different and they must be explained within particular political and social science contexts. 
Historical political economy applies this approach to the study of the past.’ See Charles S. Maier, In search 
of stability: Explorations in historical political economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
1-16 (6). 
For more on China’s ‘historical political economy’, see Carl Riskin, China’s Political Economy: The Quest 
for Development since 1949 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Shih Chih-yu, State and Society 
in China’s Political Economy: The Cultural Dynamics of Socialist Reform (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
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by preserving socio-economic relations, lifestyles, and even class identities, in ways 
seemingly counter-intuitive to socialism. This was rationalised as economic pragmatism, 
but there was a contradiction at hand because the party-state was, after all, intended to 
bring about socialism (and communism), which thus made its mission that of socialist 
transformation. Yet, even while the party-state sought to bring about socialism in the 
1950s, it still went ahead with qiaowu that contradicted socialist ideals. Moreover, 
whenever the party-state encountered contradictions between qiaowu (and its youdai) and 
socialist transformation, it favoured the youdai—even if this was resented or rejected by 
lower-level Party cadres and the non-huaqiao masses, who could not quite reconcile the 
contradictions. Even when intensified socialist transformation by the mid-1950s brought 
contradictions with qiaowu to higher levels of intensity, the party-state’s view of the 
youdai as the way to secure key economic imperatives ensured that it permitted those 
contradictions to persist. In a way, the youdai policies benefitted from their apparent 
oppositeness to intensified socialist transformation, which by 1956, appeared to be 
economically unsound. Yet, this also ensured that the youdai approach was associated 
with anti-ideological, or anti-socialist transformation positions, and this was its downfall. 
Once the maelstrom of the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightism in 1957 gave way to an 
overtly ideologically-defined political context, the same economic rationality of the 
youdai approach became evidence of Rightism. Thus the advent of Mao Zedong’s 
‘politics in command’ in 1958 meant the abandonment of the youdai approach, even as 
the new GLF placed socialist transformation at the centre of all party-state activity. 
 Finally, this thesis demonstrates the paradoxical nature of qiaowu in 1949–1959. 
Firstly, though the youdai policies theoretically pandered to huaqiao interests, they were 
ultimately unable to increase huaqiao remittances. This failure was partly due to the 
incompetence and policy violations of CCP cadres and officials, but it was mainly the 
result of contradictions between the youdai approach and CCP ideology. Though qiaowu 
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practitioners advocated the youdai approach, the impetus for socialist transformation 
never went away, so paradoxically, the more that qiaowu tried to effect the youdai 
approach, the greater the contradiction became, with all the negativity for qiaowu—and 
the huaqiao—that that fomented. Indeed, even when the contradiction was resolved in 
favour of socialist transformation, that only made things worse, since it brought the GLF 
down on the huaqiao, with drastically negative effects on remittances. Secondly, while 
the youdai approach was really about party-state self-interest, and marginalised huaqiao 
interests whenever it suited, qiaowu in 1950–1956 truly did privilege the huaqiao. Yet, 
even this positive discrimination had negative consequences in the end, since by placing 
the huaqiao in contradiction to socialism, it resulted in their identification as politically 
backward, or ideologically retarded, and fomented resentment amongst the non-huaqiao. 
This was already evident in the mid-1950s, but ironically, came home to roost after the 
end of the youdai policies, as ‘politics in command’ showed the paradox, and the cost of 
the youdai approach to the huaqiao in China. 
 
Historiography: 
Mainland Mainstream: 
Almost forty years on since his speech, Deng Xiaoping’s version of qiaowu 
history still exerts a hegemonic influence over Mainland Chinese historiography. This 
occurs mainly in rather hagiographic interpretations of the CCP leadership (especially, as 
Deng identified, ‘Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou’) that assume that its approach to 
qiaowu was benevolent and correct, and thus that the party-state’s practice of qiaowu 
prior to 1966 was necessarily blameless.  
The hagiographic interpretation of the role of Mao, Zhou et al., and the reification 
of their qiaowu lives on in the work of many Chinese historians.10 Writing on the so-
                                                
10 See Ren Guixiang, ‘Mao Zedong qiaowu sixiang yu shijian yanjiu’, Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue, No. 2 
(2014), 4-13; Ren Guixiang, ‘Xin Zhongguo jianli hou Mao Zedong yu guiguo qiaoling ji huaren kexue jia 
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called ‘first generation of CCP leaders’ and its ‘collective thinking on qiaowu’, Xu 
Wenyong’s narrative of the party-state leadership’s qiaowu is a tale of policymaking 
‘with Mao Zedong at the core’, that was basically defined by the democratic pluralism of 
the united front; by commitment to protecting the ‘rights and interests’ of huaqiao; and 
by dedication to serving the huaqiao both in and outside China. This benevolence by the 
party-state, Xu argues, led to ‘correct qiaowu’ that let the haiwai huaqiao feel the ‘warmth 
of their homeland’, even while leading those in China to integrate with socialist 
construction and progress.11 Yet, as this thesis demonstrates, the party-state’s qiaowu had 
little to do with benevolence, and was decidedly about economic realism; the commitment 
to the ‘rights and interests’ of huaqiao was actually based on utilitarian perspectives; and 
ultimately, the party-state did not seek to serve the huaqiao with ‘correct qiaowu’, as 
much as it sought to utilise, manipulate and extract. 
 The hagiographic view of the ‘first generation’ CCP leaders as benevolent 
practitioners of ‘correct qiaowu’ implies that all their policies until 1966 were positive. 
This is logical; there is little point in passing the Cultural Revolution off as an aberration 
otherwise. Thus, approved discourse on pre-1966 qiaowu refrains from casting the party-
state in negative light.12  This reluctance—indeed, institutional inability—of Chinese 
historiography to hold the party-state to account, is not uncommon.13 But the reification 
                                                
jiaowang shuping’, Guancha yu sikao, No. 4 (2014), 65-70;  Yang Libing, ‘Lun Mao Zedong de qiaowu 
fangzhen zhengce jiqi zuoyong’, Bagui qiaokan, No. 2 (2004), 4-7; Zheng Yingqia, Lu Ning, ‘Mao Zedong 
yu huaqiao’, Jinan xuebao: zhexue shehui kexue ban, 16:1 (1994), 1-7; Liu Zhengying, ‘Zhou Enlai dui 
Xin Zhongguo qiaowu gongzuo de jiechu gongxian’, Dangde wenxian, No. 3 (2000), 1-5; He Donghang, 
‘Deng Xiaoping de qiaowu sixiang tanjiu’, Jimei daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban), 7:3 (2004), 12-
16. 
11 Xu Wenyong, ‘Lun zhonggong diyi dai lingdao jiti de qiaowu sixiang yu dang de tongyi zhanxian’, Lilun 
yuekan, No. 3 (2009), 22-24. 
See also Chen Yunyun, ‘Dang de diyi dai lingdao jiti huaqiao tongzhan sixiang shulue’, Guangxi shehui 
zhuyi xueyuan xuebao, 23:3 (2012), 25-30; Chen Yunyun, Liu Cheng, ‘Dang de diyi dai zhongyang lingdao 
jiti qiaowu sixiang tanxi’, Ningbo daxue xuebao (renwen kexue ban), 26:4 (2013), 78-83; Liu Hua, 
‘Zhongguo gongchandang yu Xin Zhongguo qiaowu shiye’, Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao, 9:1 
(2005), 46-51. 
12 Xiao Wu, ‘“Jianguo yilai qiaowu zhengce de huigu yu sikao” xueshu zuotanhui jiyao’, Huaqiao huaren 
lishi yanjiu, No. 3 (2001), 11; Wang Yongkui, Wang Zhangang, ‘“Wenhua Da Geming” chuqi de zhong 
qiaowei’, Bainian chao, No. 8 (2015), 35-39. 
13 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) maintains that historians who focus on the failures of 
Chinese socialism and criticise CCP leaders are historical nihilists influenced by Western capitalism. See 
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of ‘correct qiaowu’ has led to a failure to analyse: the political economy of qiaowu; the 
contradictions between youdai policies and socialist transformation; and how the party-
state abandoned the youdai approach for coercion and exploitation. Indeed, nothing that 
even remotely suggests that the party-state’s qiaowu failed, or even betrayed the huaqiao, 
is present in Mainland historiography. 
 Thus, any search for historical interpretation in the Mainland historiography of 
qiaowu in the PRC over 1949–1959 is left only with a zombie-like history; alive to 
incidents, events and developments too prominent to ignore, but dead to the controversial, 
and unwilling to confront difficult facts. The result is a historiography that points to the 
legitimacy of huaqiao political participation, but never to the economic realism of the 
New Democracy.14 Or histories that admit that remittances were sometimes affected by 
failures to implement policy, or by ‘left deviations’, but which ignore the centrality of the 
party-state’s view on the utility of remittances, and the contradictions that arose due to 
this focus.15 Or indeed, discussions of the huaqiao experience of socialist transformation 
that claim party-state benevolence as evinced by the youdai policies, but which fail to 
identify or consider the fundamental self-interest that drove the party-state’s qiaowu, and 
the cost that it inflicted on the huaqiao.16 
                                                
Zhang Shunhong, ‘Fandui lishi xuwuzhuyi yao jiang qingchu Zhongguo de da daoli’, Qiushi, No. 96 (2016); 
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15 See Zhang Xiaoxin, ‘Bodong yu wending: 1955–1957 nian de Zhongguo qiaohui zhengce’, Dongnanya 
yanjiu, No. 4 (2012), 83-89; Yang Shihong, ‘Xin Zhongguo qiaohui gongzuo de lishi kaocha (1949–1966 
nian)’, Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu, 9:2 (2002), 89-95; Zhang Saiqun, ‘Jianguo chuqi woguo qiaohui 
zhengce jiqi shijiao fenxi’, Bagui qiaokan, No. 3 (2012), 38-44; Qiu Liben, ‘Cong guoji qiaohui xindong 
xiangkan woguo qiaohui zhengce’, Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu, No. 2 (2004), 8-20; Zhang Saiqun, ‘1950–
1957 nian woguo huaqiao touzi zhengce fenxi’, Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu, No. 3 (2011), 32-40; Gao 
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Nanyang wenti yanjiu, No. 4 (2010), 62-69; Xiao Jitang, ‘Xin Zhongguo chengli chuqi tudi gaige zhong 
huaqiao zhengce de zhiding’, Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, No. 3 (2013), 33-43; Zhao Zengyan, ‘Jianguo 
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 Consider, as a paradigmatic study, what one of the ‘leading figures’ of Mainland 
Chinese historiography on qiaowu argues.17 Zhuang Guotu suggests that in 1949–1953, 
qiaowu was ‘designed to serve the overall aim of the party and government’, and ‘to 
restore the national economy, stabilize social life and complete a series of social reforms 
in the hometowns of overseas Chinese’; while in 1954–1958, it was ‘to mobilize the 
returned overseas Chinese and their dependents to take part in the socialist construction 
and revolution’.18 To Zhuang, there is no question—or critical analysis—about the bases 
of qiaowu, beyond that preferred by CCP-approved narratives. Therefore Zhuang accepts 
out of hand that the youdai approach was party-state benevolence towards the huaqiao, 
and neither examines its economic rationalisations, nor its contradictions with socialist 
transformation—let alone its tragic cost. This is a sanitised history, which despite vague 
references to the ideological radicalism of the 1960s that negatively impacted the 
huaqiao, makes no attempt to explain how or why the CCP’s radicalisation affected 
qiaowu. But how can Zhuang explain anything, when he fails to name Mao even once, or 
even write the words: ‘socialist high tide’, ‘Great Leap Forward’, ‘Anti-Rightism’, or 
‘Eighth Party Congress’? Such white-washing, it seems, is what Yang Kuisong meant in 
his criticism of ‘Party history scholars today’, who are ‘sympathetic’ and ‘understanding’, 
but who ‘fail to ‘exhaust’ historical source materials or only pick those materials that fit 
their own point of view or personal values’.19 Zhuang’s refusal to hold the party-state to 
account is thus firmly within the mainstream of Mainland Chinese historiography on 
qiaowu, which is manifestly in need of the revision that this thesis effects. 
                                                
qiaoban dang’an wei qieru dian’, Bagui qiaokan, No. 1 (2007), 50-56; Qiao Suling, ‘Liangnan de xuanze: 
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17 Zhuang Guotu is a ‘leading figure in Southeast Asian studies and studies of the Overseas Chinese and an 
academic authority of high repute’; he sits on the Experts Committee of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. 
[http://ice.xmu.edu.cn/english/showletter.aspx?news_id=2478] Accessed 15/03/2016. 
18 Zhuang Guotu, ‘The Policies of the Chinese Government towards Overseas Chinese (1949–1966)’, in 
Wang Ling-Chi, Wang Gungwu (eds), The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays, Vol. I (Singapore: Eastern 
Universities Press, 2003), 18-37 (20-25). 
19 Yang Kuisong, Liu Wennan, ‘Studying the Chinese Communist Party in historical context: an interview 
with Yang Kuisong, October 17, 2015’, Journal of Modern Chinese History, 10:1 (2016), 67-86 (72). 
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Socialist Transformation: 
 The historiography of modern China has, in recent years, been marked by what 
Elizabeth Perry calls the ‘booming migration of historians across the 1949 divide’ of PRC 
history. Yet, though this has resulted in ‘valuable information and insights on grassroots 
society under Mao’, Perry argues that historiography on Maoist China is still limited by 
the ‘reticence on the part of the current generation of historians to advance overarching 
historical arguments about the enduring influence of that period’.20 But then, given that 
modern historiography on the PRC has near-uniformly neglected to consider qiaowu 
alongside, or in relation to other analyses of New China, perhaps what is first required is 
an examination—and a better understanding—of the history of qiaowu in the early PRC, 
before any interpretation of its ‘enduring influence’ on the modern party-state can, or 
should be attempted. Hence this thesis. 
 The common neglect of qiaowu by histories of the Maoist-era PRC is a 
particularly curious historiographical omission, especially since, as this thesis shows, the 
history of the PRC’s qiaowu is closely connected to the foundation of the PRC itself. 
Indeed, most accounts of the united front and the New Democracy fail to address its 
underlying economic realism and rationalisations that underpinned the huaqiao place in 
it, and the implications for the new PRC’s qiaowu.21 Li Hua-yu has shown that Stalin 
pushed for Soviet orthodoxy and a transitional New Democracy in contrast to Mao’s 
desire for immediate one-party CCP rule, albeit with Mao’s subsequent compliance a 
trade-off to gain ‘a free hand in domestic economic affairs’.22 Stalin’s role is borne out 
by the archives, but they suggest also that Mao’s compliance was not merely a trade-off 
                                                
20 Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘The promise of PRC history’, Journal of Modern Chinese History, 10:1 (2016), 113-
117 (113-114). 
21 They see the united front either as a function of CCP ideology (i.e. Van Slyke), or Gramscian ‘position 
strategy’ (i.e. Groot), and limit discussion of the huaqiao to the Zhigong Party. See Lyman P. Van Slyke, 
Enemies And Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1967), 2-3, 209-218; Gerry Groot, Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United 
Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony (London: Routledge, 2004), xviii-xix, 38-39. 
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with Stalin, but actually economic pragmatism. As Zhang Shu Guang argues, the dire 
state of the economy was fundamental to the CCP’s united front approach in 1949. 
Indeed, Zhang alone points to the huaqiao place in this pragmatism—albeit in passing.23 
This thesis thus adds to Zhang by showing how the CCP conceived the economic utility 
of the huaqiao (remittances), and made it the raison d’etre of qiaowu. 
If qiaowu was a function of economic realism, logic dictates that it should have 
been a priority for a party-state that was almost always in fiscal difficulties.24 This further 
implies that qiaowu must be contextualised within the ‘overwhelming task’ for the party-
state in the 1950s, to govern ‘a country as huge, diverse, fragmented, and poverty-stricken 
as China’, even while fulfilling socialism’s preconditions.25 And any ‘historical political 
economy’ of qiaowu should thus be analysed in relation to the party-state’s early attempts 
at socialist transformation: or what Julia Strauss calls ‘regime consolidation and the 
establishment of socialism’ (pre-1956); and the later, leftward (Maoist) radicalisation of 
the party-state (post-1956).26 Yet, most existent historiography has not done this. 
 Histories of the pre-1956 era of socialist transformation that neglect to consider 
qiaowu miss an important opportunity for analysis of party-state manoeuvring between 
ideological impetuses, political necessity, economic realism, and social reform—which 
were, in fact, encapsulated in the party-state’s qiaowu, and especially in the youdai 
approach to policy. Frank Dikotter’s The Tragedy of Liberation narrates ‘calculated terror 
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and systematic violence’, in the CCP’s establishment of a new regime to advance its 
revolutionary agenda.27  Yet, in this, Dikotter discusses the huaqiao only once—and 
qiaowu not at all—in a brief passage about the 1952 escalation of the Land Reform.28 
Thus Dikotter neglects both the huaqiao experience of the terror and violence, and the 
party-state’s attempts to mitigate the negative impact of its own policies on the huaqiao 
through the youdai. By neglecting qiaowu, he also misses the failure of Party cadres to 
implement the youdai, and thus overlooks further proof, albeit from a different angle, that 
‘the history of communism in China is…a history of promises made and promises 
broken’.29 To be sure, Dikotter is not unique in the historiographical neglect of qiaowu.30 
Thus this thesis, apart from being a history of qiaowu, also offers new insights into the 
internal consistency (or indeed, lack therein) of the party-state’s political and economic 
imperatives—as made manifest in its approach to qiaowu.31 
 Similarly, the post-1956 historiography of socialist transformation—and of the 
party-state’s leftward radicalisation—by neglecting qiaowu, and specifically the collapse 
of the youdai policies, misses the chance to engage with what Jadwiga Mooney and Fabio 
Lanza call, the ‘multilayered complexities’ of Cold War history, particularly ‘by 
emphasizing the power [of] individual acts, personal decisions, or local-level actions 
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acquired in the midst of superpower politics’.32 To analyse qiaowu (and its rise and fall) 
vis-à-vis the post-1956 leftward shift, is to see how the broader Cold War (especially de-
Stalinisation) affected domestic Chinese politics, and created new pressures not just for 
Mao and the CCP, but also for the rational practice of qiaowu and its ideologically 
contradictory youdai. Indeed, to examine the Eighth Party Congress’ (1956) preference 
for youdai (contra Mao’s ‘high tide’) is to see also how internal conflict and factionalism 
in the CCP interacted with external developments (especially in Eastern Europe), with 
significant consequences for qiaowu. Even to analyse the impact of ‘politics in command’ 
on qiaowu into the GLF in 1958, is to see both the ‘power’ of Mao’s resurgence, but also 
the localisation (and assimilation) of Maoist Thought and its transmogrification amongst 
Party cadres and the non-huaqiao masses.33 Thus examining qiaowu enables a better 
understanding of the political, economic and ideological vicissitudes of New China’s first 
decade, and how they interacted to foment the radicalisation of the PRC by the 1960s. 
This thesis therefore offers, in effect, a narrative of New China through a prism of qiaowu, 
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and an analysis of how socialist transformation had radicalised China by 1960—thus 
contributing to deeper understandings of New China’s radicalisation by the end of its first 
decade, that would have such an ‘enduring influence’ well into the 1970s. 
 
Western Historiography on Qiaowu: 
 Early Western views of qiaowu were unquestionably coloured by early Western 
Cold War orthodoxy, which in assuming ‘the anticapitalist agenda of the Stalinist state’, 
naturally lent itself to similar views of the new Soviet ally in 1949: the PRC.34 Indeed, 
early writings suggested that the CCP might utilise the huaqiao to export revolution.35 
This view was fossilised by Lu Yu-sun’s Programs of Communist China for Overseas 
Chinese (1956), which alleged that: ‘The real Communist policy is to secure more money 
from Overseas Chinese and instigate them to oppose local authorities abroad.’ Thus the 
CCP’s qiaowu was a ‘double policy’ of pretence at ‘favoured treatment’ for huaqiao 
interests and huaqiao in China, so as to manipulate them into sending money home, even 
while pushing the huaqiao ‘to act as the vanguard of international Communism’.36 There 
were variations, but by 1960, qiaowu was to most Western observers, a CCP plan to 
export revolution and to cheat the huaqiao of their money.37  
                                                
34 See Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century’, in Melvyn 
P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I: Origins (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-19 (3-8). 
35 Victor Purcell, ‘Overseas Chinese and the People’s Republic’, Far Eastern Survey, 19:18 (1950), 194-
196 (195); Claude A. Buss, ‘Overseas Chinese and Communist Policy’, Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, Vol. 277 (1951), 203-212 (210-212). 
36 Lu Yu-sun, Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 
1956), 14-15.  
Lu’s views were shared by the U.S. Government. See United States Department of State, ‘The Overseas 
Chinese and U.S. Policy’, 06/09/1956, Declassified Documents Reference System [DDRS], 1-16. 
37 The exception here was British discourse. The British Embassy in Beijing believed that the CCP was 
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rentiers in China’. See ‘Memorandum on Overseas Chinese Communities in Kwangtung and Fukien’, 
24/08/1956, Enclosure No. 2, ‘Peking to Foreign Office dispatch, No. 241’, National Archives of the United 
Kingdom (TNA), FCO 141/14510, 1-3 (2). 
Similarly, Victor Purcell and other British scholars were very critical of American views of qiaowu that 
they saw as coloured by ‘virulent anti-Communist’ opinions, and thus lacking in nuance. See Royal Institute 
of International Affairs (RIIA), ‘The Chinese Overseas Discussion’, 29/07/1959, RIIA/8/2664. 
For American Cold War views, see Robert Elegant, The Dragon’s Seed: Peking and the Overseas Chinese 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1959); Chester Bowles, ‘The “China Problem” Reconsidered’, Foreign 
Affairs, 38:3 (1960), 476-486. 
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 Yet, by the 1970s, the Cold War orthodoxy on qiaowu was already under attack. 
Stephen Fitzgerald’s China and the Overseas Chinese (1972) was unprecedented for its 
Chinese sources, but also for its rejection of the idea that qiaowu exported revolution. 
Rather, Fitzgerald pointed to ‘the peculiar importance of the domestic perspectives’ in 
qiaowu, and how it connected to wider CCP policies.38 But to Fitzgerald, qiaowu was still 
fundamentally about foreign policy ends. Even if qiaowu was ‘situated in China and 
preoccupied with domestic affairs’, it was ‘ultimately concerned with external policies’.39 
Thus ‘domestic Overseas Chinese policy veered from left to right to serve the 
implementation of external policy’, including the end of the youdai approach by 1959.40 
This, Fitzgerald argues, came from a ‘determination to detach the Chinese abroad from 
China’—in effect, ‘decolonisation’.41 Thus qiaowu was actually about moves from 1954 
on (around the Dual Nationality Treaty) to ‘remove the impediments which Overseas 
Chinese presented to the advancement of its foreign policy interests in Southeast Asia’, 
since the CCP judged ‘colonial’ connections to the haiwai huaqiao to be of diminishing 
utility—if not a liability—and thus by 1957, qiaowu had a ‘single overriding objective of 
detaching the Overseas Chinese from the Chinese homeland’.42 
 Yet, in fixating on the question of the PRC’s qiaowu as a function of external 
policy—either as a conduit to export the communist revolution, or as a foreign policy tool 
to effect ‘decolonisation’—most extant Western historiography on qiaowu has missed the 
point: qiaowu in the 1950s was primarily about domestic policy. 
 This thesis will show that the Chinese party-state had little-to-no interest in using 
the huaqiao to export revolution—in fact, it rejected such ideas in the 1950s. Moreover, 
if qiaowu was a political economy, then it is questionable that it would ever have sought 
                                                
38 Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A study of Peking’s changing policy, 1949–1970 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 13. 
39 Ibid., 15. 
40 Ibid., 52. 
41 Ibid., 73-74. 
42 Ibid., 116-117. 
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to spread revolution, since that would have been antithetical to its raison d’etre: to secure 
and capitalise on huaqiao economic utility, most of all by increasing their remittances. 
Politicising the haiwai huaqiao—as qiaowu practitioners noted—would only antagonise 
the governments of huaqiao domiciles, and result in restrictions on huaqiao remittances 
to, or investments in China. In that respect, qiaowu was domestically-focused since it was 
meant, above all, to serve the party-state’s economic interests. 
 Furthermore, this thesis’ view of the centrality of economic rationalisations to 
qiaowu (at least until 1956–1957 or so) also creates a certain divergence from Fitzgerald. 
Fitzgerald was influential on a generation, and continues to exert influence today.43  Yet, 
China and the Overseas Chinese is inaccurate. Indeed, this thesis’ analysis of CCP CC 
and OCAC documents—that Fitzgerald was not able to use—shows that whereas the CCP 
was disinclined to involve itself with the haiwai huaqiao, this actually had no bearing on 
the meaning or methods of qiaowu. The incentivising of remittances required qiaowu to 
persuade the huaqiao (in and out of China) that their interests were fulfilled in New China. 
Hence, external-facing qiaowu (mainly propaganda) served to spread information on 
domestic policies, so as to bolster remittances. Those domestic policies were themselves 
the main focus, as qiaowu implemented a wide-ranging youdai approach to secure 
huaqiao interests, and even if it contradicted socialist transformation. So, not only was 
the youdai far more serious than ‘double policy’ implies, but it also demonstrates that the 
political economy of qiaowu had a domestic centre of gravity. 
                                                
43 Elena Barabantseva has embraced Fitzgerald’s point that the ‘administration of Overseas Chinese affairs 
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(Leiden: Brill, 2014); Jason Lim, Linking an Asian Transregional Commerce in Tea: Overseas Chinese 
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‘Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China’: 
 While most of Western historiography on qiaowu has subordinated its domestic 
aspects to a presumed external focus, Glen Peterson’s Overseas Chinese in the People’s 
Republic of China (2012) is an exception.44 Peterson argues that ‘the PRC’s approach to 
the ‘Overseas Chinese question’ since 1949 has centred above all on an economic 
calculus: a conviction that Overseas Chinese have an important, strategic role to play in 
China’s modernization’.45 Thus resulting in ‘a set of contradictory impulses toward the 
Overseas Chinese, including the domestic Overseas Chinese, by which they were by turns 
valued and despised for their economic assets and foreign connections’.46 This thesis 
broadly agrees—but there are crucial differences. 
Whereas Peterson is concerned with demonstrating the impact of qiaowu on the 
huaqiao, this thesis is mainly focused on policymakers and policy discourse. This results 
in rather different conclusions. Peterson, for instance, does not analyse the united front 
origins of qiaowu, or the interactions between the CCP CC, the OCAC, or the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC), in policymaking. To Peterson, ‘the CCP’s conflicting approaches 
towards the Overseas Chinese after 1949 were the product of several contending 
impulses’, in which the OCAC and officials in major emigrant provinces like Guangdong 
and Fujian, were the chief advocates of ‘an accommodating approach’ to qiaowu, and in 
competition with ‘those in the CCP who were the principal upholders of the doctrine of 
class struggle’.47 Thus for Peterson, where the OCAC and its allies were able to hold their 
ground, then the huaqiao were spared the worst of class struggle, until the ascendancy of 
a more ideologically-driven CCP faction ended the youdai. This thesis disagrees. 
                                                
44 See also Glen Peterson, ‘Socialist China and the Huaqiao: The Transition to Socialism in the Overseas 
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‘House Divided: Transnational Families in the Early Years of the People’s Republic of China’, Asian 
Studies Review, 31:1 (2007), 25-40; Glen Peterson, ‘Overseas Chinese Studies in the People’s Republic of 
China’, Provincial China, 7:1 (2002), 103-21. 
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The competition that the qiaowu practitioners confronted in the 1950s was not so 
much with ideological factions in the CCP leadership, but with its local membership. For 
most of the 1950s, the highest-echelons of the Chinese party-state approved of prioritising 
economic imperatives in qiaowu. Yet, the conflict between qiaowu and the ‘ideological 
approach’ was mostly at a lower level, because of local cadres and officials who could 
not accept, or understand youdai policies. It was not, therefore, that qiaowu competed 
with more-ideological factions within the CCP; it was rather that the CCP attempted to 
practice qiaowu (and youdai) in contradiction to its own ideological impetuses.48 It was 
thus not that the CCP had ‘conflicting approaches’ to its qiaowu, as much as the party-
state’s qiaowu was in contradiction to its own quest for socialist transformation. 
 Peterson rightly points to the ‘economic calculus’ intrinsic to qiaowu, but this 
thesis shows how that economic imperative affected, and was affected by the politics of 
the party-state.49 This neglect on Peterson’s part is most prominent in his silence on the 
OCAC Fourth Expanded Conference and the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, which 
brought the contradictions between qiaowu and socialist transformation to a head, and led 
to the end of the youdai approach. In contrast, this thesis’ analysis of the two conferences 
shows how the politics of the party-state affected qiaowu. Thus, and beyond Peterson’s 
‘economic calculus’, this thesis demonstrates the political economy of qiaowu. 
 
Structure and Scope: 
 Insofar as this thesis is the story of the ‘historical political economy’ of qiaowu, 
it also exists within the larger context of Maoist China and its ‘ideological, political, 
                                                
48 For instance, Peterson suggests that Deng Zihui’s inflammatory speech in December 1950 was ‘a victory 
for more ideologically motivated members of the Party against those who had advocated a more peaceful 
and lenient approach towards land reform’. Yet, while the Land Reform’s escalation created difficulties for 
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cadres had failed to implement qiaowu. As Chapter 4 shows, even Deng favoured the youdai policies. See 
Peterson, Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China, 48-49. 
49 Charles Maier calls political economy: ‘economics in a context of politics, where the economics is less 
than the politics but the ‘less’ cannot be separated from the political’. See Maier, In search of stability, 2.  
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economic, and social elements’.50 This thesis thus offers an ‘inside’ analysis of qiaowu, 
within a narrative framed by the ‘outside’ of the early PRC.51 
The opening backdrop to this thesis rests in the combination of the heady CCP 
rhetoric heralding New China’s advent, its call for a united front and New Democracy, 
and the huaqiao response to this long-anticipated fulfilment of their ‘rights and interests’. 
Against that backdrop, the first chapter (covering 1949–1950) shows the reality of Soviet 
orthodoxy and CCP economic realism combining to motivate the creation of the New 
Democracy. This was the basis for the huaqiao’s inclusion in the united front, and the 
qiaowu (policy and institutions) that was created to govern their affairs. 
 Following qiaowu’s origin story, the second chapter (1950–1953) situates the 
nascent qiaowu policymaking in the context of the PRC’s coming to terms with external 
pressures, domestic volatility, and the internal logic of its revolution. Indeed, qiaowu 
practitioners were confronted by the negative impacts of socialist transformations (mainly 
the Land Reform), and foreign pressures (consequent to the Korean War), specifically for 
huaqiao remittance flows. Yet, this coalescence of pressures was also key for recognising 
the transnationality of interests underpinning remittances, with the domestic interests of 
huaqiao (embodied by those in China) as the crux. It was from this that qiaowu thus 
rationalised the convergence between the ‘favourable treatment’ of huaqiao interests, and 
the financial utility of this youdai approach to the party-state. 
 Yet, as the third chapter (1953–1955) shows, while qiaowu practitioners justified 
the positive discrimination in the youdai policies by a discourse of supposed huaqiao 
‘specialness’ (in characteristics and circumstances), there was a contradiction. For the 
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party-state, the youdai’s strategic imperative meant accepting its ideological aberrations. 
Yet, this did not always mean effective implementation at the local level, nor was youdai 
always well-received, even within the Party. Earlier socialist transformation (i.e. Land 
Reform) had near-uniformly negatively affected huaqiao in China; local Party cadres and 
officials had failed to rectify ‘left deviationist’ excesses, or implement youdai provisions; 
and the CCP’s General Line (1952) for agrarian collectivisation, private industry and 
commerce, had created new complications for qiaowu at home and abroad. Yet, qiaowu 
practitioners—with approval of the party-state leadership—responded by doubling down: 
on propaganda, on rectification, and above all, on youdai. Hence the party-state’s high-
profile interventions in 1955 to entrench the youdai policies.  
 Ironically, as the fourth chapter (1956–1957) reveals, despite the party-state’s 
attempts, it was unable to reconcile qiaowu (and the youdai) with socialist transformation. 
Indeed, policies that seemed to create bourgeois—or at least, non-socialist—exemptions 
for the huaqiao were made even more contradictory to socialism by Mao’s ‘socialist high 
tide’ and its drive to intensify and accelerate socialist transformation. This caused qiaowu 
serious problems, especially as lower-level cadres—and many non-huaqiao—resisted the 
youdai policies, not least because they appeared antithetical to the ‘high tide’. Yet, qiaowu 
persisted with the youdai approach, and it was encouraged in this by the party-state’s turn 
away from the ‘high tide’ in 1956. The youdai approach had been based on an economic 
rationalisation that such privileging was the means of securing huaqiao economic utility, 
and this rationality combined with a growing sense amongst party-state leaders that Mao’s 
‘high tide’ was an irrational path to calamity. Thus, the ‘high tide’ and its negative impact 
was openly rejected at the Fourth OCAC Expanded Conference and the Eighth Party 
Congress in 1956. Yet, this turn was illusory. Thereafter, in the ensuing upheaval of 1957, 
as Mao leveraged crises abroad (in Hungary) and at home (post-Hundred Flowers) to re-
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assert his authority, qiaowu’s anti-‘high tide’ link became a liability in the new Anti-
Rightist mood, and qiaowu was forced to repudiate the youdai approach. 
 The last chapter (1958–1959) shows the radical change in qiaowu after Mao’s 
heralding of ‘politics in command’ returned the party-state to the older ‘high-tide’ vision, 
especially in economic policy, and to an ideological (Maoist) basis for all policymaking. 
Previous ideas of convergence between huaqiao and party-state interests were 
abandoned, and huaqiao ‘specialness’ and youdai were now deemed Rightist, while the 
pressures created by the GLF for even more hard currency led qiaowu to coercive and 
exploitative methods. This was unwise at best; but with the GLF turn towards large-scale, 
accelerated collectivisation and economic gigantism, this new variant of qiaowu was self-
destructive, and there was a drastic fall in remittances by 1959. Yet, while the party-state 
and qiaowu practitioners flirted with reform and a return to youdai, the Lushan 
Conference led to a renewed Anti-Rightist backlash instead, and this quickly resulted in 
the abandonment of reformist ideas. Even if qiaowu was now counterproductive, the 
party-state was set on Mao’s utopianism—and so the huaqiao suffered.52 
 
Sources: 
Archival research in the PRC is unquestionably difficult, not least because of the 
modern party-state’s restrictive policies. Far from the optimism of the 1990s for a ‘new 
era’ of research, recent reports ‘paint a grim picture of doing archival research in China’.53 
Moreover, this thesis also faces specific limitations given that the OCAC (but also the 
PBOC and United Front Work Department) archives are hidden in the Central Archives; 
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Utopianism of Mao Zedong and Liang Shuming’, in Catherine Lynch, Robert B. Marks, Paul G. Pickowicz 
(eds), Radicalism, Revolution and Reform in Modern China: Essays in Honor of Maurice Meisner (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 29-54 (29). 
53 Michael H. Hunt, Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field 
Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems’, The China Quarterly, No. 122 (1990), 
258-272 (258); Charles Kraus, ‘Researching the History of the People’s Republic of China’, CWIHP 
Working Paper No. 79 (April 2016), 2. 
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that all documents touched by Mao, Zhou, and other Party leaders from the 1950s are off-
limits; and that archival destruction perpetrated during the Cultural Revolution has left a 
legacy of large gaps in the pre-1960 archives that still exist.54  
Yet, this does not mean that archival research is impossible. Following Lu Xun’s 
advice to pursue knowledge ‘like bees—gathering nectar from many flowers’, this thesis 
embraces archival pluralism.55 Firstly, and following many illustrious forebears, this 
thesis looks to provincial archives. 56  This method is optimal since the party-state’s 
propensity for paperwork has created immense collections of directives, memoranda and 
other documents, in provincial (or municipal) archives. This thesis mainly uses material 
from the Fujian Provincial Archive, the Shanghai and Beijing Municipal Archives, and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given Fujian’s historic place as a huaqiao home 
province, its provincial Party and government officials were always going to have a keen 
interest in qiaowu. Thus by combing the archives of the Fujian Party and civil 
administrations—especially their qiaowu departments—documents from the OCAC and 
other central government bodies on qiaowu can be utilised. The same logic applies also 
to archives from the Shanghai and Beijing authorities; the importance of these two cities 
ensured that their qiaowu offices were always copied in on qiaowu directives and 
documents from the party-state centre. The relative utility of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ archive has been seriously compromised in recent years by the pull-back of 
archival material, and now by its indefinite closure. Yet, even the limited files that this 
thesis was able to use offer useful insights into the party-state’s approach to qiaowu. 
 Secondly, this thesis actively utilises the published volumes of primary sources 
on PRC history. These collections (mainly in Chinese) are official (or officially-
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55 Lu Xun, ‘Zhi Yan Limin’, Lu Xun shuxin ji, Vols. 1-2 (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1976), 2: 
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56 For an exemplar of this method of triangulation, see Shen Zhihua, Xia Yafeng, Mao and the Sino-Soviet 
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 35 
approved) anthologies by institutions like the Central Archives, or the CCP CC’s Party 
Literature Research Office, which quite obviously privilege certain narratives, or censor 
(possibly) sensitive documents. Certainly, there is an ‘interested selectivity’ involved in 
the official anthologies, but they are still inherently useful—not least because these 
publications are often the only available source of archives from within the CCP CC or 
State Council.57 Furthermore, historians should already, in any case, be treating these 
archives with the ‘indispensable qualities of accuracy and good faith’—just as they would 
any other primary source.58 To simply reject them out of hand would thus be a waste of 
potentially valuable evidence. This thesis also employs a sizeable amount of ‘internal-
circulation’ publications—that were originally meant for intelligence and information 
dissemination to CCP cadres—to inform its analysis. This is especially true of the 
Guangdong Qiaowu [广东侨务] confidential journal series that was disseminated to 
cadres in Guangdong. Guangdong was the largest huaqiao home province, and this series 
is thus a useful source of documents from the OCAC and the party-state centre, and also 
provides vital evidence on how qiaowu policies that were drawn up at the centre were 
interpreted and applied (or indeed, not) at the provincial and local levels. 
 Finally, this thesis utilises archives from ‘interested observers’ of qiaowu. In some 
cases, this means material from individuals, like the compiled works of OCAC members 
(i.e. Liao Chengzhi and Fang Fang), or huaqiao in China in the public sphere (i.e. Tan 
Kah Kee). This approach also uses material from those outside China, who had an active 
interest in qiaowu. This includes the British colonial internal security apparatuses (i.e. in 
the National Archives of Singapore and the United Kingdom), which had a clear interest 
in qiaowu given the large huaqiao population in Singapore and Malaya. 
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Prologue: Fait Accompli? 
 Over the violent course of January–March 1948, the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) turned the Chinese Civil War on its head. By the end of its Winter Offensive, the 
PLA had crushed the GMD in Manchuria, and was now poised to march southwards—
and on to Beijing.59 Now in the ascendancy, the CCP CC’s slogans for May Day 1948 
triumphantly called on the masses and the ‘intellectuals, liberal bourgeoisie, other 
democratic parties, community leaders, and other patriots to consolidate and expand the 
united front against imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism, so as to bring an end 
to Chiang Kai-shek and to come together to strive to establish a New China’.60 Indeed, as 
the CCP CC declared, it was time for this united front to convene a new Political 
Consultative Conference (PCC), and establish a democratic coalition government. 
The first to respond were a group of huaqiao gathered in the ‘General Meeting of 
Singapore Overseas Chinese Denying Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic of 
China’.61 And yet, the slogans had not actually specified the huaqiao. But this group (led 
by Tan Kah Kee) clearly took the inclusion of the huaqiao in the ‘democratic coalition’ 
as an accomplished fact, since their reply to the CCP CC indicated enthusiasm for a new 
PCC and its future protection of huaqiao interests’. 62  Such sentiments were hardly 
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unique; the huaqiao in Malaya, Siam, Canada and even Cuba, followed suit, and CCP 
Chairman Mao Zedong confirmed their validity in a telegram to Tan on 1 October, stating 
that the CCP would take care to seek the huaqiao’s views on China’s future.63 
 Of course, a huaqiao place in China’s political firmament was not, in itself, 
particularly groundbreaking.64 Sun Yat-sen’s Tongmenghui had enjoyed great support 
amongst Nanyang (Southeast Asia) huaqiao—in financing and direct participation—and 
Sun had called them ‘the Mother of the revolution’ [华侨为革命之母].65 Thereafter, the 
Republic of China’s National Assembly (1912) had reserved six (out of 274) seats for 
huaqiao delegates, and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanjing government had made qiaowu a state 
priority for a new, cabinet-level Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in 1927.66 Yet, it 
was the Second Sino-Japanese War that established the huaqiao in Chinese politics 
through the crucible of the united front. The united front was Marxist-Leninist (and 
Comintern) orthodoxy, and its earliest Chinese incarnation was the First United Front 
between the CCP and Guomindang (GMD) in 1922–1927.67 But the huaqiao place in a 
united front per se actually dated back to the ‘August First manifesto’ of the so-called 
Chinese Soviet Republic in 1935, which had called for ‘a broad anti-Japanese united 
front’—by ‘all compatriots who refuse to become a conquered people’.68 
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 The ‘August First manifesto’ was the basis for the Second CCP-GMD United 
Front, and it allowed the CCP to publicly push itself to the front of the patriotic struggle.69 
But this also meant that the proposals for a huaqiao place in national politics were pushed 
into the mainstream, in the CCP’s calls for a ‘national defence government’ based on a 
‘delegate body truly representative of all our countrymen’ across a spectrum of political 
parties, public figures, popular organisations—and the huaqiao.70 This ‘national defence 
government’ was for ‘the salvation of the country’, but it was also to seek: ‘freedom and 
democracy and the release of all political prisoners’; ‘free education and the settlement 
of unemployed youth’; and ‘the protection within and without of China of qiaobao lives, 
property, and their freedom of residence and to conduct business’.71  
 The CCP’s nod to a huaqiao political role, and the necessity of qiaowu was not 
new; it was the nature of their proposed involvement that was different. Nanjing—like 
the late Qing—had engaged with the huaqiao on the basis of a relationship between the 
state and its overseas nationals (which, given the jus sanguinis of the Qing (1909) and 
GMD (1929) Nationality Laws, had meant all Chinese abroad), where their loyalty (and 
by extension, their contribution) was demanded in exchange for the protection of their 
rights and interests.72 Yet, the CCP had apparently included the huaqiao in the united 
front because it was their democratic right, in their patriotic interest, and because it was 
the basic duty of any Chinese government. This was thus the stated position that the CCP 
held onto, even as the Second World War (WWII) came to an end.  
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 At the CCP’s Seventh Party Congress in April 1945, Mao provocatively declared 
that there were two prospects for post-war China: either (a) New China, ‘which is 
independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and strong’, or ‘the old China’ run by 
the Nanjing regime that was ‘semi-colonial, semi-feudal, divided, poor and weak’.73 Such 
antagonistic rhetoric could not have been surprising, given the gradual deterioration of 
CCP-GMD relations over the war. Indeed, in Mao’s view, the ‘one and only task’ was ‘to 
mobilise the masses, expand the people’s forces and unite all the forces of the nation 
capable of being united in order to struggle under our Party’s leadership to defeat the 
Japanese aggressors and build a new China’.74 Thus the CCP abandoned the ‘united front 
from above’, and elevated the ‘united front from below’ to seek a New China.75 
The CCP proposed a ‘national assembly on a broad democratic basis’ as the basis 
for a coalition government, with representatives from across the political spectrum.76 The 
CCP, of course, sought a socialist revolution, but it also sought to continue the united 
front. In the first statement of a ‘common program’, Mao stated that while China should 
not suffer under feudal and fascistic ‘big landlords and big bourgeoisie’, and could not 
continue with ‘the old type of democratic dictatorship’ of the national-bourgeoisie given 
the ‘awakened’ political consciousness of the masses (led by the CCP), it also could not 
‘institute a socialist state system’ without meeting its pre-conditions. Instead, China had 
to establish the New Democracy first, or: ‘a united front democratic alliance based on the 
overwhelming majority of the people, under the leadership of the working class’.77 
The New Democracy was thus presented as a continuation of the united front, to 
create a democratic coalition to lay the foundations for socialism.78 In this iteration of the 
                                                
73 Mao Zedong, ‘China’s Two Possible Destinies in Chinese Society’, 23/04/1945, Selected Works, III: 
251-254 (252). 
74 Ibid., III: 252. 
75 The ‘united front from above’ was the old CCP–GMD united front; the ‘united front from below’ referred 
to ‘the efforts to gain and hold mass popular support’. See Van Slyke, ‘The United Front in China’, 120. 
76 Mao Zedong, ‘On Coalition Government’, 24/04/1945, Selected Works, III: 255-320 (255). 
77 Ibid., III: 279. 
78 In reality, as Arne Westad suggests, ‘the Comintern archives show that nearly all of Mao’s concepts from 
the anti-Japanese war period—‘protracted war’, ‘new democracy’, ‘three-thirds system’, ‘anti-leftism’—
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united front, the huaqiao place was not only continued, but made even more legitimate. 
After all, they had earned their seat at the table because they had, as Mao said, made huge 
sacrifices for the anti-Japanese united front.79 This entitled them to a role in the New 
Democracy, and to a benevolent qiaowu. Thus in 1946, CCP delegates to the short-lived 
GMD-convened PCC—which was an attempt to avoid civil war—proposed that any new 
government ‘actively and positively seek to protect huaqiao interests, to alleviate huaqiao 
suffering’.80 Indeed, for all the failures of the otherwise-hapless PCC, it still managed to 
pass a resolution on 11 March that enshrined ‘the improvement of the status of qiaobao’ 
as a state priority, and a qiaowu program to aid huaqiao interests, to assist qiaojuan in 
difficulty, to help guiqiao return to their hometowns and to positive employment, and to 
assist qiaosheng [侨生 huaqiao students].81 The PCC did not succeed—civil war broke 
out in July 1946. But a precedent had now been set by the CCP. 
 With the onset of Civil War, the united front continued to be the focus of the quest 
to establish the New Democracy, and the means by which the CCP sought to unite the 
masses against the GMD. Liao Chengzhi, as Xinhua News Agency head, broadcast a call-
to-arms to the huaqiao from Yan’an in October 1946. Harkening to the history of huaqiao 
dedication to national salvation and their illustrious revolutionary heritage—which had 
paved the foundations of the Republic with their blood—Liao exhorted the huaqiao to 
join the CCP against the GMD, who had oppressed the people, and shamefully colluded 
with American imperialism.82 Thus the huaqiao were called to a new united front for 
national salvation, to bring about the New Democracy and New China.  
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80 Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Wang Ruofei, Ye Jianying, Wu Yuzhang, Lu Dingyi, Deng Yingchao, ‘Heping 
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 By the time of the ‘May Day slogans’ in 1948, both the message of a broad 
national united front (against the GMD and for the New Democracy), and of a legitimate 
huaqiao place in the democratic coalition, were regular features in CCP discourse.83 After 
all, as Mao said in January 1948, it was ‘not merely some of the people’ who should 
govern, but it was for the workers, peasants, craftsmen, petite bourgeoisie, youth, 
intellectuals, minority nationalities, huaqiao—and many others—to govern New China, 
‘united together under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist 
Party)’.84 Thus, by May 1948, the huaqiao who responded positively to the CCP had good 
reasons to anticipate their place in the New Democracy, and to expect that New China’s 
qiaowu would cater to their rights and interests. 
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Chapter 1.  
Rights and Interests 
 
Let me call again to the huaqiao overseas, 
Compatriots to the distant ends of the earth! 
Only because of the need to feed yourself, 
Did you leave home to wander the seas... 
 
— Zhang Binglin, Song of Revolution (1903)1 
 
 
                                                
1 This translation is from Ernest Koh, Diaspora at War: The Chinese of Singapore between Empire and 
Nation, 1937–1945 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 52-53. 
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Introduction: 
  At the turn of 1948, and with the PLA’s advance on Tianjin and Beijing, the civil 
war’s end seemed imminent.2 Chairman Mao certainly thought so; his New Year’s (1949) 
message declared that: ‘The Chinese people will win final victory in the great war of 
Liberation. Even our enemy no longer doubts the outcome.’3 For Mao, the impending 
victory entailed: the further advance of the PLA south of the Yangzi; the ‘regularization’ 
of the PLA to discard ‘guerrilla habits’; agricultural and industrial production increases; 
and convening a new PCC to fulfil ‘the tasks of the people’s revolution’. Thus 1949 would 
see China emerge from civil war into ‘New Democracy’, and with a new PCC to midwife 
the birth of a New China. The new PRC, Mao said, would be governed by ‘a democratic 
coalition government’ led by the CCP, but with ‘the participation of appropriate persons’ 
from democratic parties, people’s organisations, and all other segments of society (except 
the reactionaries), including, of course, the huaqiao.4 
 At the time of the PRC’s birth, there were an estimated 10 million haiwai huaqiao, 
and 30 million qiaojuan. Thus, about 8% of China’s population (around 500 million) 
possessed huaqiao identities (in one form or another).5 In some sense, this statistical 
significance was sufficient to make the huaqiao ‘appropriate persons’ for the PCC. Yet, 
the huaqiao place in the New Democracy had never been presented as such. The CCP 
had, over the years, professed a desire to both protect huaqiao rights and interests, and to 
enable them to participate directly and legitimately in New China’s political future. Thus, 
Mao’s vision of the advent of a democratic coalition in 1949 spoke directly to huaqiao 
                                                
2 For more on the ‘three major military campaigns of 1948–49’ (Liao-Shen, Huai-Hai and Beijing-Tianjin) 
that ‘re-created the political map of China’, see Westad, Decisive Encounters, 227. 
3 Mao Zedong, ‘Carry the Revolution through to the End’, 30/12/1948, Selected Works, IV: 299-307 (299). 
4 Ibid., IV: 305-306. 
5 Since there was no national census until 1953, these are PBOC estimates. See Nan Hanchen, ‘Guanyu 
qiaohui wenti de baogao’, 18/08/1950, in CASS, CA (eds), 1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji 
dang’an ziliao xuanbian: jinrong juan [hereafter, 1949-1952 jinrong juan] (Beijing: Zhongguo wuzi 
chubanshe, 1996), 809-810. 
The 1953 census suggested a population of around 590 million, with an estimated 7.6 million on Taiwan, 
and 11.74 million haiwai huaqiao. See George B. Cressey, ‘The 1953 Census of China’, The Far Eastern 
Quarterly, 14:3 (1955), 387-388. 
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expectations for democracy—and a legacy of CCP promises to ensure that hope. Yet, for 
Mao and the CCP, their rhetoric did not match the reality of their perspectives on, and 
motivations for the New Democracy. The huaqiao, it seems, were misled.  
 This chapter begins by showing how Mao and the CCP set out to convince the 
huaqiao of their place in the united front and the New Democracy in 1949, particularly 
in terms of courting a direct huaqiao involvement with the new PCC as legitimate 
constituents. Yet, as this chapter argues, the CCP’s public position on the united front 
was disingenuous; Mao preferred to accelerate the revolutionary process, and outright 
CCP political domination. As it turned out, the CCP eventually kept its promise for a 
coalition government, but only the semblance of one. This was a compromise; partly due 
to Soviet influence, but mainly because economic rationalisations by Mao and the CCP 
leadership saw the united front as a necessity. Thus the united front was the result of 
economic realpolitik, and the huaqiao place in the New Democracy was a function of that 
rationalisation, not least due to the utility of huaqiao remittances. Given, however, that 
the united front was also the means by which the nascent party-state established qiaowu 
policies and institutions, this also meant that the policies governing the huaqiao and their 
affairs were also, at heart, functions of economic rationalisations. This chapter thus 
contextualises the origins of qiaowu, and by demonstrating its political economy, frames 
a narrative of qiaowu for this thesis’ subsequent chapters. 
 
To do some good: 
 The CCP CC had in its 1948 ‘May Day slogans’, called for a renewed united front 
to form a democratic coalition, which would thus establish a New China. This coalition 
required, as the CCP CC conceived, the participation of ‘all democratic parties, people’s 
organizations and public personages’ to have any form of public legitimacy, and thus the 
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CC started to plan for such a caucus almost as soon as the slogans had been issued.6 These 
plans, as was entirely expected by then, certainly included the huaqiao. Mao’s reply (in 
October 1948) to Tan Kah Kee, who had chaired the meeting of Singapore-based huaqiao 
that had been the first to respond to the ‘May Day slogans’, contained an implicit promise 
that huaqiao perspectives on the proposed PCC would be welcomed and consulted.7 Mao, 
as it turns out, had direct huaqiao participation in mind. 
 The ‘May Day slogans’ had met with enthusiastic responses by many huaqiao all 
over the world.8 Though the slogans had not explicitly identified the huaqiao, their 
inclusion in the New Democracy was taken as an accomplished fact. Yet, the slogans had 
not indicated what the nature of huaqiao participation in the PCC would be. There was 
in fact, a view at the time that the huaqiao would be represented by one (or more) of the 
other, non-CCP democratic parties in the future PCC. Indeed, a prominent advocate of 
that view was the Zhigong Party, which had roots amongst the North American huaqiao.9 
In its response to the slogans, the Zhigong Party declared its support for the new PCC 
and, among other things, claimed to be a ‘revolutionary party representing huaqiao 
interests’, particularly since it had explicitly included the protection of huaqiao rights and 
interests in its party platform. Thus the Zhigong Party arrogated to itself the right to speak 
for the huaqiao, stating that since ‘this Party represents their interests, we thus completely 
agree with the CCP CC’s slogans’.10 The Zhigong Party’s claim was not entirely without 
merit, since it did have a sizeable huaqiao membership (albeit, mostly North American), 
                                                
6 CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang fabu jinnian ‘wuyi’ laodong jie kouhao’, 30/04/1948, Kaiguo shengdian, 
I: 9-11 (9); CCP CC, ‘Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing ge minzhu dangpai daibiao lai jiefang qu xieshang 
zhaokai xin zhengxie wenti gei hu ju de zhishi’, 02/05/1948, ZZJZ, 197-198. 
7 Mao Zedong, ‘Mao Zedong guanyu ganxie qiaobao xiangying ‘wuyi’ kouhao he zhengxun dui zhaokai 
xin zhengxie de yijian fu Chen Jiageng dian’, 01/10/1948, ZZJZ, 209-210. 
8 But there were also pro-GMD huaqiao who rejected them. See Fujio Hara, Malayan Chinese & China: 
Conversion in Identity Consciousness, 1945–1957 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), 12-42. 
9 The Zhigong Party [致公党 party devoted to the public] had close links to the Hongmen secret societies, 
and was founded in San Francisco in 1925 by Chen Jiongming and Tang Jiyao. In 1946, Chen Qiyou and 
others re-established the party in Chongqing, seeking to lead huaqiao support for the CCP against the GMD. 
See Groot, Managing Transitions, 38-39. 
10  ‘Zhongguo zhigong dang xiangying zhonggong ‘wuyi’ haozhao de xuanyan’, 09/06/1948, Kaiguo 
shengdian, I: 30-33 (32). 
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but what Mao and the CCP actually wanted, was for the huaqiao to participate directly in 
the united front, and as a separate constituency in its own right. 
 In the CCP CC’s plans, the democratic coalition that would be the formal basis 
for the establishment of the PRC and its future government, was to be formed by 36 
constituent parts, in which the huaqiao would be a separate constituency.11 Thus, even as 
the CCP CC began to invite delegates to prepare for a new PCC, it sought the direct 
participation of certain huaqiao notables, and in this, the CCP proved to be remarkably 
successful.12 Indeed, the CCP was able to—very publicly—win one of the most famous 
of the huaqiao over to the cause of the New Democracy. 
 Of all the prominent huaqiao personalities that the CCP wanted to participate in 
the new PCC, Tan Kah Kee—whom Mao had lauded as ‘the banner of the Overseas 
Chinese’ in 1945—was the one they wanted more than everyone else.13 Tan had led the 
earliest response to the ‘May Day slogans’, but in fairness, this would have surprised no 
one. Tan was not a CCP member, but his endorsement of Mao had been public since 1940, 
and he was well-known as a vociferous critic of the GMD.14 Yet, the lengths to which the 
CCP went to gain Tan’s direct participation is noticeable, especially since CC directives 
specifically mentioned him at least three times in 1948.15 But the point was that the CCP 
wanted a huaqiao of unimpeachable patriotism, and Tan was that man. 
                                                
11 See Zhou Enlai, ‘Zhongyang guanyu zhengqiu minzhu renshi dui ‘guanyu zhaokai xin de zhengzhi 
xieshang huiyi zhu wenti’ de yijian gei Gao Gang, Li Fuchun deng de zhishi’, 08/10/1948, ZZJZ, 210-213. 
12 In a CCP CC directive sent to its Hong Kong and Shanghai branches, Chen Qiyou and Situ Meitang were 
listed as Zhigong Party delegates, and separate from the huaqiao invitees, Tan Kah Kee, Feng Yufang, and 
Wang Renshu. See CCP CC, ‘Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing canjia xin zhengxie zhe de mingdan gei gang 
fenju de zhishi’, 20/09/1948, ZZJZ, 207-208. 
13 Mao wrote ‘banner of the Overseas Chinese; [and] the nation’s glory’ to mark Tan’s return from exile. 
See Mao Zedong, ‘Wei zhuming qiaoling Chen Jiageng xiansheng de tici’, 08/11/1945, DHGLR, 2. 
14 In 1940, Tan visited Chongqing and Yan’an, and while he became disillusioned with the GMD, he was 
very impressed by the CCP; Tan thereafter became a fierce critic of the GMD. See Yong Ching Fatt, Tan 
Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend (Singapore: World Scientific, 2014), 234-286. 
Tan returned to Singapore in 1945 (after wartime exile in Java), and resumed (as Malayan Special Branch 
said) ‘his chosen role of castigator’, provoking a fierce controversy by telegramming President Truman to 
criticise American aid to the GMD. See ‘Review of Chinese Affairs’, 09/1946, TNA, FCO 141/7622. 
15 See CCP CC, ‘Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing ge minzhu dangpai daibiao lai jiefang qu xieshang zhaokai 
xin zhengxie wenti gei hu ju de zhishi’, 02/05/1948, ZZJZ, 198; CCP CC, ‘Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing 
canjia xin zhengxie zhe de mingdan gei gang fenju de zhishi’, 20/09/1948, ZZJZ, 207; CCP CC, 
 47 
 Tan was one of the most famous patriots amongst the huaqiao (and then some). 
Tan had organised 45 huaqiao associations across Southeast Asia into the Nanyang 
Federation of China Relief Funds during WWII, thus leading millions of huaqiao to 
unprecedented unity, and unparalleled contributions to China’s war effort. 16  Indeed, 
Tan’s patriotism was near-legendary; he had caused a stir across China in 1938, when in 
his righteous fury at Wang Jingwei’s attempt to negotiate with the Japanese, he sent a 
cable to the wartime PCC in Chongqing, declaring that: ‘when the enemy is still on our 
land, to talk of peace is to be a Han traitor’.17 Thus, whatever Tan’s politics, and whether 
other huaqiao agreed with him—and many did not—his patriotism was beyond reproach, 
and to have him participate in the PCC would send a message that the united front had a 
place for all the huaqiao patriots who, like Tan, had hoped for a New China. 
 By early 1949, Mao and the CCP had set their sights on convincing Tan to be 
directly involved with the united front. Of course, Tan was already pro-CCP, while Mao 
and Tan had already communicated.18 What was left was to make a big show out of the 
PCC. This was fulfilled on 20 January 1949, when telegrams from Mao to Tan were 
sensationally published in the Singapore press. Mao invited Tan to join the new Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) because it was time to form ‘a 
democratic coalition government’ to ‘marshal the strength of the Chinese people at home 
and abroad to consummate the independence and liberation of the Chinese people’.19 Tan 
enjoyed the ‘veneration of all Chinese’ in Southeast Asia, Mao said, and he thus invited 
                                                
‘Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing minzhu renshi beishang gei Xianggang fenju de zhishi’, 05/11/1948, ZZJZ, 
220-222 (221). 
16 The Federation raised C$400 million in 1937–1941. See Yen Ching-hwang, The Chinese in Southeast 
Asia and Beyond: Socioeconomic and Political Dimensions (Singapore: World Scientific, 2008), 353. 
17 ‘敌人未出国土前, 言和即汉奸’, in Tan Kah Kee, Nanqiao huiyilu, Vols. I-II (Singapore: Tan Kah Kee 
Foundation, Tan Kah Kee International Society, 1993), II: 89. 
18 Tan’s stance was made clear by January 1949, when he called the GMD a bandit regime. See Singapore 
Special Branch, ‘Translation of a special article contributed by Tan Kah Kee in the Nan Chiau Jit Pao dated 
31.1.49’, 31/01/1949, Internal Security Department (ISD) Archives, Singapore. 
19 Mao Zedong’s telegram to Tan Kah Kee, 20/01/1949, Appendix A, ‘Review of Chinese Affairs’, 02/1949, 
TNA, CO 717/182/4; Singapore Special Branch, ‘Tan Kah Kee invited to participate in the new Political 
Consultative Council’, 02/1949, ISD. 
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Tan to join the CPPCC’s Preparatory Committee. Tan’s reply was printed on 8 February, 
and while he declined a political role, he promised to return to China.20 
 While Tan declined a political role, his patriotism made it unlikely that he would 
remain uninvolved. Indeed, at a sending-off event in April 1949, he remarked that he had 
‘long desired to do some good for [his] native land’.21 Tan’s return to China, in that 
respect, was a function of his aim to ‘do some good’ for his country—which was for him, 
a lifelong quest.22 Yet, Tan also pointed to the GMD as the reason why his quest had 
hitherto come to naught. But the GMD’s failures, Tan said, stood in stark contrast to the 
CCP’s ‘good politics’, diligence, and compassion.23 Tan was clearly convinced by the 
promise of New China, and the strength of this vision soon overcame his initial reluctance. 
After Tan arrived in China in June, CCP and public figures took turns at persuading him 
to represent the huaqiao in the Preparatory Committee.24 Tan eventually accepted, and he 
was elected to the committee’s Standing Committee on 15 June.25  In the end, New 
China’s call had been too strong. The CCP, Tan said, was creating ‘a truly representative 
and democratic consensus for the future path of nation-building’, which would fulfil 
huaqiao hopes, and ensure that they ‘see their status in their respective domiciles raised’ 
to new heights.26 Tan simply could not resist being a part of this. 
                                                
20 Tan Kah Kee’s telegram to Mao Zedong, 08/02/1949, Appendix A, ‘Review of Chinese Affairs’, 02/1949, 
TNA, CO 717/182/4. 
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24 This included Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Li Weihan, Ye Jianying, Dong Biwu, Lin 
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Chen Jiageng (Fuzhou: Xiamen Municipal Committee for Research on Party History, and the Alumni 
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 The CCP had thus gotten their man. Mao would have been delighted. Earlier in 
February 1949, Mao had met the Soviet vice-Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, and while 
discussing the preparations for the CPPCC, had made a list of its constituencies. In Mao’s 
listing, there were the American huaqiao representatives (or rather, the Zhigong Party), 
and separately, the Southeast Asian huaqiao representatives, which as Mikoyan recorded, 
named Tan Kah Kee.27 The naming of Tan shows how committed Mao and the CCP had 
been to making sure that Tan and the huaqiao would be involved with the CPPCC. And 
yet, Mao and Mikoyan did not talk solely about the huaqiao. Inasmuch as the CCP made 
a serious effort to draw the huaqiao into the united front, to study what else Mao said to 
Mikoyan (and other Soviet leaders), is to see the united front’s real meaning. Which was, 
it seems, rather different to what had been sold to the huaqiao. 
 
Openness and Sincerity: 
The problem with the CCP’s rhetoric on the united front in 1948–1949 is that even 
as the Party contemplated the prospect of final victory in the civil war, Mao—but also 
others in the CCP leadership—was already prevaricating (and had been for a while now) 
on the necessity of a united front, even while the CCP continued to preach the New 
Democracy.28 Ironically, the chief witness to this insincerity was the ‘Great Master’ who 
had first instructed the CCP to embrace the united front. Mao, in messages to Stalin (30 
November 1947 and 15 March 1948), had proposed that: 
                                                
27 The English translation of this MemCon (by Sergey Radchenko) says ‘representatives of the Chinese 
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In the period of the final victory of Chinese Revolution, following the example of 
the USSR and Yugoslavia, all political parties except the CCP should leave the 
political scene, which will significantly strengthen the Chinese Revolution.29 
 
Mao, it appears, initially preferred to accelerate the CCP’s consolidation of political 
power; although he was willing to let ‘representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie’ join in a 
future, and CCP-dominated central government of New China, he wanted the CCP to be 
only political party in government.30 Stalin disapproved; the Great Master flatly rejected 
Mao’s proposals—‘we do not agree with this’—and instead instructed in 1948 that: ‘It is 
necessary to keep in mind that the Chinese government in its policy will be a national 
revolutionary-democratic government, not a communist one, after the victory of the 
People’s Liberation Armies of China’.31 Stalin thus told Mao that an acceleration of 
revolutionary reforms, like ‘nationalization of all land and abolition of private ownership 
of land’, and the ‘confiscation of the property of all industrial and trade bourgeoisie’ (and 
of the landowners, big to small) should be delayed ‘for some time’.32 On the one hand, 
Stalin’s view was similar to what Mao had told the CCP CC in January 1948, especially 
in terms of ‘avoid[ing] adopting any adventurist policies’ towards industrial or 
commercial bourgeoisie, and ‘well-to-do’ peasantry, but to focus instead on ‘real counter-
revolutionary local tyrants’.33 This, of course, was what the New Democracy (and its 
united front) was supposed to effect—a transitional stage after the CCP’s victory, to 
prepare for the next stage, and a socialist revolution.34 Yet, on the other hand, and while 
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Mao’s subsequent reply to Stalin simply and innocuously stated that he completely agreed 
with him—what Mao said and what Mao wanted were very different.35 
 The united front, and the democratic coalition government it was supposed to 
engender for New China, were not Mao’s preferred choices.36 Even as Mao cabled his 
acquiescence to Stalin’s ‘advice’ on 26 April 1948, he had no intention of delaying, or 
even easing up on the CCP’s Land Reform Campaign.37 Yet, Mao also followed through 
with the coalition government, although it is worth noting that the ‘May Day slogans’ 
came only days after his reply to Stalin—and may not have been written with non-CCP 
elements in mind originally.38 Now, there are to be sure, varied perspectives of Mao’s 
changing views—but perhaps that variance is moot. If Mao had truly been convinced by 
Stalin in 1948, then his prior New Democracy rhetoric was insincere. Or, if Mao had not 
actually needed convincing by Stalin, then his ideas about outright CCP domination post-
Civil War, were tactical and to gain space to manoeuvre.39 Yet, either way, the New 
Democracy was less about democracy than it was about political manoeuvring. 
 But to be fair to the CCP, it appeared to put great effort into preparing for the new 
CPPCC. Instructions were issued to the Party branches in Shanghai and Hong Kong—the 
likely entry points for returnees—to receive the ‘democratic personages’ answering the 
call to the CPPCC.40 While, and perhaps in view of the sheer number of responses to the 
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‘May Day slogans’, the CCP created institutional provisions for united front work in 
September 1948, and settled the Preparatory Committee’s make-up in November.41 The 
new United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP CC was placed in charge of 
work amongst the democratic elements in (still) GMD-controlled areas, amongst ethnic 
minority nationalities, in ‘united front work in politics’, in huaqiao affairs, and in 
relations with fraternal socialist parties in the Far East.42 The CPPCC was therefore an 
actual, perceptible, political exercise on the part of the CCP, and as Mao wrote to Stalin 
in December 1948, after a preparatory conference, the establishment of the CPPCC and 
the democratic coalition would follow in the summer of 1949.43 
 Yet, for all the apparent CCP activity regarding the CPPCC, the reality behind-
the-scenes was far more disingenuous. The CCP CC’s January 1949 directive to Party 
cadres on interacting with non-CCP ‘democratic personages’ required them to practice 
‘openness and sincerity’, and ‘unity and struggle’; or to unite with non-CCP personalities, 
even while conducting ‘struggle’ to further their socialist education.44 Yet, the CC also 
instructed that ‘openness’ to non-CCP members was finite, as ‘some things could be kept 
from them’.45 Inasmuch as cadres were encouraged to provide reading material to non-
CCP members to improve their political awareness, sharing internal party information 
was forbidden. Of course, most political parties are not known for transparency, but to 
instruct cadres to keep secrets even while promoting ‘openness and sincerity’, seems 
curious. Yet, when placed against the reality of the CCP leadership’s dealings with, and 
its views of other united front figures, the reason for secrecy becomes clear. 
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Fu Zuoyi [Fu Tso-yi], the GMD commander in Beiping [Beijing], surrendered the 
city to the PLA on 22 January 1949, and was thereafter specially invited to the CPPCC 
Preparatory Committee (and later, its full plenum).46 In the public narrative, Fu was a 
high-ranking GMD commander—a war criminal—who had seen the light, and obeyed 
his duty to the people, thus surrendering Beijing. This apparently showed Fu’s sincerity, 
as did a speech he made admitting his crimes, and his hopes for New China under the 
CCP.47 Yet, Fu’s surrender had not been due to conscience. Soviet envoy Terebin [Andrei 
Orlov] reported to Stalin that Fu and the CCP had come to a pragmatic understanding, 
while Fu’s contrition had been scripted so that ‘the people can forgive him’.48 This was 
judicious, but it was hardly ‘openness and sincerity’. 
 Returning to Mikoyan in 1949, a name that came up in his conversations with 
Mao was Song Qingling [Soong Ching-ling]. Sun Yat-sen’s widow was also one of the 
Preparatory Committee’s delegates, and Mao had personally invited her to the ‘historical 
and momentous’ CPPCC in January 1949, even suggesting that it fulfilled her husband’s 
last wishes for China.49 Song’s marriage to the ‘Father of the Nation’ [国父] made her a 
national symbol, and much like Tan Kah Kee, her participation bolstered the CPPCC’s 
patriotic credentials immeasurably. Indeed, as Mao told Mikoyan, he wanted Song to be 
‘chairman of the presidium’. Yet, Mao noted that Song was ‘fully subordinate to us’, 
which made her ‘huge authority among the people’ valuable—and was perhaps why Mao 
had wanted Song to be chairman.50 Even so, Zhou Enlai admitted to Mikoyan that Song 
‘still [made] them uncomfortable’, even if she was pro-CCP, and had previously been a 
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CCP courier to the Comintern. Thus, Zhou said, she was under ‘strict surveillance’, 
because the GMD might ‘take her away by force’—thus implying that Song’s loyalties 
were suspect (or transferable).51 Of course, these remarks were made confidentially, but 
perhaps that is what makes them suggestive of the CCP’s disingenuousness.52 
 Furthermore, Mao’s conversations with Mikoyan reveal the former’s personal 
views. On 4 February 1949, Mao told Mikoyan that ‘we openly explain our policy’ to the 
democrats, and ‘they like our frankness’.53 Perhaps Mao was being ironic about CCP 
‘frankness’; he told Mikoyan two days later that regarding ‘the structure of state power’, 
the CCP would not use ‘the parliamentary form’.54 While the ‘congress of people’s 
representatives’ would elect the central government, the CCP would retain the real power 
in the new government, since as Mao said: 
In the future government communists and leftist democrats will take probably 2/3 
of all seats. Formally communists will not have that many seats, but in fact the 
majority of seats in the government will belong to them because a number of seats 
will be taken by covert communists. The rightist parties will also take part in the 
government, but in the minority.55 
 
So much for the claims of a ‘truly representative’ New Democracy, or a democratic 
coalition. And yet, there is a curious dichotomy. After all, although Mao and the CCP did 
not believe in, or want a coalition government, they still created one. 
 The CCP’s approach to the New Democracy was in the first instance, a function 
of Soviet orthodoxy. Even if the so-called democratic coalition government was not the 
first preference of the CCP leadership, the Soviet influence was not something easily 
disregarded, especially since Stalin pressured the CCP to adhere to Soviet doctrine.56 But 
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at the same time, the decisive motivation for the CCP to move beyond its initial 
inclination for one-Party domination came from an economic realism that made the New 
Democracy a vital necessity. 
 The interaction of both the Soviet influence on, and the CCP’s economic realism 
in the establishment of the New Democracy was actually enunciated by Chairman Mao, 
in a conversation with Stalin’s envoy, Ivan.V. Kovalev, in May 1949. Mao told Kovalev 
that even as the CCP neared victory over the GMD, it acknowledged that: ‘we owe our 
victories to the international revolutionary movement, and first and foremost, to the 
Soviet Union’.57 Indeed, as Mao said, if there had been no Soviet Union, there would be 
no CCP. Thus the CCP owed its success to the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 
who Mao called the CCP’s ‘elder brother’ [老大哥], whose ‘high prestige’ was testament 
to the strength of the revolution, and was the basis for Soviet leadership of international 
communism.58 Yet, Mao also made a revealing remark; Mao said that he had spoken 
recently with some ‘democratic personalities’, who had told him that: ‘You communists 
have talents in political and military affairs, and this is the source of your strength; but 
you have none in economics, and this is your weakness.’59 Mao, in fact, agreed with this 
assessment, since he said that: 
We know our weaknesses; we feel it too. It is not just our leaders who have no 
experience of managing the economy, but the whole party too. We are like a girl 
who is about to be married. While she knows that she will eventually bear 
children, she has no idea how it will happen, except that this is bound to happen 
after marriage. We are exactly like that. We know the general direction, and we 
know how to develop the national economy. We strive towards this direction, but 
we cannot say how it will turn out, because we are uncertain ourselves. We must 
quickly build up our economic capabilities.60 
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Mao’s remarks hint at what underpinned the move to establish the New Democracy. On 
a basic level, it reflected the wishes of the Soviet ‘elder brother’; but beyond that, and 
despite the CCP’s initial reluctance, its reservations were decisively overcome by the fact 
that it needed help to manage the economy, especially—as Mao hinted—from the 
‘democratic personalities’. The united front was thus a Soviet invention, and the CCP’s 
creation of the New Democracy in 1949 was an economic rationalisation. 
Mao, if anything, had understated the extent of China’s economic problems to 
Kovalev. It was not just that the CCP lacked experience in the management of national 
economic affairs, it was also that it lacked that economic experience at a particularly 
inopportune moment when, ‘after decades of war, civil and international, the nation’s 
economy was at the edge of total collapse’ by 1949.61 Industrial production was only 30% 
of previous levels; infrastructure was very badly-damaged (if not destroyed); inflation ran 
rampant; trade was disrupted; coal, iron, steel, cotton, and grain production were at levels 
well below par; and over 40 million people had been displaced by flooding.62 Yet, if this 
was the fundamental problem that New China faced, then its solution was the united front. 
Or more precisely, the CCP believed that creating a democratic coalition would enable it 
to draw upon a broad range of resources. Whether it was in terms of technical expertise 
and experience, financial capital, or even intellectual knowledge—the united front held a 
vital key to New China’s economic recovery. 
 Mao was explicitly clear about the role of the united front and the democratic 
coalition in China’s economic recovery. At the inaugural session of the CPPCC 
Preparatory Committee on 15 June 1949, he stated that: 
Upon the formation of China’s democratic coalition government, its central tasks 
will be: (1) to mop up the remnants of the reactionaries and suppress their trouble-
making; and (2) to do everything possible and make the utmost effort to restore 
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and develop the people’s economy and, at the same time, to restore and develop 
the people’s culture and education.63 
 
Mao wrote later (on 30 June) that: ‘we must learn to do economic work from all who 
know how, no matter who they are’.64 And of course, few would have disagreed that 
China’s economic situation in 1949 was perilous. But then again, no one had told the 
members of the CPPCC that the New Democracy was really about economics. 
 Mao told the Preparatory Committee in June 1949 that one of the ‘central tasks’ 
of the future coalition government was to ‘restore and develop the people’s economy’, 
but he also left out an important—albeit, probably inconvenient—point: that the People’s 
Democratic United Front (as manifested by the CPPCC) was itself an economic 
derivative.65 After all, the value of the CPPCC was derived from the relative utility of its 
constituent parts. Inclusion in the New Democracy was thus not because of democratic 
rights, patriotic sacrifice, or even Soviet doctrine. As Mao wrote to Stalin on 14 June 
1949—just before the Preparatory Committee’s inaugural session: 
The general political program, developed earlier with the gravitation center of 
gaining victory in the war, must be reviewed and composed on the basis of 
restoring and developing the economy of China. The organizational structure and 
the composition of the government must also be developed for solving this task.66 
 
If the ‘composition of the government’ was a function of economic necessity, then it must 
surely follow that the huaqiao inclusion in that united front was equally an economic 
rationalisation. To be sure, it was a function of a perception that the huaqiao offered an 
enormous economic utility, because of the value of their remittances. 
 Sun Yat-sen had called the huaqiao the ‘Mother of the Revolution’ because they 
had birthed (or at least, funded) much of his revolutionary activities in the run-up to the 
Xinhai Revolution (1911). This was a theme that the CCP frequently returned to in the 
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civil war years, as the huaqiao were exhorted to uphold their revolutionary ancestry, and 
support national liberation.67 In 1949, as the CCP’s imperatives changed as it confronted 
the tasks of national government, the older imagery of patriotic huaqiao funding national 
liberation continued to hold sway, except that the objective now was the socialist 
revolution and transformation of China. Yet, for the CCP, it was not as simple as soliciting 
direct contributions. Of course, they could do that; Liao Chengzhi (who later became the 
de facto head of the new OCAC) had been very effective in gaining donations to the 
Eighth Route Army, especially from Hong Kong-based huaqiao during WWII.68 But such 
direct contributions were not indefinitely sustainable, and were not, in any case, the basis 
for huaqiao utility; it was remittances that were of the most value.69 The utility was not 
direct in the sense that the state was not the direct recipient of these funds. But rather that 
the inflow of large sums of foreign currencies into China had significant multiplier effects 
for local economies, and also—more importantly for the CCP—added to national income, 
and offered an absolutely vital non-trade source of foreign exchange.70  
 To be sure, the monies sent by haiwai huaqiao to China was mostly sent to other 
huaqiao in the homeland, like qiaojuan family/household dependents, or the qiaosheng 
youth in Mainland Chinese educational institutions, but it could also entail funds sent for 
commerce or other investment purposes, or even for philanthropy.71 This was a historical 
practice that was as old as Chinese overseas migration itself, but it had grown over the 
years into a very large sum of money; one modern estimate for 1864–1949 asserts a figure 
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of US$3.51 billion in huaqiao remittances.72 Every Chinese government—certainly at 
least since the late Qing—had seen the immense utility of these remittances, and the CCP 
recognised it too. Chen Yun, the head of the newly-formed Central Finance and 
Economics Commission (CFEC), acknowledged in June 1949 that while a trade surplus 
was the country’s best option for foreign exchange, huaqiao remittances were in second-
place.73 This, as Chen told the CFEC, ‘requires everyone’s cooperation’.74 Chen may 
have been merely encouraging the Commission to diligence, and to work more closely 
together, but whether inadvertently or not, Chen’s remark about ‘cooperation’ also spoke 
to an underlying meaning of the huaqiao place in the united front—co-opting them into 
the CPPCC was a means to a financial end. 
 The reality of huaqiao remittances was that they were overwhelmingly sent for 
family or household support purposes. According to modern estimates, the investment 
proportion of overall huaqiao remittances over 1862–1949 amounted to an average of 
3.65%; by 1949, that figure had fallen to 2.44% for the four preceding years.75 Thus, the 
vast majority of remittances were for family support. Yet, these remittances necessarily 
involved transnational and vested interests. The haiwai huaqiao remitters expected that 
the monies they sent back to the homeland bettered their dependents’ lives; whereas a 
recipient (usually the qiaojuan) was responsible for informing remitters on how monies 
were used, and by extension, on local and national conditions. In that sense, there was a 
transnationality to huaqiao remittances and their connected interests.76 Thus remitters 
                                                
72  Lin Jinzhi does not specify the rates used to convert yuan to USD but the similarities with what 
contemporary documents reported suggests that he used the contemporary exchange rates. See Lin Jinzhi 
et al., Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe, 228. 
Wu Chun-hsi’s research for 1946-1949 estimated a total of US$332 million in that period alone. See Table 
13, in Wu Chun-hsi, Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967), 80. 
73 Chen Yun, ‘Guanyu chengli zhongyang caizheng jingji weiyuanhui de baogao’, 04/06/1949, People’s 
Liberation Army Institute of Politics Party History Research and Teaching Department (ed.), Zhonggong 
dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao [hereafter, CKZL], Vols. 1-20 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun 
zhengzhi xueyuan, 1985), 18: 551-552 (551). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Lin Jinzhi et al., Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe, 364. 
76 The traditional economic motivations for migration for haiwai huaqiao also meant that remittances to 
the homeland were ‘bound by ties of expectation and feelings of obligation to provide a better life for those 
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wanted to be sure that the funds they sent home were secure, and received safely; while 
domestic recipients wanted to be assured of the legality of, and access to their funds even 
in a new political era. And all huaqiao wanted to be sure that their vested interests were 
met. After all, what was the point of remittances if New China had no place for the 
huaqiao? In that sense, the huaqiao place in the united front—in a CPPCC that was itself 
an economic derivative—was a useful sop to those interests. 
 
Common Program: 
 Tan Kah Kee and six others formed the huaqiao delegation at the Preparatory 
Committee in June 1949, with Tan as the Chief Representative [华侨首席代表] of the 
huaqiao in the CPPCC.77 The Committee first met on 15 June, in the Qinzheng Palace in 
Zhongnanhai (Beijing), and it was comprised of 134 delegates, who formed work-groups 
to discuss and prepare the documents and agenda for the full plenum of the CPPCC that 
was to meet in September.78 The Preparatory Committee also drew up documents for the 
CPPCC to consider, including: The Organic Law of the Central People’s Government 
(CPG), The Organic Law of the CPPCC, and The Common Program of the CPPCC. 
These were in fact the foundational documents of the PRC. To be sure, the CPPCC was 
defined as ‘the representatives of the Communist Party of China, of all democratic parties 
and groups and people’s organisations, of all regions, of the People’s Liberation Army, 
of all national minorities, overseas Chinese and other patriotic democratic elements’, thus 
making it, as the Common Program declared: ‘the organisational form of the Chinese 
                                                
left behind’ (i.e. qiaojuan). See Sandra M.J. Wong, “‘For the Sake of Kinship’: The Overseas Chinese 
Family” (PhD Thesis, Department of Anthropology, Stanford University, 1987), 56-57. 
For a detailed discussion of the transnational dynamics involved in huaqiao remittances, there is none better 
than Madeline Hsu, ‘California Dreaming: Migration and Dependency’, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of 
Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South China, 1882–1943 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 16-54. 
77 The other six were: Situ Meitang, Chen Qiyuan, Dai Ziliang, Fei Zhendong, Zhuang Mingli—and a 
Burmese huaqiao who did not show up. See ‘Canjia xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi choubei hui de ge danwei 
daibiao mingdan’, 16/06/1949, Kaiguo shengdian: I: 175-181 (180). 
78 Tan was in the group that decided the national anthem, seal and flag. See ‘Xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 
choubei hui ge xiaozu mingdan’, Kaiguo shengdian, I: 183-185. 
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People’s Democratic United Front’.79 Moreover, the CPPCC’s Organic Law stated that it 
was to ‘unite all democratic classes and all nationalities throughout China by establishing 
the unity of all democratic parties and groups and people’s organisations’, and thus ‘put 
forward their combined efforts in carrying out New Democracy’.80 In that sense, since 
Tan was the Chief Representative of the huaqiao to the CPPCC, he was (ex officio) the 
chief representative of the huaqiao in the New Democracy. And to be true, Tan’s place 
seemed very legitimate. He had been involved in key discussions and decisions, and had 
been consulted by CCP leaders.81 Clearly, Tan was involved with the establishment of 
the PRC in a real sense—but did that mean that huaqiao rights and interests were met? 
Tan certainly thought so. 
On 21 September, the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC met in the Huairen Hall 
in Zhongnanhai, whereupon Mao famously declared that ‘the Chinese people have stood 
up!’82 Over the next week, the CPPCC passed the Organic Laws, the Common Program, 
and elected the CPG Committee and the CPPCC National Committee.83 Finally, on 1 
October, from atop Tiananmen Square, the new CPG Chairman, Mao Zedong, declared 
the establishment of the PRC. Tan was standing right behind him. Thus Tan was literally 
behind Mao as he made his historic declaration on 1 October, but Tan was also 
metaphorically behind the CCP, in the sense that he was fully confident of New China’s 
                                                
79 ‘The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’, 29/09/1949, in The 
Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 1-2. 
80 Article 1, ‘The Organic Law of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’, 27/09/1949, 
The Important Documents, 21. 
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weiyuanhui zhuxi, fuzhuxi, changwu weiyuan he mishuzhang mingdan’, Kaiguo shengdian, I: 548; 
‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhuxi, fuzhuxi ji weiyuan’, Kaiguo shengdian, 
I: 549; Tan Kah Kee, ‘Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi di yi jie quanti shengli bimu’, 30/09/1949, 
Xin Zhongguo guanganji, 11-14. 
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future, under the leadership of Mao and the CCP. To the CPPCC on 24 September, Tan 
pointed to the years of huaqiao suffering ‘under the oppression of the Guomindang’s 
reactionary government’, but he then said: 
But it is different now. The haiwai huaqiao have become members of the Chinese 
People’s Democratic United Front and participants in the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference. The haiwai huaqiao have full rights of 
representation and expression, raising and equalising our status in the politics of 
our homeland from before. I believe my fellow qiaobao will be extremely happy 
with this.84 
 
For Tan, the events of September–October 1949 were like a new dawn for the Chinese 
people and the huaqiao. The CPPCC and CPG had unanimously approved the Common 
Program, which declared that the CPG would 'do its utmost to protect the proper rights 
and interests of Chinese residing abroad’ and also ‘adopt the measures necessary’, so as 
to ‘facilitate remittances from overseas Chinese’.85 These articles were similar to what 
the CCP delegates had proposed at the short-lived PCC in 1946, and thus it seemed as if 
there was finally a government willing to protect huaqiao rights and interests. No wonder 
that Tan said that the huaqiao would be happy. 
 Furthermore, the Organic Law of the CPG also mandated a new Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Commission (OCAC). This Commission shared its name with an organ of the 
Nanjing government, but unlike the older GMD version, this new OCAC was a supra-
Ministerial organ under Premier Zhou Enlai’s Government Administration Council.86 
Indeed, just as the CFEC had coordinating and policy authority over other ministries 
involved with economic policy-work (i.e. the PBOC, or Trade, Heavy Industry, and 
Transport, etc.), the OCAC was the highest body in the new Chinese party-state for 
policymaking and implementation in qiaowu. The OCAC and CPG had been created by 
                                                
84 Tan Kah Kee, ‘Zhengzhi xieshang dahui huaqiao shouxi daibiao zhici’, 24/09/1949, Xin Zhongguo 
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the democratic coalition, and the OCAC had non-CCP members (like Tan Kah Kee).87 
Moreover, since the CPG’s agenda was the Common Program, the OCAC’s mandate was 
thus defined by the two articles about huaqiao rights and interests, and the facilitation of 
remittances. In that sense, the party-state’s qiaowu was a child of the united front. Or at 
least, that was the theory. Given what the united front was for, and given its inclusion of 
the huaqiao for their financial utility, the reality of the OCAC’s mandate was less to do 
with serving the united front, and more about using it to use the huaqiao. But who—
besides Mao and his comrades—would have been aware of this? 
 
Conclusion: 
 The heady events of October 1949 convinced Tan Kah Kee that China had 
emerged from the darkness. Indeed, writing later on the ‘great joy and celebration that 
the founding of the PRC’ had brought, Tan mused that it was impossible to describe this 
without ‘superlative and hyperbolic’ words.88 Since Tan was so convinced that the New 
Democracy was real, and that the huaqiao place in it was legitimate, Tan submitted seven 
motions to the CPPCC while it was in session.89 Some were on huaqiao issues, others 
were national issues, but all of them typified Tan’s belief that the huaqiao now had a 
legitimate political voice in New China’s political future. 
Of course, Tan had no idea—and no way of knowing—that the united front was 
about economic rationalisations. Yet, this did not necessarily mean that the party-state’s 
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emergent qiaowu simply abandoned the Common Program mandate. In December 1949, 
on Tan’s way back to Singapore to sort out his affairs before returning later, he was 
consulted by the East China Finance Committee (ECFC) on how to revitalise remittances. 
Tan suggested that huaqiao in China be permitted to receive remittances in their original 
currencies, or in the new Renminbi (RMB) if they preferred, and allowed to make Hong 
Kong Dollar (HKD) denominated deposits with state banks if they preferred to do so.90 
This would mitigate worries about fluctuating RMB values, bolster huaqiao confidence 
in China’s economy, and thus encourage remittances. The ECFC took Tan’s advice, but 
this was hardly because qiaowu was primarily concerned with huaqiao interests. The 
party-state’s concern was for its own economic interests. While this had convinced Mao 
and the CCP to follow through with the New Democracy because of its economic utility, 
it meant that the qiaowu that came out of the united front was similarly defined by the 
intention to maximise and capitalise on huaqiao economic utility. 
 The larger imperative for qiaowu was about the facilitation of huaqiao remittances, 
not because the Common Program asserted that it was in the huaqiao interest, but because 
it was precisely what the party-state required. On 7 January 1950, as Tan travelled through 
South China, OCAC Chairperson He Xiangning sent him a directive which ordered him 
to seek the revitalisation of huaqiao remittances, and: 
(i) To use many methods to spread the news as broadly and as far as possible to 
the haiwai huaqiao regarding the underlying principle and motive behind this 
bond issue. (ii) To encourage the huaqiao to subscribe to the issue and not be 
casual bystanders. (iii) To use the qiaojuan to approach their family and relatives 
overseas to subscribe because the dividends can be directed towards their family 
in China, and so too the bond certificates.91 
 
                                                
90 ECFC, ‘Guanyu guli qiaohui de yijian’, 21/12/1949, 1949-1952 jinrong juan, 807. 
91 He Xiangning, ‘He Xiangning yao Chen Jiageng zhi dian haiwai huaqiao goumai gongzhai ji huidui 
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Given the economic rationalisations underpinning the united front, such orders fail to 
surprise. What is clear though, is that while the new PRC’s qiaowu could attempt policies 
that catered to huaqiao interests if there was a relevance to, or a possible effect on huaqiao 
remittances, ultimately, the party-state’s imperative was first and foremost, to maximise 
the utility of the huaqiao, especially in financial terms. This correlation between huaqiao 
interests and the party-state’s economic imperatives—and the questions and issues it 
engendered—would come to define the next decade of qiaowu. 
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Chapter 2. 
Screaming for socialism 
 
To bring about socialism requires fulfilling its prerequisites. Thus anxiously seeking a 
faster transformation to socialism, when its preconditions remain unmet, demonstrates 
that some of our comrades lack a practical understanding of the New Democracy, and 
that they do not believe that adherence to, and implementation of the Common Program 
will result in gradual fulfilment and maturing of socialism’s preconditions. Screaming for 
socialism every day is not going to make it happen. 
 
— Zhou Enlai, 13 April 19501 
 
 
 
                                                
1 ‘口头上天天喊社会主义并不能实现社会主义’, in Zhou Enlai, ‘Fahui renmin minzhu tongyi zhanxian 
jiji zuoyong de jige wenti’, 13/04/1950, JYZW, 1: 153-162 (155). 
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Introduction: 
On New Year’s Day 1950, He Xiangning sent greetings to the haiwai huaqiao via 
Radio Peking [Beijing] broadcast. Apart from good wishes, He also acknowledged the 
core transnationality of huaqiao: qiaojuan depended on the haiwai huaqiao for 
livelihoods, while the ‘first thought’ for those overseas, He said, was for the ‘peace and 
progress’ of their hometowns.2  Thus, He promised that the government would take 
measures to ensure: the stability of huaqiao hometowns; qiaojuan livelihoods; and that 
huaqiao in China received remittances without difficulty. Yet, as He also said, it was now 
time to ‘begin building our country’: 
We warmly and sincerely welcome the haiwai huaqiao to carry forward their 
illustrious revolutionary traditions, to redouble their aid to their homeland, and to 
participate in the great and glorious cause of building New China.3 
 
The haiwai huaqiao participation that He desired, was as she instructed Tan Kah Kee, in 
subscription to PRC bonds.4 But since foreign governments tended to ban huaqiao in their 
domains from doing so directly, what He called for, as her later broadcasts suggest, was 
for haiwai huaqiao remittances to qiaojuan (and guiqiao or qiaosheng) to fund domestic 
bond-buying.5 He’s broadcasts, in a way, reveal the fundamental foci for the Chinese 
party-state’s qiaowu in 1950: firstly, its prime imperative to gain ever-greater sums of 
foreign exchange for the party-state’s coffers; and also the recognition that qiaowu had 
to (at least) deal with huaqiao interests on some level. 
 This chapter demonstrates how the party-state’s qiaowu evolved in 1950–1953 
into a domestically-focused political practice for economic ends. The chapter begins with 
analysis of the core considerations for qiaowu: firstly, the party-state’s strategic interest 
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in securing huaqiao remittances; and secondly, the transnationality of huaqiao interests 
in remittances. Although a correlation between the two was recognised early on, this 
chapter shows that it was the problems consequent to the Land Reform programme, and 
the Korean War, that forced the party-state to address it in its qiaowu. This fomented a 
convergence in qiaowu between the imperatives to secure remittances and to cater for 
huaqiao interests. Moreover, since the Land Reform proved that huaqiao interests had a 
largely domestic centre of gravity, qiaowu began to gravitate towards policies that were 
characterised both by domesticity, and by overt attempts to protect and ensure huaqiao 
interests—all in the name, of course, of remittances. In a sense, this chapter marks this 
development as the beginning of the ‘favourable treatment’ [youdai] era in qiaowu in the 
1950s. Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, while the party-state approved of this approach 
to qiaowu—at least in theory—the reality was that it proved difficult to effect, not only 
because of contradictions due to the Land Reform’s radicalisation, but also in no small 
way, because of the severe failures of CCP cadres. 
 
Like another province overseas:  
 The perception of the huaqiao as potentially vital contributors to the Chinese 
economy was not a particularly new point of view in 1949.6 In that sense, the PBOC’s 
declaration in 1949 that huaqiao remittances were vital to the nation’s finances, since 
they were ‘an important source of our country’s foreign exchange’, was a restatement of 
an existing paradigm, or perhaps, the central bank’s acknowledgement of Chen Yun’s 
earlier instructions to the CFEC .7 In that respect, it is worth looking at the CFEC’s own 
guidelines, issued in January 1950, on huaqiao remittance policy and work. The principle, 
                                                
6 See for example Bank of Fujian Province, ‘Fujian sheng yinhang sa niandu gongzuo jihua qiaohui bu fen’, 
1941, in FPA (ed.), Fujian huaqiao dang’an shiliao, Vols. I-II (Fuzhou: Fujian dang’an chubanshe, 1989), 
I: 376-378. 
7 PBOC Shanghai Branch, ‘Zhongguo renmin yinhang Shanghai fenhang 1949 niandu gongzuo zongjie’, 
n.d., 1949-1952 jinrong juan, 832; Chen Yun, ‘Guanyu chengli zhongyang caizheng jingji weiyuanhui de 
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the CFEC said, was ‘to protect qiaobao interests, and to take in huaqiao remittances in 
large quantities’.8 An immediate consequence of this principle was a CFEC instruction 
that institutions managing remittances, like the Bank of China (BOC), were forbidden 
from engaging in arbitrage on currency exchanges of remittances. This evidently sought 
to protect huaqiao interests, since it ensured that remittances could be exchanged at a 
lower rate, and seemingly fulfilled the Common Program mandate for qiaowu. Yet, given 
how the huaqiao and their economic utility, especially in terms of their remittances, were 
perceived in the party-state’s view of the united front, perhaps the true crux of the CFEC 
guidelines was the imperative ‘to take in huaqiao remittances in large quantities’. And, 
to be fair, this was only logical. After all, the reality of New China’s early years was in 
essence the same problem that had plagued old China: a cash crunch.9 
 Even as the party-state sought to turn China towards economic recovery after 1949, 
it began to pay more attention to its fiscal and monetary policy. Zhou Enlai said precisely 
that in December 1949, suggesting that ‘financial and economic planning were embodied 
in the policies’ that the CPG undertook, so as to shift national priorities from military 
matters to national construction.10 Yet, the reality was that China’s economic recovery 
was an expensive proposition. The party-state needed money, not least to purchase 
industrial machinery, but money—particularly foreign exchange—was in short supply. 
Zhou made this explicitly clear when he said that China had to boost domestic production, 
so as to reduce imports and preserve foreign currency.11 This reality was also manifest in 
the CCP CC’s instructions to regional administrations to seek central approval before 
importing foreign machinery; as the CCP CC had to admit in December 1949 to the East 
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China regional administration, the fact was that China simply could not afford to repair 
every piece of infrastructure that had been damaged during the war(s).12 Bringing an end 
to hard times thus required large sums of hard currency. 
 The party-state’s main interests (or indeed, imperative) in huaqiao remittances 
were therefore derived from, or formulated in, the larger context of its urgent demand for 
hard currency. This was a logic that was already present in the huaqiao inclusion in the 
united front. Yet, even the need to use the united front as a sop for the huaqiao—so as to 
be able to capitalise on their utility—reflected the underlying actuality that remittances 
were an inextricable part of huaqiao identities and thus, huaqiao interests. In March 1950, 
the First Session of the National Finance Conference stated that remittances were ‘the 
second-largest source of foreign exchange for the country’, and thus had an impact on the 
country’s capacity to engage in economic construction and development, and also on the 
livelihoods of millions of huaqiao (mainly qiaojuan) in China. Hence, as the Conference 
declared, the imperative to ‘strive for’ these remittances needed ‘careful attention’, on the 
same level as raising export figures.13 Indeed, ‘careful attention’ was precisely necessary 
because there was an underlying correlation between the huaqiao and the party-state’s 
interests, that was encapsulated within huaqiao remittances. 
 Given the distinct delineation of remittances as a financial question by the party-
state in 1950, it makes sense that it was the PBOC which led the effort to address the 
correlation between huaqiao and party-state interests in remittances. The basic premise 
was simple: remittances were a necessary livelihood for literally millions of qiaojuan, 
guiqiao and qiaosheng in China; they also represented a vital flow of hard currency into 
the PRC that was crucial for economic recovery and development. Yet, the party-state 
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was aware that it could not simply rely on the vested interests of the haiwai huaqiao—to 
support dependents and maintain traditional (if not, cultural or familial) relations with the 
huaqiao in China—to secure and increase remittance flows. The willingness of remitters 
to send money was also affected by the relative stability of the PRC itself; remitters would 
always and obviously be wary in times of socio-political or economic uncertainty. Indeed, 
one of the main concerns of the huaqiao then was that the new RMB was far too unstable. 
Thus in order for the party-state to fulfil its own (financial) interest, it would also—and 
first—have to ensure that the huaqiao interest in remittances was met.  
One of the earliest PBOC instructions on huaqiao remittances was thus to instruct 
that remittances could henceforth be remitted in foreign currencies (i.e. HKD, USD, or 
GBP, etc.), and that recipients in China were permitted to keep deposits (in the state banks) 
denominated in those currencies—but only permitted to withdraw these funds as RMB.14 
This was in keeping with the ECFC’s decision (in December 1949) to allow huaqiao to 
receive remittances in their original currencies, and to hold HKD-denominated accounts, 
except it was now implemented on a nationwide scale, and applied to more currencies. 
Furthermore, it made a show of addressing worries about fluctuating RMB values, even 
while creating a ready pool of foreign currency inside China. But above all, it bolstered 
the PBOC’s claim that its policies gave the huaqiao ‘favourable treatment’ [youdai]. Thus, 
as the PBOC proposed: ‘foreign currency belongs to the public, interests belong to the 
individual’ [外汇归公, 利益归私].15 Interests meant benefits or well-being—as in the 
oft-cited ‘huaqiao rights and interests’—but clearly, the PBOC had realised that securing 
remittances required addressing the motivations to send and receive it. 
 In a way, it is possible to see the elements of the PBOC slogan as coterminous; 
foreign currency for the ‘public’ (i.e. the state) was the logical consequence of securing 
                                                
14 PBOC Head Office, ‘Di yi jie quanguo jinrong huiyi zonghe jilu’, 15/03/1950, 1949-1952 jinrong juan, 
808. 
15 Ibid. 
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huaqiao interests. By enabling—or ‘facilitating’, pace the Common Program—the 
stability and security of remittances, the party-state would also benefit from an increased 
inflow of foreign exchange. But in reality, the two were not coterminous. The ‘individual’, 
or huaqiao interest was only tolerated insofar as it served the interests of the party-state. 
New Democracy meant in an economic sense, the period before socialist transformation 
where capitalism was not yet eradicated, but was regulated, with its excesses reformed, 
curtailed and transformed.16 This did not make remittances capitalist (or even bourgeois) 
excess, but it meant that even the Common Program’s view of huaqiao ‘legitimate rights 
and interests’ was conditional on what the ‘leadership of the proletariat’ (i.e. the CCP) 
defined as being in the country’s interest. As Zhou Enlai said: 
Economics in the spirit of the New Democracy for us means that we must exercise 
leadership alongside careful planning. This leadership and the planning that is its 
exercise must be done properly, with the broad strategic view in mind, and with 
the proper contexts taken into consideration.17 
 
While the PBOC’s approach ‘in the spirit of the New Democracy’ to managing huaqiao 
remittances suggested that party-state and huaqiao interests were coexistent, in reality, 
the ‘strategic view’ saw party-state interests predominate. 
The ‘proper context’ of huaqiao remittances was defined at a PBOC conference 
in August 1950. The work in remittances, as PBOC President Nan Hanchen stated, was 
‘extremely important’ because it was intrinsically connected to the legitimate interests of 
10 million huaqiao and 30 million qiaojuan and hence: ‘it is also one of the major issues 
faced by our country’. 18 Nan defined remittances as a legitimate huaqiao interest, tracing 
the history of its suppression by the ‘imperialist-colonialist’ governments and their ‘GMD 
lackeys’. Yet, with the advent of New China and the New Democracy, Nan said, this 
                                                
16 Mao, ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’, 30/06/1949, Selected Works, IV: 421 
The CCP claims that the ‘socialist transformation’ only began after the ‘General Line for the Transition 
Period’ in 1952, yet Mao was already calling for it in 1950: ‘When the tests of war and agrarian reform are 
passed, the remaining test will be easy to pass, that is, the test of socialism, of country-wide socialist 
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17 Zhou Enlai, ‘Fahui renmin minzhu tongyi zhanxian jiji zuoyong de ji ge wenti’, 13/04/1950, JYZW, 1: 
156.  
18 Nan Hanchen, ‘Guanyu qiaohui wenti de baogao’, 18/08/1950, 1949-1952 jinrong juan, 809-810. 
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meant future qiaowu defined by the Common Program’s protection of huaqiao interests, 
and the facilitation of huaqiao remittances. Yet, Nan also set out the state’s intentions and 
claims. Nan explained the March 1950 statement that ‘foreign currency belongs to the 
public’ to mean that its sale, settlement, and accrual could only be done by national banks. 
Nan said this was in part because China guarded its sovereignty fiercely, but it was also 
because: ‘our country is presently undertaking the task of construction, and since we need 
to import a large quantity of goods, our need for foreign currency is even greater’.19 Nan 
therefore rationalised the two sides of state and individual interests by stating that 
remittances legitimately benefited the huaqiao and contributed to the nation. But then, 
Nan also made a remarkable statement to the conference: 
We have previously calculated that the total huaqiao remittance figure for one 
year is the equivalent of the total income of Shanxi province (pop. 10 million); in 
other words, it is as if the country has another province overseas.20 
 
In this, Nan revealed precisely how the party-state viewed remittances: as simply the 
equivalent of a province’s contribution to national income. Nan, of course, asserted that 
it was huaqiao interests that underpinned the party-state’s concern for remittances, but 
this is unconvincing. His explanation of ‘interests belong to the individual’ suggested that 
the state eschewed profit from remittances, which were solely intended, as he claimed, to 
serve the huaqiao. But given that Nan had claimed that remittances were a necessity for 
the accrual of foreign exchange, either he was disingenuous, or Nan, the economist, did 
not believe that the state’s accruing foreign currency—indeed, at fixed rates it set itself—
was, at least on a broad level, a form of profit. 
Despite the utilitarianism in Nan’s remarks, he at least had explicitly indicated the 
party-state’s view of remittances as a source of national income—and not as a legitimate 
huaqiao ‘rightful interest’. But at the same time, Nan was clearly keen to present the two 
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sides of interests as being conjoined. The reason for this was the realisation by then, at 
least on the part of PBOC, that the fulfilment of the party-state’s interest required more 
than just slogans and different types of bank deposits. Thus Nan’s desire to play up the 
huaqiao interest in sending or receiving remittances. Indeed, as the ECFC instructed: 
‘everything to facilitate remittances should be done’.21 Yet, the complication was that in 
the foreign countries where remitters were located, the local governments were seriously 
restricting remittances, and thus there was a very real concern that ‘imperialist oppression’ 
would diminish the party-state’s foreign exchange supply.  
The party-state was deeply concerned that foreign restrictions would affect its 
ability to gain hard currency from its ‘province overseas’, and this worry was not baseless. 
A memo in August 1950 revealed this worry in its detailed listing of the restrictions on 
remittances by regions, with significant focus on the British Exchange Controls.22 This 
was logical, since the British controlled Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore, and since 
there were new restrictions on remittances in those territories. For Hong Kong, after 20 
February 1950 and the Foreign Exchange Control Circular No. 176, banks could not remit 
HKD to branches/agencies outside the Sterling Area without prior approval.23 Moreover, 
even private remittances within the Sterling Area were limited to £50, with anything more 
requiring official approval. 24  In Singapore and Malaya, the Exchange Controls saw 
regulations placed on qiaopi agencies, the imposition of a new cap on family remittances 
(S$45), and all transfers restricted to pre-approved banks in Hong Kong.25 Given that 
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Malaya and Singapore were the source of a large percentage of pre-war remittances (70% 
in 1937-1941), and that remittances received through Hong Kong outside of the pre-
approved banks dwarfed the figure received through them by 5.5 times—no wonder the 
party-state was concerned.26 Thus at its Expanded Conference on Banking Affairs in June 
1950, the PBOC stated that since remittances suffered from ‘unreasonable limitations’ by 
the imperialists, the bank would look to different methods to facilitate remittances, 
perhaps through the BOC, but also through traditional networks of qiaopi agencies.27 
Thus 1950 saw the fossilisation of youdai in state banks’ policies on the huaqiao 
remittances.28 But the pressures on remittances had also led to a realisation that securing 
remittances could not be left to the banks alone. 
Up till this point, it was the PBOC (with CFEC oversight) which had taken the 
lead in developing qiaowu for huaqiao remittances. In a way, this was not untoward; 
given how the party-state conceived of remittances—as Nan Hanchen elucidated—the 
PBOC being at the forefront was only to be expected. Yet, it was also becoming clear to 
the party-state that remittances, or at least, the imperative to secure them, required a more 
comprehensive approach to huaqiao affairs. Thus in September 1950, the OCAC and 
PBOC convened a conference on ‘solving the problems with huaqiao remittances’, with 
the primary concern being that remittances were failing to reach pre-war highs, and were 
facing new pressures.29 Yet, while the conference, as specified by OCAC vice-Chairman 
Liao Chengzhi and Nan Hanchen, was to examine remittance issues, it was titled as being 
on ‘huaqiao juanshu welfare’.30 Moreover, it also saw participation from across the CPG: 
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including the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Post and Telecommunications, 
and Customs.31 This discursive focus and wide institutional participation suggests that 
the party-state was beginning to realise that solving remittance issues required a broader 
front of qiaowu policies and practitioners. 
Liao and Nan’s conference report suggested the existence of a multitude of 
problems affecting huaqiao remittances (both external and domestic), and emphasised 
the binary relationship between specific concern for remittances, and broader qiaowu. In 
some cases, like the alleged imperialists’ restriction of remittances, there was not much 
that qiaowu could do. Yet, there were also issues considered within the loci of qiaowu 
that could affect remittances. This was true of the issue of preserving the real value of 
remittances against the fluctuating RMB, and the ability of qiaojuan and guiqiao to 
exchange or withdraw their remittances. This was something that the PBOC and OCAC 
believed had already been addressed. But even so, there were other problems: qiaopi 
agencies were apparently unclear about policy, which resulted in a lack of cooperation 
between private couriers and official channels for remittances, and which showed that 
qiaowu had failed to effectively communicate policy. But more troubling perhaps were 
the revelations that both the huaqiao abroad and qiaojuan in China were seemingly 
(rather euphemistically) ‘unaware that the government had determined that serving the 
qiaobao and qiaojuan was the guiding principle for its policy’.32 The lack of awareness 
by the qiaopi agencies could perhaps be explained away as a product of their suspicions 
about their role in the process, or the new restrictions on arbitrage. But that huaqiao both 
in and out of China had suspicions over qiaowu’s publicly-declared mandate to serve 
them and their interests, suggested that there was a far larger problem. 
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32 Ibid., 812. 
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The problem of huaqiao being ‘unaware’ that qiaowu would serve their interests 
was not that they were ignorant, but it was because the huaqiao in China were actually 
facing oppression, which predictably undermined any sense that qiaowu was serving their 
interests. Liao and Nan said that the huaqiao were unclear about the Land Reform policies 
that were being applied across China, but that this had been made far worse by rural 
cadres in qiaoxiang [侨乡 Overseas Chinese hometowns] who had ‘deviated’ from the 
correct line in their application of CCP Land Reform policies.33 This included forcing the 
qiaojuan to buy bonds, or levying grain contributions, based on their remittances.34 The 
situation had become so extreme that qiaojuan actually wrote to their huaqiao relatives 
instructing them to stop remitting for fear of incurring further persecution. Of course, the 
Land Reform was a nationwide campaign, and the experience thereof was not unique to 
the huaqiao.35 Yet, equally, if the Land Reform in qiaoxiang was affecting remittances, 
then it was also a specific problem for qiaowu. 
Yet, even though the Land Reform’s implementation (or more correctly, deviation) 
was posing problems for qiaowu—and negatively affecting remittances—the OCAC and 
PBOC had no solution. The only ‘guidance’ that Liao and Nan proffered was (once again) 
‘to serve the qiaobao [and] to facilitate huaqiao remittances’.36 To be sure, the conference 
approved measures for dealing with some of the other problems with remittances, mostly 
through education or explanation: explaining that the RMB’s strengthening meant a 
corollary fall in the values of foreign-denominated remittances; instructing all qiaopi 
couriers about a uniform 0.005% commission on remittances from 1 October that they 
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were permitted to charge; to introduce more efficiency in the postal service; to allow 
couriers or returning huaqiao to bring in certain items duty-free as a sort of remittance-
in-kind to circumvent the imperialists’ exchange controls.37  These were all sensible 
moves to address existing concerns—but none of them addressed the problems for 
remittances that were consequent to the Land Reform. 
It was not as if the OCAC and PBOC—and the other conference attendees—had 
failed to recognise that securing the party-state’s interests (in remittances) also required 
fulfilment of huaqiao interests. The problem was that qiaowu could not yet resolve the 
problems that the Land Reform posed to the remittance flow, particularly since the party-
state itself was uncertain on what should, or could be done. The conference declared that 
it was important to ‘strengthen the internal unity’ between the huaqiao and qiaojuan, 
because it was the qiaojuan who regularly conveyed news of China to relatives overseas 
(through their letters), and thus extra care had to be taken to eliminate huaqiao suspicions, 
so they could ‘be assured and safely remit money to support their families’.38 This was 
clearly recognition of the dualistic—indeed, transnational—nature of huaqiao interests 
that underpinned remittances. And while the conference admitted that there were limits 
to the external measures that it could undertake, it proposed to improve external qiaowu 
by: raising the levels of huaqiao patriotism; helping huaqiao to find ways to contribute 
to their hometowns; encouraging huaqiao to legally oppose the foreign imperialists’ 
restrictions on remittances; promoting unity with the qiaopi; strengthening the efficiency 
of banks administering remittances; and by organising collective efforts to revitalise 
remittances in the CPG.39 This was all very well and good—except for the ironic fact that 
though the conference’s proposed policies showed that it recognised that qiaowu had to 
cater to huaqiao interests in order to fulfil the party-state’s interests, it had also done 
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nothing to address the main issue that had the most negative impact on huaqiao interests, 
and consequently, on huaqiao remittances. 
The inability of the conference to offer any solution to the problems that came out 
of the Land Reform was because there was no agreement on what could or should be 
done—even though the problem was clear. Inasmuch as ‘deviations’ in the Land Reform 
had negatively impacted remittances, Nan and Liao admitted that there were differing 
views on how qiaowu should respond to the Land Reform, and thus the conference had 
avoided coming to a decision: ‘leaving it all to the Ministry of the Interior to conduct 
further study of the problem’.40 Nothing was to be done for the moment, and indeed, 
nothing could be done yet, because the question of how the Land Reform and qiaowu 
could correlate was in essence, a question about how the huaqiao should fit into the new 
socialist society. This was an on-going debate at the time, and it was a question far easier 
to deal with in theory than it was in practice. 
 
If only 1%: 
The CCP’s Land Reform predated their civil war victory and by 1950, ‘class 
struggle in the countryside’ had been in progress for a few years.41 This involved—along 
Soviet lines—the categorisation of the Chinese countryside into classes, with labourers, 
poor peasants and middle peasants, set against the landlords and rich peasants.42 In theory, 
the CCP cadres in charge of Land Reform facilitated (if not, led) ‘struggle sessions’ where 
the poor, hitherto exploited classes voiced their criticisms of, and grievances against their 
past capitalist oppressors and feudalist exploiters, who would then confess their sins and 
accept redistribution of their land and assets, thus creating a fairer society.43 In practice, 
Land Reform very often degenerated into an ‘orgy of violence’, coerced re-distribution(s), 
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death, and destruction.44 This campaign began in CCP-controlled Northeast China around 
1946, and spread southwards with the PLA’s advances. Yet, by 1948, the CCP apparently 
began to consider moderating the pace of Land Reform.45 
By February 1948, Mao was instructing CCP cadres to ‘not be impetuous’ in Land 
Reform, which had to match the ‘level of political consciousness of the masses and the 
strength of leading cadres’.46 Part of the reason for caution was (as seen in the preceding 
chapter) because of Stalin.47 But equally, CCP control in the ‘new liberated areas’ was 
tenuous, and there were already incidences of resistance.48 Yet, it does not appear that the 
Land Reform became less violent, even after the PRC’s inauguration, since more reports 
of ‘badly-styled decisions’ of rural cadres reached the CCP CC from at least December 
1949.49 ‘Deviationist’ cadres were apparently responsible for ‘wanton violence, death and 
arrests’ [乱打, 乱杀, 乱抓], and the CCP CC was concerned enough to instruct regional 
authorities to quickly rectify the deviations.50 
The impetus towards rectification masked the ‘considerable debate’ within the 
CCP leadership on ‘how severe Land Reform should be’, particularly in the southern 
regions, which the PLA had only recently taken control of.51 This debate, in early 1950, 
leaned towards relative moderation—as Mao himself seemed to suggest in his proposal 
that a Land Reform Law to underpin the nationwide Land Reform Campaign, exclude the 
‘semi-feudal rich peasants’ for the time being, so that the CCP could better unite the 
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country and avoid ‘ultra-Left deviations’.52 Similarly, there was also a strong sentiment 
amongst some in the CCP leadership that moderation should be applied to the Land 
Reform as it was carried out amongst the huaqiao in China. 
The CCP CC recognised that the huaqiao should be treated differently in the Land 
Reform because their particular situation involved certain ‘special issues’.53 Yet, the Land 
Reform Law (30 June 1950) promulgated by the CPG Committee failed to define what 
these special issues were. Article 24, in the section ‘on the handling of the questions to 
do with special cases’ simply stated that:54 
Land and houses owned by Overseas Chinese should be handled in accordance 
with appropriate measures determined by the People’s Governments (or military 
administrative committees) of the various big administrative areas or by 
provincial People’s Governments on the principle of having regard for the 
interests of Overseas Chinese and in keeping with the general principles of this 
law.55 
  
The CPG Committee did not explain what these ‘appropriate measures’ regarding the 
huaqiao were to be. But then again, the lack of specificity about the huaqiao position in 
the Land Reform reflected the fact that the party-state had not yet determined how to deal 
with huaqiao interests, both in relation to the imperatives of Land Reform, and to the 
strategic economic imperative to secure huaqiao remittances. 
Although a prior CCP CC discussion of the Land Reform Law in May 1950 
acknowledged teshu [特殊 special or exceptional] circumstances for huaqiao, it was 
unclear how this was defined. Thus the CCP CC, in an effort at clarification, ordered the 
Fujian Province CCP Committee (FPC) to report on how they would address the question 
in July 1950. Fujian was home to many qiaoxiang, but its Party Committee was not keen 
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on special consideration for the huaqiao.56 In September 1950, the FPC reported that the 
general nature of land ownership in huaqiao areas was of dense populations and scarce 
land. Tanmu village had on average 0.815 mu of land per household, Shixi had 0.482 mu, 
Xujia had 1.04 mu—and even then, this was not particularly fertile land since yields were 
historically low, and grain shortages were common.57 These were the reasons why people 
became huaqiao in the first place, and coming from such poverty, the majority ended up 
in working class professions. But the report also noted that ‘the huaqiao also have in their 
midst, members of the feudalist and exploitative classes’.58 This included rich peasants, 
landlords (big and small) and households owned or maintained by capitalist (or bourgeois) 
haiwai huaqiao. Yet, even if the socio-economic make-up of the huaqiao households was 
mixed, the FPC was ambivalent about special considerations for them. 
The FPC’s stated priorities were to ‘eliminate the landlord class and feudalist 
oppression, enabling the peasantry to gain land’; ‘to develop agrarian production’; and 
(only) then, ‘to look after huaqiao interests’. It is unlikely that the order of these priorities 
was random, since the FPC was firm in its rejection of ‘one-sidedly looking after huaqiao 
interests’. 59  The FPC argued that when ‘dealing with the exploitative and feudalist 
elements amongst the huaqiao’, it sought to avoid being forced to ‘retain excessive 
standards, and therefore cause contradictions with the general principle of the Land 
Reform’, simply because of so-called huaqiao special characteristics.60 Of course, land 
and/or property that deserved exemption should not face expropriation or redistribution, 
but equally, those who deserved to be struggled against should not be exempted. What 
was required was the recognition of the ‘close connection’ between Land Reform and the 
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development of the huaqiao economy, so as not to ‘naively and one-sidedly exaggerate 
the special characteristics of the huaqiao and thus create inappropriate and excessive 
demands’.61 Thus the FPC suggested that the huaqiao should worry less about their 
interests and support the Land Reform first. Only then would exploitation be eliminated 
and production revitalised, thus enabling economic development that both the huaqiao 
and non-huaqiao stood to gain from. 
Furthermore, regarding concerns over the possibility that the Land Reform might 
negatively affect huaqiao remittances, the FPC’s report suggested that: 
Some [qiaojuan] believe that this approach will affect huaqiao remittances, but 
everyone here believes that as long as commercial and industrial policy is 
managed well, remittances will be unaffected. To give huaqiao landlords too 
much consideration in this respect is to be detached from the will of the masses.62 
 
Indeed, the FPC reported that a qiaojuan said that other qiaojuan who only collected rent 
(on land paid for by remittances) and did not labour [劳动 laodong] were as bad as non-
huaqiao landlords.63 Yet, it seems unlikely that this was an honest view; the FPC itself 
had noted in May 1950 that a very large majority of qiaojuan were dependent on 
remittance (or remittance-derived) incomes for their livelihoods, which makes this self-
condemnation a rather unlikely one.64 The FPC did suggest that for huaqiao who had not 
been landlords prior to going abroad—and had bought land with the profits of their post-
emigrant labour (i.e. through remittances)—they should be differentiated from landlord 
households who had always been so.65 But regardless, the FPC insisted that huaqiao 
should not be allowed ‘extra consideration’ in class assessments, since having to make 
allowances each time the huaqiao were involved would only confuse the masses.66 The 
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FPC was thus clearly not in favour of special allowances for the huaqiao—whatever their 
special characteristics or circumstances. Yet, ironically enough, the party-state soon went 
in an entirely opposite direction. 
On 6 November 1950, the Government Administration Council (GAC) decreed 
its ‘Measures governing disposal of land and other property of Overseas Chinese during 
Agrarian Reform’.67 This first established who the huaqiao were in connection to the 
Land Reform Law, so that the appropriate articles could be applied. Accordingly, the 
huaqiao were legally defined as those who had lived abroad for at least a year and/or their 
immediate family in China (qiaojuan), while a guiqiao was a huaqiao who had not 
(already) returned for more than three years.68 The decree also integrated the FPC’s 
proposed differentiation between variant huaqiao landlords households; those who were 
landlord households before they (or their members) had gone abroad (and become 
huaqiao) would remain so, and thereafter face the full application of the Land Reform. 
Whereas landlord households that only became so after they (or their members) had gone 
overseas—and sent back money to buy land—were allowed to keep their private property 
(i.e. houses), even though their land could face expropriation. The ‘special’ justification 
here was that those huaqiao who had been poor, and thus forced into economic migration, 
had also suffered from capitalist or imperialist oppression and exploitation while abroad, 
much like the working class had—even if they became landlords later.69 
This relative leniency was not merely for the treatment of the landlords, it also 
applied to assessment of who were landlords.70 For one, huaqiao landlords ‘who were 
engaged in industrial and commercial activities’ were to be dealt with under Article 4 of 
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the Land Reform Law, which exempted properties used for such purposes from any 
expropriation.71 Exemptions were also given to qiaojuan who employed labourers to farm 
some of their land; they were to be classified as ‘semi-landlord with rich peasant status’, 
which meant that under Article 6, they too could escape expropriation.72 Non-labour 
derived income (like remittances) only mattered in one respect: per Article 8, all qiaojuan 
were entitled to the same quantities of redistributed land or assets as non-huaqiao 
households, except for households who lived off remittances alone, and did not labour.73 
It is worth noting that the FPC (and other provinces like Guangdong) had actually 
suggested some or parts of these policies.74 Which makes the necessity for the GAC’s 
direct intervention somewhat curious, as were the exemptions for the huaqiao landlords 
that contradicted Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy—even if a Chinese revolution required 
Chinese characteristics.75 Sinicization was a convenient ideological cover for the CCP 
most of the time, but this qiaowu requires some explaining. 
It was not so much the characteristics of the Chinese revolution—or even CCP 
benevolence—as much as it was the PRC’s circumstances that dictated qiaowu.76 The 
key consideration was the onset of China’s intervention in the Korean War, or what the 
party-state would later call ‘the Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea’.77 
Given that Mao was demonstrating a growing inclination to intervene in Korea from as 
early as August 1950—indeed, even before Inchon—it only stands to reason that certain 
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economic priorities in the PRC were raised to higher levels of importance, even as the 
country made preparations for war.78 In September 1950, the CFEC had already reported 
to Mao that in order to aid national economic construction, it was vital to engage in 
increasing production, improving communications and infrastructural networks, 
‘attracting huaqiao remittances’, and ‘creating impetus for the progressive return of 
capital to the country’.79 To be sure, economic construction was a priority even before 
the Korean War, but that only makes it all the more likely that the actual intervention 
necessitated even more attention to the economy. 
 On 27 October 1950, just two days after the Chinese People’s Volunteers had 
crossed the Yalu River—and sent the Cold War to new heights of tension—vice-Premier 
(and CFEC head) Chen Yun and Finance Minister Bo Yibo sent a memo to Mao and the 
CCP CC regarding their ‘Estimates on the Current Situation and Measures to address 
Financial Questions’.80 Chen and Bo’s planning presumed a scenario where the Korean 
War would escalate, and possibly lead to attacks on China.81 The point being, as Chen 
told the CFEC on 15 and 27 November, that there would be intense economic pressures 
in 1951.82 Whereas planning for 1950 presumed ‘peaceful recovery’, the onset of war 
predicated increased expenditure and a ‘lower revenue expectation’.83 Chen admitted that 
the economy was far from resilient, and despite higher expenditures, China could not seek 
foreign loans, or issue more bonds, since ‘it would not amount to much as well’.84 Hence, 
as Chen said: 
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In terms of investment in economic development, we have the following 
guidelines. Anything that has a direct impact on military affairs and materiel, 
anything with direct impact on state revenue, and anything that stabilises the 
market; these we will fully embrace and engage in. We have to be circumspect 
about everything else.85 
 
In that light, and considering what the OCAC and PBOC had reported about the Land 
Reform’s early impact on remittances, it is clear that huaqiao remittances were the 
underlying basis for the 1950 GAC decree. In that sense, qiaowu was predicated on a 
party-state desire to ‘fully embrace and engage’ in securing remittances. 
 Unfortunately for the CFEC, while China’s intervention in Korea underlined the 
necessity of remittances—given rising expenditure and falling revenues—it also created 
a different difficulty, since it resulted in the United States’ intensification of an ‘economic 
Cold War’ against the PRC, and the introduction of sweeping economic sanctions.86 This 
was a new and unwelcome development that the CFEC rushed to counteract in December 
1950, issuing instructions designed to reduce the impact of the American sanctions. These 
ranged from the ‘rush purchases’ of import materials before the embargo took effect, to 
the cancellation of orders, the refund of purchases that had been blocked from transfer to 
Chinese ports, and new regulations on the flow of remittances.87  
The new regulations promulgated by the PBOC in December 1950 suggested that 
remittances could, and should henceforth be sent in the form of import materials.88 The 
problem with foreign currency transfers was that this left the PRC exposed to the added 
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risks and difficulties of ensuring transactions, even while the US and its allies tightened 
the pressures on Chinese trade and finances.89 Yet, realising however that the huaqiao 
would not necessarily understand what was going on, the CFEC made limited allowances 
for huaqiao to still send money home directly, albeit only in Swiss francs, or HKD via 
Hong Kong; while guiqiao were encouraged to bring gold or US dollars (only in cash) 
with them into China on their returns.90 Yet, none of this meant that the perception of the 
remittances’ core utility to the economy was diminished—in fact, even despite the new 
pressures, the OCAC and PBOC took pains to stress that remittances remained a critically 
important resource for the country.91 
In January 1951, the BOC issued instructions to promote remittances in RMB 
instead of foreign currency. This reflected the change in the utility of foreign currency 
remittances as a mechanism to preserve value in an era of foreign sanctions on China, and 
it seems to have convinced remitters quickly since the BOC estimated in February 1951, 
that RMB now made up 40% of remittances via Hong Kong.92 Indeed, the BOC seemed 
to believe that the huaqiao would now prefer RMB to their prior ‘misguided affection for 
foreign currency’, while the qiaojuan, once assured of the value of RMB remittances, 
would welcome the change. 93  To some extent, the BOC was simply being self-
congratulatory: ‘this success demonstrates that the People’s Government has served the 
qiaobao, executing correct remittance policy, and the achievements we have 
accomplished have also been educational towards the qiaobao in showing to them New 
China’s economic prosperity and the ever-increasing standards of living for the people’.94 
This was rather disingenuous, since the bank did not promote RMB remittances until it 
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was forced to by the embargo. But nonetheless, the BOC’s assessment implied that the 
way to incentivise the huaqiao abroad into maintaining, or increasing remittances, was to 
focus on the domestic settings and interests—as indeed, the ‘ever-increasing standards of 
living for the people’ implied. This focus actually reflected the direction that qiaowu was 
generally moving towards by 1951. 
The OCAC and the PBOC had first pointed to the transnationality of huaqiao 
interests underlying their remittances back in September 1950, and the OCAC also led 
the charge to embrace this transnationality more broadly in policy-work. In early 1951, 
the OCAC sent directives to local governments to instruct them on the collection of 
haiwai huaqiao publications.95 This information-gathering drive was apparently due to a 
desire ‘to better understand the situation of the qiaobao’.96 But the OCAC ordered that 
this drive be kept secret, ‘to avoid the unreasonable scrutiny of the reactionary 
governments’ on those haiwai huaqiao who were sending materials back.97 This sense of 
caution was also evident in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) orders to the PRC’s 
representatives based in Southeast Asia to: ‘plan for the long-term, preserve our strength; 
avoid risk-taking, forestall losses’.98 The MFA instructed representatives to organise 
opposition to American imperialism amongst the huaqiao if possible, but only if it did 
not alienate any local revolutionary or political movements, and if it was not illegal. The 
point was that such moves would also bring undue suspicion onto the huaqiao, both from 
local governments, and also from non-Chinese political movements.99 Encouraging the 
huaqiao to support their homeland was thus never to risk their long-term interests and 
security.100 Here was thus a basic acknowledgement of transnational huaqiao interests; 
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for the OCAC (and MFA) the implication was that effective policy looked to the huaqiao 
interest, even if it was served best by downplaying loyalties to, or support for New China. 
This secured their longer-term interests, enabling them to continue remitting money home, 
which ultimately was the bigger (and far better) contribution to the party-state’s interests. 
Yet, it is also worth noting that the most effective qiaowu was actually that which focused 
on domestic huaqiao interests. 
To be sure, the transnationality of huaqiao interests meant that haiwai huaqiao 
interests—in whichever foreign country—were key to the flow of remittances. Indeed, 
the logic for the OCAC and its fellow qiaowu practitioners was inescapable: without the 
haiwai huaqiao, there would be no remittances. Yet, since motivations for remittances 
were centred on the persons, property, and maybe even philanthropy, that were all in 
China, the other inescapable fact was that incentivising the huaqiao to send and receive 
remittances depended on domestic considerations. In a way, perhaps this was always a 
given; remittances had historically been mostly for family support. In any case, by 1951, 
this understanding had been forced to the forefront. 
 Given an understanding that qiaowu—and its imperative to gain remittances—
was best served by addressing the transnationality of huaqiao interests, the party-state 
and its qiaowu practitioners began to undertake broader approaches to qiaowu policy, that 
went beyond facilitating finances. In that respect, Shanghai—that great port at the heart 
of Chinese trade, finance and industry, and the home of many qiaojuan, guiqiao and 
qiaosheng—was a microcosm of qiaowu’s new direction. In April 1951, the Shanghai 
People’s Government (SPG) acknowledged that the qiaojuan ‘cannot be meaningfully 
separated from hawai qiaobao’.101 Thus, the task for the SPG was to cater to qiaojuan 
(domestic) interests, precisely so as to pacify the interests of the haiwai huaqiao, and thus 
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ensure the smooth flow of remittances.102 Moreover, the SPG also suggested that the 
haiwai huaqiao had great interest in investing in China, and needed guidance.103 The SPG 
thus created a separate qiaowu office under its Civil Affairs Department, to focus on these 
issues and to work with other qiaowu practitioners.104 This typified the direction qiaowu 
was headed in: always defined by the remittance imperative, but underpinned by broader 
approaches to huaqiao interests. As the SPG noted: ‘We must help them [huaqiao] solve 
their problems, encourage them in their patriotism, and strive to win their support and 
participation in national construction’.105 
  Shanghai’s attempt to professionalise and domesticate qiaowu reflected the 
prevailing qiaowu discourse in the party-state’.106 Indeed, given the domestic centre of 
gravity for huaqiao interests, the task for qiaowu was to cast the PRC as the guardian of 
those domestic (indeed, Mainland) interests. Zhou Enlai (in October 1951) claimed that 
while foreign governments persecuted the huaqiao, New China had a ‘deep care for 
them’.107 Similarly, He Xiangning conflated guiqiao and qiaojuan participation in the 
‘Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea’ with haiwai huaqiao opposition 
to the US’ imperialism.108 Indeed, He asserted that even if the US restricted remittances, 
the qiaojuan and guiqiao could participate positively in the Land Reform and production, 
and achieve self-reliance.109 Equally, the haiwai huaqiao could help to revitalise industry 
by remitting to invest in it.110 Ultimately, as He said: 
Dear qiaobao, I hope that you, while overseas, are able to work closely together 
with our foreign friends, and more positively embrace, on the one hand the 
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development and establishment of your own overseas enterprise; and on the other 
hand, also participation in New China’s construction work. You can always look 
to the CPG for concern and positive assistance because you belong to a homeland 
that loves you.111 
 
The public discourse on qiaowu was thus that the PRC would do its duty to the huaqiao, 
and if the huaqiao (writ large) were similarly to give their homeland all their love and 
support, then everyone stood to gain. Yet, the problem with this discourse was that—and 
once again for the CCP—rhetoric was not reality. 
 In June 1951, at the first-ever OCAC Expanded Conference on qiaowu work, He 
Xiangning equated the new era of New China’s ‘great construction’ with a ‘new era’ of 
qiaowu. He defined qiaowu’s duties as to introduce to all the ‘broad masses of qiaobao 
and qiaojuan’ the ‘great victories of our homeland, the role of Mao Zedong thought in 
these victories, and the situation and experience of the nation-wide and unified struggle 
in economic construction’.112 Indeed, He said that qiaowu was intended at: ‘organising 
qiaojuan and guiqiao to participate in production’, and ‘encouraging huaqiao capital 
investment in national construction’. As He declared, these were the ‘things that affect 
the huaqiao whether they be within or without China, particularly in terms of qiaojuan 
and guiqiao livelihood’, and therefore had to be the focus of qiaowu.113 Yet, the real 
reason why a ‘new era’ of qiaowu was concerned with the ‘things that affect the huaqiao’ 
was rather more to do with its underlying political economy. 
 In a report to Zhou Enlai in June 1951, He Xiangning stated that to ‘strive for 
huaqiao remittances and to forestall the possibilities of difficulties arising in the flow’, 
the OCAC requested that the national banks ‘take special care of remittances, and the 
special circumstances of qiaosheng, and come up with a plan for capital preservation and 
guaranteed interest rates’.114 According to He, a remittance deposit of HKD 2000 per 
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month for each qiaosheng was sufficient to support their studies; for a qiaojuan household 
(of 3-4 persons), HKD 3000 was enough for basic necessities. Moreover, these figures, 
according to He, were on the low side.115 Indeed, He asserted that: 
Based on our estimates of there being over 10 million huaqiao, if only 1% of the 
huaqiao respond to our encouragement, this would be a capital inflow of around 
HKD 200 million in funds for construction and production.116 
 
He was right to point out that remittances would constitute capital reserves for the 
economy—and not individual property—because the state banks were basically the only 
ones legally entitled to administer foreign exchange deposits, conversions, and the 
monthly payments. But He’s rhetoric also reflected two larger points. Firstly, He’s 
scenario of 1% responding meant HKD 200 million more, and not 100,000 more huaqiao 
sharing in the warm embrace of the homeland. Secondly, He’s conditional ‘if’ suggested 
that she recognised that gaining remittances depended on whether qiaowu could 
successfully convince the huaqiao. Thus the ‘new era’ of qiaowu was actually an exercise 
in the accumulation of economic resources, underpinned by the politics of persuasion.117 
The huaqiao were thus given special considerations, not because they were legitimately 
entitled, but because the whole exercise rested on qiaowu being able to offer a convincing 
argument, or indeed, an incentive for remittances.  
 In a way, despite the fact that the OCAC and qiaowu practitioners were, in essence, 
devising an elaborate deception—or at the very least, deliberate manipulation of huaqiao 
relations, identities and connections—given that this qiaowu approach was designed to 
incentivise the huaqiao into remittances, and basically, greater economic utility, there 
was perhaps still a convergence in this utilitarianism between the party-state’s economic 
interests and huaqiao interests. In that sense, despite its disingenuousness, perhaps there 
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were benefits for all in this form of qiaowu. Yet, what was also true was that the relative 
success of this policy approach depended on successfully convincing the huaqiao that 
their interests were met. Thus Liao Chengzhi declared to some Burmese and Indonesian 
huaqiao visitors to China in September 1951 that: 
We are determined, on the domestic front, to do all aspects of huaqiao work well, 
while on the external front, our embassies will spare no effort in seeking to protect 
huaqiao interests.118  
 
This was the gospel of the ‘new era’ of qiaowu that the OCAC preached.119 But then 
again, Liao and his fellow qiaowu practitioners would soon realise just exactly how much 
qiaowu was failing to convince.120 
 
All huaqiao have money: 
 The Korean War was the impetus for an intensification of the CCP’s attempt at 
socio-political transformation, particularly as Mao believed that China’s intervention 
could both raise its ‘international prestige’, and also generate ‘added political energy for 
securing Communist control of China’s state and society’. 121  Thus, alongside the 
mobilisation of the Chinese people’s ‘hatred of the U.S. imperialists’ came also an intense 
campaign to suppress ‘reactionaries and reactionary activities’.122 To be sure, this was 
partly a reaction to the perception of external threat.123 But it was also to eliminate all 
remaining resistance to CCP control.124 Mao and the CCP CC had, after all, ordered the 
campaign prior to the Korean intervention, justifying it as: 
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So as to strike a blow against the imperialists’ plots to sabotage, and to completely 
eliminate Chiang Kai-shek’s remaining bandit groups; so as to ensure the smooth 
progress of the Land Reform and economic construction; and so as to consolidate 
and expand the victory of the Chinese people.125 
 
Significantly, the CCP CC explicitly tied the suppression [镇反 zhenfan] to the Land 
Reform, which implied that those who obstructed its ‘smooth progress’ were counter-
revolutionaries and/or reactionaries. Equally, to ‘strike a blow’ against the enemies of the 
revolution was to intensify the Land Reform—which had, to some in the Party, been too 
lenient on the landlords and overly-concerned with ‘peaceful class assessment, peaceful 
expropriation and peaceful redistribution’.126 
 The perception of threat at home and abroad in late 1950 thus engendered in 
China’s leaders the belief that it was necessary to ‘transform the country’s Land Reform 
into a violent class struggle’.127 This was enunciated by Deng Zihui—in charge of Land 
Reform in Central-South China—in a speech in December 1950 that rejected ‘purely 
technical’ Land Reform and called for the destruction of the landlords, and for ‘class 
struggle and opposition between hired labourers, poor and middle peasants, and 
landlords’.128 Yet, ‘landlord’ was fast becoming ‘a kind of stand-in category for all forms 
of assumed and imputed opposition to the Party and the Revolution’.129  
Initially, the CCP CC was concerned by the possibility of far-left deviations.130 
But the problem was that they were inconsistent. In December 1950, Deng Zihui and the 
Central-South Bureau suggested a ‘hands off approach to mobilisation’ of peasants, to 
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allow them to ‘attack the landlords’. To the Bureau, to take a ‘hands off approach to 
mobilising the masses’ was in fact ‘to be complacent on class struggle’, while to ‘one-
sidedly insist’ on a predetermined schedule for Land Reform work, and to ‘speak 
hollowly of a united front’, was ‘a half-cooked appearance’.131 The CCP CC agreed that 
Land Reform should not ‘veer right’ and let landlords off easily, but it warned that far 
left deviations were dangerous. In particular it warned against misguided attacks on rich 
peasants, wanton violence, coercion and ‘creating a big storm about very little’.132 Yet, 
the CCP CC was obviously not successful in advocating restraint, since by January 1951 
this radicalisation had spread to East China as well.133  
Conversely, even as the CCP CC preached relative restraint, some other CCP 
leaders also called for radicalised mobilisation, such as Mao Zedong’s November 1950 
call to Fujian to ‘accelerate the progress of the Land Reform, and to expand the armed 
and determined suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in local areas’.134 What 
this meant was that even as qiaowu from November 1950 and into 1951 attempted a ‘new 
era’ of policy, the party-state was instigating—whether inadvertently or not—a more 
radical mood that would have very serious repercussions for qiaowu. 
In December 1951, Nan Hanchen and Hu Jingyun issued the PBOC’s official 
report on remittance work for the year just past.135 According to their calculations, 1951’s 
remittances had increased year-on-year by 40% (US$118 million to US$170 million).136 
Direct investment by huaqiao [侨资 qiaozi] amounted to US$3 million; a small figure 
compared to remittances for household support, but still a welcome trend. This, the PBOC 
                                                
131 CCP CC Central-South Bureau, ‘Zhongnan ju guanyu fangshou fadong qunzhong chedi wancheng tugai 
jihua de zhishi’, 01/12/1950, ZZWX, 4: 402-414 (402). 
132 CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tugai zhong jiuzheng youqing pianxiang he zhuyi fangzhi 
‘zuo’ qing weixian gei zhongnan ju de pifu’, 20/12/1950, ZZWX, 4: 400-402 (400). 
133 CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang zhuanfa huadong ju, Zhejiang shengwei guanyu jiuzheng tugai zhong 
cuo hua jieji chengfen de zhishi’, 22/01/1951, ZZWX, 5: 49-51 (49) 
134 Jiang Guangliang, ‘Kangmei yuanchao yundong dui jianguo chuqi tudi gaige yingxiang chu tan — yi 
Jiangxi sheng wei li’, 94-95. 
135 Hu Jingyun was the PBOC vice-President. 
136 Nan Hanchen, Hu Jingyun, ‘Qunian qiaohui gongzuo zongjie yu jinnian zhengqu kuoda qiaohui qiaozi 
de fangzhen’, 06/12/1951, 1949-1952 jinrong juan, 836-838 (836). 
 97 
claimed, vindicated the correctness of their slogan to ‘serve the qiaobao, [and] facilitate 
huaqiao remittances’. The PBOC’s correct policy, it argued, had been in: organising the 
qiaopi couriers to overcome the Western embargo; maintaining good awareness of the 
situation amongst the huaqiao overseas; strengthening the ‘education’ (or propagandising) 
of haiwai huaqiao and qiaojuan; continuing the professionalising of qiaowu to efficiently 
handle qiaojuan travel documents, currency exchange, and to find employment for, and 
settle huaqiao refugees [难侨 nanqiao]; ensuring that bank branches spread information 
to the huaqiao; strengthening communication networks between the government and the 
huaqiao; providing guidance on investment opportunities to the huaqiao; and in assisting 
huaqiao enterprises in the recovery and expansion of their businesses.137  
Yet for all the achievements the PBOC claimed, they were also very cautious. The 
PBOC asserted that the importance of remittances to the economy was only going to 
increase; huaqiao remittances in 1951 were equivalent to 80% of China’s exports to the 
‘capitalist countries’—which was year-on-year growth of 29%. 138  Thus remittances 
‘would henceforth be an important source of strength in supporting the national 
economy’.139 However, the PBOC’s report also contained indications that there were 
problems—foreign and domestic.140 In the foreign situation, the Western embargo was 
still in effect, with consequent difficulties for qiaopi and the remittance flows. Yet, when 
it came to the domestic setting, the situation was far more problematic. 
 The PBOC called for a very ‘thorough rectification of deviations in the Land 
Reform’. This meant strengthening propaganda and education in the qiaoxiang and 
overseas, to correct the actions of cadres and Land Reform work units, since—whether 
due to cadres’ deviations or rumours spread by ‘Chiang bandits’—the huaqiao had 
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developed ‘four fears’ about remittances. Firstly, that remittances left recipients liable to 
higher class assessments (i.e. landlords); secondly, that the banks would arbitrarily deduct 
from remittances; third, that recipients would be coerced into making ‘donations’; and 
fourth, that local Peasant Associations would force recipients into making ‘loans’.141 All 
of this meant that large sums of remittances were left in accounts in Hong Kong, for fear 
that withdrawal in China would lead to problems. The PBOC thus insisted on ‘educational’ 
work to qiaojuan to alleviate their fears, so that they could then inform huaqiao relatives 
of the ‘true’ conditions, and ‘more thoroughly rectify the deviations’.142 
Nan and Hu made it clear that none of this was the PBOC’s fault. The problem, 
as they saw it, was that large-scale propaganda was not possible in imperialist-controlled 
countries, but the most effective propaganda was always via qiaojuan letters. That, to the 
central bank, placed the blame on the local cadres. Some of the poor or false information 
emanating from the villages was allegedly the fault of the reactionary ‘old intellectuals’ 
who wrote rumour-mongering letters on behalf of others. Yet, this did not convince the 
PBOC since its own inspection had found many qiaojuan writing the ‘tales of misery’ 
themselves. One view was that the qiaojuan did not write of a better life for fear of 
censorship by ‘reactionary governments’, and hence ‘continually spoke of misery’. Yet, 
the PBOC did not believe this, and stated that what was needed was more guidance from 
local cadres to the qiaojuan on the information they were sending overseas. This was not 
something the PBOC considered part of its responsibility; it was rather the duty of cadres 
and Land Reform work units.143 What the PBOC saw as its chief concern was in ‘offering 
guidance to huaqiao investment’; since remittances mostly depended on qiaojuan needs 
and interests, local cadres were to be responsible for rectifying the situation. 
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To be true, the issue of information dissemination—a ‘letter writing campaign’ as 
Glen Peterson notes—was particularly controversial at the time.144 While intended at 
creating positive publicity for New China, and to revitalise remittances, the campaign 
instead stirred up negative publicity, as many qiaojuan either wrote about poor conditions 
in qiaoxiang, or wrote ‘ransom notes’ requesting (demanding) money for fear of what 
local Party cadres and Land Reform work units might do to them otherwise.145 The 
PBOC’s report, on the other hand, demonstrates that it was not concerned with who was 
actually to blame for the content of the letters—whether it was the ‘counter-revolutionary 
intellectuals’, local cadres, or misguided qiaojuan was beside the point. The point was 
that it had to be rectified because it affected remittances. 
 The PBOC was not alone in its concern. Liao Chengzhi, in a report to Liao Luyan, 
the Minister for Agriculture, and Premier Zhou Enlai (also in December 1951), also 
criticised the Land Reform in qiaoxiang. Liao drew a comparison between Fujian and 
Guangdong, and stated that because the FPC had developed a better, and more accurate 
understanding of remittances and Land Reform in qiaoxiang, ‘there had not yet been any 
complaints from overseas’. Yet, in Guangdong, deviations abounded. As the Western 
Guangdong Party Committee admitted: ‘some of them [cadres] even believe: all huaqiao 
have money—all of them are bad’.146 Liao believed that such views amongst local cadres 
were exacerbated by their rudimentary understanding of economics, and thus resulted in 
serious deviations. These, as Liao described, included cadres ‘attacking inaccurately, [and] 
attacking without restraint’. To them, ‘all landlords were evil’ but even leasers of small 
plots (i.e. 1-2 mu) and small retailers were assessed as landlords. Cadres conflated 
capitalism with feudalism, and thus ‘attacked’ without discernment, with qiaojuan 
possessing less than even 1 mu of land assessed as landlords because their remittances 
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basically constituted ‘exploitative profit’. Unsurprisingly, all of this had caused ‘a stirring 
up of insecurity’ amongst the huaqiao.147 
This situation, to Liao, had an impact on perceptions of New China amongst the 
haiwai huaqiao. Based on the OCAC’s research and reports from consulates, Liao 
asserted that because of the news from home, and because of negative rumours spread by 
the US and its allies, haiwai huaqiao had increasingly negative views about the PRC. But 
this situation could not be addressed, Liao asserted, unless there was a solution to the 
internal problem first, which the OCAC’s research had firmly centred on the issue of 
huaqiao remittances. As Liao described, qiaojuan were fundamentally afraid of the 
persecution to which remittances opened them to. This was anything from higher class 
assessments (as landlords); being ‘struggled against’, which ranged from public shaming 
to physical violence; expropriation, or forced ‘contributions’ of 30-50% of remittances, 
or forced loans. All of which resulted in qiaojuan writing to relatives telling them either 
to send less money, or not at all, with some even sending received remittances back. Even 
though the PBOC stated that overall remittances were up, Liao pointed out that 
Guangdong had seen decreases in a three-month period after Land Reform, while fully 
40% of the remittances sent for central Guangdong remained in Hong Kong accounts, 
because nobody dared to withdraw the money.148 
Faced with such a situation, Liao proposed nine rectifications. Firstly, that the 
South China Bureau require Party Committees and Land Reform work units to study ‘the 
local qiaojuan situation’, examine previous activities, and effectively disseminate the 
1950 GAC decree. Second, to ensure that class assessments followed the letter of the law. 
Thirdly, huaqiao remittances were not to be used as a form of class assessment; it was 
not a form of feudalism, nor was it capitalist profit.149 Fourth, to ensure that the (real) 
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huaqiao landlords were dealt with proportionately under the 1950 GAC decree. Fifth, 
qiaojuan who were renting out their land because of a lack of labour were not landlords.150 
Sixth, officials were not to use remittances to assess how much qiaojuan could rent their 
land out for—and they were not to force qiaojuan ‘to beg for more money’. Seventh, 
when ‘struggling against’ the truly evil huaqiao landlords, action had to be approved by 
at least county-level Party Committees. Eighth, ‘all matters relating to huaqiao 
remittances must adhere to the governance and regulations issued by the banks’, while 
cadres were prohibited from interfering with remittances. Ninth, to mobilise the huaqiao 
to support the Land Reform, and to combat the falsehoods, every county was to hold its 
own qiaowu discussion meetings to explain government policy, rectify deviations, and 
enable the huaqiao to inform their relatives abroad of the improving situation in the 
homeland and in their hometowns.151 
Liao knew that there were serious problems with the Land Reform, and that the 
huaqiao had justifiable concerns. However, his concern was not so much for huaqiao 
suffering, but rather for the unacceptable risks to remittances. Thus his proposal that 
education be strengthened for qiaojuan, so that they would write more positive letters to 
relatives. It was the remittances that mattered to qiaowu—not the huaqiao. Or, as Liao 
instructed on the suggested discussion meetings: ‘there must necessarily be some sort of 
preparation beforehand, lest they become meetings for qiaojuan to voice their misery’.152 
Avoiding the perception of misery was the main focus—not actually removing it. 
  The OCAC and PBOC reports in December 1951 proved very influential, and 
Liao’s nine-point rectification was approved on 3 January 1952.153 This was almost 
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immediately followed by the CCP CC’s first-ever statement on qiaowu on 6 January. The 
CCP CC formally defined haiwai huaqiao as nationals of the PRC—those who had taken 
up local citizenship were no longer to be included. Yet, the CC acknowledged that all 
huaqiao had close connections with their homeland, not least because of their 
‘unbreakable bonds’ with the qiaojuan. Thus qiaowu was to protect the ‘legitimate 
interests’ of huaqiao, to align huaqiao policy with foreign policy and to expand the 
patriotic unity of the huaqiao.154 This entailed ‘positive methods within and without 
China’, that would 'protect the legitimate interests of the huaqiao, serve the huaqiao, 
welcome back refugees’, and also encourage the haiwai huaqiao to ‘gradually move their 
assets and business back to the homeland’.155 The CCP CC also instructed that the 
huaqiao (especially in Southeast Asia) should avoid local politics, while qiaowu should 
communicate with them more effectively, and ‘exert great strength in doing huaqiao 
remittance work well, to guide the huaqiao to return and invest in China, and to direct the 
huaqiao towards work that would best preserve their rightful interests’.156  
To be sure, the CCP CC’s instructions were not new, with one notable exception 
in the unprecedented renunciation of huaqiao dual nationality rights, and by extension, 
jus sanguinis, but even that was not publicly communicated until 1955.157 Thus what the 
CCP CC statement actually constituted was both an endorsement of qiaowu, and a 
roadmap for its future. The CCP CC accepted the transnationality of huaqiao interests, as 
derived from ‘unbreakable bonds’ between huaqiao in and outside of China. It approved 
the focus on domestic-centred interests as a means of incentivising huaqiao remittances 
and more broadly, economic contribution. And the CCP CC endorsed the position that 
outward-facing qiaowu should avoid incurring problems for the haiwai huaqiao and their 
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long-term interests. In fact, given the renunciation of dual nationality, this revealed the 
party-state’s intent to shed responsibility for the huaqiao outside of the PRC’s borders, 
without compromising the portrayal of New China as the locus of huaqiao ‘patriotic 
unity’, and to focus on qiaowu inside China, and to therefore portray the party-state as 
the guardian of huaqiao interests in the homeland. The CCP CC had thus approved the 
transnationality of huaqiao interests as conceived by the OCAC and its fellow qiaowu 
practitioners, and the political economy of qiaowu that was intended to capitalise on that 
transnationality. Yet, curiously, the CCP CC also pointedly noted that: ‘the various local 
qiaowu institutions are to cooperate with local governments in carrying out guonei 
huaqiao and qiaojuan work’.158 But then, this was the crux of the problem. 
 The OCAC and PBOC believed that effective remittance policy was connected to 
qiaowu’s ability to convince the huaqiao that their interests were being fulfilled, but what 
qiaowu practitioners only realised belatedly was that they also had to convince the CCP 
at the local level. Indeed, a common view amongst local Party officials in South China 
was that ‘struggling against’ the huaqiao landlords was necessary to satisfy the majority’s 
needs, and to be on the side of the masses. In February 1952, the Party Committee of 
Zhongshan County (Guangxi Province) reported to the CCP CC South China Bureau, that 
under current regulations, they were limited to expropriating land from huaqiao who had 
become landlords only after going overseas; but if ‘we were not to touch their excess 
grain, this would affect our ability to satisfy the needs of the poor and tenant farmers, and 
the majority would be unhappy’.159 The South China Bureau sent to Beijing for further 
instructions, and the CCP CC re-emphasised the 1950 GAC decree—but while the Bureau 
had at least sought clarification from Beijing, this was not always the case.160  
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 In a way, even though the CCP CC instructed qiaowu and local officials to work 
together, what dissonance there was, was of the party-state’s own making. What did not 
help the implementation of the 1950 GAC decree was the launch of yet another mass 
mobilisation in 1952: the ‘Three Antis’ campaign (anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti-
bureaucratism).161 It was, as Bo Yibo described, ‘a revolutionary movement of the same 
historical importance’ as the war in Korea, the Land Reform, and the zhenfan 
campaign.162 But this particular mobilisation was aimed at securing China’s economy by 
saving money, since ‘without adequate supplies of money, we simply cannot build the 
economy of the New Democracy’.163 Thus, and logically enough, the Three Antis initially 
targeted Party and government officials guilty of corruption, waste and bureaucratism. 
Yet, the Three Antis soon morphed to target a segment of society that the huaqiao had 
long been vulnerable to being associated with: the national bourgeoisie. According to 
Zhou Enlai, the Chinese national bourgeoisie, though in the united front and not the same 
as the big capitalists or comprador classes, were still ‘at base the same with bourgeois all 
over the world’, as they were mercenary, profit-driven, opportunistic, and preoccupied 
with ‘their own minority interest’.164 This, following Zhou’s assertion of ‘the national 
economy having the highest priority’, meant that these individual interests were going to 
have to be subjected to ‘that which is best able to satisfy the largest possible majority of 
the people to the highest and most long-term interests’.165 
 Zhou was of course, not referring to the huaqiao when he made those remarks 
about individual and national interests. Indeed, given how the party-state saw qiaowu’s 
contribution to the national interest, it is unlikely that Zhou would have considered the 
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huaqiao interest—in qiaowu’s political economy—to be unnecessary. Yet, that did not 
mean that CCP cadres were as enlightened. If bourgeois-ness was to be preoccupied with 
a ‘minority interest’, it was surely no great leap to see a huaqiao landlord, or a qiaojuan 
with remittances as having that ‘minority interest’. 
Though qiaowu had stressed that huaqiao landlords were not feudalists, or big 
capitalists, and that remittances were not exploitative profit, how were local cadres—
those whom Liao Chengzhi had derided for ignorance of economics—to reconcile such 
a differentiation with ‘the largest possible majority’? The national bourgeoisie, after all, 
included a spread of small-time retailers, traders, and industry and commerce owners—
so no wonder that local CCP officials like the Zhongshan Committee questioned just how 
exactly they were meant to fulfil the needs of the majority, and look after the huaqiao. 
Chen Yun and Bo Yibo could state in January 1952 that the Korean War’s continuance 
required careful attention on the economy, but local cadres would have been far more 
likely to interpret that ‘careful attention’ in the light of calls to mobilise against capitalist 
evils—as indeed a second campaign did, on 26 January 1952 with the extension of the 
‘Three Antis’ to a new ‘Five Antis’.166 
 The problem with local CCP cadres and officials identifying huaqiao as either 
Three or Five Antis enemies was made worse in Guangdong because there, the party-
state attempted to conduct a more ideologically-pure Land Reform—with the result that 
qiaowu in the region with the most qiaoxiang, was turned upside down.167 In the wake of 
the intensification of the Land Reform in late 1950, the Central-South Land Reform 
Committee had ordered Guangdong officials to take a harsher line in their implementation 
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of Land Reform.168  The Central-South leaders alleged that Guangdong officials and 
cadres were too closely linked to the local people, and were overly lenient to landlords 
because of social (and familial) relationships. Thus accused of ‘localism’, the Guangdong 
Land Reform Committee was forced into self-criticism and then into a promise in January 
1951, that the province’s Land Reform would henceforth be ‘a struggle that shakes 
heaven and earth’.169 Yet, the Party evidently did not believe this ‘localism’ could be self-
corrected, since over the next two years, 80% of local cadres (from Guangdong) from the 
county level up were purged and replaced by some 6000 cadres sent from the Northern 
provinces.170 These Northern cadres were chosen because they had no local affinities—
and certainly, no sympathy. 
 The purge of Guangdong ‘localism’ was not just because of the Central-South 
Bureau’s hard line; it was Mao’s desire also to accelerate the Land Reform in South China, 
and he dispatched Tao Zhu to Guangdong in 1952 with his ‘personal mandate’ to intensify 
the Land Reform there.171 Tao gradually displaced, replaced or purged leaders accused of 
‘localism’—including Fang Fang.172 Fang had deep roots and a ‘devoted following in the 
party organisation’ in the region.173 But while Fang was the Third Secretary for South 
China, he was also an OCAC Commissioner.174 Indeed, Fang had ‘paid special attention 
to the question of handling land belonging to overseas Chinese’ in a speech in October 
1950 on the Land Reform in Guangdong, and so he symbolised qiaowu as much as he 
typified ‘localism’.175 Both ensured that Fang was demoted in October 1952, and later 
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removed from the Guangdong Party hierarchy.176 The party-state was thus seemingly 
unable to reconcile its qiaowu with its own demands for ideological purity. 
Yet, for Liao Chengzhi, to insist on ideological dictates against qiaowu, as had 
been the case in Guangdong, would only undermine its political economy. In a speech to 
visiting Burmese huaqiao in May 1952, Liao made a curious remark: ‘It does not matter 
what occupations the qiaobao are in—industry, agriculture, small-scale retail or business, 
or capitalists, even if comprador-capitalists—as long as they have the homeland in their 
hearts.’ 177  Furthermore, since ‘the homeland and overseas are two different places 
entirely; the situation is different in each and our methods must also be different’—and 
thus, as Liao said, ‘we must be careful not to make the mistake of dogmatism’.178 Liao 
may have couched these remarks as being about different domestic and external aspects 
of qiaowu, but actually, his point was rather more critical.  
 Liao’s warning about dogmatism was not merely about avoiding transplanting 
domestic qiaowu to external settings (and vice versa). His point was rather that the correct 
approach was one which employed appropriate qiaowu policy in flexible ways. In June 
1952, Liao told the National United Front Conference that reaching out to the haiwai 
huaqiao was to build a ‘Patriotic United Front’ to promote contributions to the homeland. 
Yet, he also noted that this meant ‘not the methods of revolutionary struggle’, but ‘a 
gradual approach’. This was because ‘the main components of this unification effort are 
from the middle and upper levels of society’.179 And thus it was necessary to avoid 
activities that might agitate the haiwai huaqiao, such as propagandising on the Three and 
Five Antis, or stirring revolutionary activity amongst them that might provoke their local 
governments. It also meant encouraging huaqiao to visit their homeland, because this 
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allowed them to report to friends and family on New China; and striving to win huaqiao 
direct investment, because it had a ‘huge implications for our political situation’.180 This 
would all—Liao said—increase remittances. Yet, as Liao noted, qiaowu was also very 
much about appropriate policies towards the huaqiao in China. This included China’s 
acceptance of 18,000 huaqiao refugees, ‘with great results for propaganda work’.181 But 
Liao pointedly noted that positive management of the qiaojuan and qiaoxiang also had 
‘decisive meaning’: which meant that it was thus necessary ‘to look after huaqiao in the 
Land Reform’, not to harass them, and not to go beyond the boundaries of the law in 
expropriations.182 Thus, and as far as Liao was concerned, ‘revolutionary struggle’ should 
not undermine the political economy of qiaowu. 
Ironically, the CCP CC seemed to share Liao’s views on avoiding the (forced) 
conflation of ‘revolutionary struggle’ and qiaowu. Or at least, the CCP CC never quite 
recognised that the contradiction had been of its own making. Thus, even as it sought 
intensification of Land Reform—especially in Guangdong—the CCP CC also ordered 
the rectification of Land Reform deviations in qiaoxiang in April and September 1952.183 
Indeed, the CCP CC even ordered that, ‘if there is a lack of clarity as to whether huaqiao 
should be classified as middle-rich peasants, middle peasants or poor peasants, 
assessments should be inclined towards a lower classification and not higher’.184 Of 
course, such qiaowu policies made for good propaganda, which also encouraged 
investment.185 After all, Liao’s United Front Conference speech had drawn a direct line 
between overseas propaganda and more huaqiao direct investment, and this was a 
correlation that the party-state was profoundly interested in, particularly since reports 
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from East China in August 1952 suggested a considerable investment interest amongst 
huaqiao. Given that Shanghai alone could report remittance values of US$1.6 million per 
month, the potential for returns were clear enough.186 This therefore explains also the 
urgency of the moves to create an ‘Overseas Chinese Investment Guidance Committee’ 
made up of regional representatives, the CFEC, OCAC, Trade Ministry and other related 
agencies, to find areas for huaqiao investment, and to encourage and lead the investors.187 
Thus, on the surface, Liao’s ‘positive management’ of qiaowu seemed to work. Yet, the 
problem was that while this made for positive propaganda, the latter presumed that the 
Land Reform deviations in qiaoxiang were being rectified. Yet, given that the CCP CC 
neither recognised, nor addressed the contradictions that it had helped to create, this 
assumption, as it turns out, was actually very misguided. 
In December 1952, the OCAC and PBOC issued a damning report on qiaowu. On 
the one hand, they admitted that they had not been as successful as they had hoped in 
attracting huaqiao investment. On the other, overall remittances had risen year-on-year 
from US$118 million (1951) to US$170 million (1952), which meant that remittances 
were still dominated by remittances to qiaojuan.188 The PBOC and OCAC were proud of 
the increases, but they warned that ‘in various districts, regional and local authorities—
especially village cadres—are guilty of very serious deviations in their conduct’.189 
Cadres were still using remittances to assess class statuses, arbitrarily punishing those 
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who received remittances, or levying huge fines. Or worse, in areas that had actually 
finished the Land Reform, cadres were continuing to victimise those with remittances. 
The ‘four fears’ about remittances were still prevalent, and instability had again led to 
stoppages.190 Here, however, the PBOC and OCAC noted that while Shanghai and Fujian 
practiced ‘correct policy’—and had seen remittance increases—Guangdong was the 
opposite. Given that Guangdong was home to 60% of the huaqiao in China, it had an 
inordinate significance to qiaowu and remittances.191 But Guangdong remittance values 
had dropped by 14.9% year-on-year.192 On a national level, Shanghai and Fujian made 
up for Guangdong’s shortfall, but this was unsustainable. Thus the OCAC and the PBOC 
restated their tired injunctions once again, while the CCP CC piled on with a nation-wide 
directive for ‘earnest rectification’.193 Yet, perhaps the CCP CC should have considered 
what its intensification of the Land Reform in Guangdong had resulted in. 
Given the stark figures for Guangdong, perhaps Liao Chengzhi was always going 
to intervene at the CCP CC South China Bureau’s Conference on qiaowu in January 1953. 
While Liao praised the Guangdong Land Reform for eliminating feudalism, he pointedly 
noted that by Tao Zhu’s own admission, only 25-30% of those qiaojuan ‘hit’ had been 
accurately targeted; whereas 20-25% were wrongly attacked, and 50% dealt with 
disproportionately.194 This was unacceptable, and Liao argued that the officials needed to 
recognise the long-term consequences of their failures on qiaowu and its political 
economy. Yet, if they were able to stabilise the situation amongst the huaqiao in China, 
it would give the haiwai huaqiao an ‘assurance of heart’, which would thus attract their 
remittances and capital investment in the economy—which, Liao pointed out, was more 
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than likely to benefit Guangdong. Thus, Liao asserted, practicing correct qiaowu had to 
be a priority for the local CCP committees and civil administrations.195 
 For Liao, the lesson was that qiaowu would not be best served if it remained purely 
an endeavour for the OCAC and its partner government agencies, with (occasional) CCP 
CC oversight. It was clear that effective qiaowu needed to be a part of local civil 
administration. In January 1953, the OCAC reminded Fujian People’s Government (FPG) 
qiaowu officials of the provisions that had been created to effect, as they said, ‘a policy 
of preferential treatment towards huaqiao questions’.196 Moreover, the OCAC reminded 
provincial authorities of qiaowu’s transnationality in March 1953, requiring information 
on what ‘principles’ provinces were using in their communications to haiwai huaqiao.197 
This was actually more a reminder to conform, since the OCAC told the East China 
Administrative Committee in May, that as far as huaqiao investment was concerned—
‘the Central Government’s guiding principle has certainly not changed’.198  
 The early forms of ‘preferential treatment towards huaqiao questions’, were in 
the PBOC’s ‘favourable treatment’ [youdai] policies, intended at reassuring huaqiao 
concerns about the security of remittance deposits, and fluctuations in RMB values. 
Thereafter, youdai also characterised the approach to huaqiao ‘special issues’ in the Land 
Reform—although that had also been undermined by the failures of Party cadres. But by 
1953, youdai was no longer just for specific issues; as the OCAC had told the FPG, it was 
a general principle. Thus it applied also to the qiaosheng who were simultaneously: 
guiqiao (returning for higher education), closely connected with huaqiao families abroad, 
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and in regular receipt of remittances. In August 1953, this youdai saw the OCAC, the 
CFEC and the Ministry of Education (MOE), increase the total number of qiaosheng 
scholarships by 1,000 places.199 This was in the huaqiao interest, but it also meant 1,000 
new regular remittances. This was the basic point of youdai; indeed, this was the political 
economy of qiaowu. In September 1953, Shantou (Guangdong) officials reported 
incidents where school officials had attempted to manage remittances on students’ 
behalf.200 This had led to some qiaosheng becoming so incensed that they preferred to 
send the money back. The OCAC, PBOC and MOE intervened immediately to end this 
practice. Their intervention was in line with a policy statement that Liao proffered in 
August 1953. For haiwai huaqiao, qiaowu would ‘consider their vital interests, seek 
solidarity in self-help, aim for long-term survival, [and] consolidate their patriotic unity’; 
while domestically, it would ‘develop production, facilitate huaqiao remittances, look 
after and help solve qiaoshu problems and to gradually improve the lives of qiaoshu’.201 
Yet, the problem was that not everyone agreed with this perspective. 
To some extent, the integration of qiaowu with local civil administrations did take 
place. October 1953 saw the Shanghai CCP Committee (SPC) approve a plan by the 
Shanghai United Front Department to settle a group of 516 guiqiao from Japan.202 
Shanghai officials noted that these guiqiao came from different socio-cultural settings, 
with varied economic backgrounds, and thus needed help in employment and housing, 
with finances, acclimatisation to new settings, and finding schools for their children.203 
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This can justifiably be seen as in line with the approach that the OCAC encouraged, but 
this was actually more a Shanghai exception than the rule. 
The problem with the integration of qiaowu with local administration was that by 
1953, the contradictory behaviour of the CCP had resulted in a common perception of 
huaqiao as class enemies. In February 1953, Xinhua reported that cadres in Guangdong 
were still failing ‘to carry out the correct huaqiao policy of the Central Government, and 
have violated huaqiao remittances’.204 Thus Guangdong cadres apparently refused to 
reform. Worse still were the September 1953 reports of huaqiao unrest in Fujian—which 
had previously been lauded for its qiaowu.205 Apparently cadres were having extramarital 
affairs with qiaojuan wives (one ‘with more than ten’) who voluntarily or not, had been 
giving their remittances to these cadres. Such affairs, some cadres believed, was ‘to both 
gain a wife, and also money to spend’.206 Now, the prevalence of qiaojuan extramarital 
activity, reflected in a way, what Glen Peterson calls ‘direct action’ by women after the 
1950 Marriage Law.207 But the real issue here was that this was a qiaowu disaster. One 
cadre in Hui An county said: 
You huaqiao are all capitalists. Anyway, capitalists all have money, so if your 
wife has an affair, just get a divorce and after that marry another one and it will 
be fine…in the future capitalists will be struggled against; even Tan Kah Kee will 
be struggled against.208 
  
If all huaqiao were capitalists—indeed, class enemies—and therefore could not seek 
redress from the authorities, since they were all slated for ‘struggle’, then it was no 
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wonder that qiaowu found little cooperation from local officials, and it was no wonder 
that Xinhua warned that ‘the haiwai huaqiao are dissatisfied’.209 
 It was of course, not the fault of qiaowu that cadres were behaving in this way, 
but it was qiaowu that bore the brunt of the consequences: Fujian’s remittance values for 
the first half of 1953 sank by 22.08% year-on-year, which was actually worse than the 
16.1% fall for the last six months of 1952.210 Xinhua suggested that the decreases were 
to do with foreign restrictions on remittances, economic pressures overseas, changes in 
the flow of emigration, and because the poorer qiaojuan, after Land Reform, had been so 
positively engaged in production that they were now ‘less dependent on remittances.211 
Foreign pressures were not in the control of qiaowu—but becoming less dependent on 
remittances was a strange result. Indeed, given the experiences of the qiaojuan in the 
Land Reform, this was simply untrue. But then again, in the light of everything that had 
been going on since 1950, perhaps the qiaojuan simply did not want remittances anymore. 
After all, who wanted the struggle? 
 
Conclusion: 
 By 1953, it was clear that something was rotten with qiaowu. Given a core 
imperative to secure remittances for the party-state, the fact that they were falling 
indicated that qiaowu was failing. In 1950, the PRC added US$122.57 million to its 
foreign reserves through remittances; in 1951, it was US$169.23 million; but for 1953, a 
mere US$121 million.212 These figures essentially bookmark the narrative of qiaowu in 
the early years of the PRC. To an extent, qiaowu had enjoyed a degree of success in 
revitalising remittance transfers after the end of the Civil War, even in spite of the PRC’s 
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intervention in the Korean War. Yet, the drastic collapse of remittances after 1951 (to 
new lows) indicate that it was the domestic pressures consequent to the radicalisation of 
the Land Reform, the zhenfan, and the Three and Five Antis, that had the greatest—and 
most negative—effects on the flow of huaqiao remittances. 
 As the OCAC (and other qiaowu practitioners) saw it, the primary consideration 
for huaqiao remittance policymaking was really that huaqiao remittances embodied a 
transnationality of interests: for the haiwai huaqiao who saw remittances as a pillar of 
relationships (familial, traditional, cultural, even commercial) with their homeland; and 
for the huaqiao inside China that were dependent on remittances for their livelihoods. 
This understanding thus influenced the development of qiaowu. 
 On a basic level, since the remitting of funds depended in the first instance on the 
haiwai huaqiao, the main concern for outward-facing (external) qiaowu was the longer-
term security (and survival) of haiwai huaqiao interests, in whichever domicile they 
resided in. Hence the somewhat counter-intuitive tendency in qiaowu to keep public 
alignment with the CCP or New China to a low profile, at least insofar as the haiwai 
huaqiao were concerned. Yet, given the understanding of huaqiao remittances as a 
derivative of transnational interests between all huaqiao—or what the CCP CC called 
‘unbreakable bonds’—this implied that that huaqiao interests as applied to remittances 
had a domestic centre of gravity. After all, the relative interests in remitting and receiving 
remittances were all located in the homeland. Thus qiaowu practitioners realised that any 
attempt to increase (or secure) remittances depended on convincing the huaqiao that their 
domestic interests were being met. But therein lay the problem. 
 Certainly, convincing the huaqiao that their interests in China were being met was 
a difficult proposition. 1950-1953 saw the introduction and intensification of the Land 
Reform, the zhenfan, the Three and Five Antis, and intervention in the Korean War. The 
Land Reform, already the cause of death, violence and the destruction of traditional socio-
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economic structures, also inordinately affected huaqiao in China because remittances 
became tied to class status, and because special allowances for their ‘minority interest’ 
made them targets in the midst of ideological radicalisation. The suppression campaign 
and the Three and Five Antis became, as Frank Dikotter notes, a veritable ‘Great Terror’ 
with millions executed (1.2 per thousand), and millions more sent to labour camps or 
placed under the ‘surveillance of the masses’.213 The huaqiao were targets because of 
their alleged bourgeois-ness—whether because of their houses, foreign income, or the 
fact that many did not need to labour—they were different, and they suffered for it. If 
qiaowu failed to convince, it was because it did not have much to go on. 
 The party-state’s qiaowu practitioners knew what the reality was. Thus the OCAC 
(and its partners like the PBOC) created policies to cater to huaqiao interests in China, or 
to at least appear as if this was the case. Hence the beginning of the youdai approach in 
qiaowu in the early 1950s. Yet, qiaowu was not helped at all by contradictory actions by 
the party-state. Thus Land Reform leniency for the huaqiao was undermined by the 
radicalisation of the Land Reform, and the Three and Five Antis. Even when qiaowu was 
approved by party-state leaders (like the CCP CC’s 1952 statement), the Party itself—or 
at least its cadres and officials—was uncooperative, and whether because of ignorance or 
ideological deviation, qiaowu encountered resistance. Thus perhaps qiaowu also failed to 
convince the huaqiao because it could not even convince its own Party.  
 There were, however, still some options for the OCAC and qiaowu in terms of 
offering a far more convincing case to prove that huaqiao interests would find a warm 
embrace in their homeland. Indeed, this case was greatly strengthened by the news of the 
future National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1953, and the prospect of huaqiao 
participation in this (theoretically) highest of state institutions. It is curious that the build-
up to the NPC in 1953 was never a significant part of propaganda to the haiwai huaqiao—
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or for that matter, to the qiaojuan who worried about their safety in a state that had used 
them for target practice. Though the NPC was declared one of the three main tasks of 
1953 (with the first Five Year Plan of economic construction and the Korean War) it nary 
got a mention in qiaowu.214 This is surprising, especially since there was significant 
interest amongst the huaqiao. 
The Electoral Law (gazetted on 1 March 1953) stated that the haiwai huaqiao 
were reserved 30 delegates in the NPC. Certainly, 30 was not a large bloc, but it was not 
insignificant. Yet, how these delegates were to be elected was not announced, and was to 
be separately determined.215  This news aroused excitement across the country—and 
certainly excited the huaqiao.216 Given also that Tan Kah Kee and He Xiangning were 
appointed to the NPC’s Constitution Drafting Committee, while Liao Chengzhi was 
placed on the Legislation Committee, there was clearly an opportunity in late 1953 for 
the OCAC and qiaowu to engage on a subject of great interest to the huaqiao in and out 
of China. Yet, whether that was enough to make up for qiaowu’s failures in the last three 
years, was a separate question for 1954. 
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215 The nationalities/ethnic minorities bloc had 150 seats, while the PLA received 60. See CPG Committee, 
‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui ji difang ge ji renmin daibiao dahui xuanju 
fa’, 11/02/1953, JYZW, 4: 21-31 (22, 25). 
216 ‘Xiamen bu shao ren dui xuanju fa renshi mohu’, 02/04/1953, NBCK. 
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Chapter 3.  
No complaints, no escapes, no shortfalls 
 
Chairman Mao has instructed that: “The standard of good agricultural collectivisation 
should be ‘no pig squeals, no cattle bellows, and no peasant complaints.’” Thus insofar 
as huaqiao work is concerned, it behoves us to ensure that there are: ‘No huaqiao 
complaints, no qiaojuan escapes, and no huaqiao remittance shortfalls.’ 
 
— Luo Lishi, November 19551 
 
  
 
 
                                                
1 ‘毛主席指示: “农业合作化好的规格是要做到 ‘猪不叫, 牛不叫, 农民不叫’”, 那么在华侨工作方面, 
我们要求做到 ‘华侨不叫, 侨眷不跑, 侨汇不少’’, in Luo Lishi, ‘Guanyu dali dongyuan qiaojuan guiqiao 
jiji canjia nongye hezuo hua yundong bing jixu quanmian shenru guanche qiaowu zhengce de baogao’, n.d. 
(12/1955), Guangdong qiaowu [GDQW], No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 17-28 (21). 
The Guangdong qiaowu [广东侨务] was published by the Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Committee [广东省华侨事务委员会] for ‘internal distribution only’. 
Luo Lishi was the deputy-director of the Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, but 
not much else is known of him, probably because he was purged in 1958. See Chapter 5. 
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Introduction: 
 In 1955, New China seemed to have an image problem. In March 1955, the CCP 
CC South China Bureau declared that propaganda towards the huaqiao was vital to 
bolster the patriotic unity amongst the haiwai huaqiao; counter the anti-CCP rumours 
spread by the imperialists; and to address the past failures of CCP cadres in the 
implementation of qiaowu, especially the deviations in remittance work.2 These issues 
required serious attention because: ‘since the Liberation, the huaqiao remittance earnings 
are the equivalent of 50% of our total foreign exchange earnings from trade with 
imperialist countries’.3 Hence propaganda on, and the correct implementation of qiaowu, 
behoved all Party cadres and officials. 
 The South China Bureau made it clear that propaganda was a fundamental part of 
qiaowu policy. In a second directive, the Bureau defined propaganda’s role as: 
Raising the patriotism of the vast numbers of huaqiao, guiqiao and qiaojuan; 
improving the socialist understanding of the guiqiao and qiaojuan; enabling the 
positive development of huaqiao remittances; industriously increasing production 
and support for the nation’s socialist industrialisation efforts; promoting the 
patriotic unity of the huaqiao; improving the relations between huaqiao and the 
peoples in their countries of residence; and the expansion of our country’s 
international united front.4 
 
This role, as it turns out, was absolutely vital. By 1955, it had become manifestly clear to 
qiaowu practitioners that qiaowu was flailing in the face of contradictions. Whereas 
qiaowu was a political economy—both in terms of how it was conceived, and practiced—
its application had been hampered by failures in party-state policies, both domestic and 
foreign, since 1953. These failings contradicted—and sometimes undermined—the 
ability of qiaowu to fulfil its imperatives, especially in terms of securing remittances. This 
                                                
2 CCP CC South China Bureau, ‘Guanyu dangyuan, tuanyuan, ganbu yu guowai huaqiao de lianxi de 
tongzhi’, 07/03/1955, GDQW, No. 9 (22 Mar 1955) 19-20 (19). 
The basis for the overall propaganda push towards the huaqiao came from the CCP CC. See CCP CC, 
‘Guanyu xiang guowai huaqiao xuanchuan zonglu xian de zhishi’, 02/02/1954, ZZWX, 15: 222-224. 
3 CCP CC South China Bureau, ‘Guanyu dangyuan, tuanyuan, ganbu yu guowai huaqiao de lianxi de 
tongzhi’, 07/03/1955, GDQW, No. 9 (22 Mar 1955) 19. 
4  CCP CC South China Bureau, Propaganda Department, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang dui huaqiao, qiaojuan 
xuanchuan gongzuo de zhishi’, 16/03/1955, GDQW, No. 9 (22 Mar 1955), 22-23 (22). 
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chapter begins in late 1953, with an analysis of how qiaowu struggled to deal with, on the 
one hand, the failures and legacies of the Land Reform, and on the other, the political 
challenges and contradictions, consequent to the advent of the General Line. These 
challenges were made even more complex in 1954 because of the resistance amongst 
lower-level Party cadres and officials to qiaowu protections for huaqiao remittances—let 
alone its youdai provisions. Even worse, these failings also became apparent overseas, 
and thus provoked negative perceptions of the PRC and its qiaowu amongst the haiwai 
huaqiao, that were exacerbated by a foreign policy that seemed like it was marginalising 
them. This was thus a negative situation for qiaowu, and as this chapter concludes, was 
what pushed qiaowu practitioners into direct—and firmer—interventions to effect a much 
broader system of special provisions and youdai for the huaqiao. The propaganda push 
to the huaqiao in 1955 was thus a function of this impetus for corrective action in qiaowu, 
but as the chapter shows, it had been long overdue by that point. 
 
They will fervently leap: 
 New China had, by December 1953, apparently reached the end of the first stage 
of the Chinese revolution. The CCP CC declared that since 1949, imperialism, feudalism 
and bureaucrat-capitalism had been overturned, and China had been turned into the New 
Democracy—and thus the PRC had ‘victoriously completed’ the preconditions for the 
next stage of socialist progress.5 This four-year mark was not just for macro views of the 
revolution, as the OCAC had also used that timeframe for its own review, in an Expanded 
Conference in November.6 In his address to the Conference, Liao Chengzhi asserted that 
the OCAC had successfully achieved: increases in qiaosheng numbers and their economic 
                                                
5 CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang pizhuan zhongyang xuanchuanbu wei dongyuan yiqie liliang ba woguo 
jianshe chengwei yige weida de shehui zhuyi guojia er douzheng — guanyu dang zai guodu shiqi 
zongluxian de xuexi he xuanchuan tigang’, 28/12/1953, ZZWX, 14: 491-529 (492).  
6 Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guonei qiaowu gongzuo de zhidao sixiang’, and ‘Qiaoxiang de tudi gaige’, in ‘4 nian lai 
qiaowu gongzuo de baogao’, 01/11/1953, DHGLR, 194-198. 
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contributions; ‘great patriotic feeling’ amongst the huaqiao; encouragement of huaqiao 
investment in industry; and the integration of huaqiao enterprises with national economic 
development.7 Future qiaowu, Liao asserted, was to be defined by the General Line and 
national construction, the domestic and external situation, and alignment with Chairman 
Mao’s directives.8 This meant: mobilising the huaqiao in China to positive participation 
in socialist construction and production; cooperating with educational authorities to better 
utilise qiaosheng talents; seeking ‘self-help through production’ for guiqiao (and huaqiao 
refugees) to end their welfare reliance; guiding huaqiao capital to positive investments; 
and implementing the principle of ‘facilitating huaqiao remittances, and serving the 
huaqiao’.9 To be fair, none of this was particularly new. Indeed, as Liao’s promotion of 
labour productivity (over welfare) shows, this future qiaowu was also evidently in line 
with national economic plans.10 Liao had thus presented a record of achievement, and a 
promise of future relevance—but actually, there was something else. 
Liao declared many victories for qiaowu, but he also tellingly pointed to the ‘Land 
Reform in the qiaoxiang’ in an entirely separate section of his report.11 This, Liao argued, 
was the most important aspect of domestic qiaowu.12 The Land Reform had mostly been 
completed by November 1953, and it had, Liao said, successfully redistributed land to 
the benefit of 92% of qiaojuan from the labouring masses, who had seen their lives 
positively transformed. This was all well and good, but Liao also admitted that in other 
respects, the Land Reform in qiaoxiang had seen failures and deviations.13  
                                                
7 Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guonei qiaowu gongzuo de zhidao sixiang’, 01/11/1953, DHGLR, 194-195. 
8 The General Line [总路线] is discussed in detail subsequently, but here: ‘The general line or the general 
task of the Party for the transition period is basically to accomplish the industrialization of the country and 
the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in ten to fifteen 
years, or a little longer.’ See Mao Zedong, ‘Refute Right Deviationist views that depart from the General 
Line’, 15/06/1953, Selected Works, V: 93-94 (93). 
9 Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guonei qiaowu gongzuo de zhidao sixiang’, 01/11/1953, DHGLR, 195. 
10 See for instance, the directives to cut expenditure and save funds for priority industrial projects: Zhou 
Enlai, ‘Guodu shiqi de zonglu xian’, 08/09/1953, JYZW, 4: 301-313 (313); Deng Xiaoping, ‘Caizheng 
guongzuo de liu tiao fangzhen’, 13/01/1954, JYZW, 5: 34-38 (35). 
11 Liao Chengzhi, ‘Qiaoxiang de tudi gaige’, 01/11/1953, DHGLR, 195-198. 
12 Ibid., 195. 
13 Ibid., 196. 
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Liao’s discussion of Land Reform deviations (unsurprisingly perhaps) focused on 
Guangdong. Out of the province’s estimated 6.4 million qiaojuan, 60% (3.84 million) 
had ‘gained the benefits of the Land Reform’, 35% (2.24 million) had ‘not gained any 
positive benefits, but had not suffered any losses’, while 5% (320,000) had being classed 
as landlords (and had undergone expropriations). But within that 5%, only 25% (80,000) 
‘were truly landlords’ and had been dealt with appropriately; 50% (160,000) were 
‘basically assessed correctly’ but had faced overly-extreme punitive action; and 25% had 
either been assessed wrongly, or had been dealt with incorrectly. Moreover, aside from 
the landlords, others had undergone class assessments that had seen ‘poor peasants and 
farm labourers becoming middle peasants; small retailers becoming capitalists; and 
middle peasants becoming rich peasants’—these were all ‘fairly commonplace’ errors, 
and affected around 20% of qiaojuan (1.28 million).14 Perhaps this was why Liao did not 
mention the Land Reform alongside the other qiaowu successes. 
The reasons for the deviations were varied. As Liao explained, the masses had a 
deep hatred for their feudal oppressors, who, as Liao said, had also tried to sabotage the 
Chinese revolution, which thus led to extreme behaviour. Or it was because of cadres’ 
deviationist failures, especially regarding remittances.15 The so-called deviations were 
supposedly decreasing because of rectification, but ‘re-examination of past work’ was 
still necessary.16 The main rectification dealt with Land Reform assessments, especially 
for those wrongly based on remittances. Indeed, remittances were not exploitative profits, 
and Liao stressed that they were not to be used to assess entitlements or expropriations. 
Moreover, while assessments should be based on qiaojuan landholdings and labour, since 
the main labour of these households was usually overseas, this circumstance was to be 
considered where qiaojuan were unable to till their own land. Moreover, expropriations 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 196-197. 
16 Ibid., 198. 
 123 
due to wrong assessments were be corrected and suitable aid offered to victims—‘in this 
way, we can cause the wrongfully-assessed qiaojuan to be satisfied, and strengthen the 
unity between qiaojuan and the local peasantry’.17 
 The point of unity was not just about rectifying errors, it was also a function of 
qiaowu’s theoretical role. He Xiangning’s 1954 New Year’s broadcast claimed that ever 
since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the guiqiao and qiaojuan had joined the masses 
in social reforms, patriotic unity, mobilisations and economic activity, ‘offering a great 
contribution to the development of agricultural production and national economic 
construction’.18 She did not mention the Land Reform deviations, and said only that since 
‘qiaojuan are mostly engaged in agrarian production, with some also engaged in 
handicrafts; as the country moves towards industrialisation, the qiaojuan will be one with 
the peasants and handicraft workers, gradually moving towards collectivisation, and a 
better and happier life’.19 Clearly, the OCAC believed that the deviations had been, or 
were now being addressed, and so qiaowu could move forward into the General Line. But 
it was not quite as simple as that. 
  Liao’s definition of qiaowu’s future had referred to the General Line, and this 
harkened to Mao’s June 1953 definition of ‘the general task of the Party for the transition 
period’ to the Politburo, which made the General Line the dual goals of: industrialisation, 
and the ‘socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and 
commerce’, in 10-15 years.20 This envisioned, alongside the first Five-Year Plan, the 
socialist transformation of all private industry and commerce, and the advance of the 
mutual-aid and cooperative movement (or collectivisation) in agriculture. To be sure, the 
General Line’s economic features were not new ideas, but the acceleration of socialist 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 He Xiangning, ‘Jiji canjia zuguo shehui gaige he jingji jianshe’, 30/12/1953, DHGLR, 127-128 (127). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mao, ‘Refute Right Deviationist views that depart from the General Line’, 15/06/1953, Selected Works, 
V: 93; Liu and Wang, ‘The Origins of the General Line for the Transition Period and of the Acceleration 
of the Chinese Socialist Transformation in Summer 1955’, 724-725.  
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transformation did represent a new impetus.21 Mao suggested that New Democracy was 
on the way out, and to fail to accept this was no less than ‘Right Deviationist mistakes’—
nothing should, or would be allowed to obstruct ‘revolutionary struggle’.22 
 The accelerated socialist transformation was not immediately popular with all of 
the CCP leadership; Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai in particular, preferred a more gradual 
implementation of socialism through the New Democracy. But Zhou, Liu and others fell 
into line soon enough—this was preferable to being labelled a ‘Right Deviationist’.23 But 
this also had implications both for the united front, and the huaqiao. Whereas the united 
front had underpinned the New Democracy, Liu told the UFWD that the work of the 
united front was now to fulfil the aims of socialist industrialisation and agricultural 
collectivisation, and it was ‘fundamentally a service in the interests of the working class 
and labouring masses’.24 And tellingly enough, cadres were to be mindful that ‘this form 
of united front work is a form of class struggle’.25 
While the New Democracy had been a means to economic recovery, the General 
Line was the path towards extensive economic development. Zhou Enlai told the CPPCC 
in September 1953 that ‘the guidance of the General Line’ was to: concentrate on heavy 
industry; cultivate skilled human resources; develop infrastructure and transport, light 
industry, agriculture and commerce; and promote agrarian and handicraft collectivisation, 
and the transformation of private enterprise.26 Socialist transformation, Zhou said, also 
                                                
21 See Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, JYZW, 4: 298-300; 
Li Weihan, ‘Guanyu ‘ziben zhuyi gongye zhong de gongsi guanxi wenti’ gei zhongyang bing zhuxi de 
baogao’, 27/05/1953, JYZW, 4: 183-200. 
22 ‘Our present revolutionary struggle is even more profound than the revolutionary armed struggle of the 
past. It is a revolution that will bury the capitalist system and all other systems of exploitation once and for 
all. The idea, “Firmly establish the new-democratic social order”, goes against the realities of our struggle 
and hinders the progress of the socialist cause.’ See Mao, ‘Refute Right Deviationist views that depart from 
the General Line’, 15/06/1953, Selected Works, V: 94. 
23 ‘Mao called his speech ‘Refute Right Deviationist Views that Depart from the General Line’. Zhou and 
Liu were never named, but his audience was in no doubt about what was happening…Mao savaged Zhou 
Enlai’s formulation of ‘the social order of New Democracy’, and the term would never be used again.’ See 
Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 231. 
24 Liu Shaoqi, ‘Jiaqiang dang de tongyi zhanxian gongzuo’, 18/07/1953, JYZW, 4: 271-277 (276). 
25 Ibid., 4: 277. 
26 Zhou Enlai, ‘Guodu shiqi de zonglu xian’, 08/09/1953, JYZW, 4: 306. 
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involved a first step towards the ultimate elimination of private property, or the increasing 
of controls placed on ownership of capital, property and enterprises, which would change 
private enterprises into semi-private enterprises.27 Thus the General Line clearly heralded 
imminent and serious changes. And yet, given the precarious position of the Chinese 
economy in 1953, what would this actually cost? 
 New China had not been rich to begin with, and was fast running out of money 
by 1953. In September 1953, Chen Yun warned that the country had a deficit of RMB 21 
trillion (about HKD 89 billion).28 The reasons for this were low tax revenues, over-budget 
wastefulness in construction projects, and of course, the huge cost of the intervention in 
the Korean War.29 This explains the various injunctions by party-state leaders to cut costs 
and reduce expenditure even as the country continued with the first Five-Year Plan and 
the General Line. But if the country was obviously cash-strapped, and yet still set on 
socialist transformation, then there had to be a way to make up the shortfall. This was 
where the General Line came in. 
 In the first instance, the General Line re-organised the agrarian sector through 
both collectivisation, and the ‘unified sale and purchase system’ that instituted a state-run 
monopoly on grain (and other agrarian products). Chen Yun argued in October 1953 that 
China had a ‘serious problem’: a large shortfall in available grain, which meant higher 
prices, and insufficient supplies for urban centres—where industrialisation was based.30 
The reasons for this were varied; the Party claimed that it was because of rent-seeking 
behaviour by private merchants and peasants who hoarded grain; while historians suggest 
                                                
27 Ibid., 4: 308. 
28 Chen Yun, ‘Kefu caijing gongzuo zhong de quedian he cuowu’, 14/09/1953, JYZW, 4: 341-345 (345). 
The exchange rate was HKD 234: RMB 1 million (12 September 1953). See Appendix D-IV, ‘Comparison 
between the Official and Free Market Exchange Rates of the Jen-min Pi, 1950 to 1954’, Wu, Dollars, 
Dependents and Dogma, 191-197 (196). 
Dikotter puts the deficit at RMB 2.4 billion (July 1953); this is probably calculated using the post-February 
1955 ‘new’ RMB (1 ‘new’: 10,000 ‘old’). See Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 216; CCP CC, ‘Guanyu 
faxing xin de renminbi de xuanchuan tongzhi’, 07/02/1955, ZZWX, 18: 120-125. 
29 China spent more than RMB 6.2 billion on its intervention. See Zhang, Economic Cold War, 140. 
30 Chen Yun, ‘Shixing liangshi tonggou tongxiao’, 10/10/1953, JYZW, 4: 385-398 (385-386). 
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that China in 1953 was in a famine, not least because of the Land Reform; or from another 
angle, that the monopoly was designed to resolve financial shortfalls.31 Whatever the 
case, the Party decided to end ‘free purchase’ and private trade in grain.32 Thus the state 
dictated a fixed yield for a farm plot, determining also the quantity of grain a person 
required per month. This subsistence amount, combined with the amount that was due as 
agricultural tax, plus whatever seeds that were needed for the next round of sowing, were 
deducted from the pre-determined fixed yield. The remainder (or ‘surplus’) was then 
compulsorily sold to the state at fixed prices. That surplus was used to ‘feed the cities, 
fuel industrialisation and pay off foreign debts’, and if there was leftover, peasants were 
allowed to purchase extra quantities. 33  That, in essence, was the ‘unified sale and 
purchase system’ that was introduced in October 1953.34 
Instituting ‘unified sale and purchase’ required even more state oversight of 
agrarian production, and in the context of General Line socialisation of agriculture, this 
motivated an expansion of collectivisation. A form of collectivisation was already in 
existence by the end of 1953 in the ‘mutual aid teams’, where peasants voluntarily shared 
equipment, ploughing animals and other farming necessities to till the land they had 
received in the Land Reform. Results had been mixed, but in late 1953, Mao called for 
an acceleration of collectivisation through the development of Agricultural Producers’ 
Cooperatives (APC).35 Whereas mutual-aid teams had shared equipment when necessary, 
                                                
31 This shortfall was also due to the reduction of Soviet aid to the Five-Year Plan. See Dikotter, The Tragedy 
of Liberation, 212-217. 
32 Chen Yun, ‘Shixing liangshi tonggou tongxiao’, 10/10/1953, JYZW, 4: 389-390. 
33 Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 217.  
See also Kenneth Walker, Food grain procurement and consumption in China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984); Robert Ash, ‘Squeezing the Peasants: Grain Extraction, Food Consumption and 
Rural Living Standards in Mao’s China’, The China Quarterly, Vol. 188 (2006), 959-998. 
34 The ‘unified sale and purchase system’ was swiftly approved. See CCP CC, ‘Guanyu shixing liangshi de 
jihua shougou yu jihua gongying de jueyi’, 16/10/1953, JYZW, 4: 412-21. 
‘Unified sale and purchase’ was also extended to other products like food oil, and in 1954, to cotton cloth. 
See Chen Yun, ‘Liangyou chanxiao qingkuang ji chuli banfa’, 13/11/1953, JYZW, 4: 478-481; CCP CC, 
‘Guanyu zai quanguo shixing jihua shougou youliao de jueding’, 15/11/1953, JYZW, 4: 482. 
35 Dikotter suggests that ‘not much of the aid was mutual’ and was often coercive, while Hou Xiaojia argues 
that ‘most party cadres above the county level were fully engaged in the ‘Three-Anti’ movement and cared 
little about the mutual aid and cooperation movement’. See Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 208-210; 
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the APCs made this permanent. APCs pooled land with members receiving shares based 
on their contributions. This was still only semi-socialist, since it had (nominal) private 
ownership of land, tools and equipment that were contributed in return for shares.36 But 
this, Mao said, would be resolved in the next stage; for now, it was just as important to 
socialist transformation as ‘unified sale and purchase’.37 The two were indeed closely 
linked, since APCs became the main unit by which rural life was governed, including the 
purchase or sale of surplus crops. Socialist transformation was thus about effecting CCP 
governmentality as much as it was about changing production relations.38 
 Private industry and commerce had a different trajectory to the agrarian sector in 
the initial period of the General Line. Mao had said that socialist transformation entailed 
eventual elimination of private property and capitalism, but here he preached ‘steady 
progress, avoid haste’, over a 3-5 year interim period.39 The reason for this was simple. 
Private enterprises were ‘a great wealth’, employing almost 4 million workers, providing 
crucial manufactures, aiding capital accumulation, and providing important training for 
cadres.40 Of course, some capitalists were reactionary and ‘at a large distance’ from 
socialism, but Mao also criticised workers who ‘refused to permit capitalists to gain any 
benefits whatsoever’.41 The correct path was instead state capitalism [国家资本主义
guojia ziben zhuyi] through ‘joint state-private ownership’ [公私合营 gongsi heying] of 
                                                
Hou Xiaojia, ‘“Get Organized”: The Impact of the Soviet Model on the CCP’s Rural Economic Strategy, 
1949-1953’, in Bernstein, Li (eds), China learns from the Soviet Union, 167-196 (181). 
36 Mao Zedong, ‘Guanyu nongye huzhu hezuo de liangci tanhua’, 16/10-05/11/1953, JYZW, 4: 404-411 
(408). 
37 Mao Zedong, ‘Guanyu nongye huzhu hezuo de liangci tanhua’, 16/10-05/11/1953, JYZW, 4: 410. 
Cooperatives were also created in the handicrafts industry in late 1953. See Liu Shaoqi, ‘Guanyu shougong 
ye shengchan hezuo she wenti’, 08/12/1953, JYZW, 4: 559-564. 
38 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983, 
Arnold I. Davidson (ed.), Graham Burchell (trans.) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
The CCP changed the new system’s original name from ‘compulsory purchase’ [征购 zhenggou] to ‘unified 
purchase’ [统购 tonggou], since zhenggou sounded similar to the Japanese version inflicted in the 1930s. 
See Kuhn, Origins of the Modern Chinese State, 105. 
39 Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, JYZW, 4: 298. 
40 Ibid., 4: 299. 
41 Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, JYZW, 4: 299. 
See also Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘Masters of the Country? Shanghai Workers in the Early People’s Republic’, 
in Brown, Pickowicz (eds), Dilemmas of Victory, 59-79. 
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enterprises.42 This entailed capitalism that existed not ‘to make profits for the capitalists 
but to meet the needs of the people and the state’.43 This allowed capitalists to play a 
patriotic role, and thus state capitalism was not coercive, but in line with the ‘principle of 
voluntarism’, and therefore ‘different from dealing with the landlords’.44 This sounded 
much like the older New Democracy ideals about the possible and positive contributions 
of the patriotic bourgeoisie, and indeed, as UFWD head Li Weihan told the All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), state capitalism would enable capitalists 
to help fulfil the Chinese people’s ‘hundred-year old desire’.45 Yet, within such familiar 
exhortations were also rather implicit warnings. 
 State capitalism, Li warned the ACFIC, was to transform industry and commerce. 
First, in relations between the state and private owners, the state was in charge. Secondly, 
it was now the workers (labour) who would supervise capital. Even ‘joint state-private 
owned enterprises [were] not normal joint-stock enterprises’ since socialism exercised 
the leading role, and enterprises had to align with national plans, i.e. the Five-Year Plan.46 
The third warning was the most telling—especially for the huaqiao since the 1950 GAC 
decree on huaqiao Land Reform had exempted industry and commerce—as Li said that 
state capitalism was not permanent, and in the future ‘all the means of production and 
capitalist property will completely change to a system of socialist ownership’.47 When 
that time eventually came, Li obliquely noted, ‘those who had made a contribution to the 
people’ would be taken care of, along with their children.48 Socialist transformation for 
                                                
42 This form of ownership had existed since at least 1951. See Wang Shaoguang, ‘The Construction of State 
Extractive Capacity: Wuhan, 1949–1953’, Modern China, 27:2 (2001) 229-261 (241). 
43 Mao Zedong, ‘On State Capitalism’, 09/09/1953, Selected Works, V: 101.  
The breakdown of how joint state-private concerns would ‘meet the needs’ of the greater good was: 34.5% 
of profits went to the state as tax; 15% was due to the workers’ welfare fund; 30% for re-investment in the 
enterprise; and 20.5% as dividends for the capitalist. See Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye 
de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, JYZW, 4: 299. 
44 Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, JYZW, 4: 299. 
45 Li Weihan, ‘Zai zhonghua quanguo gongshang ye lianhehui huiyuan daibiao dahui shang de jianghua’, 
26/10/1953, JYZW, 4: 427-443 (428). 
46 Ibid., 4: 437. 
47 Ibid., 4: 443. 
48 Ibid. 
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private industry and commerce was therefore not as far-reaching as it was in agriculture 
(yet), but it indicated an imminent future, and it spelled out certain expectations.  
 Li’s veiled warning about ‘those who had made a contribution to the people’ did 
not specify what he meant, but there can have been little doubt that this was about money. 
After all, in December 1953, the CPG issued RMB 6 trillion worth of ‘1954 National 
Economic Construction Bonds’.49 This bond issue was linked to the national construction 
program, and subscription was thus presented as a possible public display of patriotism. 
For private enterprise owners, capitalists—and basically the bourgeoisie—to subscribe to 
the bonds was simply what was expected of them. Indeed, the heaviest burden of 
subscription allocations fell on the urban bourgeoisie, with RMB 3.2 trillion assigned to 
private urban industry and commerce, private owners in joint state-private enterprises, 
and other urban residents.50 When more than 50% of the burden fell on urban areas, and 
on private industry and commerce, the expected contribution was obvious. 
 The General Line thus presaged a clear direction. For the agrarian sector, it was 
APCs and ‘unified sale and purchase’. For industry and commerce, it was state capitalism, 
the Five-Year Plan and financial contributions. Yet, where did the huaqiao fit into this? 
The only mention of qiaowu was merely in passing in a GAC statement on the 1954 bond 
issue, which presumed a ‘great enthusiasm’ of the haiwai huaqiao, and an expectation 
that ‘they will fervently leap to subscribe’.51 The GAC did not explain this, or what it 
actually meant for qiaowu, but it was soon made clear that the huaqiao were definitely to 
be included in the General Line. 
 To be sure, the inclusion of the huaqiao in socialist transformation was supported 
by the OCAC. Liao Chengzhi had stated in November 1953 that qiaowu’s future was tied 
to the General Line, and He Xiangning echoed this on New Year’s Day 1954, reminding 
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the qiaojuan and guiqiao to ‘be one with their peasant brethren’ and ‘march towards 
collectivisation’.52 This also applied to the huaqiao involved in industrial construction or 
production; they were to heed the leadership of the CPG and to develop positive 
contributions. Indeed, in all sectors, they were to ‘learn to labour, to be hard-working in 
their planting, to strive to conserve resources, to overcome difficulties, and to transform 
their own lives’. 53  The huaqiao in commerce were also to improve the People’s 
Livelihood, to obey the law, ‘to establish a new way of doing business’, to accept the 
leadership of state enterprises, and to embrace state capitalism and play positive roles in 
the country’s economic construction. 54  Thus qiaowu clearly sought to include the 
huaqiao in socialist transformation’s dictates. 
 Yet, despite the intention in 1954 to align qiaowu with the General Line and its 
impetus for accelerated socialist transformation, there were still concerns about the 
legacies of an earlier attempt at socialist transformation that still plagued qiaowu. Indeed, 
inasmuch as Liao had defined future qiaowu as aligned with the General Line, he had also 
warned of the legacies of deviations in the Land Reform, and had asserted that a necessary 
rectification of Land Reform failures amongst the huaqiao was still an ongoing task. 
Thus, and given that the General Line had called for the acceleration of socialist 
transformation, qiaowu would—at the very least—have had to consider how it would (or 
could) reconcile the demands for ‘revolutionary struggle’ with its policy imperatives. 
After all, its most recent experience of socialist transformation had evidently failed to 
lead to positive results for qiaowu’s policy goals. 
 In some sense, the question for qiaowu was similar to that which confronted the 
party-state as a whole: what did the General Line actually require? Mao’s answer was 
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that the General Line was to be the ‘beacon illuminating our work in all fields’.55 And it 
truly did become the all-encompassing focus for the party-state’s work. Despite the initial 
reluctance of Zhou Enlai et al., once the Party leadership came around, they demanded 
that the party-state embrace it at all levels. Chen Yun’s introduction of ‘unified sale and 
purchase’ stressed that the work should ‘necessarily rely on the rural cadres, Party and 
Youth League members’.56 Yet, as Li Fuchun, Minister of Heavy Industry and CFEC 
deputy-head, pointed out, while industrialisation was one of the main goals of the General 
Line, the fulfilment of that objective was limited by both the quantity and quality of 
trained cadres available. Hence, as Li said, the party-state would expand its Party Schools, 
technical schools and professional training for cadres, who Li reminded to seek technical 
development (and learn from Soviet advisers). 57  Mao similarly told rural cadres to 
become ‘experts in agricultural socialist transformation’, and knowledgeable in theory, 
policy, plans, and methodology.58 Perhaps this was in response to the lessons of the Land 
Reform, or to the early wastefulness of the first Five-Year Plan, but the party-state clearly 
placed the onus for the General Line’s success on the professionalism of its cadres. 
 The emphasis placed on the party-state cadres’ expertise and professionalism was 
one that qiaowu fervently shared. Liao’s November 1953 report had asserted that many 
of the Land Reform deviations came down to cadre failings, ignorance, overzealousness, 
or a basic lack of understanding.59 The FPC and the South China Bureau (among others) 
had since addressed these failings, and Liao was confident that the rectification would 
have good effects. But the OCAC also went further in April 1954, creating the first-ever 
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qiaowu training program for cadres.60 But then again, theirs was a great responsibility. 
Indeed, as Liao’s commencement address to this first class defined the mission of qiaowu: 
In the overseas setting: to positively unite the various classes of huaqiao; to isolate 
the imperialists and Guomindang reactionaries; to cause the broad masses of 
huaqiao (including huaqiao bourgeoisie) to unite around their homeland. In the 
domestic context: to mobilise guiqiao and qiaojuan towards positive participation 
in socialist construction, transformation and production; and to mobilise them to 
love and protect their homeland’s daily advance towards socialism.61 
 
This mission, Liao said, was as complex as it was important. The cadres were warned to 
avoid the two main causes of ‘left deviationist behaviour’; ideological problems and ‘poor 
quality’ thinking about qiaowu.62 Yet, ironically, this was rather prescient of Liao. As it 
turned out, qiaowu in 1954–1955 would be plagued by contradictions, with the General 
Line’s impetus for accelerated socialist transformation, and a corollary of ‘poor thinking’ 
on qiaowu leading to problems amongst the cadres and officials on the ground. 
 
Rather Left than Right: 
 Liao’s April 1954 qiaowu statement was ostensibly based on the General Line—
and indeed prescribed ‘advance toward socialism’.63 But this future brought trepidation. 
Some huaqiao in Xiamen were worried that ‘fulfilling socialism required blood’.64 Others 
were unsure about state capitalism; if full socialism was inevitable, then their private 
enterprises were now pointless. Others worried about bank deposits—lest interest be 
viewed as ‘profiting without labour’.65 Worst—and after the GAC’s bond issue—was the 
view that ‘buying bonds is to turn live money into dead money’, and the fear that 
remittances would bring pressure to buy bonds.66 Moreover, haiwai huaqiao were wary 
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of investing, because they feared the repercussions from foreign governments, or doubted 
its worthwhileness: ‘after spending so much money, there is nothing to show for it’.67 
Others saw a Catch-22: socialist transformation made them uneasy about depositing 
remittances with Chinese banks, but socialism’s inevitability also made buying property 
to preserve wealth unviable.68 Clearly, what the OCAC believed about its victories was 
not universally shared. 
 Yet, whatever the uncertainty about the future, qiaowu was still very much about 
political economy. Due to the deficit, fiscal plans for 1954 prioritised expenditure cuts 
and increasing revenue, and among the most affected was funding for qiaosheng. In May 
1954, the OCAC and MOE instructed that local qiaowu offices were not to offer financial 
aid to qiaosheng any longer. Schools could offer aid via (non-huaqiao specific) People’s 
Scholarship funds, but the imperative was to cut costs.69 Yet, this was not only about 
savings.70 Liao noted in November 1953 that some qiaosheng had rejected remittances as 
‘profits of exploitation’, and had written to their families to say that ‘there is no need to 
remit money, the country has taken care of everything’. 71 Some even cut ties because 
their families were bourgeois. This was undesirable, especially because of the negative 
impressions it created amongst huaqiao. Hence, Liao asserted, it was vital that qiaosheng 
maintain close ties with their families, ‘including economic connections’, which thus 
meant teaching qiaosheng that the mentality ‘that the country would pay for everything’ 
was wrong. It also meant instructing qiaosheng ‘to strive to gain huaqiao remittances, to 
pay for tuition or living expenses, or to deposit with our national banks’.72 
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 The point of the qiaosheng thus lay mainly in their remittances. In May 1954, the 
OCAC introduced a policy that gave qiaosheng who received regular remittances an 
entitlement to bridging loans, in the event that their remittances were disrupted. This 
policy did not cover qiaosheng who did not receive remittances at all, or who had not 
received any within the last calendar year. There were also requirements for guarantors. 
For sums below RMB 200,000, guarantors had to be either CCP cadre or ‘a fellow 
qiaosheng who received regular remittances’. For all sums above RMB 200,000, both 
were required. This evidently ensured that the party-state would get its foreign 
exchange—one way or another. But the BOC was also entitled to regain its principal 
through direct deductions from the borrower’s account. 73  Yet, despite the evident 
utilitarianism here, given the party-state’s obvious concern with safeguarding remittances, 
surely the larger implication for the huaqiao was that whatever the imperatives of socialist 
transformation, the golden goose would be kept safe? 
To be sure, the advent of the General Line did not seem to preclude qiaowu’s 
practice of youdai. Whereas there had been special leniency in the Land Reform for 
huaqiao households who had only become landlords after becoming huaqiao, similar 
allowances were now offered to huaqiao bourgeoisie and capitalists. In response to 
questions on ‘how huaqiao capitalists were to undertake socialist transformation’, the 
OCAC drew a clear line. For those abroad, the ‘practice of capitalism in the countries in 
which they live is perfectly legal’, and ‘we have no cause to require them to undergo 
socialist transformation’.74 As for huaqiao who sent money back, or who had or wanted 
to invest in China, they were welcomed—especially in joint state-private enterprise—
with the CFEC forming a committee to guide their investment.75 Of course, huaqiao 
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capitalism overseas was still exploitative of workers’ surplus value, but here the OCAC 
preached tolerance, stating that the General Line did not eliminate capitalism, but rather 
sought to use it positively. These huaqiao had roles to play, and to reject their investment, 
or ostracise their relatives from employment, or view their remittances as ‘exploitative 
profit’, was only to ‘add a greater financial burden to the country’.76 Such allowances, the 
OCAC asserted, were also part of a constitutional obligation to the huaqiao. 
The PRC’s Constitution—still a draft until the first NPC in September 1954—
stated in Article 98 that ‘the People’s Republic of China protects the proper rights and 
interests of Chinese resident abroad’.77 This made the Constitution a useful device by 
which qiaowu justified allowances towards the huaqiao. Article 98 protected their ‘rights 
and interests’, and Article 11 guaranteed ‘the rights of citizens’ own lawfully-earned 
incomes, savings, houses and other means of life’ (including remittances).78 But actually, 
the Constitution’s provisions for huaqiao were also very necessary because the deviations 
against qiaowu—and violations of remittances—were still commonplace. 
In March 1954, the qiaowu office and PBOC branch for Yunnan investigated an 
apparent fall in remittances in Hexi County, producing a report for the OCAC and PBOC 
in June that caused a furore. Firstly, even though local officials knew the importance of 
remittances, they had marginalised the protection of huaqiao proprietary rights to their 
remittances, so as to effect ‘struggle’ against counterrevolutionaries. Thus, while officials 
paid lip service to huaqiao rights, they confiscated, fined, deducted or froze remittances 
as punitive action against huaqiao in post-Land Reform ‘supervision of the masses’ or 
reform-through-labour.79 Some cadres had forced those classed as qiaojuan rich peasants 
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to seek approval before withdrawing their remittances, but then only approved those with 
‘no political problems’. The Yunnan People’s Government (YPG) was cognisant of the 
significance of huaqiao remittances, but considered such abuses merely ‘overly rigid’ 
methods. After all, remittance levels were often unaffected since overseas relatives had 
no idea of the situation, because some cadres impersonated qiaojuan in letters.80 The 
OCAC and PBOC were horrified. The cadres were warned that remittances affected 
qiaojuan livelihood, but also ‘the question of production’, as ‘one of the most important 
sources of the country’s foreign exchange’. Thus absolutely no violation or interference 
with remittances would be brooked, even for ‘huaqiao remittances that belong to 
landlords, rich peasants or those under the supervision of the masses’, and any deviation 
from these instructions would be ‘not only erroneous, but illegal’.81 Punitive action was 
to be based on the law, and was not to target remittances. As the PBOC and OCAC warned, 
‘to lump remittance work and anti-counterrevolutionary struggle together, indeed to plan 
to use remittances as a means of controlling the potential actions of counterrevolutionaries 
is incorrect’.82  
 The OCAC and PBOC were also concerned with reports of other, more insidious 
interferences with remittances. Yunnan was warned to let the huaqiao spend remittances 
as they saw fit—on ancestral graves, funerals, celebrations, weddings, or philanthropy—
it was not for cadres to govern how huaqiao lived. Moreover, cadres were warned that 
remittance proprietary rights extended to the haiwai huaqiao; until recipients received the 
money, senders were entitled to seek redress from remitting banks if the remittance was 
never received, and so cadres would be undermining the BOC/PBOC if they interfered 
with remittances.83 Such reports concerned qiaowu practitioners, indeed that these abuses 
                                                
80 OCAC, PBOC, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui, Zhongguo renmin yinhang zonghang lianshu 
pifu dui Yunnan sheng huaqiao shiwu chu ti chuli qiaohui banfa bu fu zhengce’, 20/09/1954, GDQW, No. 
5 (25 Oct 1954), 4-10 (5-6). 
81 Ibid., 5. 
82 Ibid., 5-6. 
83 Ibid., 6-7. 
 137 
still existed convinced the OCAC and PBOC that ‘the post-Land Reform situation for 
qiaowu and remittance policy work still harbours numerous failings’.84 Thus the OCAC 
and PBOC sent their lengthy criticism across the country, requiring regional authorities 
to ‘seriously check the conditions’ of qiaowu work in their jurisdictions.85 
 The OCAC and PBOC report had (rightly) identified the legacies of the Land 
Reform as a major factor in the problems with remittance work, and this was an issue 
which Liao’s 1953 rectification agenda was intended to address. But clearly, this was still 
a work-in-progress—and not just in the qiaoxiang, but in the cities too. Guangzhou’s 
qiaowu bureau had, in July–August 1954, undertaken a general survey of the city’s 
huaqiao. The survey excluded the suburbs, qiaosheng, new guiqiao, huaqiao in public 
sector work, and those not on the household register, but still involved 33,891 persons.86 
The city’s qiaowu officials found that of the huaqiao households in the city, 4,751 were 
completely reliant on remittances for survival, of which 1,440 (30.3%) were in dire straits; 
while of the 3,601 households partially reliant on remittances, 982 (27.2%) were in 
difficulty. There was also a minority that did not receive any remittances at all.87  
 Further investigations revealed that Guangzhou had seen an 18.4% fall in 
remittances over January–June 1954. According to officials, there were two main reasons: 
one was external, blaming the imperialist embargo, GMD propaganda, and foreign 
economic recessions. Yet, the other reason was that remittance policies were failing: there 
were violations of remittances, and not only were the masses ignorant of policy, but 
cadres had also failed to implement it. Consequently, qiaojuan had deep suspicions, and 
many left their remittances in Hong Kong—estimated at US$100 million. Yet, since that 
amount had even reached Hong Kong, qiaowu practitioners argued that ‘the imperialist 
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embargo is not the primary cause’. It was instead the failure to implement policies.88 
Relatedly, huaqiao were also being denied exit visas—mainly for Hong Kong. Most visa 
applications were for travel to collect remittances, but others wanted to visit family or 
transit through Hong Kong. Yet, Public Security was more than likely to reject these 
applications because of deep-rooted suspicions about the reasons for travel, whether the 
huaqiao would return, or because they were unfamiliar with ‘the applicant’s background’, 
and cadres thus preferred rigid attitudes and ‘to rather be left than right’.89 Yet, qiaowu 
officials believed that this was a reflection of cadres’ ignorance.90 
 Finally, it had become common for tenants of huaqiao-owned property to refuse 
to pay rent. These tenants, some in arrears for years, included cadres, peasants, workers, 
and businessmen—practically all segments of society—but the huaqiao owners were also 
from similarly diverse class backgrounds. Nevertheless, these tenants claimed that such 
rent demands were actually evidence of landlordism and exploitation, and thus refused to 
pay. After all, as a tenant remarked: ‘In a communist world, the one living in the house is 
the one who owns it.’91 This problem was very serious, because for many huaqiao, rental 
revenue was an important supplementary income. Indeed, that they were unable to earn 
this was one reason for the large numbers of huaqiao with economic difficulties—and 
given that Guangzhou’s qiaowu bureau paid out RMB 8 million every month in welfare, 
this was a huge burden.92 The urban qiaowu problems were thus different from qiaoxiang, 
but they had similar themes: huaqiao dissatisfaction and suspicion, official treatment of 
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the huaqiao that preferred overt strictness as ostensibly more ‘left’ behaviour, and with 
the masses themselves believing that the huaqiao deserved what they got. 
 Whereas the OCAC had sought rectification of the Land Reform’s failures and 
excesses amongst the huaqiao in China, and especially so as to repair the damage that 
had been wreaked on remittance flows, the post-Land Reform situation did not appear to 
be improving. Instead, with the advent of the General Line and its overt othering of the 
bourgeois in the interests of ‘revolutionary struggle’, qiaowu was confronted with a new 
set of difficulties. In the era of accelerated socialist transformation, the cadres on the 
ground seemed to want ‘to rather be left than right’, but this was coming at the expense 
of huaqiao interests—and hence, at the expense of remittances. This did not go unnoticed. 
In response to instructions from the South China Bureau, the East Guangdong Party 
Committee proposed in December 1954 to ‘comprehensively and systematically execute 
and propagate qiaowu policy from the cadres to the masses, so as to struggle and strive 
to fulfil the huaqiao remittance objectives’.93 The motivation for this was that, while the 
region had a minor success in raising remittance figures by 1.65% over 10 months, and 
in qiaojuan and guiqiao participation in APCs that ranged from 48% (Dabu County) to 
86.8% (Mei County), and 80% participation in Mei County Credit Cooperatives, it also 
admitted that ‘at present, the execution of policy across the region is very uneven’.94 For 
instance, Chao An County’s 51 villages had at least 76 major incidents of ‘remittance 
infringements’.95 East Guangdong also said unidentified ‘evil businessmen’ had deceived 
qiaojuan through false investment schemes, but this was never elaborated on. In any case, 
despite the small increase in remittances, the region had only met 83.91% of its target.96 
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The situation was admittedly serious, and thus the Committee suggested ‘mobilising the 
whole Party to rely on the masses’ to fulfil correct qiaowu policy. 
 Correct qiaowu firstly meant ‘the expansion of opportunities and outlets’ for 
remittances to be utilised.97 Thus the policy that the huaqiao were entitled to spend money 
as they saw fit—on ‘weddings, funerals and celebrations’—was to be propagated.98 
Indeed, if huaqiao wanted to construct buildings, local officials were to provide suitable 
assistance, including permission to purchase building materials and food.99 Guidance was 
also to be given through a special huaqiao South China Investment Company, and despite 
ongoing socialist transformation, any huaqiao who returned to invest would retain their 
class.100 Which was useful, given that the party-state held that bourgeois activity abroad 
did not always make one a capitalist, since haiwai huaqiao were victims of imperialist or 
colonialist oppression. But this policy also reflected concerns about class statuses. 
 Secondly, correct qiaowu was to address the ‘legacies of huaqiao class status 
problems’. According to the South China Bureau, apart from counterrevolutionaries, 
‘despotic landlords’, and landlords who deserved ‘the people’s wrath’, all other classes 
could be revised if necessary.101 Liao had promised this in late 1953, but its application 
since its official start in April 1954 had been uneven. 102  In some cases, the mere 
suggestion of huaqiao class changes had been met with deep resistance from peasants 
unwilling to return confiscated property to huaqiao, and from local cadres who found 
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‘toadying-up’ to huaqiao ideologically inconsistent.103 But the orders were clear. All 
incorrectly classed huaqiao could have their statuses changed (or ‘removing hats’).104 All 
huaqiao workers, shop employees or businessmen who were classed concurrently as 
landlords were to be cleared (or ‘cutting off tails’). For the correctly classed, if they had 
been law-abiding, ‘in view of the need to take care of the huaqiao, it is permissible in all 
cases to deal with them generously and to announce that they are not to be treated as 
landlords from henceforth’. Even absentee haiwai huaqiao landlords could have their 
class revised, and rich peasants adjusted to poor or middle peasants, since ‘this had a very 
large positive effect on gaining huaqiao remittances, and uniting with the huaqiao and 
qiaojuan’.105 Those undergoing reform-through-labour should be relieved after two years, 
while former landlords were not to be ostracised, and were allowed to join cooperatives. 
Expropriated property was to be returned, unless already distributed. In the event that 
property had not been re-distributed, but was being occupied, ownership rights were to 
revert to the huaqiao, but arrangements could be made for renting or borrowing.106 
 In line with the rights of huaqiao, remittances were to be vigorously protected, 
with infringements severely dealt with, and both the cadres and the masses educated on 
policy. The huaqiao rights were such that, ‘even in cases where recipients of remittances 
are law-breakers from landlord households, it is imperative that law-breaking landlordism 
is separated entirely from remittances’.107 Some cadres thought that this was ideologically 
counter-intuitive, but the East Guangdong Party Committee reminded them that: 
Looking at this from a national perspective, the crux of the issue is the 
accumulation of funds for socialist industrialisation, and the construction of the 
heavy and machine industries. Therefore, in consideration of the state and 
                                                
103 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Meixian guanche chuli huaqiao dizhu 
chengfen wenti shidian gongzuo jieshao’, n.d. (c. 12/1954), GDQW, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 34-36 (36). 
104  East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Cong ganbu dao qunzhong, 
quanmian di xitong di xuanchuan guanche qiaowu zhengce, wei zhengqu wancheng qiaohui renwu er 
fendou’, 06/12/1954, GDQW, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 23. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., 24. 
107 Ibid. 
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people’s highest interest, we cannot refuse to use money derived from huaqiao 
industrialist and merchant families.108 
 
Similarly, the cadres in charge of local Credit Cooperatives were also warned against any 
infringements, and to cooperate with the banks to ensure that ‘facilitating remittances’ 
was carried out in service of ‘the state and people’s highest interest’. 
 The Committee also proposed a more serious effort to organise the qiaopi couriers 
to resist the imperialists’ restrictions on remittances, and to utilise the transnationality of 
their occupation. Domestically, the qiaopi couriers could ensure that remittances were 
delivered on behalf of the huaqiao limited by anti-China restrictions. While externally, 
the couriers could help to spread positive propaganda. Thus couriers were encouraged to 
contribute positively—and crucially, allowed their commissions.109 Finally, the guiqiao 
were to be appropriately settled. The principle for returnees was still ‘self-help through 
production’, but work groups were to pay specific attention to their needs.110 
 There was thus serious attention towards the issues affecting qiaowu in 1954, and 
a strong focus on better implementation on the ground. This also placed the responsibility 
for qiaowu on local, lower-level cadres. In that respect, Hainan Island is an excellent case-
study of the utter failure of cadres in qiaowu. But this case-study needs to begin with the 
victory cadres declared in October 1954, when Wenchang County reported a remittance 
increase of 66%. Indeed, so successful was Wenchang that even previously suspicious 
huaqiao had since ‘written letters to express their gratefulness’.111 Wenchang’s victory—
so it said—had been due to correct application of qiaowu policy: it had rectified huaqiao 
classes; encouraged qiaojuan and guiqiao participation in collectivisation; encouraged 
‘glorious labour’ and not reliance on remittances; implemented policy on huaqiao 
                                                
108 Ibid., 25. 
109 Ibid., 26. 
110 Ibid., 27. 
111  Wenchang County Party Committee United Front Department, ‘Zhonggong Wenchang xianwei 
tongzhanbu guanyu guanche huaqiao zhengce gongzuo de tongbao’, 19/10/1954, GDQW, No. 6 (5 Dec 
1954), 12. 
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marriages, ‘causing the qiaojuan to feel that the government cares for them’; and engaged 
in education, making cadres more knowledgeable, and assuring the qiaojuan and guiqiao 
of their remittance rights.112 The result was the expansion of huaqiao patriotic unity, and 
dramatic remittance increases. Such reports were not unique to Wenchang; Hainan as a 
whole reported an 88% success rate in class revision island-wide.113 
Hainan cadres trumpeted their successes and were generally held as models of 
correct qiaowu. In a November 1954 discussion of the letters received by provincial 
offices, Guangdong authorities held up Hainan’s positive example, proven by letters from 
huaqiao expressing gratitude to Chairman Mao, the CCP and CPG; enthusiasm for 
national construction and the gaining of remittances; and their approval for qiaowu.114 
Hainan’s success, so it said, was because it had professionalised cadres and improved 
their knowledge. Chen Wuying (head of Hainan qiaowu) said as much to the ‘Second 
South China Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work’, quoting penitent cadres 
who had ‘previously failed to hear the Party’s qiaowu policies’, but who were now no 
longer ‘ignorant of the immense utility that gaining remittances offered to the country’s 
socialist industrialisation and construction’. 115  Chen cautiously pointed to room for 
improvement since some still believed that class revision was for haiwai huaqiao, and 
not for qiaojuan. But that was for future work; Hainan had done well thus far. 
                                                
112 The Marriage Law (1950) entailed a right to divorce ‘under conditions of abandonment’. In some cases, 
qiaojuan wives had seen this as ‘license for openly defying the authority of their overseas husbands’; while 
others rejected a ‘double standard’ where haiwai huaqiao kept separate wives/families overseas. Either 
way, haiwai huaqiao men responded to divorce demands and petitions by cutting off remittances and thus 
official policy was that ‘mediation and reconciliation, rather than divorce, were the preferred means for 
dealing with marital disputes’. Only when all attempts at resolution had been exhausted would the matter 
be sent to the Courts. See Peterson, Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China, 40-43. 
See also Wenchang County Party Committee United Front Department, ‘Zhonggong Wenchang xianwei 
tongzhanbu guanyu guanche huaqiao zhengce gongzuo de tongbao’, 19/10/1954, GDQW, No. 6 (5 Dec 
1954), 14; ‘Guangdong sheng huaqiao hunyin wenti hen yanzhong’, 01/11/1954, NBCK. 
113 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Yue zhong, Hainan, yue bei qu dangwei 
zhaokai quan qu qiaowu gongzuo huiyi’, n.d. (c. 1954), GDQW, No. 6 (5 Dec 1954), 25. 
114 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang chuli huaqiao lai 
xin de yijian’, 15/11/1954, GDQW, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 4-6 (4). 
115 Chen Wuying, ‘Hainan qiaoxiang jiehe nongye huzhu hezuo yundong, guanche zhengce, jiejue yiliu de 
jingyan’, n.d. (c. 13-21/12/1954), GDQW, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 12-14 (12-13). 
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 Hainan’s apparent focus on class revision was seemingly endorsed in February 
1955 when the South China Bureau approved the Guangdong qiaowu Party Group’s 
proposal on the early revision of huaqiao class. Since late 1954, a (rather ironic) team led 
by Tao Zhu, and (now) OCAC vice-Chairman Fang Fang had been engaged in a pilot 
program for early revision of huaqiao landlord status.116 While the Land Reform Law 
entailed a five-year period after assessment before a landlord could apply for a class 
revision, the Bureau authorised in February 1955 an accelerated process for huaqiao (and 
only huaqiao) landlords and rich peasants.117 Successful revision now required law-
abiding behaviour, and reform of exploitative behaviour, but without the five-year wait. 
The Bureau instructed local Party Committees that early revision was ‘one of the most 
important tasks at present’, and the reasons for this were simple.118 The pilot program’s 
ostensible effect was an increase in remittances—Guangzhou had an increase of 3.7% in 
January; West Guangdong districts, 7.9%; and Zhongshan County first among equals at 
13%.119 Early revision was also immensely popular, and those qiaojuan with revised 
classes were eager to write letters to ‘report joy’.120 Changes in class also enabled more 
huaqiao to participate in collectivisation, offering APCs and Mutual Aid Teams more 
resources—especially remittances.121 
The Guangdong qiaowu Party Group’s pilot program was convincing, and the 
South China Bureau thus extended it to huaqiao rich peasants, who had not been included 
originally.122 But the Party Group went further, suggesting that qiaowu become part of 
                                                
116 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Party Group, ‘Guanyu chuli huaqiao dizhu 
tiqian gaibian chengfen de shidian gongzuo baogao’, 03/02/1955, GDQW, No. 9 (9 Mar 1955), 3-13 (3-4). 
117  CCP CC South China Bureau, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang huanan fenju pi zhuan ‘Guangdong sheng 
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119 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Party Group, ‘Guanyu chuli huaqiao dizhu 
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122 Après Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Director, Rao Zhangfeng, the ‘experimental 
phase’ had seen 2406 out of 2614 huaqiao landlord households (across 9 counties) undergo class changes 
in a 2-month period; basically a 91.6% success rate. See Rao Zhangfeng, ‘Guangdong sheng huaqiao shiwu 
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Party Committees’ permanent agendas, to effect systematic implementation.123 The class 
revisions were to continue, but other qiaowu issues like the protection of remittances, the 
return of huaqiao property, rent disputes, and propaganda to qiaojuan and the masses, 
were all to receive further attention.124 The Party Group asserted that qiaowu rested on 
‘Party Committees at all levels and qiaoxiang cadres’, who had to remember that time 
was literally money, since ‘a delay of one month in implementing policy is the same as 
the loss of one month’s possible remittances’.125 Yet, while the Party Group reminded 
districts to adhere to policy, it said that Hainan had basically completed the work. Given 
its successes, Hainan was a model of victorious qiaowu.  
Yet, despite the glorious victories that Hainan was supposed to have had by 1955, 
the stark reality was that it was close to crisis. Reports that things were not quite as 
glorious as had been thought emerged in June 1955 when Xinhua reported that Hainan’s 
remittance figures had actually fallen every year since 1951, with the past five months 
seeing a fall of US$100,000 (RMB 240,000) year-on-year.126 Apart from the usual nod 
towards imperialist restrictions on remittances, the reasons for the fall were otherwise 
domestic. Indeed, the first reason was because ‘various county Party Committees and 
cadres have failed to pay attention to huaqiao work, and have been insincere in making 
the implementation of huaqiao policy part of their work agendas, preferring to believe 
that it is the sole responsibility of qiaowu departments’.127 In Wenchang, with a huaqiao 
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123 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Party Group, ‘Guanyu chuli huaqiao dizhu 
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124 Ibid., 12-13. 
125 Ibid., 13. 
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University Press, 2009), 265. 
127 ‘Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao’, 01/07/1955, NBCK. 
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population above 50%, the local Party Committee’s cadre conference in April 1955 
turned Chen Wuying away, while its Party Secretary, who was apparently too busy with 
other work, had obstructed the qiaowu work teams attempting class revisions.  
There were also reports of ‘deviations in the unified sale and purchase’, with 
qiaojuan complaining that they had insufficient food—especially those who had once 
been landlords/rich peasants. One qiaojuan from Lehui County said each person had only 
been able to buy 7 jin of food provisions each month, while other qiaojuan who had 
wanted to hold weddings or build houses had never been able to buy more than 20-30 jin, 
which was not sufficient to host guests or feed workers.128 While a few qiaojuan had been 
driven by this suffering to commit suicide, more generally—and worryingly, given the 
point of qiaowu—the huaqiao were unsure of what was the point of remittances if they 
could not use it to feed themselves, and were thus writing to their relatives abroad to tell 
of the deprivations that ‘unified sale and purchase’ had forced upon them.129 
Wenchang had claimed that it had effectively managed huaqiao marriages, but 
the 1955 report suggested a far different situation, with large numbers of qiaojuan 
demanding divorces, and local officials avoiding any involvement. In one district, out of 
80 qiaojuan households in a village, 13 had extra-marital affairs. Such incidents had come 
to the knowledge of haiwai huaqiao men, who had furiously cut off remittances. One 
huaqiao fumed that even if they had ‘avoided the landlord hat’ or had those hats removed, 
they had been ‘given the hat of a cuckold’.130 Worst still was that ‘the large majority of 
those who have had unnatural male-female relations with qiaojuan are rural cadres’.131 
Clearly, despite Wenchang and Hainan’s reports, the reality was that Party cadres were 
                                                
128 1 jin (or 1 catty) is 0.5 kg. See ‘Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao’, 01/07/1955, NBCK. 
129 This situation was not unique to huaqiao; the government set subsistence quotas for grain ‘at roughly 
13 to 16 kilos per head each month—a little more than half the required amount of unhusked grain to 
provide 1700 to 1900 calories. It was a starvation diet imposed equally on all villagers.’ See Dikotter, The 
Tragedy of Liberation, 217, 213. 
130 ‘Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao’, 01/07/1955, NBCK. 
131 This was similar to Fujian (see Chapter 2). ‘Unnatural male-female relations’ [不正当的男女关系] was 
Xinhua’s term. See ‘Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao’, 01/07/1955, NBCK. 
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the problem, and the fundamental contradiction in qiaowu was really that what the party-
state determined was not what its cadres were doing. 
 In fairness, the East Guangdong Party Committee’s qiaowu office had begun to 
discover some problems already in February 1955.132 Cadres were apparently abusing the 
‘unified sale and purchase’ system, using it to punish class enemies, and withholding food 
from qiaojuan who lived off remittances; other cadres had restricted supplies to meet their 
own quotas for surplus accumulation; while cadres had also failed to convey policy 
regarding huaqiao property since qiaojuan were unsure if they could build houses, or 
own property in a period of socialist transformation.133 Other huaqiao investors had 
questions about whether they were entitled to dividends and the protection of their capital, 
or if the huaqiao investment companies even offered a superior interest rate to bank 
deposits. All of this was sufficient for one huaqiao to remark that: ‘the Centre’s huaqiao 
policies are great and correct, but the rural cadres’ implementation of these policies is 
inadequate’.134 East Guangdong clearly saw the problem, but its response was rather 
lame. Cadres were told to head to rural areas to resolve these issues ‘as a priority’, to 
engage in yet more policy education, or indeed to conduct more checks on work.135 Such 
actions, the Party Committee believed, would fulfil the party-state’s qiaowu policies 
which were ‘correct and absolutely necessary to implement’.136 Yet, none of this was 
particularly new, and since cadres (as on Hainan) had long claimed to be implementing 
such policies, was not particularly helpful either. The cadres therefore could not be relied 
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on to keep faith with qiaowu, indeed, the cadres were actually the problem. Thus by early 
1955, a far more direct intervention in qiaowu was clearly needed. 
 
More money, more problems: 
By January 1955, Liao Chengzhi had to admit (again) that qiaowu was failing. 
Indeed, it was a failure made even more egregious by the fact that in 1950-1954, the PRC 
had seen a net remittance inflow of US$684.06 million. This, as Liao told the CCP CC, 
was about 50% of the hard currency earnings from exports to capitalist countries.137 Yet, 
while remittances had peaked in 1951 (US$169.23 million), they had fallen ever since, 
with 1954’s figure only 70% of 1951.138 The decline was significant, and although there 
had been external pressure, Liao noted that ‘our work has contained severe failings’.139 
Yet, Liao was not referring to the OCAC and PBOC. He was blaming instead the failure 
to implement policies on the ground by the lower-level cadres and officials. Indeed, Liao 
said that remittances had declined because of: the common violations of remittances; the 
linkages of huaqiao class status to remittances; the wrongful linkages of grain yields to 
remittances; and the persecution of qiaopi couriers due to suspicions of their class, or as 
spies because of their travel.140 These violations had greatly undermined efforts to secure 
remittances, so much so that the qiaojuan were unwilling to receive or seek remittances, 
as they now believed that: ‘more money, more problems’.141 
                                                
137 Whereas the report in the ZZWX only lists the PBOC and OCAC Party Groups as authors, Liao was 
personally responsible and he presented it to the State Council. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guanyu guoqu qiaohui 
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141 The phrase literally means ‘more gold summons disaster’ [多金招祸]. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhongyang 
huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang 
zhongyang de baogao’, 03/01/1955, ZZWX, 18: 140. 
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The problem, as the OCAC and PBOC Party Groups admitted, was that qiaowu 
had failed to protect or guarantee the ‘proprietary rights of huaqiao remittances’, because 
it had failed to communicate this imperative to Party cadres.142 Past statements on this 
imperative had been kept within limited Party circles—with the exception of Fujian, since 
the FPG had publicly declared that remittances were inviolate.143 Otherwise, such public 
statements had never been countenanced. Some believed that to do so would confirm the 
anti-CCP and imperialist propaganda that alleged that huaqiao remittances were under 
attack. But then again, remittances were truly under attack—from within. In focusing on 
rectifying Land Reform excesses, the OCAC and PBOC had only belatedly seen the 
growing contradiction in the General Line era between collectivisation in qiaoxiang, and 
qiaowu. Cadres had focused on remittances as a resource for agrarian collectivisation and 
socialist transformation, and since this was technically outside Land Reform rectification, 
had ignored qiaowu directives.144  After all, socialist transformation was the national 
agenda, which therefore meant that the OCAC and PBOC would have to intervene 
directly to define qiaowu in the context of the General Line. 
 The priority for the OCAC and PBOC was more effective communication of 
qiaowu to the cadres and masses, particularly in areas with large huaqiao populations. 
Cadres were essentially out of control: coercing huaqiao to join Credit Cooperatives; 
persecuting qiaojuan for allegedly-bourgeois lifestyles; accusing remittances of being 
exploitative profits; forcing huaqiao to subscribe to National Economic Construction 
Bonds; and including remittances in land yield demands, thus forcing qiaojuan to sell 
more grain to meet ‘unified sale and purchase’.145 Such violations were not confined to 
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cadres; the masses were guilty too. Some said ‘individualist capitalists’ had cheated the 
huaqiao with false investment schemes. But there were also postal workers impersonating 
qiaojuan in letters demanding money; ‘hooligans’ extorting remittances; and Village 
Committees which examined huaqiao letters and exacted levies.146 It was thus necessary 
to instil the lesson that remittances affected over ten million huaqiao in China, 
representing both their livelihoods, and their potential economic contributions. To attack 
remittances was therefore both a violation of legal rights and economic sabotage. Thus, 
while Liao called for policy education and investigation of violations, he also requested 
that the State Council issue a decree on ‘Resolutely implementing and protecting huaqiao 
remittances policy’, with an accompanying People’s Daily editorial, ‘so that the country’s 
huaqiao remittance policy will be known in every household’.147 
Secondly, all violations of remittances were to be rectified.  While collectivisation 
was a national priority, and the CCP desired that qiaojuan join in the socialisation of 
agriculture, participation was to be strictly voluntary. To coerce qiaojuan into joining 
cooperatives (whether Credit or APCs) would wreck attempts to increase remittances.148 
Similarly, that qiaojuan received this income without labour was not to preclude their 
participation in collectivisation, and it certainly was not grounds for an increase in harvest 
demands. All direct violations—whether false investment schemes, impersonated letters, 
or extortion—were to be rectified, with ‘abominable cases’ severely dealt with in a high-
profile way, pour encourager les autres.149 
Thirdly, recipients’ rights to use remittances as they saw fit were to be protected. 
Since remittances were mostly for family support, they were not exploitative profits. Of 
course, while the collectivisation drive was a priority, cadres were not to force the issue, 
or limit how remittances were spent—even if not on the Mutual Aid Teams or the APCs. 
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Even where huaqiao households were enabled by remittances to live relatively better (if 
not, bourgeois) lives compared to the masses, cadres were not to seek to ‘equalise’ the 
two demographics by restricting huaqiao spending. This would reduce the desire to even 
seek remittances, which of course, was unacceptable. Conversely, cadres were to provide 
qiaojuan with opportunities to spend their money. If goods were controlled under ‘unified 
sale and purchase’ (i.e. cotton cloth or cooking oil), cadres were to allocate larger amounts 
of food or goods for qiaojuan so that they would use their remittances.150 
Fourthly, for the huaqiao who wanted to invest in property, land or construction, 
they were to be allocated extra building material and food (for workers).151 Moreover, 
those huaqiao who invested in urban construction were to be given a five-year exemption 
from property tax. Longstanding huaqiao interest in philanthropy was also encouraged. 
But to prevent misappropriations, local officials and community bodies were warned not 
to re-allocate funds intended for specific purposes, or to solicit donations from huaqiao 
directly.152 The OCAC and PBOC also suggested that the CCP CC authorise Beijing, 
Shanghai, Fujian, and Guangdong to research and arrange for opportunities for huaqiao 
to invest. Of course, direct investment had been a small part of remittances in 1949-1955, 
at around RMB 120 billion (US$4.87 million).153 Yet, there was potential for growth. The 
PBOC estimated that HKD 2 billion (US$349.99 million) from Southeast Asian huaqiao 
had come into Hong Kong in recent years, and had mostly remained there.154 To gain that 
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capital, the OCAC and PBOC suggested that huaqiao investments in national investment 
companies be guaranteed an 8% yearly interest; have guaranteed proprietary rights even 
after the transition to socialism; have no bearing whatsoever on class status; and entitle 
the investor to a job from the state enterprise they invested in.155 
Finally, the OCAC and PBOC determined to move away from their previous 
hesitation about propaganda to the haiwai huaqiao. Whereas they had previously thought 
that this might only encourage the imperialists’ anti-CCP propaganda, they now felt that 
it was necessary to accurately and extensively convey information to the haiwai huaqiao 
about the PRC’s protection of remittances and the implementation of qiaowu. Moreover, 
it would also help in the dissemination of information about the homeland’s development, 
thereby encouraging the haiwai huaqiao into patriotic unity with their homeland, and to 
oppose the restrictions placed on remittances by foreign governments.156 
Liao Chengzhi believed that this extensive formulation by the OCAC and PBOC 
would place qiaowu implementation, and remittance protections at the heart of future 
work agendas for Party Committees in huaqiao areas. Indeed, the rectification Liao 
demanded suggested a direct intervention in the implementation of qiaowu, so as to 
resolve the fundamental problem, which was that it was the party-state’s own agents who 
undermined its objectives. Or, as Liao said: 
There is still a large portion of cadres who harbour an incorrect perspective; they 
believe that the Centre has two incompatible policies—one, that of the socialist 
transformation of agriculture, and the other, that of huaqiao policy. This is an 
error, and it is an extremely harmful way of thinking. Policies for huaqiao work 
and for huaqiao remittances are part of the Party’s most important policies. These 
policies embody the Party’s approach during the transitional period towards the 
labouring masses, towards the bourgeois, and are in obedience to the Party’s 
overall objective in the General Line. To implement the Centre’s policies on the 
protection of huaqiao remittance proprietary rights and to do qiaojuan work well, 
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not only helps to win over the guowai huaqiao to the homeland, but also helps to 
contribute to developing production and the socialist transformation of 
agriculture.157 
 
The CCP CC apparently agreed with Liao, since it soon issued an ‘all-China’ directive 
approving the OCAC–PBOC memorandum, and instructing that all regional and local 
governments implement it henceforth.158 
The immediate consequence of the OCAC–PBOC report and the CCP CC’s 
directive was the State Council’s decree on 23 February 1955 that explicitly entrenched 
the principle that remittances were legal income, and made its protections long-term 
policy, thus giving the OCAC–PBOC suggestions the force of law.159  There would be no 
excuse for any ignorance of qiaowu henceforth—not least because the national press were 
instructed to, and did give the decree substantial coverage. Indeed, as Liao had suggested, 
the People’s Daily ran a lengthy editorial on 3 March (written by him) that publicised the 
State Council decree. 160  This direct intervention by the State Council served two 
purposes: it sent a strong message to the cadres and the masses, but it also added impetus 
to the wider propaganda directed at the haiwai huaqiao that was part of this new qiaowu 
activism. The propaganda push in 1954–1955 was thus a function of the Liao-devised 
qiaowu intervention in January–February 1955.161 The necessity for this push was most 
obviously to counteract the negative publicity that failures in qiaowu had created by 1954, 
and the anti-CCP propaganda that had capitalised on situation.162 But there was another 
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reason: to stabilise the transnational connection between New China and its overseas 
children, despite—or perhaps precisely because of—a growing sentiment that the PRC 
was marginalising, or even seeking to outright abandon its duties to the haiwai huaqiao. 
 Liao’s editorial for the People’s Daily in March 1955 took care to emphasis the 
constitutional basis of the PRC’s stance on the ‘legitimate rights and interests’ of huaqiao 
and of course, on the legality of remittances as lawful income, and the state’s guarantee 
of their right to own property.163 But the point of such references was that by 1955, the 
huaqiao had ample reason to doubt the Constitution. 
Originally, the Electoral Law of 1 March 1953 had reserved a thirty-delegate bloc 
to represent the haiwai huaqiao in the NPC, with the precise method of their election to 
be separately determined.164 This aroused excitement amongst the huaqiao.165 But many 
were unsure of how this would work, since the most direct and obvious suffrage would 
have been elections among the imperialist or reactionary-governed haiwai huaqiao. This 
prospect horrified British officials in Southeast Asia, not only because it would infringe 
unprecedentedly on British sovereignty, but also since it would be profoundly subversive 
in Malaya and Singapore.166 The British government thus thought to deliver a demarche 
to the CPG, to reject ‘unwarrantable interference with the sovereignty of the local 
territorial administration concerned’.167 Yet, the British need not have worried. 
As it turns out, the PRC’s extension of democracy to the haiwai huaqiao turned 
out to be a damp squib. On 28 November 1953, British Chargé d’affaires Humphrey 
Trevelyan reported to the Foreign Office that He Xiangning had been quoted saying that 
‘having regard to the circumstances in which the Overseas Chinese lived abroad’, and 
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given that ‘nominations’ for elections would be difficult’, delegates would be selected by 
‘consultation’. Trevelyan believed this meant ‘that the Chinese have given up the idea of 
holding elections overseas’—and he was correct.168  
Rather than hold any sort of election, the OCAC simply chose thirty delegates to 
the NPC at an Expanded Conference from 8-14 July 1954. The delegates included famous 
names like Tan Kah Kee, Situ Meitang, He Xiangning and Liao Chengzhi. Liao claimed 
that the thirty candidates had been nominated from haiwai huaqiao able to return to 
China, and guiqiao who were ‘still representative of Chinese abroad’, and of course, ‘in 
accordance with the actual circumstances of overseas Chinese’. 169  But even if 
circumstances prevented haiwai huaqiao from voting for, or nominating delegates, their 
qiaojuan relatives, their qiaosheng children, and their guiqiao friends had all been equally 
shut out of the process. Of course, that was not to say that the huaqiao in China did not 
get to vote. They could still vote in local elections and for regional NPC delegates—just 
not for their own huaqiao representatives.170 
 The huaqiao were thus denied the franchise—and this took place even without a 
British protest. Trevelyan believed that this stemmed from Beijing’s new desire for good 
relations with the newly-independent countries of Southeast Asia. After all, Zhou Enlai 
had told the NPC on 23 September that the PRC was willing to resolve the huaqiao dual 
nationality issue with Southeast Asian countries that had, or would establish diplomatic 
relations with it.171 This issue came from a traditional view that nationality was based on 
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ethnicity—or blood, hence jus sanguinis. Thus huaqiao, even if born abroad, could claim 
Chinese nationality, or more troublingly, China could lay claim to their loyalties.172 Thus 
giving voting rights to the haiwai huaqiao would only have provoked already-suspicious 
governments, and given the close ties between huaqiao in and out of China, to restrict the 
franchise for one group meant that it had to be restricted for all. 
 It was true that this electoral restraint on the part of the PRC was motivated by 
foreign policy, but this had actually begun with the January 1952 CCP CC statement on 
qiaowu that stated that Chinese abroad with local citizenship were not huaqiao. Yet, this 
early rejection of dual nationality was obviously not discussed outside the CCP CC, which 
thus explains why the British thought the PRC had a new foreign policy in 1954. Actually, 
it was the continuation of an existing policy, except with the added intention of using the 
dual nationality issue as foreign policy tool. 
 Since April 1954, the PRC had publicly preached the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence’, or: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-
aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual 
benefit; and peaceful coexistence.173 Dual nationality fell within these principles, and 
Zhou Enlai thus told Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi in June 1954 that the huaqiao should 
be loyal to their adopted countries, while U Nu was told in Rangoon that the huaqiao 
should ‘abide by the host country’s laws’.174 Indeed, Zhou told the Indian, Indonesian and 
Burmese ambassadors to China in July that the huaqiao dual nationality issue would be 
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solved with Indonesia first, and Burma thereafter.175 Even Mao told Nehru in October 
that: ‘the question of overseas Chinese should also be solved in an appropriate manner’.176 
But since the PRC’s rejection of dual nationality—even if only in private—had actually 
predated the Five Principles, all this apparent accommodation on the dual nationality 
issue was actually more about foreign policy bargaining.177 
By the time of Liao’s qiaowu report to the CCP CC in January 1955, leveraging 
on huaqiao dual nationality in foreign policy paralleled the rapprochement between 
Beijing and Jakarta, with movement towards Chinese participation in the Bandung 
Conference, and a treaty on dual nationality in April 1955. Indeed, in January 1955, even 
before the Dual Nationality Treaty negotiations were concluded, Zhou Enlai was already 
telling the Indonesian Ambassador that he expected an agreement to be formally 
reached.178 But curiously, the contemporaneous OCAC-PBOC memorandum in January 
1955 made no mention of dual nationality. Then again, since the CCP CC’s 1952 qiaowu 
statement, dual nationality was no longer a matter for qiaowu, and belonged to the MFA. 
Yet, even if qiaowu was uninvolved with the dual nationality talks, it had to deal with the 
consequent perceptions that the PRC was abandoning the haiwai huaqiao. 
The PRC’s use of huaqiao dual nationality in foreign policy chess soon created a 
corollary problem when foreign press reports began to accuse the PRC of abandoning the 
haiwai huaqiao.179 While such views from Western and anti-CCP sources were to be 
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expected, the danger was that this could compound already negative perceptions amongst 
huaqiao. After all, declining remittances already indicated the existence of suspicions of 
the PRC amongst the huaqiao, and this weighed heavily on qiaowu practitioners. Hence, 
while the Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee’s ‘overall objectives’ for 
1955 had conventional emphases on remittances and investment, there was also a strong 
intent ‘to strengthen connections with guowai huaqiao’, and also to ‘expand propaganda 
work to the huaqiao in a planned manner and through effective communication’.180 
Propaganda, of course, was not the end in itself. The Land Reform—and indeed, its 
rectification—had proven to qiaowu that there was a transnationality of huaqiao interests 
inextricably connected to remittances, and that the satisfaction of those interests had a 
domestic centre of gravity. After all, the remitters and recipients both had interests in the 
money, but both their interests were also mainly established in China. This, of course, 
was the basis of youdai. But it was also the basis for the propaganda to convince the 
huaqiao of this preferential treatment. Thus the youdai approach in qiaowu was actually 
a kind of balancing act between political economy and public relations.181 
To be sure, the youdai approach dated back to the early Land Reform leniency for 
huaqiao landlords in 1950, and had also been affirmed in 1954–1955, in the rectification 
of Land Reform deviations, despite the onset of the General Line. Yet, the State Council’s 
February 1955 decree marked a new departure for youdai, because it also implied that the 
youdai approach would be practiced even if it was actually contradictory to socialist 
transformation. To be true, qiaowu had encountered contradictions on the ground in 
1954–1955, especially in terms of how local cadres and officials failed to implement, or 
even resisted qiaowu provisions for huaqiao, in the context of the General Line and its 
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socialist transformation. Yet, this had not been seen as contradiction between qiaowu and 
socialism, but rather the fault of what Liao had called an ‘incorrect perspective’ by those 
who thought qiaowu and socialist transformation incompatible.182 For Liao and qiaowu 
practitioners, there was no contradiction. Even if their rationalisations of priorities had 
(always) placed the securing of huaqiao remittances at the very top, this ultimately served 
socialist transformation. This was the view that the CCP CC accepted anyway. 
However, despite what Liao and the OCAC (and PBOC et al.) argued, there was 
a latent contradiction between youdai and socialist transformation. Mao’s vision of the 
General Line had called for the transformation of socio-economic relations and situations, 
into more socialist ideals and forms. Yet, qiaowu ran contrary to this. The General Line 
sought the end of bourgeois and capitalist ownership, while youdai privileged huaqiao 
property rights and private investments. Socialist transformation entailed collectivisation 
and common ownership of the means of production, but youdai exempted the huaqiao 
and protected their individual rights. This was publicly justified as arising from the special 
circumstances or characteristics of the huaqiao—such as the haiwai huaqiao exemption 
from class assessment as bourgeois because they supposedly suffered under imperialism. 
But the real reason for this was always about remittances. And it was this imperative that 
motivated the acceptance of contradiction. After all, as Liao had convinced the CCP CC 
and State Council to decree: ‘The state policy of protecting remittances from the Overseas 
Chinese is not only the present policy of the state but also the permanent policy of the 
state.’183 That was to say, even after socialism. 
 Practically every OCAC intervention after the State Council’s decree in 1955 was 
an instance of youdai that proved the centrality of the remittance imperative, and one 
example of this was in terms of huaqiao correspondence. The huaqiao were prolific letter 
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writers, both to each other, and to government bodies. Guangdong had naturally paid 
some attention to this previously, especially given that the province contained the most 
huaqiao.184  But in March 1955, the OCAC issued its own directive on letters received 
by official agencies. Cadres and officials were required to learn qiaowu and government 
decrees and policies, so that their replies to the haiwai huaqiao could aid the ‘patriotic 
unity’ between the huaqiao and their homeland.185 The concern here was that a positive 
connection between the haiwai huaqiao and the PRC had to be maintained, so that the 
remittance flows could be secured. 
The management of huaqiao correspondence was of vital importance especially 
because many of the letters were about huaqiao marriage (divorce) issues. The party-state 
had long practiced a gendered policy in terms of huaqiao marriages, in that qiaowu tended 
to side with haiwai huaqiao husbands when qiaojuan wives sought divorces, and often 
pressured wives to drop their cases.186 Yet, if the qiaojuan wife persisted, then a divorce 
petition would be sent overseas. However, in May 1955, the OCAC and the Supreme 
People’s Court alleged that the dispatch of the petitions had been inconsistent. Some were 
sent by county courts, others by qiaowu bodies, or the OCAC, or foreign consulates. The 
OCAC claimed that this bred haiwai huaqiao suspicion (as their letters suggested) and 
thus demanded stricter protocol, with all correspondence henceforth to be conducted only 
by provincial qiaowu and judicial offices. But what the OCAC was really trying to do 
was reduce divorce petitions, as they only caused resentment amongst the haiwai huaqiao 
men who were the remitters. Hence cases involving ‘relatively important’ or high-profile 
huaqiao, or with the potential for ‘a very large impact’, were to be sent to the OCAC for 
(euphemistic) ‘further research’, that would, of course, allow the petitions to be delayed 
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or obfuscated.187 Here youdai was for the haiwai huaqiao men, since the preservation of 
huaqiao families maintained remittances. But this was hardly in keeping with the spirit 
of the Marriage Law, or socialist liberation and gender equality.188 
 Of course, qiaowu practitioners were also aware of the accusations that the CCP 
had exploited the huaqiao. Indeed, as Liao had suggested in January 1955, the decline in 
remittances was partly to do with such views, which were compounded by reports of poor 
qiaoxiang conditions. To address this, directives on correspondence towards the haiwai 
huaqiao sought to standardise the content of replies to create a better image of the PRC. 
Thus directives in May 1955 instructed that guiqiao and qiaojuan were to be educated on 
how state bonds were state-guaranteed savings, patriotic expressions, and contributions 
to socialist construction, but all open attempts to court haiwai huaqiao subscription were 
forbidden.189 If however, qiaojuan ‘wanted to take the initiative to write to their qiaobao 
to request that they remit money to subscribe to the bonds’, extra care was to be taken in 
guiding their correspondence, to avoid giving anti-CCP governments excuses to restrict 
remittances, and to avoid arousing haiwai huaqiao suspicion.190  
 A similar intervention also took place in the management of qiaosheng letters. 
Ironically, some qiaosheng had become too enamoured with socialism, even to the point 
of ‘far left’ deviations. Some believed their haiwai huaqiao families backward and/or 
reactionary, while others feared that their bourgeois origins precluded membership in the 
CCP or Youth League. Thus many now rejected remittances as ‘exploitative profit’, or 
even publicly repudiated their families.191 This, of course, provoked negative reactions 
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amongst haiwai huaqiao parents. Thus the OCAC and MOE instructed schools to conduct 
intensive education to teach qiaosheng to report on the homeland and qiaoxiang to their 
families; to report their academic progress; and to teach them the differences between 
China and their families’ domiciles, and not to impose one on the other. Indeed, schools 
were to ‘teach them to treat their families correctly’, to write regular letters, and to gain 
remittances.192 They were also to be taught that their remittances reduced the burden they 
placed on national finances, and also contributed to China’s foreign reserves. But lest the 
huaqiao become wary, schools were told ‘not to overdo the foreign exchange message’, 
and to emphasise instead ‘how remittances reduce the country’s financial burden’.193 
Schools were thus to play an active role in letter-writing, whether in guiding terminology, 
or censoring possibly controversial vocabulary.194 The point was to bolster the relations 
between qiaosheng and their families, to the benefit of remittances and the pacification 
of huaqiao. But not, as it were, to the vindication of socialist education. 
 Clearly, a central focus of qiaowu in 1955 was on effective communication, but it 
was only one aspect of policy. As OCAC vice-Chairman Zhuang Mingli told a conference 
in Fujian, while talking about correct policy was necessary, ‘we still have 2 million or 
more qiaojuan and guiqiao who are not present here with us in conference’.195 The 
success of qiaowu rested also on having something to show for all its talk. This, as East 
Guangdong qiaowu officials reported in June 1955, was still a problematic proposition. 
Firstly, some cadres were still unwilling to carry out class revisions. Secondly, improper 
class revision also led to instances where the ‘political treatment’ of former landlords or 
rich peasants had not changed. Thirdly, even where class revision had been undertaken, 
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the return of huaqiao property (even if wrongfully confiscated) did not follow. Fourthly, 
problems with ‘unified sale and purchase’ abounded; around 90% of qiaojuan in Jieyang 
County wrote to relatives telling of starvation, some committed suicide, and a growing 
number tried to escape China (with a 120% increase in Jieyang in one month).196 
It was not all bad news. Fujian had by August 1955 ‘basically completed dealing 
with leftover problems to do with land, as well as in the early revision of huaqiao 
landlords’ class status’.197 But Fujian, as Liao Chengzhi had noted in January 1955, was 
better at qiaowu than most. Elsewhere, firmer intervention was needed. One solution was 
to control bad news. Thus East Guangdong officials co-opted the qiaopi couriers into 
censorship efforts, citing an instance (in October 1955) where a courier had convinced a 
qiaojuan not to write that ‘life is hard; there is money but no rice to buy; we are starving’. 
But to write instead that ‘our household did not harvest as much because of a water 
shortage so please send money to aid us’.198 On the other hand, changing the content of 
letters was not enough to satisfy huaqiao interests. For instance, while the property of 
former huaqiao landlords and rich peasants was supposed to be returned after class 
revision unless already re-distributed, property that had been ‘borrowed’ by the masses 
or government or military personnel had not been returned. In line with the youdai 
approach, instructions were thus issued requiring all property borrowed by government, 
military, or other public agencies to be returned by the end of October, or converted into 
formal leases or borrowing agreements, with proprietary rights reverting to the huaqiao. 
Similarly, other properties borrowed by the masses were also to be returned, or entered 
into lease or borrowing agreements, in line with ‘looking after the huaqiao and looking 
                                                
196 East Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Yuedong qu di 3 ci qiaowu gongzuo huiyi hou 
guanche qiaohui zhengce qingkuang gongzuo yijian de zonghe baogao’, 06/06/1955, GDQW, No. 12 (18 
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after the peasants’.199 All violations were to be severely punished.200 Compared to earlier 
years, this was a far more assertive and firmer intervention by the party-state’s qiaowu 
practitioners to implement the youdai approach. 
Firmer intervention went together with an even wider application of the youdai 
approach to qiaowu. The State Council decree in February 1955 had made it clear that 
huaqiao remittances were, and would be private property in perpetuity. In August 1955, 
this was extended to include physical huaqiao property. On 6 August, Mao issued a 
decree granting incentives for huaqiao use of, and investment in uncultivated land, in 
order to develop huaqiao patriotism and encourage participation in national economic 
construction.201 To that end, it permitted huaqiao to apply to use hitherto uncultivated 
land either through private enterprise, joint state-private enterprise or even cooperatives. 
Most importantly, if huaqiao agrarian investment took the form of private or state-private 
ownership, their usage rights were guaranteed for a full twenty to thirty years.202 This 
clearly suggested a tolerance of huaqiao capitalism that would last even well beyond the 
era of socialist transformation, and it was a clear statement of youdai.  
From the perspective of the party-state, there can have been little doubt that its 
qiaowu was clearly defined by youdai by the latter half of 1955. This was an approach to 
policy that had been formulated by qiaowu practitioners, and endorsed by the CCP CC 
and the State Council. Thus, despite the contradictions that youdai actually posed to 
socialist transformation, this was not particularly a concern for the party-state. Yet, what 
was rather more concerning though, was that the Party cadres were still proving rather 
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resistant. As Fujian pointed out to the OCAC in October 1955, the protection of 
remittances, and the youdai for huaqiao were well and good, but cadres were still of the 
belief that ‘in all things requiring money, look to the huaqiao and qiaojuan’.203 In this, 
ironically enough, the cadres were not wrong; that principle was basically the raison 
d’etre of qiaowu. But even so, it was not supposed to look like that. 
 The issue, as the Guangdong Conference on qiaowu (chaired by Fang Fang) 
admitted in December 1955, was that ‘various levels of the Party do not pay attention or 
are ignorant of the important meaning of this work’.204 Thus the conference proposed 
some necessary improvements. The first was with socialist transformation: huaqiao had 
to be integrated with collectivisation, and this meant not only class revision work (with 
6% of households still not re-assessed), but also that former landlords and rich peasants 
should be allowed to participate in cooperatives. This also meant that qiaojuan with no 
labour experience were to be trained, not coerced and criticised. In all circumstances, 
remittances were not to be levied unless voluntarily offered. Secondly, on ‘unified sale 
and purchase’, Guangdong would allocate more food and establish special shops for 
(only) huaqiao in huaqiao-concentrated areas so they could buy extra items on top of 
their allocations. The conference also re-emphasised the need to settle huaqiao property 
and rent disputes. The guiqiao were also to be domiciled in their hometowns, with 
employment arranged by the state if necessary, but with encouragement of their 
participation in labour and production as a first option. Moreover, since remittances 
‘definitely required additional protection’, education programs for cadres and masses on 
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policy would be extended, with severe rectification of violations.205 This was much like 
earlier policy, but there was also a new principle at hand: liberality. 
 In terms of the huaqiao who wished to leave or enter the PRC, the Conference 
proposed liberality. Unless there were valid reasons (i.e. pending criminal charges or 
‘political problems’), huaqiao should be allowed to leave China if they wished; the PRC 
‘welcomed’ all arrivals but would not ‘send off’ those who left.206 Instead of restricting 
new arrivals ‘for fear of saboteurs and spies’, the restrictions should be loosened so that 
the haiwai huaqiao could travel freely to their homeland. Indeed, rather than prevent 
departures ‘for fear of people badmouthing us’, the conference suggested that there was 
nothing to fear since the country was developing well, and real criticisms were always 
worth examining for value.207 This was a departure from traditional visa regulations—
and thinking—but the OCAC, Foreign Ministry, Public Security and PLA confirmed this 
as a national policy in December 1955.208 But then, this was consistent with the direction 
that qiaowu was heading in. After all, any unhappy qiaojuan and guiqiao would be less 
inclined to seek remittances, while suspicious and dissatisfied huaqiao would have less 
incentive to remit. But if the youdai approach was properly executed, there would be ‘no 
huaqiao complaints, no qiaojuan escapes, [and] no huaqiao remittance shortfalls’—and 
thus if qiaowu was done well, New China had nothing to worry about.209 
 
Conclusion: 
By the end of 1955, the practice of qiaowu by the OCAC and its partners had 
undergone significant changes. On the surface, the youdai approach continued existing 
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qiaowu that catered to huaqiao interests, so as to secure party-state interests. Yet, what 
had truly changed was how qiaowu related to socialist transformation. Previously—as in 
post-Land Reform rectification—qiaowu had tried to reconcile its imperatives with the 
CCP’s quest for socialism. For qiaowu practitioners, the two were not incompatible. The 
rationalisation was that qiaowu was a key to the resources that the General Line and 
socialist transformation needed. Hence the youdai was a pragmatic necessity. But in 
reality, it was not so simple, since Party cadres proved very resistant to youdai. This was 
partly due to ignorance, but it was also an ideological intransigence enabled and 
emboldened by the General Line’s ‘revolutionary struggle’. Moreover, despite the 
rhetoric on the Dual Nationality Treaty, and about New China’s positive development 
that were proffered to the huaqiao, qiaowu was aware that it was failing to convince the 
huaqiao that their interests were met.210 There was thus an urgent need for an intervention 
to ensure more effective qiaowu by 1955. In part, this saw greater emphasis on positive 
communications with the huaqiao. But in the main, qiaowu became overtly defined by 
youdai, even if this contradicted socialist transformation. The principle for youdai was 
not new. But the liberality with which qiaowu now applied it, and the side-lining of more 
socialist ideals—this reflected a new trajectory. Of course, qiaowu was not acting 
uilaterally—this new direction had the approval of the party-state leadership. Yet, what 
qiaowu practitioners did not realise (yet) was that inasmuch as qiaowu had undergone 
changes, New China was itself moving to the left. 
At the end of July 1955, Mao declared to a conference of Party Secretaries that ‘a 
new upsurge in the socialist mass movement is imminent throughout the countryside’.211 
Countering criticism that socialist transformation was already too fast, he announced that 
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‘the high tide of socialist transformation in the countryside’ had been reached, and was 
soon to ‘sweep over the whole country’.212 By this Mao meant collectivisation; while 
there had been 14,000 cooperatives in late 1953, and 650,000 in June 1955, he wanted 
further growth to 1.3 million.213  This would transform 110 million households into 
collective farming, but it was possible, Mao said, with ‘socialist enthusiasm’. Yet, there 
were two potential problems: either ‘left deviationist mistakes’ where the Party became 
‘dizzy with success’; or ‘right deviationist mistakes’ where the Party was ‘scared of 
success’ and preferred conservatism that led to ‘resolute contraction’.214 The problem at 
hand, Mao alleged, was right deviationism, because some were reluctant to accelerate the 
process, and ignorant of the inevitability of the ‘high tide’. Yet, Mao predicted that by the 
end of the first Five-Year Plan (in 1957 or 1958), 250 million people in 55 million 
households would be in cooperatives—or half the peasant population.215 
 For its part, qiaowu was not against the ‘high tide of socialist transformation’. 
Guangdong qiaowu deputy-Director Luo Lishi declared in late 1955 that the province 
was determined to achieve a target of 150,000 cooperatives by the end of 1956, with a 
75-80% participation rate of peasant households.216 Collectivisation had also started in 
the qiaoxiang, and in a survey of 25 qiaoxiang (plus 1 village), 38.94% of qiaojuan were 
in APCs, while 35.96% were in Mutual Aid Teams.217 It was therefore not as if qiaowu 
was uncooperative with the drive for accelerated socialist transformation—indeed, 
according to Luo, the youdai dictum of ‘no huaqiao complaints, no qiaojuan escapes, no 
huaqiao remittance shortfalls’ was itself in homage to one of Mao’s quotes.218 Yet, Luo 
also said that the ‘socialist high tide’ would be for qiaowu in general: whether for ‘uniting 
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with the guowai huaqiao’, gaining remittances, or supporting industrialisation.219 These 
things had all been important aspects of qiaowu since the advent of the General Line (and 
earlier), and qiaowu’s role was to gain financial resources to fund economic programs—
even if, especially after 1955, its methods contradicted socialist transformation. Yet, if as 
Luo said, future qiaowu was going to be informed by the ‘socialist high tide’, surely any 
contradiction was unsustainable. Indeed, according to Luo, qiaowu was to effect ‘the 
positive leadership of rural guiqiao and qiaojuan into participation in the collectivisation 
campaign’ as its ‘biggest and most central task’.220 But if qiaowu in the ‘high tide’ was 
to make collectivisation its chief priority, then what about the earlier position on qiaowu 
that ‘the crux of the issue is the accumulation of funds for socialist industrialisation’?221 
Luo, of course, did not speak for the OCAC, PBOC, or any other central party-state 
institution. But if his understanding of qiaowu was firmly within the ambit of the ‘socialist 
high tide’, and if, as Mao said, opposition to that was right deviationism—where, in the 
end, did that leave qiaowu? There was, it seems, a looming contradiction. 
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Chapter 4. 
Fourth–class socialism 
 
Some qiaojuan are like passengers riding on the socialist train; even though they are not 
necessarily sitting on the soft seats and riding in comfort, they are at least in the fourth-
class carriage. 
 
— Fang Fang, 26 December 19571 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 ‘由于坚持侨眷与全体人民一起发动, 也顺利地过了几个关, 进入了社会主义, 有些侨眷好像乘社会
主义的火车一样, 虽不是坐软席那么舒服, 但也跟着坐上了四等车’, in Fang Fang, ‘Dui dangqian 
qiaowu gongzuo de zhishi jianghua (zhaiyao)’, 26/12/1957, GDQW, No. 1 (22 March 1958), 1-7 (2). 
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Introduction: 
 New China, Chairman Mao told the Sixth Supreme State Conference (SSC) on 25 
January 1956, was at the threshold of the last stage of the socialist revolution, and with 
the ‘high tide’ of revolutionary spirit sweeping through China, would enter full socialism 
within three years.2 This harkened to the impending liberation of China’s productive 
forces; as agriculture and light industry/handicrafts moved from individual ownership 
into socialist collective ownership, so too would commerce and industry be transformed 
from capitalist to socialist ownership, and thus ‘greatly develop industrial and agricultural 
production’.3 Thus China, Mao declared, would take its rightful place among the world’s 
leading lights within the next ten years. 
 Mao had announced ‘the high tide of socialist transformation’ in July 1955, so his 
SSC pronouncements were not surprising.4 Unless of course, the delegates had failed to 
pay attention to the more than 104 directives Mao had issued between September and 
December 1955 on driving his ‘socialist high tide’ forward.5 Mao, in fact, had been quite 
accurate in his predictions. The number of households in APCs had jumped from the 16.9 
million Mao cited in July 1955, to more than 70 million by December 1955; or, over 60% 
of China’s 110 million peasant households.6 Thus even though the SSC passed the ‘Draft 
Agricultural Program for 1956-1967’, it was not new policy, but it was in fact, a process 
that was already underway.7 
 To Mao’s mind, the ‘socialist high tide’ in agriculture was both necessary, and 
motivational for an acceleration in the transformation of commerce and industry. Yet, it 
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also entailed ideological loyalty to Mao Zedong Thought. To resist ‘the speed of socialist 
transformation of agriculture’ was not only conservatism, as Mao said, but also rightist 
thinking.8 By 1956, it was clear that to be labelled a rightist conservative was a none-too-
subtle warning of what might follow: at best, a diatribe from Mao—‘some of our 
comrades are tottering along like a woman with bound feet’—or worse, identification as 
a counter-revolutionary and thus arrest and/or judicial punishment. 9  To resist 
conservatism thus entailed—as Zhou Enlai explained—adherence to Mao’s vision ‘to 
complete socialist transformation early; over-fulfil the national plans for industrial 
development; and accelerate the progress of the technical transformation of the national 
economy’.10 Thus Mao’s ‘high tide’ of socialist transformation would continue, and it 
would also be further defined by the principles of ‘more, faster, better and more 
economical’ [又多, 又快, 又好, 又省].11  Anything else was apostasy.   
 Some amongst the 300-odd SSC delegates were undoubtedly uneasy with the 
extent of the acceleration that Mao called for; the Chairman had ridden roughshod over 
his comrades’ reservations in 1955.12 But what did this mean for qiaowu? 1956 would 
see qiaowu practitioners doubling-down on youdai policies and its discourse of huaqiao 
specialness. Yet, a dramatic reversal would take place by late 1957. This chapter begins 
with analysis that while qiaowu did not oppose the ‘socialist high tide’ per se, qiaowu 
practitioners realised that youdai was being resisted or undermined by cadres who either 
did not understand the political economy of qiaowu, or who found the youdai policies 
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counterintuitive or contradictory to socialism. Yet, even so, qiaowu persisted with 
youdai—and so did the party-state’s leadership. As this chapter shows, the appreciation 
of the CCP CC for youdai was because its premise on economic rationality spoke to a 
growing sense in the Party leadership that Mao’s ‘high tide’ was a rash path headed for 
disaster. This criticism prominently came to a head in mid-1956 at the Eighth Party 
Congress. Yet, this was also the peak of youdai, as 1957, suffice to say, was a chaotic 
year. Mao used domestic crises consequent to the Polish October and Hungarian Uprising 
to call for rectification of contradictions between the Party and the masses—and to re-
assert his authority. Yet, when this fomented intense criticism of the CCP in the Hundred 
Flowers, Mao seized the opportunity to unite the besieged Party behind him, and to launch 
an Anti-Rightist Campaign against his and the CCP’s critics. Henceforth, not only was 
anti-CCP criticism Rightism, but even policy not aligned with Mao was Rightism. And 
this was the precise charge against qiaowu for its youdai policies. 
 
‘Is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau your Daddy?’ 
Fang Fang had defined the three key performance indicators of qiaowu in late 
1955 as: ‘no huaqiao complaints, no qiaojuan escapes, [and] no huaqiao remittance 
shortfalls’.13 And while these imperatives represented different strands of policy, they 
were all connected by the principle that qiaowu was to maximise the economic utility that 
the huaqiao offered. As such, as Tao Zhu instructed in December 1955: ‘Party 
committees at every level must pay serious attention to this work’.14 This was thus the 
impetus behind the policies that entrenched a correlation between ideas of huaqiao 
specialness [huaqiao teshu], and youdai policies.15 
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 An explicit correlation of teshu and youdai in the practice of qiaowu can be found 
in instructions issued on New Year’s Day 1956 regarding food and consumer goods 
allocations under ‘unified sale and purchase’.16 Of course, the demand for more food (and 
consumer goods) was not unique to the huaqiao, since nationwide rationing had been 
introduced since August 1955 to solve inefficiencies in the state monopolies, and to 
control domestic migration.17 Yet, it was only the huaqiao who received extra allocations 
for ‘their special needs’.18  In 18 huaqiao areas in Guangdong, authorities increased 
allocations for huaqiao households that included in total: 10 million jin of rice, 100,000 
bolts of cloth, 1 million jin of cooking oil, and 1 million jin of sugar.19 Guangdong 
officials believed that such youdai was a path to unity with the huaqiao, but also to gain 
foreign exchange, as it created new avenues for using remittances. Thus, while officials 
saw that youdai might cause resentment amongst non-huaqiao, their solution was to 
expand propaganda on qiaowu, ‘to cause the masses to support favourable treatment of 
the huaqiao’.20 Clearly, special needs meant special treatment. 
 Guangdong’s initiative on huaqiao allocations of food/consumer goods was a 
prominent instance of the correlation between teshu and youdai. This, it was held, was an 
important part of achieving Fang Fang’s three-pronged slogan. Indeed, as the OCAC, 
Commerce, and Food and Grain Ministries pointed out in February 1956, the issue of 
food/goods allocations for huaqiao not only affected remittances, but also huaqiao 
migration, whether from rural to urban areas, or even from China.21 Hence, it was also 
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imperative to check the yield assessments of huaqiao land to revise overly-high demands. 
Moreover the allocation for huaqiao with food shortages (i.e. 10-20 jin of rice/grain a 
month) had to be increased to at least 24 jin a month per person.22 Both the high demands 
and food shortages motivated huaqiao migration, and these measures were thus to ensure 
‘no qiaojuan escapes’. The authorities were also aware of the risk of youdai causing 
resentment amongst non-huaqiao, but they believed that the risk could be lessened 
through propaganda.23 Guangdong’s initial proposals were thus amended to integrate the 
new instructions, and by March 1956, youdai had been further entrenched in these qiaowu 
policies on extra food distribution for huaqiao households.24 
 The desire to implement youdai better also led to efforts to ensure ‘no huaqiao 
complaints’ regarding their investments. But this was a complex issue since huaqiao 
investment could mean either new foreign direct investment, or existing investments in 
private industrial or commercial firms. In both cases, the end of private ownership that 
Mao preached was likely to have serious implications. Furthermore, investment was not 
limited to finance (i.e. in bonds or shares) but also included land, construction, or even 
philanthropy. Thus this was a question without a ready answer. 
 One proposal about huaqiao investments in January 1956 was a Guangdong 
suggestion of tax relief for construction funded by huaqiao remittances. A three-year 
break had been offered in 1955 to remittance-funded projects, but this was now raised to 
five years. Moreover, where the project was a joint investment between haiwai huaqiao 
and friends/relatives in China: if the haiwai huaqiao had the sole proprietary rights, then 
                                                
Grain Ministry, Commerce Ministry, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang dui qiaojuan, guiqiao liangshi, shiyou, tang, mianbu, 
roulei deng wuzi gongying de zhishi’, 21/02/1956, GDQW, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 4-7 (5). 
22 The directive specifically required ‘Guangdong, Fujian, Guangxi and others’ (or, major qiaoqu) to ensure 
the 24 jin minimum. Of course, in reality, 24 jin (12 kg) was still not a healthy diet, but it would have made 
a difference to the starving. See OCAC, Food and Grain Ministry, Commerce Ministry, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang 
dui qiaojuan, guiqiao liangshi, shiyou, tang, mianbu, roulei deng wuzi gongying de zhishi’, 21/02/1956, 
GDQW, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 5-6. 
23 Ibid., 7. 
24 Guangdong Province Food and Grain Department, ‘Guanyu dui guiqiao qiaojuan liangshi gongying de 
guiding’, 19/03/1956, GDQW, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 8-9. 
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the five-year exemption applied, while the three-year break applied if the rights belonged 
to the party-in-China. If the rights were shared, then local qiaowu agencies and provincial 
governments would decide.25 What made this obviously an attempt to entice capital 
inflows was the added instruction that construction by parties from Hong Kong or Macao 
using remitted funds could also enjoy similar tax breaks.26 So, even if the ‘Hong Kong 
and Macao compatriots’ were not huaqiao (after 1950), youdai was extended to them 
since there was foreign exchange involved. To be fair, the tax break played to 
longstanding huaqiao practices of using land purchases and construction as a means of 
asset preservation. Yet, for this to work, the huaqiao also needed to believe that their 
property would actually remain theirs. 
 The problem in early 1956 was that it was not at all clear how the acceleration of 
socialist transformation—indeed, towards socialist ownership—affected existing 
huaqiao investments, let alone future investment. Some private enterprises had, since the 
General Line (1953), already been in joint state-private ownership. But 1956 saw 
accelerated movement towards full socialist ownership, or essentially, nationalisation. In 
some cases, this was a matter of mere days, as when the Shanghai Federation of Industry 
and Commerce decreed on 15 January that all remaining private enterprises enter joint 
state-private ownership by 20 January.27 But even that was temporary since the desired 
end was when ‘all commerce and industry became functions of the state’.28 This was 
achieved with the barest of token compensation for private holdings, with a promised 5% 
                                                
25  Guangdong Province Finance Department, Tax Office, ‘Guanyu huaqiao qiaojuan xinjian fangwu 
mianzheng fangdi chanshui zai zhixing zhong jige juti wenti de buchong guiding’, 12/01/1956, GDQW, 
No. 16 (20 Feb 1956), 5. 
26 The ‘Hong Kong and Macao compatriots’ had not been recognised as huaqiao since the 1950 GAC 
decree on huaqiao Land Reform, but the idea that they be treated like huaqiao in terms of investments 
dated back to December 1955. See Fang Fang, ‘Jianjue guanche zhixing youguan huaqiao gongzuo de 
zhengce, ba huaqiao gongzuo renzhen zuohao’, 17/12/1955, GDQW, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 12; GAC, 
‘Guanyu tudi gaige zhong dui huaqiao tudi caichan de chuli banfa’, 06/11/1950, 1949-1952 nongcun jingji 
tizhi juan, 318-320. 
27 British Consulate-General, Shanghai,‘Shanghai Fortnightly Summary’, No. 27, 03/02/1956 in Robert 
Jarman (ed.), China; Political Reports, 1911-1960 [CPR], Vols 1-11 (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 2001), 
10: 211-213. 
28 Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 241. 
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return on the value of the private holdings for seven years.29 This, unsurprisingly enough, 
did not reassure huaqiao investors. 
 In Guangdong, some huaqiao argued for a differentiation between those who had 
invested before and after 1949—one, it was said, had contributed to socialist construction, 
whereas the other had, at best, enriched the ruling-class. Thus those who invested post-
1949 should be entitled to the same benefits as those who invested in the state-run 
Overseas Chinese Investment Companies (i.e. 8% annual interest).30 Others worried that 
accelerated socialist transformation meant that the huaqiao would not be consulted on the 
nationalisation of their holdings.31 Curiously, a few huaqiao in Fujian actually expressed 
enthusiasm for nationalisation, and sought to start the process earlier.32 These sentiments 
were however, likely to have been intended at creating images of patriotic, progressive 
voluntarism. After all, as many huaqiao saw it, accepting socialist ownership early was 
‘the clever thing to do’—it certainly was a better alternative to being ‘like a leper’.33 
 The party-state was well aware from its own investigations that regardless of what 
the huaqiao said, the reality was that they had mostly accepted socialist transformation 
under pressure, or even violent duress.34 But the party-state did not actually have a plan 
to reassure them yet. The CCP CC’s instructions issued on 3 February 1956 suggested 
that voluntary offers from huaqiao enterprise owners to undergo socialist transformation 
could be accepted, but all other related issues had to wait for investigations to finish.35 
The one exception was for qiaopi, who were ‘not appropriate’ for socialist transformation, 
lest their delivery of remittances from capitalist countries be affected. Otherwise, the CCP 
CC had no guidance on how youdai in qiaowu fit into the ‘socialist high tide’. 
                                                
29 Around 800,000 had their holdings expropriated. See Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 239–241. 
30 ‘Guangzhou shi huaqiao ziben jia dui siying gongshang ye gaizao de fanying’, 07/02/1956, NBCK. 
31 Ibid. 
32 ‘Guiqiao qiaojuan dui siying gongshang ye shehui zhuyi gaizao de sixiang fanying’, 18/02/1956, NBCK. 
33 Ibid. 
34 CCP CC, ‘Guanyu tingzhi dongyuan ziben jia ba zhangwai zicai touru heying qiye de zhishi’, 24/01/1956, 
ZZWX, 22: 123-124. 
35 CCP CC, ‘Guanyu huaqiao touzi jingying de siying gongshang ye shehui zhuyi gaizao zhong ying zhuyi 
wenti de tongzhi’, 03/02/1956, ZZWX, 22: 172-173. 
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 The question of qiaowu in the ‘socialist high tide’ led in February 1956, to a 
jointly-convened OCAC Party Group and UFWD conference, with Fang Fang and Liao 
Chengzhi responsible for delivering the conference’s report to the State Council. Indeed, 
it is noteworthy that this report was endorsed by many other state institutions with roles 
in qiaowu.36 This was significant because, ‘regarding the Party’s guidelines on domestic 
qiaowu work during the transition period’, Fang and Liao said:  
The conference was unanimous in determining that, based on the special 
characteristics of qiaojuan and guiqiao, to: positively educate and organise the 
qiaojuan and guiqiao to join with people across the country to participate in 
socialist construction, to embrace socialist transformation, to strive to gain 
huaqiao remittances and huaqiao investment to increase foreign exchange 
reserves, to settle appropriately the questions of employment for guiqiao and 
education for qiaosheng, and through the qiaojuan, guiqiao and qiaosheng, to 
influence the broad masses of huaqiao abroad towards unity and love for their 
homeland.37 
 
Most of the so-called guidelines would have been familiar, but the operative instruction 
within the report’s guidelines was really the clear instruction that qiaowu was to be ‘based 
on the special characteristics of qiaojuan and guiqiao’.  
 Liao and Fang made it clear that the youdai in qiaowu was the crux. For instance, 
for rural huaqiao households, and in a move ‘appropriate to their special characteristics’, 
cooperatives were forbidden from using remittances as evidence of reactionary-ness, and 
to thus exclude qiaojuan and guiqiao from collectivisation.38 The huaqiao households 
were to receive special allowances even in the more fully socialist Advanced Agricultural 
Producers’ Cooperatives (AAPC), where income depended on labour contributions.39 
                                                
36 This included the CCP CC Rural Affairs Department, PBOC, BOC, and the Ministries of Public Security, 
Food and Grain, Commerce, Labour, Education. See Liao Chengzhi, Fang Fang, ‘Guodu shiqi de guonei 
qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen’, 17/02/1956, DHGLR, 207-212. 
37 Ibid., 208. 
38 Ibid. 
39 APCs were semi-socialist because while labour and the means of production were collectively pooled, 
members still owned their land and tools, and were entitled to income shares based on those contributions. 
AAPCs were fully socialist as the means of production and land were owned collectively, and members 
became ‘agricultural workers who received work points for their labour’. See Dikotter, The Tragedy of 
Liberation, 237; Yang Mo-wen, ‘Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in Communist China’, in Union 
Research Institute (ed.), Communist China, 1949-1959, Vols. I-III (Hong Kong: The Union Research 
Institute, 1961), I: 149-176 (153-156). 
AAPCs theoretically fulfilled: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’. See Karl 
Marx, The Gotha Program (New York: National Executive Committee, Socialist Labor Party, 1922), 31. 
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This system placed qiaojuan at a disadvantage since their household’s primary labour (i.e. 
younger adults) were by definition (of huaqiao), mostly overseas. Hence, Liao and Fang 
instructed that AAPCs make provision for qiaojuan and guiqiao so that they would not 
suffer falls in their income.40 Indeed, regardless of the ‘socialist high tide’, there were 
also provisions for qiaojuan and guiqiao who did not labour, and lived off remittances. 
Such persons should be permitted to do so—lest they seek to migrate—and if they had 
suspicions about collectivisation, they were to be patiently addressed. 
 As for the questions about huaqiao investments, Fang and Liao admitted that 
previous perspectives had been unhelpful, but they now determined ‘to do good work in 
the socialist transformation of domestic huaqiao investment’.41 The intention was to 
integrate the desire of huaqiao to invest, along with the country’s economic plans, and 
thus direct returning capital investment to areas where they could play positive roles, such 
as in plantation agriculture, or localised industrial projects in qiaoxiang. At the same time, 
while the socialist transformation of enterprises was unavoidable, because huaqiao 
private enterprises were intrinsically connected to haiwai huaqiao, ‘some special 
measures in the transformation process’ were necessary.42  
The OCAC Party Group advocated that the post-1949 huaqiao investment in 
enterprises be guaranteed an 8% yearly return after transformation, with employment 
provided for the huaqiao investors. Moreover, for post-1949 huaqiao investors, their 
shares would remain private property even ‘after the successful achievement of 
socialism’.43 Pre-1949 huaqiao investment however, had to accept the same deal as other 
private investors/owners in the country: 5% interest for seven years. This was meant to 
placate the majority of huaqiao investors, and it went further in guaranteeing that 
regardless of when the investment was made, huaqiao private property was not to be 
                                                
40 Liao, Fang, ‘Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen’, 17/02/1956, DHGLR, 208. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 209. 
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included in the verification (and liquidation) of capital assets unless they were used for 
business purposes. Otherwise, they were legal property. Finally, to consolidate the 
existing regional Overseas Chinese Investment Companies, a new state corporation 
would be set up to direct huaqiao capital to where it was most needed.44 
 Liao and Fang also reported that qiaowu had arrested the remittance decline in 
1955, and thus they could now report a slight increase.45 But they also warned that anti-
counterrevolutionary activity and accelerated collectivisation risked affecting remittances, 
and thus remittances had to be differentiated from ‘counterrevolutionary funds’. 46 
Moreover, a direct correlation was drawn between ‘gaining remittances’, and ‘taking care 
of qiaojuan living habits’ by addressing their food/goods allocation.47 This endorsed the 
Guangdong proposal (January 1955), and was also the basis for the OCAC’s own youdai 
allocation policies that followed.48 The qiaopi were also exempted from business taxes, 
which paralleled the effort to gain remittances from the qiaosheng, with educational 
facilities to be expanded ‘to accept even more qiaosheng’.49  Moreover, cadres were 
instructed that though the qiaosheng in some cases truly ‘had counterrevolutionaries 
among them’, it was vital that cadres did not over-propagandise, lest students learn the 
lessons so well that they cut ties with their ‘backward’ bourgeois families.50 
 The UFWD and OCAC Party Group report of February 1956 thus offered a vision 
of qiaowu that was at base, a clear correlation of teshu with youdai. To be sure, it also 
spoke to how and where qiaowu practitioners saw qiaowu in the larger context of socialist 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
45 1955 saw a US$12.549 million increase year-on-year. See Lin Jinzhi et al., Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo 
geming he jianshe, 228-231. 
46 Liao, Fang, ‘Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen’, 17/02/1956, DHGLR, 209. 
47 Ibid. 
48  Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, Commerce Department, Civil Affairs 
Department, Food and Grain Department, Supply and Marketing Cooperative, ‘Guanyu dui huaqiao zengjia 
liangshi, mianbu, shiyou, tang 4 zhong tongxiao shangpin de teshu gongying, gedi bixu renzhen liji guanche 
zhixing’, 01/01/1956, GDQW, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 15-16; OCAC, Food and Grain Ministry, Commerce 
Ministry, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang dui qiaojuan, guiqiao liangshi, shiyou, tang, mianbu, roulei deng wuzi gongying 
de zhishi’, 21/02/1956, GDQW, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 5. 
49 Liao, Fang, ‘Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen’, 17/02/1956, DHGLR, 210. 
50 Ibid., 211. 
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transformation. This was in a sense, clearly still a political economy, as the OCAC always 
grounded its qiaowu—indeed, its youdai approach—in economic rationalisations. Thus 
Liao and Fang confidently stated that ‘domestic qiaowu work is a long-term responsibility 
of our Party’, and that ‘to believe that the socialist revolution invalidates the necessity of 
qiaowu, or to consider it an undue burden or bother, is incorrect’.51 Yet, in spite of the 
broad agreement between the OCAC and other party-state institutions on the correlation 
between teshu and youdai, the problem was that qiaowu actually appeared to contradict 
the ‘socialist high tide’. 
 Chairman Mao had in October 1955, pronounced the impending ‘extinction of 
capitalism’.52 Indeed, as Mao declared, the past year’s main work (or as he described, 
‘the anti-idealism struggle’; ‘the anti-counterrevolutionary struggle’; ‘the food and grain 
question’; and ‘the agricultural collectivisation question’) had been ‘a struggle against the 
bourgeoisie and we have dealt them a serious blow, and will continue to give further 
crushing blows to them’.53 The ‘anti-idealism’ referred to the ‘bourgeois idealism’ of the 
scholar Hu Feng, whose imprisonment as a counterrevolutionary in June 1955 had 
sparked off a purge of intellectuals.54 But this was less about idealism or materialism than 
it was about eliminating the bourgeois discourse from politics altogether.55 Indeed, even 
collectivisation, and the food and grain issue (or basically, ‘unified sale and purchase’), 
according to Mao, were also struggles against the bourgeoisie. So, if the other in all of 
this was the bourgeoisie, and if the ‘socialist high tide’ presaged their impending 
eradication, then surely the youdai approach, with all its special exceptions and 
exemptions from effecting purer socialism, was—at the very least—somewhat counter-
intuitive to the Maoist mainstream. 
                                                
51 Ibid. 
52  Mao Zedong, ‘Guanyu nongye hezuo hua he ziben zhuyi gongshang ye gaizao de guanxi wenti’, 
11/10/1955, JYZW, 7: 260-264 (263). 
53 Ibid., 7: 263. 
54 Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 186-189. 
55 Spence, The Gate of Heavenly Peace, 374. 
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 The OCAC’s April 1956 directive on food and goods allocation reveals that it was 
aware of how counter-intuitive it was to propose special treatment for one particular—
minority—constituency, even as the rest of the country was racing towards socialism. 
Thus alongside the calls for greater implementation of the special allocation came also 
directives to strengthen education for cadres in huaqiao areas, ‘to cause them to recognise 
the important meaning of this work’, and to learn the ‘special circumstances’ of huaqiao, 
and that their allocations were ‘entirely reasonable’.56 The problem, of course, was when 
the cadres refused to accept the youdai policies or their justifications. 
 Whereas the OCAC and its qiaowu partners advocated youdai, the reality was that 
there was significant confusion, or resistance amongst local, lower-level cadres. In some 
cases, the problems were old ones, as in March 1956 when the OCAC had to remind 
Shandong Normal University to teach qiaosheng ‘not to scold their parents for being 
bourgeois’.57 This suggested that cadres had not conveyed information adequately. But 
in other cases, cadres simply opposed youdai. While the OCAC had ordered that qiaojuan 
participation in collectivisation be managed in consideration of the labour deficiency of 
huaqiao households, many cadres openly defied this. In Kaiping County in Guangdong, 
a 70-year old qiaojuan, being unsuitable for field work, was given the impossible job of 
looking after children, which the OCAC noted, ‘required her to manage nine children, 
when five of them are still learning to walk, and four of them still need to be carried’. In 
another case, two qiaojuan women over 60-years old were assigned to arduous field work. 
Thus instead of implementing youdai, cadres were ignoring it. Yet, as one cadre said: 
‘You join the collective and do not labour; who is going to feed you!’58 
                                                
56 OCAC, ‘Dui ‘liangshi bu, shangye bu, zhong qiaowei guanyu jiaqiang dui qiaojuan, guiqiao liangshi, 
shiyou, tang, mianbu, roulei deng wuzi gongying zhishi’ de xuanchuan yijian’, 13/04/1956, GDQW, No. 
18 (9 Jun 1956), 1-3 (1). 
57 OCAC, ‘Guanyu zai ziben zhuyi gongshang ye shehui zhuyi gaizao zhong ruhe zhidao huaqiao xuesheng 
yu guowai zichan jieji jiating lianxi wenti de gonghan’, 03/03/1956, BMA #002-008-00092, 1-10 (3). 
58 OCAC, ‘Zhuanfa Kaiping xian Shuikou qu Longtang xiang cengceng guanche huaqiao zhengce de zuofa’, 
02/04/1956, GDQW, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 17-24 (19). 
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 One reason why cadres resisted youdai was pure pragmatism. As a Production 
Team leader in Kaiping noted: ‘My team is responsible for 130 mu, and out of the 27 
labourers I have, seven are qiaojuan—if they do not labour positively, then who are we 
to rely on?’59 For such cadres, to allow the qiaojuan to enjoy collectivisation’s benefits 
even while they shirked a full commitment to labour was simply ridiculous. One cadre 
remarked: ‘They want us to fulfil quotas on the one hand, and then on the other hand also 
carry out huaqiao policy—being a cadre is really difficult.’60 Yet, resistance to youdai 
was also derived from popular resentment. In Kaiping, peasants complained: ‘The 
government sees the monied men; but nobody cares if peasants live or die.’ Others 
mocked the qiaojuan who participated in collectives: ‘The government has permitted you 
to not work, why do you want to work?’61 
 Resistance to youdai extended to practically all aspects of qiaowu. In Jieyang 
County in Guangdong, cadres persisted in discriminating against huaqiao households 
considered class enemies. Shantou qiaowu officials discovered that in certain villages, 
while most peasants were permitted to retain around 20-25 jin of grain (per month) from 
their assessed land yields under ‘unified sale and purchase’, for qiaojuan and guiqiao 
who had been re-classed in 1954-1955 (from landlord or rich peasant status), the average 
was 16-21 jin—with the lowest at 11.5 jin. Cadres also refused to return huaqiao property 
confiscated in the Land Reform, but instead allowed cooperatives to expropriate them. 
Those qiaojuan and guiqiao who wanted to join AAPCs or APCs were also being rejected 
because of the negative views about their class statuses. Yet, when they were confronted, 
rural cadres were defiant—as one blithely remarked: ‘We rural cadres are uneducated and 
so we do not understand policy.’62 
                                                
59 Ibid., 20. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 22. 
62 GPC United Front Department, ‘Zhuanfa qiaowu ju ‘jiancha Jieyang xian Wulian qu Qianqu xiang dang 
zhibu yanzhong qishi he weifan huaqiao zhengce de baogao’ de tongzhi’, 04/05/1956, GDQW, No. 18 (9 
Jun 1956), 25-27 (25, 27). 
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 In a way, it was not actually that cadres did not understand qiaowu’s political 
economy per se. The problem was more to do with relative perceptions of economic 
utility. Conversely, while some cadres rejected huaqiao from collectivisation, others 
coerced them into it. The reason for the coercion was remittances, which many cadres 
(and peasants) saw as a ready source of funds. Coerced contributions were forbidden, but 
there were still indirect methods. One common way was to hold meetings where relentless 
pressure was applied. As one qiaojuan said: ‘I feel sad every time they call a meeting of 
qiaoshu, once a meeting is called it means they want money.’ 63  Thus, while the 
Guangdong People’s Committee (GPPC) strongly reiterated that voluntariness was 
imperative, that apparently did not preclude being pressured into volunteering.64 
 Some cadres also simply did not care for qiaowu very much. An investigation in 
May 1956 by the Guangdong and Hainan qiaowu Party Groups revealed that local cadres 
were actually and utterly complacent. One cadre remarked: ‘since 90% of the qiaojuan 
and guiqiao are now in the cooperatives, let the cooperatives handle them—anyway, their 
livelihood and production problems are not really that big’. Another cadre said: 
‘Chairman Mao works hard every day, and you dare to not work?’65 In fairness, Hainan’s 
collectivisation had seen a high rate of participation by huaqiao households because it 
had tried to manage huaqiao labour deficiencies via an innovative differentiation between 
so-called normal, special and honorary cooperative members.66 But Hainan also had to 
                                                
63 GPPC, ‘Guanyu dongyuan qiaojuan huaqiao cunkuan touzi ji xingban huaqiao gongyi shiye de tongbao’, 
29/04/1956, GDQW, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 24-25 (24). 
64 In Puning, Guangdong, a qiaojuan who had been reluctant to buy bonds in 1955 had been accused of 
saving his money for ‘old Chiang’. Another had to buy RMB 200 of bonds before her class was changed. 
One other incident had seen the village People’s Committee deprive an elderly qiaojuan of sleep for two 
nights before he agreed to purchase bonds. See BOC Puning Branch, ‘Guanyu qu nian Hantang xiang, 
Cikeng xiang zai tuixiao gongzhai gongzuo zhong weifan huaqiao zhengce wenti de baogao’, 06/05/1956, 
GDQW, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 13-15. 
65 GPC, ‘Pizhuan sheng qiaowei dangzu, Hainan qiaowu ju gongzuo zu ‘guanyu Hainan qu guanche 
huaqiao zhengce chubu qingkuang baogao’’, 30/05/1956, GDQW, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 4-11 (5, 8). 
66 Normal members [社员] did regular labour, special members [特别社员] did less, while an honorary 
member [名誉社员] did little or no labour, but contributed something (money, land or tools). The Hainan 
qiaowu Party Group believed that this had stabilised labour relations between the huaqiao and the masses. 
See GPC, ‘Pizhuan sheng qiaowei dangzu, Hainan qiaowu ju gongzuo zu ‘guanyu Hainan qu guanche 
huaqiao zhengce chubu qingkuang baogao’’, 30/05/1956, GDQW, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 9. 
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admit that the numbers of qiaojuan attempting to travel abroad had increased. In the first 
three months of 1956, 1,524 persons had left Hainan, and only 49 returned.67 So whatever 
collectivisation’s successes, qiaowu was not succeeding. The Party Groups believed that 
the issue was a failure in education, which itself was due to the cadres’ inadequate concern 
for qiaowu. After all, cadres in Qiong Dong were so ambivalent that they were not at all 
bothered that they had lost the County Committee’s directives on qiaowu work.68 
 Thus while youdai was meant to effect positive engagement with the huaqiao, and 
thus effectively utilise their economic potential, it was creating problems instead. In April 
1956, Guangzhou qiaowu officials reported that a two-month survey revealed that both 
cadres and huaqiao were very unclear on youdai. At one extreme, some huaqiao 
interpreted youdai to mean that they were so ‘special’ that they could get away with 
forging documents for travel, arbitrarily evicting tenants, or raising rents.69 At the other 
extreme, cadres openly rejected policy, particularly on food allocations and travel 
permissions.70 When one qiaojuan enquired with the city’s qiaowu Bureau about travel, 
the Bureau replied that the police had not yet returned her paperwork. When the qiaojuan 
went to the police, a cadre was so furious that he had not been consulted first, that he 
snapped: ‘Is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau your Daddy?’71 To be sure, many 
qiaowu officials on the ground had long believed that their local Party and government 
counterparts were inattentive to qiaowu.72 But the derision for qiaowu itself suggests that 
youdai was actually proving very divisive. 
                                                
67 Ibid., 7. 
68 Ibid., 10. 
69 Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, ‘Guangzhou shi di 2 ci guiqiao, 
qiaojuan daibiao huiyi gongzuo baogao’, 29/04/1956, GDQW, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 31-41 (33). 
70 Ibid., 37-39. 
71 While lao dou [老豆] (from 侨务局是你的老豆吗?) is usually Cantonese slang for ‘Father’, the more 
ambiguous ‘Daddy’ is apropos because it can also mean ‘pimp’ or ‘Sugar Daddy’. Given the sentiment that 
huaqiao were special by virtue of their wealth, it is likely that this remark was pejorative. See Guangzhou 
Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, ‘Guangzhou shi di 2 ci guiqiao, qiaojuan daibiao 
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Guangzhou’s solution to the general problems with qiaowu was to engage in even 
more propaganda and education to ‘raise awareness’, and to ‘allow everyone to boldly 
express their sentiments and raise questions’.73 On the other hand, this was clearly not 
enough, since a March 1956 report from the Guangdong CCP Committee (GPC) 
identified the causes of qiaojuan escapes as: 
(1) Insufficient determination in looking after the special characteristics of 
qiaojuan in collectivisation with regards to their main labour strength being 
overseas, and their general weakness in labour; 
(2) The failure of some districts to make adequate and timely adjustment to 
allocation of food and other consumer goods for qiaojuan; 
(3) An overly-strict control regime for processing permissions for travel to Hong 
Kong and Macao, as well as for entry and exit of the country; 
(4) Unresolved issues regarding education and employment for qiaojuan children; 
(5) Previous inadequacy in educating the backward elements amongst the 
qiaojuan while also failing to adequate look after their special characteristics; at 
the same time, the wrong thinking prevalent amongst some rural cadres and 
peasants and their frequent resort to coercion and commandism has not been fully 
addressed, and has led to qiaojuan dissatisfaction and suspicion.74 
 
Guangdong thus called for a more rigorous implementation of youdai, which entailed: 
distinguishing between different types of cooperative members; permission to live off 
remittances; permitting qiaojuan to keep their houses as private property even after 
collectivisation; ensuring a 24 jin minimum per month per huaqiao in food allocation; 
rigorously educating rural cadres and the masses; and relaxing procedure for travel by 
qiaojuan to Hong Kong, Macao and beyond.75 The Guangdong report was approved by 
the CCP CC in May 1956, which also added an instruction that ‘all those who have failed 
to seriously carry out qiaowu policy thus far are required to go a step further in making 
arrangements to do so’.76 So, clearly, when faced with resistance to qiaowu, the CCP CC 
came down on the side of youdai.77 
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 The CCP CC directive of May 1956 suggests that whereas lower and local-level 
cadres were often resistant and/or resentful of qiaowu and its youdai, the Party’s central 
leadership had no such qualms. The irony of course, was that while the OCAC and every 
other interested institution were pressing this program of qiaowu, those who resisted were 
in fact, trying to keep faith with the ‘socialist high tide’. But perhaps that irony was 
inevitable since the Party leadership itself had by mid-1956 begun to consider a slower 
pace of socialisation, even while they took stock of the ‘high tide’. In that context, youdai 
was obviously not going away—yet. 
 
Special Circumstances:  
 Despite the resistance of local cadres and officials to the youdai policies, and its 
contradiction with the ‘socialist high tide’, qiaowu practitioners were undeterred. Indeed, 
qiaowu in mid-1956 saw even more vigorous assertions of youdai.78 In this, qiaowu—led 
especially by the OCAC—was emboldened (or enabled) by the growing sense that ‘high 
tide’ features were ‘rash advances’ [冒进 maojin] and thus ruinous. Mao had overridden 
such reservations in the Party in 1955, but they re-emerged more strongly in 1956, and 
thus qiaowu—or rather, the economic rationality of the youdai approach—caught the 
political mood of opposition to the ‘high tide’. 
 The clarion call of the ‘socialist high tide’ in 1955 had been for: ‘more, faster, 
better and more economical’. And this, the People’s Daily had explained, was to build 
‘more’ (or larger); to grow ‘faster’ (against conservatism); to do things ‘better’; and to 
seek ‘economical’ methods against hasty and careless work.79 Yet, many CCP leaders 
were uncomfortable with this vision. By February 1956, Zhou Enlai was warning the 
                                                
78 See GPC, ‘Zhuanfa sheng huaqiao touzi fudao weiyuanhui dangzu guanyu touzi gongzuo de baogao’, 
17/05/1956, GDQW, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 15-17; GPPC, ‘Guanyu huaqiao zai cheng zhen ji nongcun 
jianzhu fangwu, dianpu de gongdi chuli banfa de tongzhi’, 12/05/1956, GDQW, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 20. 
79 People’s Daily editorial, ‘Wei quanmian di tizao wancheng he chao’e wancheng wu nian jihua er fendou’, 
01/01/1956, JYZW, 8: 1-8 (5). 
 188 
State Council that the ‘better and more economical’ imperatives were being neglected. 
Indeed, as Zhou warned: ‘socialist enthusiasm should not be damaged, but unrealistic and 
baseless things should not be proposed or wildly accelerated, or else there will be a grave 
danger’.80 In March, Liu Shaoqi, in a speech on cultural work, said on transforming 
theatrical troupes into state-run units that ‘this is not progress, it is retreat’. Indeed, Liu 
pointedly noted: ‘The same applies to everything else; if there is no obvious advantage to 
be gained, there is no need to change anything, or at least, the changes can be made at a 
slower pace.’81 While in June, Li Xiannian’s budget report warned that ‘rash advances’ 
led to ‘the incurrence of losses’.82  
 Objection to the ‘socialist high tide’ did not mean that Party leaders opposed 
socialist transformation. As Liao Luyan told the NPC in June 1956, 61% of peasant 
households had been organised into AAPCs, which combined with APCs, indicated a 
dramatic success. Yet, accelerated collectivisation had also caused problems: wastage, 
unscrupulous uses of resources, inefficient management, unreasonable allocation of 
income shares, unsafe work practices, poor husbandry, and overly-intense labour.83 But 
the crux, Liao argued, was ‘the tendency towards one-sided emphasising of the national 
and collective interest even while disregarding individual interests’; especially since a 
regard for individual interests was ‘the most important step towards consolidating and 
developing agricultural collectivisation’.84 By 20 June 1956, with the People’s Daily 
criticising ‘impatience’ and announcing imminent rectification of excesses, the CCP 
leadership was clearly turning away from the ‘socialist high tide’.85 
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 The CCP leadership’s turn away from Mao’s ‘high tide’ vision was not unnoticed 
by the Chairman, who was personally offended by the People’s Daily criticisms.86 Yet, 
Mao found that a more collegial approach was necessary—for the time being. The reason 
for this was Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ to the 20th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 25 February 1956, 
which launched a ‘devastating attack’ on Stalin and Stalinism.87 Khrushchev lambasted 
Stalin for, inter alia, his regime of terror, his various atrocities, his megalomania and his 
cult of personality—all in all, a series of accusations that left listeners ‘in a state of 
shock’.88 They were not the only ones. 
 While the CCP’s delegates to the 20th Congress were not invited to the ‘secret 
speech’, a copy was later sent to Beijing.89 While Mao and his colleagues were shocked 
by the speech, Khrushchev’s revisionism at least seemed to presage a rectification of the 
asymmetry in international communism. After all, Stalin’s requirement of subservience 
from other parties had previously caused much resentment in the CCP leadership. Stalin 
had also been guilty of a number of sins—ranging from his support of Wang Ming to his 
equivocation during the Civil War.90 Yet, that did not mean that the CCP was particularly 
keen on ‘de-Stalinisation’ since Mao proposed a view that 70% of Stalin’s work had been 
correct, and only 30% mistaken. Thus the People’s Daily, on 5 April 1956, declared 
Stalin, despite his mistakes, ‘a great Marxist-Leninist’.91 
 Mao’s equivocation on Stalin’s legacy came down to the fact that, to his own 
mind—and to many others—‘Mao was China’s Stalin, the great leader of the People’s 
Republic’. 92  Criticising Stalin could be a transnational enterprise—China had many 
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legitimate grievances—but criticising Stalin also had an obvious parallel in that a negative 
judgement of his flaws could also be applied to Mao’s leadership. Attacking the Stalinist 
cult of personality and its centralisation of authority in one man hit too close to home for 
Mao, and he was forced to take defensive measures. 
Given the growing opposition within the Party leadership that Mao faced, the 
‘secret speech’ thus influenced him into giving way on the ‘high tide’.93 On 25 April, 
Mao’s ‘On the Ten Great Relationships’ speech to the Politburo demonstrated his 
acceptance of criticisms of the ‘high tide’, acknowledging the need for ‘a balance between 
heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other’. Mao, in 
fact, championed openness and democracy, calling for criticism from non-Communists, 
as it was ‘more favourable to the Party, to the people, and to socialism’.94 Mao thus 
encouraged intellectuals (long-accused of counterrevolutionary ideas, à la Hu Feng) to 
express their ideas and criticisms freely; as he told the SSC on 2 May: ‘Let a hundred 
flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.’95 While Mao did not agree with 
his colleagues, he gave way—temporarily. 
 For qiaowu, the turn away from the ‘high tide’ by June 1956 offered a favourable 
opportunity for a reassertion of the youdai approach. Of course, in the first instance, 
qiaowu and its youdai policies had had a tenuous relationship (at best) with the ‘high 
tide’, while conversely, the OCAC Party Group (chiefly Fang Fang and Liao Chengzhi) 
were close to the proponents of ‘rash advances’ criticisms in the CCP.96 In a way, it was 
only to be expected that the youdai approach—which had come into conflict with the 
‘high tide’ time and again—would have a keen resonance when the political mood shifted 
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against the ‘high tide’ itself. But beyond that, youdai had a special significance in mid-
1956 because it was both a discourse and a model of how economic rationality could 
serve socialist transformation—without causing economic disaster. 
 On 8 June 1956, at the OCAC’s Fourth Expanded Conference in Beijing, Fang 
Fang publicly placed qiaowu in the camp of anti-‘rash advances’. According to Fang, 
qiaowu was presently encumbered by ‘serious problems and mistakes’ largely due to the 
excesses of the ‘socialist high tide’. As Fang described, ‘high tide’ collectivisation had 
seen huaqiao ostracised and excluded from cooperatives, and even when huaqiao 
households had joined cooperatives, their special circumstances had been neglected. This 
had led to a failure to integrate the qiaojuan and guiqiao into production, either because 
of a disregard for the household work that traditionally occupied qiaojuan, or because 
cooperatives had blindly insisted that they meet production quotas, whatever their labour 
deficiencies. Moreover, while the State Council’s 1955 decree had made remittances 
inviolate, the ‘high tide’ had seen incidents of huaqiao being pressured into investments 
or taking up shares in cooperatives, or coerced into making deposits in credit cooperatives. 
Furthermore, ‘unified sale and purchase’ had also seen cases of arbitrarily high demands 
on land yields, thus leaving qiaojuan and guiqiao with insufficient food. All of this, Fang 
argued, represented grievous failures.97 
 Part of the problem was institutional failure. Fang said that some local qiaowu 
offices had not understood huaqiao conditions and circumstances properly, and had thus 
been unable to make adequate and timely checks on work, or implement policy correctly. 
Fang also pointed to a stark inadequacy in propaganda and educational work amongst 
Party cadres and the masses: ‘meaning therefore that they did not have complete 
understandings of policy, and making it impossible for qiaowu policy to be carried out, 
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thus ensuring that qiaowu work was caught in a long-term passivity’.98 This was simply 
subjectivism and bureaucratism, which Fang said would be rectified in five areas. 
 Firstly, the youdai policies in agrarian collectivisation were to be more firmly 
implemented, and any deviations were to be immediately rectified. Given that over 90% 
of huaqiao households were already involved in collectivisation (with 50% in AAPCs), 
this re-emphasis on youdai was mainly in terms of labour management: the huaqiao who 
wanted to live off remittances, or who were incapable of labour, were not to be forced to 
take part in labour. Those without labour experience could be trained, but it was to be a 
strictly voluntary and gradual process. Moreover, cooperatives were forbidden to coerce 
or pressure the huaqiao into making contributions or investments.99 
 Secondly, the youdai policies towards huaqiao foreign investors would be further 
developed. A state huaqiao investment company would lead this drive—as an extension 
of existing provincial Overseas Chinese Investment Companies—and investors would be 
guaranteed: 8% annual interest, employment in state enterprises, and their proprietary 
rights even after socialism. Indeed, ‘based on a consideration of the special characteristics 
of huaqiao industry and commerce’: huaqiao investors were to be informed prior to 
nationalisation; all commercial debts to huaqiao would be repaid, even post-
nationalisation; and huaqiao holders of post-1949 investments would receive ‘generally 
higher’ annual interest post-transformation than the non-huaqiao received.100  
Thirdly, and in a restatement of the 1955 State Council decree, Fang declared that 
remittances were a legitimate right and interest of the huaqiao, and were thus inviolate. 
It seems that during the ‘high tide’ collectivisation, remittances had often been identified 
as sources of contributions, deposits and investments to APCs and AAPCs. While in some 
other cases, remittances had been seen as evidence of backwardness, thus causing many 
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huaqiao to reject further receipt of remittances. Whatever the case, it was unacceptable, 
and Fang demanded that all interference with remittances be stopped.101 
 Fourth, the guiqiao were to be more efficiently employed and settled. Since 1949, 
some 200,000 or so huaqiao had returned to the homeland, and while they constituted a 
source of manpower, many work units had discriminated against them, either because of 
ignorance about huaqiao ‘special characteristics’, or because of a belief that guiqiao were 
politically-backward because of prolonged exposure to foreign influences. Thus many 
guiqiao with technical skills ended up wasted in agrarian production instead of industry, 
while ‘advanced intellectuals’ were assigned mundane jobs that did not utilise their 
education. Thus there was a need to rectify this wastage of human resources.102 
 Fifth, Fang emphasised that the qiaosheng were a source of trained manpower, 
the recipients of large sums of remittances, and also conduits for external propaganda. 
Hence all schools with qiaosheng were to adopt the principle of ‘equal results, priority 
admission’, which meant that all things being equal, qiaosheng would have priority in 
enrolment. Three ‘tuition schools’ for qiaosheng would also be established in Beijing, 
Guangzhou and Jimei (Xiamen) to attract more returnees, and also enable them to qualify 
for entry into higher education institutions.103 
 Fang proposed three steps to the rectifications. First, strengthening administrative 
capacity; from the provincial (or autonomous municipality) level downwards, all qiaowu 
agencies were to have appropriate manpower, training, and to also form closer ties with 
provincial People’s Committees. Secondly, committees or work groups of qiaojuan at the 
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local levels were to work with village town committees and local groups, to implement 
qiaowu from the ground up. Finally, the huaqiao community associations [侨联 qiaolian] 
were to be consolidated under a national federation, to allow ‘the broad masses of guiqiao 
and qiaojuan to have a forum to express their opinions, to check on qiaowu work and to 
effectively communicate with guowai huaqiao’.104 
 Fang’s speech was a vigorous defence of youdai at the OCAC Fourth Expanded 
Conference, and it also echoed the OCAC–UFWD report in February that had argued for 
a youdai approach ‘based on the special characteristics of qiaojuan and guiqiao’, so as to 
gain hard currency, achieve patriotic unity with the haiwai huaqiao, stabilise socio-
economic relations for the huaqiao in China, and further socialist transformation.105 Yet, 
while the February report had suggested how youdai could work in, and aid the transition 
to socialism, Fang’s address in June was a sharper contrast of qiaowu with the failures of 
the ‘socialist high tide’. Fang had admitted to institutional failures by local qiaowu 
offices, but this was pro forma self-criticism since Fang did not return once to this theme, 
and instead pointed repeatedly to cadre deviations and violations of youdai, to make his 
case for rectification. The point was that qiaowu could contribute a great deal to the 
socialist transformation, but only if the economic rationality of its youdai policies was 
unhindered by the deviations of cadres bent on ‘rash advances’. To be sure, this was the 
mainstream view at the Conference; Tan Kah Kee declared that existing problems were 
‘not the fault of national policy’, but rather ‘the product of deviationist failure amongst 
various cadres’.106 Yet, it was not just the OCAC who took this view. In fact, the Fourth 
Expanded Conference’s insistence on the youdai policies resonated very strongly with 
many in the CCP leadership. 
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 The point of the youdai was that it offered qiaowu a rational means to fulfilling 
a key economic imperative. But this also made it attractive to those who saw Mao’s ‘high 
tide’ as ‘rash advance’, and the pro-youdai position thus became firmly associated with 
the calls for more pragmatic and gradual approaches to socialist transformation, and with 
those who enunciated such views, like vice-Premier Deng Zihui.107  
 Deng Zihui held a reception for county Party Secretaries and Governors on the 
sidelines of the OCAC Fourth Expanded Conference, where he stressed that qiaowu was 
an ‘unshirkable duty’.108 As Deng said, ‘the crux of huaqiao work is domestic qiaowu’, 
since to do qiaowu well in China was also to win over the haiwai huaqiao. This was a 
well-accepted policy tenet by now, but Deng also saw that meeting huaqiao interests with 
domestic youdai might also stir controversy, especially since ‘the peasants have a certain 
egalitarianism’.109  Thus Deng advised that qiaowu should refrain from setting itself 
against the peasants, or else the peasants would grow to resent the huaqiao, and that it 
was further incumbent upon qiaowu to reach out to the peasants, and to ensure that it did 
not appear to ‘over-privilege’ the huaqiao.110 
 Deng’s warning about ‘over-privileging’ the huaqiao might ostensibly sound 
like a contradiction of youdai, but he in fact reminded the gathered officials that youdai 
was a necessity.111 In fact, Deng was giving a pragmatic warning, since he believed that 
the masses would resent youdai if they were left to their own devices. Thus if the huaqiao 
were to be ‘an important source of strength for socialist construction’, then the masses’ 
perceptions of youdai had to be managed.112 Since youdai was premised on rationality, it 
was also only rational that qiaowu manage perceptions. After all—and in a backhanded 
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reference to the ‘high tide’—as Deng remarked: ‘We must adhere to Marxist-Leninist 
dialectical materialism—or what Chinese people call ‘seeking truth from facts.’ Enough 
is enough, and not enough means, not enough.’113 Thus Deng concluded: ‘We must not 
cause the qiaojuan to become an eyesore to the peasants; basically, we must look to both 
aspects at the same time, and not one before the other.’114 
 Looking ‘to both aspects at the same time’, as Deng instructed, was essentially 
to pragmatically present youdai as both a rational policy approach, and as a better path to 
socialist progress. On the same day in June 1956 as Deng’s sermon on pragmatism, He 
Xiangning told the NPC that the huaqiao were fully supportive of the ‘high tide’, as was 
proven by the 90% qiaojuan participation in collectivisation. This, He implied, was 
because qiaowu had encouraged the huaqiao in their support for socialist transformation. 
From the 1955 State Council decree on remittances, to Mao’s directive on huaqiao usage 
of wasteland, and to ‘appropriate care for qiaojuan special conditions’ in food/goods 
allocation, this had all brought the huaqiao closer to their homeland.115  Indeed, He 
pointed to results—a 50% increase in huaqiao investment, compared to four years earlier. 
Thus youdai was clearly a viable and successful approach. 
 Yet, He’s apparent integration of the youdai approach with the ‘high tide’ was 
disingenuous, especially since she said ‘careless and impatient attitudes’, the neglect of 
huaqiao ‘special circumstances’, and ‘trying to accomplish a 12-year plan in three years’, 
were the causes of problems.116 But in publicly reconciling the narratives of the ‘socialist 
high tide’ and the youdai, He was claiming credit on qiaowu’s behalf. Collectivisation, 
after all, had truly succeeded in transforming agrarian China. Thus, to associate the youdai 
with that success was to bolster its socialist credentials, and would also mitigate criticisms 
that qiaowu had over-privileged the huaqiao in socialist transformation. 
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 He’s attempt to cast youdai as appropriately socialist, even as she blamed its 
problems on the ‘rash advances’ of the ‘high tide’, was apropos of the ongoing debate 
over the future of collectivisation. On 15 June 1956, Liao Luyan had submitted a draft 
‘Model Articles of Association for Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives’ to 
the NPC. These were for the most part based on the version for the APCs, but they were 
intended to ‘address the new problems that arose when the APCs were converted to 
AAPCs’, and had been ‘based on the new experiences learnt during the agricultural 
collectivisation and construction process’.117 Which for Liao, mostly meant (as noted 
earlier), ‘address[ing] the tendency towards one-sided emphasising of the national and 
collective interest even while disregarding individual interests’.118 
 Fang, Deng and He had all pointed to the youdai approach as an economically 
rational means to fulfilling qiaowu imperatives in the context of socialist transformation. 
Indeed, this sense of youdai as a sort of middle way between socialist transformation and 
economic rationality was exactly what the NPC endorsed on 30 June 1956 when it passed 
the ‘Model Articles’. Articles 14 and 15 provided for, inter alia, the special circumstances 
of qiaojuan and guiqiao who were labour-deficient by making provision for their 
employment in roles suitable to their ability and/or capacity to labour.119 Article 49, 
alongside an acknowledgement that cooperatives among minorities had to respect their 
customs and practices, ordered those in the huaqiao areas to ‘pay special attention to unite 
the guiqiao and qiaojuan with the running of the cooperatives’.120 Article 58 guaranteed 
that guiqiao and qiaojuan would not be ostracised, and ensured that their representation 
in a cooperative’s assembly would be in proportion to their population in the cooperative. 
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Article 61 ensured that cooperatives with significant proportions of guiqiao or qiaojuan 
should also reserve a number of leadership positions for them. 121  Thus while 
collectivisation was held as a key part of socialist transformation, it was also entrenched 
with new youdai provisions for the huaqiao, based on a logic that youdai for huaqiao 
specialness was necessary, and the key to maximising their economic utility.  
 While the ‘Model Articles’ endorsed the youdai approach in qiaowu, far more 
significant approval was to come at the first session of the CCP’s Eighth Party Congress 
in September 1956. Of course, the OCAC had not waited for the Eighth Party Congress 
to begin shoring up youdai—that began after the Fourth Expanded Conference.122 Yet the 
Eighth Party Congress offered a prominent platform for a very decisive underlining of 
the pre-eminence of youdai in qiaowu.123 Indeed, Liu Shaoqi, in his political report to the 
Congress on 15 September, remarked that ‘the patriotic huaqiao overseas are also a part 
of the united front, and we must continue to unite with them’.124 While Liu specified the 
haiwai huaqiao, his instruction ‘to unite with them’ was not actually about those abroad—
since as Deng Zihui had pointed out previously, uniting with the huaqiao abroad was 
precisely through domestic qiaowu. Moreover, Liu was clearly not advocating unity with 
the haiwai huaqiao in a sense of a homeland–diaspora relationship, because since the 
Dual Nationality Treaty (1955), the PRC had maintained that the haiwai huaqiao should 
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take up local citizenship.125 Thus ‘unite with them’ had little to do with either patriotic or 
diasporic identities of huaqiao. As Li Weihan explained to the Congress on 25 September, 
qiaowu defined by the imperative to ‘unite with them’ meant the traditional ‘protection 
of the legitimate rights and interests of huaqiao’, along with the rejoinders to take up local 
citizenship and to be law-abiding. But it was also about youdai: the protection of 
remittances, preferential provisions for huaqiao investment, facilitation of huaqiao 
investment and qiaosheng higher education, and ‘looking after the special circumstances 
and needs of domestic huaqiao’, and so on.126 This, Li said, was just as important as 
rectifying ‘high tide’ excess. And thus the youdai in qiaowu was the future. 
 Of course, none of this meant that qiaowu was actually uninterested in the 
haiwai huaqiao, especially since the precious remittances originated with them. But the 
youdai in domestic qiaowu reflected the party-state’s realisation that the transnationality 
of huaqiao interests in their remittances found its most comprehensive satisfaction inside 
China. Thus inasmuch as the PRC did not want the responsibility for Chinese abroad who 
had taken up local citizenship, the party-state was careful to be seen as upholding the 
‘unbreakable bonds’ between all Chinese. As Zhou Enlai told some Burmese huaqiao in 
December 1956, even if those who became Burmese citizens were no longer huaqiao: 
‘we will still be relatives, and what is so bad about that? Just like how a daughter remains 
a relative even after she marries’.127 Thus while youdai was a domestic locus of policy, 
its fulfilment of huaqiao specialness spoke to a transnational audience. 
 In a sense, youdai was domestic policy, but also transnational propaganda. 
Given that the propaganda to the haiwai huaqiao was to encourage them to look to local 
citizenship and their long-term interests, and also to spread positive information on 
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qiaowu and huaqiao situations in China, youdai was basically relevant abroad and 
necessary at home.128 In that vein, the State Council finally established Fang Fang’s 
proposed national qiaolian in October 1956.129 The All-China Federation of Returned 
Overseas Chinese (ACFROC), while theoretically an organisation for the guiqiao, was 
actually an OCAC device to bring existing organisations for guiqiao and qiaojuan under 
central control.130 This was to aid the dual purposes associated with the youdai approach: 
to help implement domestic policy that catered to huaqiao interests (and incentivised their 
remittances), and to inform propaganda on those precise policies to the haiwai huaqiao 
(that would also encourage remittances). Thus the OCAC defined the objectives of the 
ACFROC as: ‘uniting and educating guiqiao and qiaojuan, communicating with guowai 
huaqiao on the local situation and qiaowu policies, and organising welfare services for 
guiqiao and qiaojuan’.131 This, as the new ACFROC Chairman, Tan Kah Kee, declared 
at its inauguration on 5 October, would strengthen the ‘broad People’s Democratic United 
Front’ that Liu Shaoqi had pointed to at the Eighth Party Congress.132 Indeed, as the 
ACFROC editorialised: ‘in order to do qiaowu work well, we must not neglect the special 
characteristics of huaqiao and qiaojuan’.133 
 By October 1956, the paramountcy of the youdai approach in qiaowu was 
clearly established. Indeed, the youdai in domestic policy had been precisely endorsed by 
the party-state as the means towards fulfilling the economic imperatives of qiaowu, and 
as a means for reconciling economic rationality with socialist transformation. Yet, while 
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the Eighth Party Congress ensured that youdai was the Party-approved doctrine for 
qiaowu, and indeed, also the main feature of its external-facing propaganda, there was 
another, inadvertent consequence to its approval. The Congress, after all, saw an apparent 
reduction in Mao’s status since it ‘dropped the Socialist High Tide, deleted all references 
to Mao Zedong Thought from the [Party] constitution, and denounced the cult of 
personality’.134 Indeed, when the Congress had approved Liu Shaoqi’s political report, it 
had resolved that the excesses of the ‘high tide’ had been ‘adventurism’ and that the task 
ahead was to prevent and correct ‘leftist adventurist tendencies’, as much as it was also 
to resist rightist conservatism.135 The Congress’ approval of youdai thus also meant that 
this approach to qiaowu was nailed squarely by association to the rejection of ‘leftist 
adventurism’—and more importantly, to the rejection of Mao. This would come back to 
haunt qiaowu in 1957. 
 
The Great Debate: 
 Inasmuch as Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ and the consequent ‘de-
Stalinisation’ were influential on the renunciation of the ‘socialist high tide’ in China, 
their other inadvertent effect was to foment severe instability within the Soviet bloc. By 
October 1956, both Poland and Hungary had seen the replacement of erstwhile Stalinist 
regimes on the back of mass demonstrations and popular discontent that had been 
inspired—to a large extent—by ‘de-Stalinisation’.136  The two crises were eventually 
resolved—in vastly different ways and with divergent consequences—but both had been 
observed with great concern in China.137 
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 The immediate effect of the Polish October and Hungarian Uprising for China 
was the inspiration they provided for popular dissent. As Frank Dikotter notes, while 
‘people had to read between the lines, as the news was severely censored’, they were 
aware of enough, since ‘workers started invoking the example of Hungary in acts of 
defiance against the state’.138  Workers protested for a variety of reasons—like their 
stagnant or decreasing incomes, poor housing and welfare—‘but what caused the 
explosion of discontent was the collectivisation of private enterprises under the Socialist 
High Tide’.139 Workers started to strike, and were soon joined by some 100,000 students 
by 1957.140 Elsewhere, peasants began to clamour to leave the APCs and AAPCs. Of 
course, rectification of the ‘socialist high tide’ had been promised at the Eighth Party 
Congress, but it now seemed as if the Party was losing control. 
 The Polish October and the Hungarian Uprising, as Zhu Dandan has pointed 
out, ‘stimulated domestic debates’ in China amongst the Party and people. Against the 
backdrop of strikes, demonstrations, and peasants leaving collectives, the suggestion was 
that the CCP, like its Hungarian and Polish counterparts, had become estranged from the 
people it was supposedly leading.141 Mao was one of those who believed that what had 
happened in Hungary (and to a lesser extent, Poland) could also happen in China. Indeed 
Mao believed, as Shen Zhihua asserts, that the CCP’s problem was that its relationship 
with the masses was now threatened by popular dissatisfaction with its erroneous policies, 
and its past behaviour which had been ‘divorced from the masses’.142 Hence, Mao called 
for an internal rectification campaign to eliminate the bureaucratism, factionalism and 
subjectivism in the Party. Bureaucratism and subjectivism referenced previous failings, 
                                                
Nagy’s introduction of liberalising reforms did not, however, quell anti-Communist sentiment, and finally 
the Red Army invaded Hungary. See Bekes, ‘East Central Europe, 1953-1956’, 350-351. 
138 Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 278. 
139 Ibid., 279. 
140 Ibid., 278. 
141 Zhu, ‘The Hungarian Revolution and the origins of China’s Great Leap policies, 1956-57’, 454-455. 
142 Shen Zhihua, ‘Yi jiu wu qi nian zhengfeng yundong shi ruhe kaishi de’, Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, No. 
6 (2008), 72-83 (72-73). 
 203 
but factionalism hinted at something else. Indeed, as factionalism implied, Mao also 
believed that such a rectification offered an opportunity for him to ‘reclaim the initiative’ 
barely a month after the Eighth Party Congress had publicly renounced his ‘high tide’ 
vision (if not his Thought) and marginalised his leadership.143 
 The CCP leadership, while acknowledging the likely ‘contradictions among the 
people’, were not in favour of Mao’s internal rectification.144 Liu Shaoqi proposed ‘top-
down’, ‘self-regulative’ reform to the CCP CC in November 1956.145 But Mao preferred 
direct action: ‘strikes, popular parades and demonstrations as proper methods for forcing 
the cadres to correct their mistakes’.146 Yet, Mao was unsuccessful. As a People’s Daily 
editorial on 29 December 1956 for the Politburo suggested, while ‘shortcomings’ would 
be ‘determinedly criticised and overcome’, such criticisms should ‘only be made in the 
service of consolidating democratic centralism and the leadership of the Party’.147 
 Given the CCP leadership’s resistance, Mao unsurprisingly took his ideas to a 
different audience on 27 February 1957, and lectured the 11th SSC on ‘How to Handle 
Contradictions among the People’.148 Mao said that the Hungarian crisis was due to their 
Party’s bureaucratism and its conflation of counterrevolutionary threat with legitimate 
concerns of the people. Indeed, Mao acknowledged similar mistakes in China, 
particularly during past political campaigns, and now promised amnesty for political 
prisoners, and ‘expressed regret’ at the loss of life. Yet, this meant that China could end 
up like Hungary, unless the CCP reformed itself.149  Mao criticised the Party for its 
bureaucratism and declared that it would be the people who would show where the Party 
                                                
143 Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 284. 
144 Zhu, ‘The Hungarian Revolution and the origins of China’s Great Leap policies, 1956-57’, 454. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid., 456. 
147 People’s Daily editorial, ‘Zai lun wuchan jieji zhuanzheng de lishi jingyan’, 29/12/1956, JYZW, 9: 482-
511 (504). 
148 Most cite this as ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ but the original title 
was ‘如何处理人民内部的矛盾’ and was amended afterwards to ‘关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题’, 
which was its title when the (amended) speech was published in June 1957. See Mao Zedong, ‘Ruhe chuli 
renmin neibu de maodun (jianghua tigang)’, 27/02/1957, JYZW, 10: 50-55 (54). 
149 Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 287. 
 204 
had failed. No one would be exempt, or as Mao asked (rhetorically): ‘Old cadres cannot 
be criticised?’150 The principle, as Mao had proposed in May 1956, was to: ‘Let a hundred 
flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend; long-term coexistence, mutual 
supervision.’ The ‘hundred flowers’ was a reference to allowing for different viewpoints 
in the arts and science, but as Mao explained on 1 March, ‘long-term coexistence’ and 
‘mutual supervision’ also referred to the persistence (and tolerance) of the (non-CCP) 
political parties, their alternative perspectives and mutual criticism.151 Only thus could 
the Party resolve its contradictions with the people. 
 The SSC included non-communists and delegates from the other democratic 
parties, and they approved Mao’s speech.152 Mao, to be clear, had called for a specific 
Rectification Campaign. Indeed, to the National Propaganda Work Conference on 12 
March, Mao claimed that the CCP CC had since decided to launch a Rectification to 
criticise and correct bureaucratism, subjectivism, and factionalism within the Party.153 
Thus Mao openly invited non-CCP personages to participate in the criticism, as they 
wished. As for how the process would work, it was to be through open criticism but also 
self-criticism, where individuals were to study and reflect on their work. While cadres 
were wary of non-Party criticisms, Mao said that the criticisms would be like ‘breeze or 
mild rain’, avoiding personal attacks, and focused on learning ‘from past mistakes’.154 
Yet, Rectification did not appeal to the CCP CC or the Party at large.155 And Mao’s 
desired criticisms were also slow to materialise since the prior experiences of intellectuals 
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of Maoist campaigns were enough to make them practice, as Jonathan Spence notes, ‘an 
understandable caution’.156 
 Given the general reluctance for Mao’s proposed Rectification, qiaowu was not 
any different in early 1957, and its focus was on youdai; apart from the launch of the 
ACFROC, September 1956 to April 1957 also saw a string of new policies.157 One in 
particular bears highlighting because it shows the extent to which qiaowu was prepared 
to privilege and set the huaqiao apart from the masses. On 8 February 1957, the Politburo 
instructed that the country should ‘increase savings’ to recover from the excesses of 1956. 
The ‘high tide’ had seen expenditure rise sharply in 1956 by around RMB 2.8-3 billion.158 
This had to be corrected, and one of the Politburo’s austerity measures was a requirement 
that every person be allocated 1 jin less of grain/rice a month.159 Under ‘unified sale and 
purchase’ this was an effective, albeit crude measure, since a reduction in allocations also 
meant that the state had more to sell. Yet, the Fujian PBOC and qiaowu Committee argued 
that applying this measure to the huaqiao would be counterproductive. Since the 
Politburo’s main consideration was financial, then remittances—which in Fujian, 
amounted to an estimated US$38 million in 1957—should not be undermined, which was 
exactly what reducing allocations to the huaqiao would do. Thus, in ‘primary huaqiao 
areas, especially where there are the most remittances’, the correct measure was instead 
to allocate even more food/goods to huaqiao, which would ‘help to withdraw more 
currency from circulation, and thus motivate qiaojuan to gain more remittances’.160 
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 The Fujian qiaowu and PBOC report was endorsed by the FPC, which noted in 
a report to the CCP CC, that ‘in the midst of developing the campaign to increase savings, 
we must avoid negatively impacting the motivation of qiaojuan to gain remittances as a 
result of one-sided propaganda on cost-cutting’.161 The CCP CC agreed with this and sent 
the Fujian proposals (in May 1957) to all provinces that had huaqiao populations, with 
its ringing endorsement of the ‘very good’ suggestions, suggesting that to balance the 
need to ‘increase savings’ amongst the masses, with special provisions for huaqiao so as 
to gain remittances, was in its judgement, ‘correct’ policy.162 
 Yet, even as the youdai policies continued to prosper (and proliferate), Mao also 
continued to advocate Rectification. After the National Propaganda Work Conference on 
12 March, Mao headed south to hold meetings with CCP officials and cadres, acting as 
‘a wandering lobbyist’ for Rectification.163 Mao’s message was that Rectification was for 
the Party to overcome internal contradictions, and thus overcome contradictions with the 
masses. In that respect, Mao said, the Party should not be wary of criticism, but should 
embrace it.164 In the end, Mao proved convincing.165 By April 1957, even Zhou Enlai had 
admitted that: ‘correct treatment of contradictions among the people requires first of all 
that the CCP engage with the issue’.166 Thus on 27 April, the CCP CC approved Mao’s 
directive ‘On instructions regarding the Rectification Campaign’, which thus determined 
to ‘let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend’ alongside 
‘long-term coexistence, mutual supervision’.167 The Chairman had gotten his wish. 
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 Mao had envisioned that the Rectification Campaign would focus on CCP 
bureaucratism, factionalism and subjectivism, and would involve ‘open criticisms’ in 
structured settings by democratic personages and intellectuals. One example of this was 
over 8-16 May 1957 in a UFWD–organised series of seven meetings. Some attendees 
criticised the discrimination that non-CCP members faced in government work, where 
‘they had very little authority relevant to their duties’. Others criticised the campaigns 
against the alleged reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries, many of whom had been 
members of the democratic parties. There were also criticisms of Party policy, which 
while well-founded, was poorly implemented at lower levels.168 Yet, all this ‘mutual 
criticism’ suggested that the Rectification was going as planned, and providing, as Li 
Weihan noted, a ‘motivating influence’ for reform.169 But this was not to last. 
 As the news of the Rectification Campaign spread more extensively in May 
1957, criticisms began to appear outside of structured fora, and became ‘a torrent of 
criticism’.170 Students, workers, peasants, and intellectuals—Chinese society—began to 
voice louder and increasingly strident criticisms.171 The CCP was openly criticised for: 
its record on democracy, human rights, economic development, social inequality, civil 
rights; its failures in accelerated collectivisation; the violence and repression it had 
perpetrated in past political campaigns; and the severe gap between general living 
standards and Party members’ living conditions.172 Shanghai alone saw ‘major labour 
disturbances’ involving over 30,000 workers in around 580 enterprises, with another 700 
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minor ‘walkouts and organised slowdowns’. Some 8,000 students also took to the streets 
to mark the May Fourth Movement in an uncomfortable reminder of how social unrest 
had led to that ‘abortive student uprising’ in 1919.173 Rather than improving the Party’s 
authority and credibility, Rectification was undermining it.174 
 The Rectification Campaign (or, more popularly, the Hundred Flowers) had 
been conceived as a means to induce CCP internal reform, but the wave of public criticism 
unleashed on the CCP came as a rude shock. In such a climate, qiaowu could not have 
gone unscathed. Yet, if open criticism was intended to ‘increase the credibility’ of the 
CCP with the masses, then surely qiaowu—so often in contrast to the failure of cadres to 
look after the huaqiao—was safe from allegations of bureaucratism and the like?175 But 
the reality was that qiaowu, or at least, its youdai approach, was stuck in a rather 
ambivalent position vis-à-vis ‘contradictions among the people’ and the cadres. 
 One prominent example of contradictions in qiaowu lay in the issue of huaqiao 
ancestral graves. In September 1956, the GPPC’s attention had been called to instances 
of huaqiao ancestral graves in qiaoxiang being forcibly relocated or demolished to make 
way for road-building, irrigation, crop-planting and various agrarian economic projects. 
In order to protect ‘huaqiao and qiaojuan customs and practices’, Tao Zhu had ordered 
that no relocation of graves be undertaken without official approval, with no coercion 
permitted. If the land was indispensable, then the huaqiao were to be negotiated with, or 
given material to build new graves. Where a project was in the vicinity of huaqiao graves, 
any encroachment in a radius of 15 chi (5m) from the grave was prohibited.176 
 Yet, despite Tao Zhu’s intervention, Guangdong qiaowu officials reported in 
March 1957 that the situation was still not ideal. Some among the cadres and the masses 
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had ‘the mistaken view’ that the government protected huaqiao graves, but not the non-
huaqiao’s. Others said that huaqiao customs were backward superstitions (indeed 风水 
feng shui) and disputed the use of remittances for building graves or holding rituals.177 In 
response, Guangdong officials insisted that non-huaqiao ancestral graves were also to be 
protected, and while feng shui was truly backward superstition, the huaqiao were entitled 
to their beliefs; officially, the state would ‘not promote, [but] not forbid’ such customs.178 
Yet, the fact that these issues had even arisen suggested to qiaowu practitioners that there 
was truly confusion and contradiction among the masses, that was consequent to the 
youdai policies. Hence, as the GPPC instructed cadres, it was necessary for them to 
differentiate ‘who is an enemy and not, employing methods of persuasion and education 
to resolve contradictions among the people’.179 Yet, if there were such contradictions 
among the people regarding the youdai, was persuasion and education enough? 
 If there were contradictions regarding qiaowu, then pace Mao there was a need 
for Rectification, and by late April 1957, qiaowu had begun to move towards Mao’s 
position—as did the rest of the Party. At the third plenary session of the Eighth CCP CC 
Conference—which issued ‘On instructions regarding the Rectification Campaign’—
Liao Chengzhi argued that:  
Due to the inadequacies of qiaowu institutions in propaganda and education work, 
as well as in implementation of qiaowu policy, internal contradictions among the 
huaqiao, guiqiao, qiaojuan, the domestic population, and the cadres, have not 
been correctly understood by the cadres and the people. The question of how to 
clarify their thinking and understanding, based on Comrade Mao Zedong’s 
instructions on handling contradictions among the people, is at present, the key 
issue for the continued implementation of qiaowu policy.180 
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Thus Liao clearly aligned qiaowu with the larger momentum towards Mao’s Rectification 
Campaign. In a way, perhaps this was inevitable given the tendency in the Party. Yet, this 
would also lead to dramatic consequences for qiaowu later on. 
 Criticisms of qiaowu in the Hundred Flowers, as was the general intention, were 
supposed to come from structured fora, and a prominent example of this was from Chen 
Qiyou, Chairman of the Zhigong Party. At the UFWD-organised meetings over 8-16 May 
1957, Chen ‘advanced criticism on the problems of how to settle the dispute over his 
party’s buildings, how to find schools for the returned Overseas Chinese students, how to 
select students to study abroad and so forth’. Chen suggested that for qiaowu, ‘the spirit 
of equality is not shown in all the matters concerned’.181 The issue, as Huang Dingchen 
from the Zhigong Party said, was that ‘despite the fact that the government attaches 
importance to Overseas Chinese affairs, the United Front Department does not care much 
about the work of the Chih Kung Tang and extends it little assistance’.182 To be fair, the 
Zhigong Party were not wrong; neither the OCAC nor the UFWD had ever sought its 
input. But then again, the Zhigong Party had never been designated as the representatives 
of the huaqiao, that role had been for the specially-nominated huaqiao delegates (like 
Tan Kah Kee). Moreover, after the Fourth Expanded Conference, the role of interlocutor 
between qiaowu and huaqiao had been passed to the ACFROC. Thus, the Zhigong Party’s 
(understandable) frustration was not actually a legitimate qiaowu contradiction. 
 Yet, what the Zhigong Party suggested about huaqiao grievances was a very 
different matter. Chen Qiyou told Xinhua on 11 May that he had discovered serious 
dissatisfaction among the guiqiao, particularly those from Japan. Reports in 1956 had 
already shown that many Japanese guiqiao faced discrimination because of their different 
political, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, which often meant that they were given 
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unsuitable or irrelevant jobs—as was the case of a former Tokyo University Professor, 
who was not permitted to teach in Wuhan Normal University, but instructed to engage in 
‘self-study’.183 But while poor employment options were bad enough, it was also reported 
that general discrimination—even abuse—was not unusual for Japanese guiqiao. The 
qiaosheng among them were ostracised, or in other cases, these guiqiao saw their 
Japanese wives face sexual harassment.184 Things evidently had not changed by April 
1957, since Chen Qiyou found similar tales—so much so that some had decided to give 
up on China and return to Japan.185 Yet, these Japanese guiqiao were merely one locus of 
unhappiness amongst the huaqiao in China. 
 In Guangzhou, the huaqiao were also dissatisfied. Though youdai policies had 
seen guiqiao and qiaojuan receive special allocations of foodstuffs and goods in ‘unified 
sale and purchase’, this presumed that there were even supplies to be found. Thus the 
qiaojuan and guiqiao called for a ‘special market’ system to allow them to use their 
remittances to purchase items imported specifically for them. Thus the state could gain 
foreign currency, and they could access more goods.186 On the other hand, perhaps the 
guiqiao and qiaojuan also wanted to use their foreign currency because the state was 
profiting from arbitrage at their expense.  According to official bank rates, US$100 was 
RMB 234, but the free market rate (in Hong Kong), as huaqiao complained, was closer 
to RMB 254, which meant that they lost about 8% of the real value of their remittances.187 
The Chinese banks’ commission was 2.5%, but even if the banks took no commission, 
the huaqiao still lost out. Thus many huaqiao chose to receive remittances in Hong Kong, 
convert it to RMB and smuggle it back, or left it in Hong Kong banks, stocks or property. 
Either way, the PRC lost out because the huaqiao were dissatisfied with it. 
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 The criticisms of qiaowu that arose amongst the huaqiao were thus not against 
youdai per se, but against the failures of the party-state and its qiaowu practitioners to 
implement youdai. At the fourth plenary session of the Shanghai PCC (22-25 May 1957), 
the huaqiao delegates Lin Chaopin, Chen Shiyin and Zheng Kuiyi lambasted the state of 
qiaowu. Of course, the special provisions for huaqiao were basically correct, but their 
implementation was clearly lacking. Whether it was remittance protections, guiqiao 
employment, or the ways that cadres had treated the huaqiao in socialist transformation—
the results did not match the intentions. Previously, of course, they had been afraid to 
speak, ‘lest we be accused of having backward thinking’, but in the Hundred Flowers, to 
speak ‘was to do their duty’.188 Yet, what Lin, Chen and Zheng did not realise was that 
the party-state’s interest in youdai was fast diminishing. 
 While the Rectification was conceived as internal Party reform, the ‘torrent of 
criticism’ that the Hundred Flowers unleashed forced a rethink.189 The backlash began on 
15 May 1957 with Mao’s ‘Things Are Changing’ memorandum; he now claimed that the 
Hundred Flowers had been intended to expose the rightists, and to allow them ‘to bury 
themselves’.190 Thus, while the ‘rightists’ continued criticising, the Party prepared to 
strike.191 Finally, on 8 June, the People’s Daily accused rightists of trying to overthrow 
the Party and the working class.192 Mao, on his part, published a version of ‘On the 
Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ that had been edited to seem as if 
it had been a ‘strategy to unmask the enemies of the revolution’ all along.193 
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 Having now supposedly unmasked the rightists and anti-communists, Mao 
instructed in July 1957 that the country train the sights of Rectification onto these 
enemies. Employing the methods of ‘great debate’ [大辩论 da bianlun], the masses, led 
by the Party, were to engage in struggle against rightists in meetings, denouncing their 
Rightism and requiring them to confess their deviationist behaviour. 194  This new 
campaign, Mao said, would last at least until the spring of 1958. As Rectification turned 
into an Anti-Rightist Campaign, some half a million were labelled rightists and suffered 
through struggle sessions, criticisms and coerced confessions for offences—sometimes 
real, but mostly imagined.195 Yet, this new backlash against the Hundred Flowers also 
meant that the Party leadership now ‘fell into line’ with Mao, lest they be accused of 
Rightism. 196  This had two effects: the re-statement of Mao’s ideas on economic 
development that would lead to the Great Leap Forward in 1958; and more immediately, 
a re-emphasis on socialist values and the centrality of the Party.197 
 Anti-Rightism, as the CCP directed in August 1957, was to institute a ‘great 
debate’ across China on ‘the two roads of socialism or capitalism’—with the socialist 
road the obviously correct choice.198 In that light, political discourse and policy had to be 
judged by which of the ‘two roads’ it took. The OCAC fell in line with Anti-Rightism 
very early on. He Xiangning, at the NPC on 11 July, now rejected the idea that huaqiao 
special characteristics, or the need for unity with the haiwai huaqiao exempted huaqiao 
from ‘reform campaigns and movements’, and dismissed suggestions that huaqiao were 
dissatisfied ‘because of these campaigns’. Indeed, to He: ‘None of these perspectives are 
aligned with reality, nor are they in line with huaqiao desires.’199 He’s assertions on 
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‘huaqiao desires’ were nowhere near reality, but then again, perhaps what the huaqiao 
wanted or thought was no longer the point. As He declared: ‘To overly emphasise special 
care for a minority, and thus affect nationwide measures overall—this is wrong.’200 He 
now accused youdai of selfish demands that only led to ‘damage to the interests of the 
country and the majority of people’. Indeed, she said that rather than seek youdai, qiaowu 
was now firmly in the midst of overcoming its ‘serious bureaucratism, subjectivism and 
factionalism’ so that it could aid socialism’s advance.201 The era and indeed, the practice 
of youdai had thus fallen victim to Anti-Rightism. 
 He’s speech in July 1957 was a harbinger of the end of youdai, but the actual 
turn away took longer as qiaowu struggled to deal with both the imperatives of Anti-
Rightism and its founding principles (so to speak) and political economy. What was clear 
though, was that post-Hundred Flowers qiaowu now had a clear prioritisation of the 
‘majority interest’ against that of the huaqiao. This was clear in Tao Zhu’s order on 4 
July 1957 for a new and stringent inspection regime for Guangdong’s borders with Hong 
Kong to ensure that the huaqiao did not smuggle cash or goods into China. The huaqiao 
had been allowed certain leeway with regards to personal luggage in the past, but faced 
with a trend of huaqiao converting remittances in Hong Kong and thereafter either 
smuggling cash into China, or purchasing goods in Hong Kong to resell, Tao ordered a 
clampdown. If anyone was going to profit, it would and should be the party-state, and all 
smugglers would be ‘dealt with severely’.202 This was clearly a prioritisation of the party-
state’s interest, and a reversal of youdai, but at the same time, it was not contradictory to 
the economic imperative that qiaowu was supposed to serve. 
 Smuggling remittances affected the party-state’s accumulation of foreign 
currency, and in that sense, a clampdown was inevitable. But the focus on remittances 
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also saw a form of youdai continue. The State Council approved a OCAC, PBOC and 
Trade Ministry proposal on 30 July 1957, that brought up the earlier suggestion (from 
huaqiao themselves) that huaqiao be allowed to use foreign currency to purchase extra 
food/goods which the state imported and sold. The State Council’s approval did not 
mention imports, but allowed increased allocations of foodstuff, consumer goods and 
‘high-quality’ products (i.e. medicine) for the huaqiao, with their purchases to be in 
proportion to remittances received. The State Council left the purchase ratio up to 
Guangdong and Fujian, but authorised them to create special departments to manage 
huaqiao allocations. Yet, this was a façade of youdai, and more akin to profiteering since 
the State Council instructed that sale prices should be higher than under ‘unified sale and 
purchase’—indeed suggesting that edible oils and cotton cloth be sold at a 100-200% 
mark-up.203 The majority interest thus came at the expense of the huaqiao; the youdai 
was on the way out, but huaqiao economic utility was fair game. 
 The State Council did continue to issue youdai policies in August 1957 for 
huaqiao investment, and it continued to claim that it was concerned about huaqiao special 
circumstances and interests, but this was window dressing.204 Anti-Rightism now meant 
a campaign amongst the huaqiao: to eliminate the capitalist inclinations of ‘richer 
huaqiao households’, to oppose individualism and ‘departmental selfishness’, to cause 
qiaojuan and guiqiao to enthusiastically love and participate in cooperatives and 
collective enterprise, to be ‘one with the masses’ and to be thrifty and frugal.205 Above 
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all, this meant intensified socialist education for the qiaojuan and guiqiao to eliminate: 
the ‘feeling that they were special’, the overemphasis on their needs, their neglect for 
long-term majority interests, their desires to leave cooperatives, remittance smuggling, 
and their capitalist inclinations.206 Anti-Rightism was thus no less than the sweeping 
eradication of the huaqiao interest itself. 
 As part of the general Anti-Rightist Campaign, ‘Great Debate’ sessions were 
held in qiaoxiang where accused rightists were forced to self-criticise and to confess their 
counterrevolutionary sins—and unsurprisingly, many huaqiao tried to escape. Yet, the 
OCAC in August 1957 ordered a clampdown on ‘hiding from rectification’. All 
guiqiao—including qiaosheng—were to participate in Anti-Rightist struggle in their 
work or educational units. If individuals were out of employment or school, the local 
qiaolian was to organise their ‘study session’.207 If a huaqiao actually ‘escaped from 
struggle’, they were to be (euphemistically) ‘persuaded to return to their original units’—
and local Public Security informed.208 Another directive on 31 August stated that guiqiao 
and qiaosheng could be sentenced to ‘labour re-education’ as a means to rectification—
harkening back, as it were, to the punishments of the Land Reform.209 
 As all of this was going on, the OCAC itself was forced to reach for a new 
governing principle. In October 1957, this was defined, according to the Guangdong 
qiaowu head, Luo Lishi as: ‘equal treatment, somewhat different; according to special 
characteristics, appropriate care’.210 This new principle signalled the party-state’s intent 
to eradicate huaqiao privileges, even while qiaowu tried to maintain the façade of catering 
to the huaqiao interests. According to Luo, ‘equal treatment’ meant that the huaqiao had 
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to be one with the masses and embrace socialism. It was still noted though, that they were 
‘somewhat different’ and thus could not transform overnight. Hence, they would still 
receive ‘appropriate care’ for their ‘special characteristics’.211 Superficially, this sounded 
like youdai, but it was not even close to it. 
 Luo claimed that the huaqiao would still receive ‘appropriate care’, but his 
subsequent discussion of remittance smuggling proves the falseness of his statement. 
Guangdong, Luo said, had ‘lost remittances’ of around US$7 million in January–July, 
and was on course to lose US$10 million in 1957. Guangdong was thus instituting 
extensive education and propaganda against smuggling, but Luo also warned that the 
Public Security Ministry had since recommended that all the remittance smugglers be 
executed.212 The smuggling of currency and goods had arisen because the huaqiao had 
become dissatisfied with the losses they regularly incurred in exchanging foreign 
currencies inside China. But here, the party-state’s solution was to threaten them with 
death. In any event, the huaqiao were left with only one option if they did not want to 
exchange their remittances for RMB with the state banks: to use remittances under the 
State Council’s July 1957 provision for allocations of consumer goods and foodstuffs to 
the huaqiao outside of ‘unified sale and purchase’ on the basis of their remittances. The 
State Council had recommended raising prices, but Guangdong believed that high prices 
resulted in low demand, determining instead to unilaterally cancel all the prior youdai 
allocations to the huaqiao in ‘unified sale and purchase’ in 1958.213 Thus, in the end, 
leaving the huaqiao with little choice but to use their remittances to purchase the (so-
called) extra allocations to make up the shortfall. 
 This policy was passed off as ‘appropriate care’, but all that was being cared for 
was the party-state’s interest. In the case of the pastiche of youdai that let huaqiao use 
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remittances to purchase extra food/goods, the interest was explicit. After all, the 
Guangdong instructions on 6 December on the allocations also made allowances for 
huaqiao visitors to China and ‘international friends’ to also make such purchases, but 
remarked that: ‘for all huaqiao without foreign currency, because the government’s 
youdai provisions for huaqiao have not yet been cancelled, they will not be given any 
further youdai’.214 This was ‘appropriate care’—but it was care for profit.   
 Even the idea of ‘equal treatment’ was false since the explicit message of Anti-
Rightism was that the huaqiao—with all their differences—were ideologically-backward. 
The ‘Great Debate’ method of struggle was of ‘three comparisons, two reviews and five 
antis’ in meetings, which were to: ‘compare with overseas, compare with the past, 
compare with the peasants; review production results, review labour attitudes; oppose 
sabotage, oppose corruption, oppose wastage, oppose dependency, oppose laziness’.215 
For qiaojuan with labour deficiencies; guiqiao who came from capitalist countries; or 
qiaosheng who lacked socialist knowledge, the comparisons necessarily went against 
them. Which meant in the end, that even to have a huaqiao identity was a liability. This 
was not a new phenomenon; huaqiao had long been easy targets for such allegations.216 
But this was nowhere near a sense of ‘equal treatment’. 
 The end of 1957 thus saw the end of an era in qiaowu. In November 1957, Liao 
Chengzhi told the OCAC that qiaowu was now entering its third stage. The first had been 
during WWII; the second dated back to the founding of the PRC; and now, the third stage 
would be defined by: the ‘transformation of the ownership of the means of production’, 
the ‘socialist revolution in politics and ideological thinking’ and ‘the question of the 
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position and direction of huaqiao work’.217 This did not mean that qiaowu would abandon 
its fundamental imperatives. But it did mean that qiaowu was entering a new reality. In 
some sense, qiaowu would not change: Liao said that the ‘work of gaining remittances 
would not decrease, but instead, requires a greater effort from us’.218 Indeed, the OCAC, 
in the third stage, was ‘to aid externally, the winning over of post-colonial Southeast Asia 
and the striving for international peace’, and ‘internally, to determinedly advance socialist 
transformation and socialist construction’.219 Yet, whereas the OCAC had once been 
proactive, even autonomous, to the extent that it had been able to both advocate and carve 
out special provisions for its own policy, that role was now reduced. In foreign affairs, 
qiaowu was to align completely with the MFA, which suggested a future irrelevance, 
since Liao declared that the OCAC would, in the interests of its work in maintaining links 
to the haiwai huaqiao, reduce its role in domestic affairs, with a 33% reduction in size, 
and devolution of work to local authorities.220 In a way, this made sense. If qiaowu was 
no longer about special policy for the huaqiao, but instead the integration of the huaqiao 
within the socialist whole, then its domestic focus would become irrelevant. 
 The corollary to the subordination of qiaowu to the new socialist imperatives 
was thus the subordination of the huaqiao to the masses. Liao’s November 1957 speech 
launched this new era, and its consequences were immediate. On 1 December, the OCAC 
issued instructions on the settlement of guiqiao in 1958 and made it explicitly clear that 
they would now be required to focus on ‘the glory of labour’ and join the masses.221 
Moreover, education was also to instruct the guiqiao to raise their class awareness—‘to 
learn from the workers’ and ‘emulate the peasants’.222 Far from ‘appropriate care’ for 
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special characteristics, qiaowu was to obey the demands of socialist transformation, and 
there would soon be no room for the huaqiao to be huaqiao any longer. 
 
Conclusion: 
The reality—and irony—of the vicissitudes of 1956–1957 for qiaowu was that the 
seeming vindication of its youdai approach in mid-1956 was also an incontrovertible 
demonstration of its contradiction with, and opposition to Mao’s vision of socialism, and 
thus the triumph of youdai held also the seeds of its own destruction.  
 To be sure, qiaowu practitioners had initially believed that the youdai approach 
could, and should persist during Mao’s ‘socialist high tide’, and even aid socialism’s 
progress. After all, the political economy of qiaowu rationalised catering to huaqiao 
interests as being the means to fulfilling the party-state’s economic interests. The ‘high 
tide’ called for faster socialist transformation, but it did not change the fact that the party-
state needed the foreign exchange from huaqiao remittances. Thus securing remittances 
through the youdai policies was clearly a rational course of action. Yet, in reality, the 
youdai approach did not sit well with the ‘high tide’ at all.  
Mao’s vision called for revolutionary struggle and the eradication of capitalism. 
While conversely, qiaowu and its youdai policies protected bourgeois interests, privileged 
minority huaqiao ‘specialness’, and exempted the huaqiao from socialism. Or at least, 
that is what it seemed like to many Party cadres and officials, who resented the positive 
discrimination given to the huaqiao, and resisted the contradictions that qiaowu imposed 
on their attempts to keep faith with Mao’s vision of revolutionary progress. Yet, when 
qiaowu practitioners were confronted with the contradiction between the ‘high tide’ and 
their youdai approach in 1956, they stuck firmly to their guns. 
As far as qiaowu practitioners were concerned, the youdai policies were intended 
to meet the party-state’s interests, and thus their rational implementation should not be 
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obstructed. Hence the OCAC Fourth Expanded Conference’s insistence on the youdai 
approach, and on the need to rectify the failures of Mao’s ‘high tide’. In fact, this view 
resonated strongly with many in the CCP leadership who had, by mid-1956, come to view 
Mao’s ‘high tide’ as dangerously ‘rash advances’ that led only to economic calamity. 
Thus the prevailing view amongst the CCP leadership by the Eighth Party Congress in 
September 1956, was for a slowing down of socialist transformation, and for a return to 
economic rationality and stable development. In this context, the youdai approach and its 
rationality were obviously welcomed, and thus the Eighth Party Congress endorsed the 
youdai approach resoundingly. Yet, this also meant that the youdai approach was now 
irrefutably associated with the criticisms of, and opposition to Mao’s vision. 
 As it turns out, the party-state’s turn away from Mao’s ‘high tide’ vision—and his 
leadership—was brief, as the onset of the Polish October and the Hungarian Uprising in 
late 1956 created a crisis of confidence amongst the Party leadership that gave Mao the 
opportunity to reclaim the ascendancy. The events in Eastern Europe provoked a reaction 
in China, especially in increasingly vocal and direct expressions of public dissent and 
protest against the CCP. This burgeoning crisis created worries among Party leaders about 
the ‘contradictions among the people’, but it also pushed the Party to re-unite behind Mao. 
Mao proposed a Rectification Campaign of open criticism and dialogue, to enable the 
Party to reform and reclaim its authority, and therefore unite with the people again. Yet, 
Mao underestimated the depth of feeling against the CCP, and his plan to let a Hundred 
Flowers bloom only unleashed a wave of public criticism of the CCP. 
 The huaqiao in China had strong opinions on how the party-state had treated them. 
Ironically, it was not that the huaqiao opposed qiaowu, but rather that they criticised the 
failures to implement the youdai policies, since many faced discrimination, exploitation, 
or violations of their interests. Yet, such fierce criticisms also ensured that the huaqiao 
would be considered part of the anti-CCP sentiment in the Hundred Flowers. Although 
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the attacks on its authority had come as a shock, the party-state soon turned on its critics, 
and led by Mao, launched an Anti-Rightist Campaign in mid-1957 against all its critics, 
who were now accused of being rightist, anti-socialist enemies. Thus those huaqiao who 
insisted on their privileged treatment, and the youdai policies and ideas that had enabled 
them, were all now seen as evidence of rightist contradiction. 
 The CCP backlash against the Hundred Flowers pushed China to the left, and into 
a ‘Great Debate’ on ‘the two roads’ with only one correct answer; capitalism was rightist 
deviation, and those against Mao’s vision of socialist transformation were simply rightist 
counterrevolutionaries. Thus even qiaowu practitioners had to ensure their alignment with 
Mao’s vision, lest they end up accused of being rightists too, and this necessarily meant 
a turn away from youdai. For qiaowu which had been so closely linked to opposition to 
the ‘high tide’, the huaqiao interest could no longer be a priority. While qiaowu did not 
abandon its underlying economic imperatives, it now had to subordinate all policy to the 
‘majority interest’ (as Mao defined) for renewed and intensified socialist transformation. 
This mainly meant the intensification of the Anti-Rightist Campaign among the huaqiao, 
the marginalisation of huaqiao identity against that of the broad ‘labouring masses’, and 
the subjugation of huaqiao interests to the party-state’s. 
 Thus by the end of 1957, qiaowu had turned 180°. Even Fang Fang, who along 
with Liao Chengzhi had been a leading ideologue of the youdai approach, was forced to 
change tune by 26 December 1957: 
As to our past work, there were instances where our provision of care was too 
broad, where we accommodated too much, and where we did not carry out enough 
political and ideological education—these were shortcomings in policy 
implementation on our part.223 
 
It is possible that Fang did not mean what he said. Indeed, his remark about the qiaojuan 
in the ‘fourth-class carriage’ of the socialist train can be viewed in two ways; Fang was 
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either saying that the huaqiao were at least on the same train as the masses, or it was a 
backhanded remark that the end of youdai had left the huaqiao as fourth-class citizens.224 
Yet, either way, it was moot. The reality was that regardless of Fang’s feelings, he had to 
declare that the huaqiao would not be allowed to ‘obstruct the interests of socialism’ any 
longer, and would have to accept a ‘domestic policy of assimilation, and through socialist 
principles, the gradual elimination of qiaojuan and guiqiao special characteristics’.225 
This was foreboding, but this was just the beginning. Given that China had been returned 
to the path of accelerated socialist transformation, and given also that advocating youdai, 
or the huaqiao interest, was no longer possible, the future of qiaowu was anything but 
certain. In fact, it was about to get worse, as qiaowu entered the new era of ‘politics in 
command’, and the Great Leap Forward. 
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Chapter 5.  
Politics in Command 
 
Ideological and political work is the fundamental guarantor of economic and technical 
work; it serves the foundations of the economy. Ideology and politics is the Commander-
in-Chief; it is the soul. If we slacken—even slightly—in our ideological and political 
work, our economic and technical work will surely go astray. 
 
— Mao Zedong, 31 January 19581 
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Introduction: 
 On 9 October 1957, Chairman Mao proclaimed that a return to the old ‘socialist 
high tide’ slogan of ‘more, faster, better and more economical’ was imminent.2 This 
meant the revival of Mao’s vision of accelerated socialist transformation and economic 
development, but also the continuation of Anti-Rightist Rectification until May Day 1958 
at least. Anti-Rightism though, was now not only directed against the Party’s enemies in 
society, but also against rightists in the Party. The rightists, Mao said, were those who 
resisted ‘high tide’ principles, in their opposition to ‘rash advance’.3 This was thus the 
backdrop to the People’s Daily declaration on 27 October of a future ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ (GLF): the PRC would soon, through mass political mobilisation, ‘build 
socialism on top of a backward economy’.4 
 Mao’s resurgence was encouraged by the historic Sputnik satellite launches on 4 
October and 3 November 1957. As Mao told fellow communist leaders in Moscow in 
November 1957, these unprecedented events showed that: ‘the east wind prevails over 
the west wind, that is to say that the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly 
superior to the forces of capitalism’.5 This sentiment, in the vein of older Marxist-Leninist 
ideas about the ‘correlation of forces’, tied in well with Mao’s idea of a GLF, and thus 
even as the USSR aimed to economically overtake the USA in 15 years, Mao declared 
his intention to catch the UK in the same time.6 Mao’s grandstanding was of course, also 
about claiming a leading position for Chinese communism (and himself) internationally.7 
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Republic of China, 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey, I: 268-272. 
5 Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine, 13; Mao Zedong, ‘Zai Mosike gongchan dang he gongren dang daibiao 
huiyi shang de jianghua’, 14-18/11/1957, JYMZ, VI: 625-647. 
6 Mao entirely approved of the People’s Daily terminology of a ‘Great Leap Forward’. See Shen, Li, After 
Leaning to One Side, 156-157. 
7 See Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 70-71; Shen, Li, After Leaning to One Side, 156. 
 226 
But the idea that the ‘objective conditions’ favoured China’s socialist transformation was 
a popular one, and on New Year’s Day 1958, the People’s Daily declared that it was time 
‘to ride and advance with the east wind that prevails over the west wind; [and] to ride and 
advance with the communist wind that prevails over rightists, bureaucratism and 
conservatism!’8 
 For the party-state’s qiaowu practitioners, 1957 had seen the renunciation of 
qiaowu’s previous youdai approach, and also the prospect of impending and sweeping 
changes to the institutional powers and roles of qiaowu itself. Equally, the advent of the 
GLF, and the (perceived) changes to the ‘correlation of forces’ found their way into 
qiaowu. In November 1957, Liao Chengzhi told an OCAC conference that Sputnik 
heralded a crucial turning point in world history—and thus ‘it behoves us to determinedly 
press on along the socialist road, accelerating our country’s socialist construction’.9 
Indeed, the ‘objective conditions’ also suggested, as Liao said, that: ‘a new political 
situation has emerged throughout the country, with all manner of work now in a Great 
Leap Forward’.10 And this certainly applied to qiaowu. 
 This chapter analyses qiaowu during the early GLF. Following the repudiation in 
late 1957 of the youdai approach in the wake of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, 1958 saw 
Mao impose a new governing paradigm for the party-state: ‘politics in command’. Mao’s 
decree that (his) political ideology become the preeminent consideration in all party-state 
activity marked the advent of a new mode of policy. For qiaowu, its prime imperative to 
capitalise on huaqiao economic utility was unchanged, but its methods were now defined 
by an impetus to conform to the GLF and ‘politics in command’. This impetus to both 
seek huaqiao utility, and to conform to the ‘socialist road’, led to both the eradication of 
youdai, and the creation of policies designed to exploit and extract from the huaqiao—
                                                
8 People’s Daily editorial, ‘Chengfeng polang’, 01/01/1958, JYZW, 11: 1-7 (7). 
9 Liao Chengzhi, ‘Liao Chengzhi fu zhuren zai zhong qiaowei di er jie di yi ci quanti weiyuan huiyi shang 
de jianghua’, 27/11/1957, GDQW, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 1. 
10 Ibid., 3. 
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even if it violated their interests. This policy approach undermined the rationality that had 
once underpinned youdai, and unsurprisingly, by 1959, this approach (and the larger 
effects of the GLF) had devastated huaqiao remittances. This realisation proved sufficient 
to influence qiaowu practitioners into proposing reform of GLF-centric policies, and 
indeed, to return to (some) youdai. Yet, while this reformist perspective enjoyed some 
support in the CCP CC initially, it was short-lived, and was soon obliterated by the 
leftward shift of the party-state after the Lushan Conference (July 1959). Rather than 
accept reform, Mao turned on the critics of the GLF, accused them of being anti-socialist 
and anti-CCP, and forced the party-state to renew its support for the GLF. Thus rather 
than any reform of counterproductive policies, qiaowu practitioners were forced to return 
to the Maoist camp, and qiaowu was left on a path to destruction. 
 
A Great Leap Forward for qiaowu: 
 Fang Fang had asserted in late 1957 that after all that China—and qiaowu—had 
gone through in the last year, work amongst the huaqiao would enter a ‘new era’ in 1958. 
But though Fang said qiaowu would be changing, there was still a certain reticence on his 
part, which he revealed when he said that for ‘all of qiaowu policy to be for socialism, is 
also complicated’.11 Yet, in a way, the issue was not that complex at all—or at least, it 
was not for Mao Zedong.  
Mao had, at the Hangzhou (3-4 January 1958) and Nanning (11-22 January) 
Conferences, lambasted those CCP leaders who had opposed ‘rash advances’ in 1956. Bo 
Yibo’s preoccupation with balancing budgets was criticised, as was Zhou Enlai, who Mao 
warned was ‘only fifty metres’ from being a rightist.12 The result was that the Party 
leadership fell in line behind the Chairman’s call for a GLF and a ‘new high tide in 
                                                
11 Fang Fang, ‘Dui dangqian qiaowu gongzuo de zhishi jianghua (zhaiyao)’, 26/12/1957, GDQW, No. 1 (22 
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12 See Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine, 16-18; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 72-73. 
 228 
production’—or indeed, a revival of the old ‘high tide’. 13  Mao, following the two 
conferences, produced ‘sixty theses’ on work that placed ‘permanent revolution’ at the 
heart of the GLF. This was a new stage of the revolution, Mao claimed, that followed the 
Land Reform, the transformation of private enterprise and so on, and would continue 
along the ‘political and ideological fronts’.14 More precisely, this meant that ‘ideological 
and political work’, as Mao said, was ‘the fundamental guarantor of economic and 
technical work; it serves the foundations of the economy. Ideology and politics is the 
Commander-in-Chief, it is the soul.’15 This, Mao insisted, was the only way to be ‘Red 
and Expert’ in economic development, and to fail to prioritise politics and ideology was 
to be ‘red in name, but white in reality’.16 What being ‘Red’ meant was, of course, what 
Mao said it was. But the CCP leaders fell in line at Hangzhou and Nanning, and the Party 
soon followed suit.17 Politics was in command.18 Everything else—and qiaowu—would 
have to obey. 
 The message of ‘politics in command’ was a clarion call to the party-state that 
started at its highest echelons, and travelled down its hierarchy, especially after Mao’s 
speeches at the Chengdu Conference (8-26 March) to the CCP CC department and 
regional Party Committee secretaries.19 The OCAC Party Group, as Liao Chengzhi and 
Fang Fang’s report in February 1958 to the UFWD suggests, got the message. Fang and 
Liao identified the two key tasks of qiaowu as: ‘the basic resolution, within 10 years of 
the question of the Southeast Asian huaqiao’; and ‘the implementation, from the 
perspective of 600 million people, of principles of ‘overall consideration, appropriate 
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arrangement’ and ‘building the country with diligence and thrift’, so as to adapt to the 
present socialist revolution and Great Leap Forward’.20 Yet, the OCAC Party Group also 
offered a self-criticism. They had failed, they said, to lead guiqiao and qiaojuan to labour 
and production; they had over-accommodated in the allocation of goods to guiqiao and 
qiaojuan; they had not guided the huaqiao to accept socialist transformation and to 
support production; and they had also overly-worried about the ‘international influence’ 
of guiqiao and qiaosheng issues, permitting their clamour for special consideration, at the 
expense of ‘political and ideological education’.21 
 Given the self-admitted failures of the OCAC, a new way forward was necessary. 
Firstly, the Rectification Campaign would extend to the guiqiao and qiaojuan to push 
them onto the ‘socialist road’. Secondly, the principle of ‘building the country with 
diligence and thrift’ would be implemented so as to teach huaqiao to labour and play 
positive roles in the great production campaign. Thirdly, and based on the principle of 
‘overall consideration, appropriate arrangements’, the OCAC would resolve the ‘problem 
of special characteristics’, and would no longer over-emphasise huaqiao specialness. 
Fourthly, all new guiqiao would be settled, and led to participate far more positively in 
production. Fifthly, the OCAC would seek to ‘straighten’ the various qiaolian so as to 
more firmly establish their socialist cores.22 This, Liao and Fang said, would ensure a 
‘new initiative’—‘thus bringing about a Great Leap Forward for qiaowu’.23 
 Liao and Fang did not really discuss new policy towards the haiwai huaqiao even 
though one of their key tasks referred to Southeast Asian huaqiao—but there was little to 
say. Indeed, the idea of a (so-called) Southeast Asian huaqiao question was actually in 
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reference to Zhou Enlai’s August 1957 instruction that the number of Dual National 
haiwai huaqiao be halved in ten years.24 In that sense, the ‘advice’ to haiwai huaqiao that 
taking up local citizenship was in their ‘long term interests’ was simply the continuation 
of a foreign policy dating to 1952. Hence, the haiwai huaqiao were ‘to seek common 
ground in the midst of difference’ in their foreign domiciles.25 Yet, for the huaqiao in 
China, they were to follow a line of, ‘from commonality, transform differences’.26 This, 
as it turns out, was an intention to ‘transform and eradicate’ the ‘special characteristics’ 
of the huaqiao in China.27 
 Examining the five parts of the OCAC’s ‘new initiative’ enables analysis of 
qiaowu when politics took command, and in that regard, it was the Rectification that was 
most important. Rectification was however, about qiaowu practitioners as much as it was 
for the huaqiao. It was not enough for qiaowu cadres to be competent; they were to be 
‘Red and Expert’.28 Cadres, as Guangdong qiaowu Party Group deputy Secretary Wu 
Feng criticised in March 1958, were guilty of the ‘five fears’ and ‘five attitudes’. Cadres 
were: ‘afraid of huaqiao remittance decreases; afraid of huaqiao complaints; afraid of 
affecting the guowai huaqiao; afraid of qiaojuan migration; and afraid that democratic 
personalities would complain’. 29  Cadres also had ‘bad attitudes’ regarding: their 
proclivity for foreign things; squeamishness in implementing policy; apathy; extravagant 
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lifestyles; and the harbouring of grievances.30 These were serious errors, especially when 
economic rationalisations—like concern for remittances—led to ‘backward thinking’. 
Indeed, as Wu decried: ‘remittance work is only one aspect of qiaowu—we cannot 
possibly do everything for remittances’. Instead, all qiaowu that forsook struggle for 
‘unprincipled accommodation’ would simply have to be rectified. Curiously, Wu also 
suggested that these errors were the fault of Luo Lishi and other comrades who had failed 
to check ‘rightist and defeatist tendencies’.31 
 Luo Lishi, the putative head of Guangdong’s qiaowu, had been a supporter of the 
‘high tide’. But Luo could not escape Rectification, and neither did thousands of qiaowu 
and non-qiaowu cadres who were purged as the party-state strained itself into ideological 
conformity.32 Indeed, for qiaowu, Rectification was all the more necessary because of its 
previous youdai. As Wu told a conference in mid-1958: 
In the past, qiaowu work was biased towards provision of care, thus neglecting 
education and committing rightist errors. Experience has since proven that 
‘politics in command’ is the soul of every good work. Without politics in 
command, there is no way to do good work; even if there are some 
accomplishments, they cannot be consolidated. ‘Politics in command’ is the 
precondition for a Great Leap Forward in production, while also being of service 
to construction and production.33 
  
Of course, as Wu also said in July, Rectification was set against Rightism, or indeed, the 
‘anti-rash advance’ perspective of 1956.34 Yet, given the association between the Eighth 
Party Congress, and the youdai approach, Rectification for qiaowu was clearly inevitable. 
The ‘new initiative’ thus required that old Rightism be eradicated, so that qiaowu could 
then effect the preconditions for the GLF. 
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 Rectification was also the key to the second and third aspects of the OCAC’s ‘new 
initiative’: to eradicate youdai and teshu ideas, and to push the huaqiao in China towards 
the ‘socialist road’. The two were related since guiqiao and qiaojuan resisted socialism 
precisely because they clung to such ideas—and this was most evident in issues about 
remittances. As the PBOC Guangdong Branch admitted, remittance work had been 
‘biased towards economic perspectives’ and neglected politics and ideology. But now, 
with politics as the ‘the soul [and] direction’, remittance work would be a function of the 
‘mass perspective’.35 And thus the huaqiao would be educated on the ‘mass perspective’ 
so that their remittances could (and would) be changed henceforth from ‘dead treasure’ 
into ‘living wealth’—and made of use to the masses.36 
 To be fair, the focus on remittances as a site where youdai had to be rectified 
predated ‘politics in command’. This had been true from the December 1957 clampdown 
on remittance smuggling (in cash or in kind) by the huaqiao who were trying to avoid 
losses that the PRC’s fixed exchange rates inflicted on the real values of remittances.37 
By early 1958, Guangdong could report a success in its anti-smuggling campaign. The 
figures for December 1957 revealed a 9.32% increase in remittances coming into 
Guangdong compared to the same period in 1956; in some counties, the increase was as 
high as 30%, while the province saw a 5.8% increase overall year-on-year.38 
To be sure, remittance smuggling was always going to be suppressed, given 
China’s voracious—and growing—appetite for foreign exchange. Indeed, with the GLF, 
increasing imports of equipment to supply the large-scale construction programs made 
                                                
35  PBOC Guangdong Branch, ‘Guangdong sheng qiaohui gongzuo cujin huiyi zongjie’, 27/05/1958, 
GDQW, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 24-34 (24). 
36 Ibid., 27. 
37 Luo Lishi, ‘Zai Guangdong sheng qiaowu juzhang kuoda huiyi de baogao’, 15/10/1957, GDQW, No. 27 
(20 Dec 1957), 5. 
38 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Dali daji zousi taohui huodong de juda 
chengguo: qudong yilai quansheng qiaohui xianzhu shangsheng’, n.d. (probably 03/1958), GDQW, No. 1 
(22 Mar 1958), 19-20; Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, ‘Guanyu zai 
fan zousi yundong zhong dui qiaojuan guiqiao jinxing xuanchuan gongzuo zongjie (zhaiyao)’, 17/01/1958, 
GDQW, No. 1 (22 Mar 1958), 8-15. 
 233 
foreign exchange that much more important. 39  This explains the heavy pressure on 
qiaowu—that was then passed on to the huaqiao—to secure more remittances. In 1957, 
the PRC gained US$108.28 million in foreign exchange through huaqiao remittances, 
and it sought an increase to US$115.25 million in 1958.40 On the surface, this increase 
was not unrealistic. But while the real value of US$7 million was about RMB 35 million, 
the fixed rate (2.4) that the Chinese state banks offered the huaqiao would have meant 
only RMB 16.8 million.41 What’s more, in the PBOC’s 1958 targets, remittances were 
expected to make up 80% of the total foreign exchange not from foreign trade, so the 
point of remittances (in the ‘mass perspective’) was really that the huaqiao were expected 
to subsidise a weak RMB, fund the GLF—and to be grateful about it.42 
 Yet, while the expectation of remittances from the huaqiao was clear enough, the 
party-state was initially still somewhat wary of giving off the impression that the 
Rectification was a means of pressuring the huaqiao. The Shanghai Leading Group for 
Rectification’s instructions in March 1958 suggested that cadres avoid pressing the 
huaqiao on their foreign connections and remittances. Instead, the Rectification 
(meetings, sessions, criticisms and etc.) was to focus on socialist education and ‘building 
the country with diligence and thrift’. Thus encouraging the huaqiao to gain remittances 
was subsumed into a call to ‘love the country, [and] love the Party’ [爱国爱党 aiguo 
aidang].43 Yet, with the intensification of the GLF by mid-1958, the severity of the 
Rectification amongst the huaqiao, and its pressure on their financial contributions also 
                                                
39 Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine, 75. 
40 PBOC Head Office, ‘Guanyu yi jiu wu ba nian duizi fei maoyi waihui shouzhi jihua wenti (jielu)’. 
09/01/1958, in CASS, CA (eds), 1958–1965 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian: 
jinrong juan [hereafter, 1958-1965 jinrong juan] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1989), 
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41 The Trade Ministry acknowledged that the real rate was around RMB 4.87 per US$1—in fact, it used 
US$1: RMB 5 in its internal calculations. See Trade Ministry, ‘Guanyu tiaozheng xianxing duizi waihui 
neibu qingsuan paijia de baogao’, 06/11/1958, 1958-1965 jinrong juan, 545-546. 
42 The target for non-foreign trade earnings was US$145.25 million; remittances at US$115.25 million, was 
79.34%. See PBOC Head Office, ‘Guanyu yi jiu wu ba nian duizi fei maoyi waihui shouzhi jihua wenti 
(jielu)’. 09/01/1958, 1958-1965 jinrong juan, 551. 
43 SPC Leading Group for Rectification, ‘Guanyu fadong qiaojuan guiqiao canjia li nong zhengfeng de 
tongzhi’, 21/03/1958, SMA B20-2-255-1. 
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increased. On 5 May 1958, at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress, Liu 
Shaoqi re-defined the General Line as being: ‘to go all out and strive for the best in 
building socialism with more, faster, better and more economical results’.44 By this point, 
the GLF—especially in the agrarian sector—had already resulted in intensified 
collectivisation, large-scale construction projects, and a heightened political atmosphere, 
and it would only become more intense after the General Line was reassessed.  
 While Fang Fang had once worried about ‘complications’, his interpretation of 
qiaowu in the (new) General Line was simple enough: qiaowu was ‘for the whole 
people’.45  This counterintuitively suggested that qiaowu (or more formally, huaqiao 
shiwu) was now no longer about the eponymous huaqiao. But what it really meant was 
that though qiaowu managed huaqiao affairs, it did so in service to the (socialist) whole, 
with no room for affirmative action, positive discrimination, or special treatment. This 
meant the eradication of teshu and youdai ideas—which were ‘not fashionable’ and were 
thus ‘to be forgotten’.46 It also meant, Fang now warned, that ‘the one finger that is 
uncomfortable, should not be allowed to obstruct the movement of the other nine’.47 This 
applied to new anti-youdai moves such as the repudiation of ancestral graves provisions, 
and goods/foodstuffs allocation. But mostly, qiaowu ‘for the whole people’ simply meant 
new approaches to the utilisation of huaqiao labour and capital. 
 If qiaowu was a function of the needs of ‘the whole people’, then remittances too 
were to serve the greater whole. Whether it was for the larger (centralised) needs of the 
state to cover its trade deficit, or the localised needs of cooperatives for capital to expand 
production, remittances were the obvious way to meet the demands of the ‘whole people’. 
This was recognised even before the General Line (May 1958), since the OCAC issued a 
                                                
44 Liu Shaoqi, ‘Zhongguo gongchan dang zhongyang weiyuanhui xiang di ba jie quanguo daibiao dahui di 
er ci huiyi de gongzuo baogao’, 05/05/1958, JYZW, 11: 247-280 (257). 
45 Fang Fang, ‘Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo lizheng yuejin juxian de jianghua’, 24/05/1958, GDQW, 
No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 10-16 (11). 
46 Ibid., 13-14. 
47 Ibid., 12. 
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memorandum in April regarding qiaojuan and guiqiao investment in agricultural 
production, suggesting that local agencies look to huaqiao capital as a way of funding the 
GLF.48 Yet, the OCAC saw that this could be counterproductive if it led to haiwai 
huaqiao suspicion.49 Hence qiaowu was to ensure that when huaqiao were encouraged to 
invest, volunteerism was to be maintained, and coercion—direct pressure or otherwise—
was prohibited. 
 Yet, coercion was exactly what happened. While local Party cadres, like the 
Foshan County CCP Committee, reported that ‘political education and ideological 
mobilisation’ had increased huaqiao investment, these were one-sided reports.50 The fact 
was that the methods by which the huaqiao were ‘encouraged’ to contribute were 
coercive, and were precisely resented as such. While the Rectification (and General Line) 
had involved the holding of town and village meetings to effect socialist education, Mei 
County in Guangdong reported that qiaojuan and guiqiao had been very dubious, 
believing that: ‘every time a meeting was called they would be required to produce more 
money’. Some also questioned why—as food shortages began across China due to the 
neglect of farming in favour of GLF construction—pressure was being placed on them. 
As one qiaojuan notably remarked: ‘A lack of food affects production, the stomach needs 
to Leap Forward first. Since the huaqiao have no special considerations under the equal 
treatment principle, then it is only correct that equal treatment must be applied to our 
financial contributions’.51 Yet, Mei County saw these views as the fault of old views on 
huaqiao teshu, which when rectified, would ameliorate.  
                                                
48  OCAC, ‘Guanyu fadong qiaojuan guiqiao touzi nongye shengchan xu zhuyi de wenti tongzhi’, 
02/04/1958, GDQW, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 34-35.  
49 Ibid., 34. 
50 Foshan reported that it had gained: RMB 1.4 million in donations; RMB 7.18 million in investment in 
agricultural production; and RMB 4.28 million to investment companies. See Foshan CCP Committee, 
‘Guanyu dangqian fadong huaqiao, qiaojuan touzi juanxian gongzuo bixu zhuyi de jige wenti de tongzhi’, 
18/05/1958, GDQW, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 35-36. 
51 Mei County Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Work Group, ‘Mei xian zhaokai qiaojuan 
guiqiao xianchang huiyi de jingyan zongjie’, 31/05/1958, GDQW, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 61-67 (62, 63). 
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  Yet, rectification of the teshu ideas was the precise means of coercion. Puning 
County (Guangdong) reported in October 1958 that its remittances had increased by 
8.15% (compared to 1957) over January–August. Moreover, Puning had successfully 
encouraged huaqiao deposits in credit cooperatives that amounted to 45% of overall 
deposits.52 Yet, Puning had also called 1214 meetings over 3 months at all levels from 
all-county meetings to Production Brigades, or an average of 13.5 meetings of one form 
or another every day. 53  At meetings, apart from regular dosages of General Line 
propaganda, cadres engaged in comparison exercises [评比 pingbi] at all levels, from 
province, to cooperative, down to households and individuals. Each was assessed on how 
relatively advanced (or backward) they were—model workers and peasants were ‘Red 
Flag’, and the backward were defeatist ‘White Flags’ who were to be struggled against.54 
The pingbi similarly applied to huaqiao in Puning (and elsewhere), except that along with 
politics and ideology, were comparisons of investments, donations, remittances and 
lifestyles. This, Puning asserted, encouraged a ‘Great Leap Forward in qiaowu’. But of 
course it did—it was either that or a ‘White Flag’.55 
 Some huaqiao in China did appear to support the GLF. One qiaojuan blamed past 
qiaowu for: ‘over-emphasising extra care for us, causing those of us who could labour to 
become spoilt and lazy’. Another wanted to become ‘a Red qiaojuan, and a member of 
socialism’s vanguard’.56 Yet, given that the alternative was to be a rightist, enthusiasm 
was obviously the safer choice. In any case, those huaqiao responsible for conveying their 
communities’ sentiments had by the end of 1958, been thoroughly suppressed, as the 
OCAC Party Group’s February 1958 pledge to ‘straighten’ the qiaolian had promised. 
                                                
52 Puning County Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Puning xian 9 ge yue lai qiaowu gongzuo zonjie’, 
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53 Ibid., 6.  
54 Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine, 36-37. 
55 Puning County Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Puning xian 9 ge yue lai qiaowu gongzuo zonjie’, 
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56 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Leading Group for Rectification, ‘Guanyu 
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Given its association with the First Session of the Eighth Party Congress that had rejected 
the ‘socialist high tide’, the ACFROC had unsurprisingly been an early target for 
Rectification—even before the Party Group’s February report. And by late January 1958, 
the ACFROC was promising to ‘eliminate the teshu thinking that is divorced from the 
masses, so as to resolve the contradictions between the huaqiao and the peasants’.57 This, 
according to the ACFROC, meant the ‘supervision of the masses’, to aid qiaowu and to 
eradicate erroneous teshu emphases.58 
 Apart from the ACFROC, Rectification also extended to local qiaolian, or any 
local huaqiao community associations or organisations. Previously, those huaqiao with 
influence or standing in huaqiao communities had been obvious candidates for roles in 
the qiaolian, and they were thus similarly obvious targets for Rectification. The qiaolian 
leaders were thus pushed towards self-criticism, mutual criticism, and into studying 
socialist transformation, and ‘to open their hearts to debate’ [交心辩论 jiaoxin bianlun].59 
This was not as benign as it sounded. To jiaoxin involved admitting errors and mistakes, 
and gaining correct knowledge of ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the 
People’. This meant speeches, ‘Big Character Posters’, and demonstration of clarity and 
support for the Party line. Yet, jiaoxin was mainly about imposing an ideological 
correctness—to ‘help these people clarify what was right and what was wrong’. 60 
Shantou’s (June 1958) Rectification report lists some so-called clarified issues: ‘the East 
Wind prevailing over the West Wind’; ‘the superiority of socialism’; ‘whether the 
huaqiao bourgeois class needed to be transformed, and whether guiqiao and qiaojuan in 
general needed to undergo education’; ‘the issue of huaqiao and teshu, and individual 
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58 Ibid., 7. 
59 Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Leading Group for Rectification, ‘Guanyu 5 
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interest versus national and the people’s interests’; ‘the leadership of the Party’; and 
‘participation in labour’.61 
 Rectification thus transformed the qiaolian into mere tools for the GLF. As a 
report from Xinhui County (July 1958) indicates, the (new) duty of the qiaolian was not 
to the huaqiao, but to the party-state’s interest. Xinhui’s qiaolian apparently, post-
Rectification, had ‘unanimously approved a petition to the government to repudiate all 
special quotas for the allocation of edible oil, sugar, cloth and meat’ for huaqiao.62 Given 
the severe shortages amongst huaqiao—and everyone else, everywhere else—this seems 
counterintuitive. Yet, in this, they were only following orders to eliminate youdai. Failure 
to do so would only have meant purging, especially given the Guangdong United Front 
Department’s order that qiaolian committees be more than 50% ‘leftist’ or ‘centre-
leftist’.63 The ‘straighten[ing]’ of the qiaolian in the GLF thus meant the marginalisation 
of huaqiao interests and huaqiao voices. 
 The eradication of youdai in qiaowu enabled leveraging on remittances in the 
interests ‘of the whole people’, but it also aided restructuring huaqiao labour. Taishan 
County, for instance, considered that previous youdai on ‘freedom to participate in work’ 
(or indeed, not work) had not solved any practical problems.64 It was instead, necessary 
to educate huaqiao on ‘the glories of labour’ to help them walk together with the masses 
on the socialist road. After Liu Shaoqi’s re-statement of the General Line in May 1958, 
these views only became more intense, as was the case across China.65 
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 According to Fang Fang in May 1958, the needs of ‘the whole people’ made it 
necessary for huaqiao to ‘equalise their identity’ with the masses.66 Thus with the call ‘to 
go all out’ to fulfil the GLF, there could be no room for non-participation in labour by 
‘lazy persons’ and ‘privileged households’.67 Thus Taishan, which once had about 20-
30% huaqiao non-participation in labour, now boasted 98% participation post-
Rectification.68 The same also applied to state farms/plantations manned by guiqiao. The 
Changshan Farm (near Zhangzhou, Fujian) had struggled since 1953 with restless guiqiao 
employees, 75% of whom were labelled ‘centrists’ or ‘backward’. 69  Yet, after the 
Rectification and ‘the victory of socialism’, the Changshan guiqiao had since been 
educated in the correct socialist perspectives and work methods, and had thus become 
disciplined, hardworking and diligent—and with 100% labour participation.70 
 Settling huaqiao labour was one of the OCAC Party Group’s February 1958 key 
foci, but it was not an end in itself. Like the eradication of youdai and teshu ideas, and 
‘straighten[ing]’ the qiaolian, these processes served the GLF. Thus Guangzhou had, over 
a six-month period, undertaken a Rectification amongst huaqiao with a 95% participation 
rate. With the elimination of youdai, and the purge of the qiaolian, the huaqiao had been 
pushed to participate in the GLF. By April–May 1958, Guangzhou huaqiao had 
contributed RMB 1.126 million towards production, and had established local 
agricultural cooperatives, but also 38 industrial cooperatives, including neighbourhood 
iron and steel furnaces. Guangzhou had also seen a 17.5% increase in remittances in a 
six-month period due to its eradication of smuggling. Even the local qiaosheng had got 
in on the fervour, voluntarily renouncing their scholarships so that the funds could be 
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redirected.71 What Rectification thus accomplished was thus a radical restructuring of 
huaqiao socio-economic relations. 
 The transformation of socio-economic relations amongst huaqiao intensified in 
August 1958 with the establishment of the People’s Communes. 72  The Communes 
amalgamated the APCs and AAPCs in a given area, sometimes incorporating up to 20,000 
households in a unit run on regimented, near-military lines, with communal facilities for 
cooking, eating, childcare, healthcare and provision of other necessities. This, it was held, 
allowed for greater mobilisation and distribution of labour, and the countryside was soon 
turned into some 26,000 communes.73 This, as Guangdong’s qiaowu Committee said in 
November 1958, meant that qiaowu was now to focus on ‘guiding qiaojuan and guiqiao 
to offer their strength and money to support industrial and agricultural production and 
construction, positively entering into the People’s Commune campaign’. 74  Thus in 
Jieyang, out of a huaqiao labour strength assessed at 3,100, some 3,264 joined the local 
Commune.75 This was not a miscalculation; but a 105% participation rate meant that there 
were labourers who were not even expected to work, like the 70-year old qiaojuan who 
cadres said had refused to rest because he said that to work was beneficial to both himself 
and the country.76 Elsewhere, in Mei County, qiaojuan in one village more than doubled 
their workdays in 1958, while huaqiao households across Mei County contributed 5.529 
million jin of scrap metal to the backyard furnaces to make steel.77 Indeed, after reducing 
‘superstitious practices’ and ‘backward extravagance’ (including the Chinese New Year), 
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Mei County huaqiao were able to bank deposits of RMB 6.486 million.78 Thus by the end 
of 1958, qiaowu had evidently brought the huaqiao squarely into the GLF. 
 The promulgation of ‘politics in command’ in January 1958 thus saw qiaowu fall 
into line, and become, as Puning’s qiaowu anthem revealed, chiefly defined by Mao’s 
vision and the GLF: 
Party Committees in command, qiaowu cadres work for them, 
 campaigns are as waves, one wave pushing the next onward, 
 the path ahead must be clear, closely tied to core work, 
 staff should share their thoughts; reflections should be timely; 
 politics is our Commander, ideology is the soul, 
 qiaojuan education is the key, it aids propaganda out and in. 
 
 ‘Replying letters’ is a tool, qiaoxiang news touches many people, 
 qiaobao come and go, receive them with warmth and generosity, 
 strive to win others over to our side, there is an impact at home and abroad; 
 develop models for others to follow, all should learn from experimental fields; 
 slogans should be loud and clear, all are measured by the ‘five’ and ‘four’, 
 mobilise all the positive forces, reach for the skies and raise the Red Flag.79 
 
Keep Left: 
 In November 1958, the OCAC sent a report to the State Council which stated that 
for qiaowu regarding the haiwai huaqiao, ‘united front work in different regions should 
                                                
78 Ibid., 35. 
79  党委挂主帅, 侨干当参谋, 
运动如波澜, 后浪推前浪, 
 方向要明确, 中心结合紧, 
 参谋出意见, 反映须及时, 
 政治是统帅, 思想是灵魂, 
 侨眷重教育, 内外宜宣传。 
 
 ‘回批回文’ 是工具, 侨乡报导感动人, 
 出入侨胞多接待. 热情朴素又大方, 
 争取对象有重点, 国内国外相呼应, 
 培养典型来带动, ‘试验田’ 里去观摩, 
 口号提出要响亮, ‘五比’ ‘四看’ 见短长, 
 积极因素调动起, 冲天干劲插红旗。 
 
The ‘five’ and ‘four’ were the ‘five comparisons and four observations’ for pingbi of huaqiao: comparisons 
of politics, ideology, lifestyle, investments and, donations; and observations of motivation, responses, 
remittances, and (remedial) measures [比政治, 比思想, 比生活, 比投资, 比捐献；看干劲, 看反映, 看侨
汇, 看措施]. 
Puning County Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Puning xian 9 ge yue lai qiaowu gongzuo zonjie’, 
21/10/1958, GDQW, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 13-14. 
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also see different methods’.80 Thus the huaqiao in the capitalist and imperialist countries 
should be encouraged to and/or used to counter anti-CCP propaganda; while the huaqiao 
in the Non-Aligned countries (for instance) should be encouraged to play positive roles 
in fostering better relations between their homeland and their domiciles. This became the 
‘three good(s)’ policy [三好 san hao] in which the PRC: supported the haiwai huaqiao 
who took up local nationality abroad; encouraged the haiwai huaqiao who retained 
Chinese nationality to be law-abiding, and build good relations with locals; and welcomed 
all huaqiao who wanted to return to the homeland, to join the GLF and ‘like everyone 
else in the country, participate in labour and production’.81 The first two ‘good(s)’ were 
not new, and even the third was quite understandable.82 The GLF and its expansion of 
industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation had obviously meant a greater demand 
for technical expertise.83 But what the OCAC failed to address was why any huaqiao 
would even want to return to China in the first place. 
 For the huaqiao in China, their experience of the GLF was generally not dissimilar 
from the rest of the country. The basic point was that by 1959, the GLF was clearly failing, 
and the Chinese were plainly suffering. Food shortages had increased over 1958, rather 
than decrease as a result of glorious labour and the transition to the People’s Communes.84 
By January 1959, CCP leaders themselves estimated some 70,000–120,000 deaths from 
starvation. 85  Inefficiency and waste plagued production; the vaunted iron and steel 
production campaign had caused RMB 5 billion of losses; peasants had been diverted 
from agricultural work to work on large-scale construction projects; and ultimately, ‘up 
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to a third of the time devoted to agriculture was lost’.86 Furthermore, much-inflated 
statistics—particularly for grain produced—gave false impressions to economic planners, 
who therefore failed to amend requisition quotas that were imposed on the peasants.87 
Thus China was moving ever closer to an economic calamity by 1959. 
 Yet, there was also a specific consequence of qiaowu’s submission to ‘politics in 
command’ in 1958: a sharp fall in huaqiao remittances. The figures for remittance had 
initially risen during the early GLF, with Guangdong notably reporting a 23.64% increase 
year-on-year for January–May 1958, while China saw a 14.47% increase nationally in 
the first half of 1958.88 This was attributed, at the time, to successful efforts, particularly 
in Guangdong and Fujian, to suppress the remittance smuggling, and to the mobilisation 
of the qiaojuan and guiqiao to gain more remittances (to convert to deposits and 
investments). Yet, by February 1959 it had become clear that 1958 as a whole had seen a 
7.84% decrease compared to 1957’s remittances, with the third and fourth quarters of 
1958 seeing decreases of 16.03% and 43.82% respectively.89  
Explanations for the stark decline in remittances were varied. The devaluation of 
the Indonesian rupiah, and restrictions by Thailand, Singapore and Malaya were blamed. 
But the main reason, the PBOC and OCAC said, was that many qiaojuan and guiqiao had 
inadequate understandings of the GLF and People’s Communes.90 These huaqiao had 
feared that remittances would become public property in communes, and had thus 
reduced efforts to gain remittances, telling relatives to cease remittances, or even 
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splurging wildly on food and drink before Communisation. Conversely, with the 
communes’ management of all aspects of socio-economic life, some qiaojuan and 
guiqiao now believed that there was no need for remittances any longer. Some cadres had 
exacerbated the issue by saying that remittances were an obstacle to the achievement of 
an ideological Great Leap, while other cadres placed restrictions on huaqiao deposits, 
imposing 50-100 year timeframes before any withdrawals were permitted. And finally, 
the spectre of the nefarious Hong Kong remittance smugglers was raised again.91 
 To be sure, the advent of the People’s Communes had truly led many huaqiao in 
China to fear the loss of their remittances, and the alleged huaqiao splurges on food and 
drink (also clothes, bicycles, watches and etc.) had actually happened.92 But that had been 
in October 1958; the overall decline had started before that. A Trade Ministry report had 
already noted in November 1958 that remittances were falling throughout the year. In the 
first quarter, the average inflow was US$12 million per month; in the second, US$8 
million; third, US$7 million; and by October, US$5 million.93 Yet, the Ministry stated 
that: ‘This is because the establishment of the People’s Communes in our country have 
resulted in more secure livelihoods, for instance, when greater supplies of food, clothing 
and other items are distributed next year, in principle remittances will decrease even 
more.’94 This was a barefaced attempt to impose ideology on data, and it paralleled the 
larger politicisation of statistics in the GLF.95 But there was clearly a problem. 
 The real problem was that the huaqiao were deeply dissatisfied. Reports from 
Shanghai counties (Songjiang, Jinshan, Nanhui, Fengxian) in January 1959 suggested 
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serious discontent over the People’s Communes.96 There were huaqiao who, because they 
had remittances, wanted no part in collective production, and in some cases, intended to 
leave the communes and travel abroad. Others also refused their assigned jobs.97 This 
obviously did not match what the OCAC and PBOC said (in February), but the fact was 
that huaqiao were discontented. In Jinjiang (Fujian) alone, some 14,035 applied for travel 
permission. This 69.2% increase on 1957 had mostly occurred in the latter half of 1958. 
Which, as Xinhua reported, was because ‘they are dissatisfied with collective life, afraid 
of labour, harbouring nostalgia for bourgeois lifestyles’.98 
 Aside from the communes, even the students were discontented. Reports in May 
1959 suggested that Nanjing, Shanghai, Shandong, Guangzhou and other regions with 
large student populations, had seen increasing numbers of the qiaosheng requesting to 
leave China since March. Some had (so-called) ‘ideological problems’, or an alleged 
fondness for bourgeois lifestyles. But others were pressured by their parents overseas to 
return home. Yet, the main reason, according to Xinhua, was that schools had failed to 
properly educate these students on the GLF, on supporting the Party, and on more positive 
participation in socialist labour and production.99  
 Initial explanations for qiaowu problems and huaqiao dissatisfaction tended to 
place the blame on the huaqiao themselves, and not the circumstances of the GLF that 
huaqiao found themselves in. On the other hand, qiaowu practitioners—certainly the 
OCAC—knew very well that the situation was far more complex. By May 1959, the 
OCAC had become aware of huaqiao letters sent overseas ‘complaining of hardship, 
causing instability amongst the guowai huaqiao’, due to the ‘comparative tightness’ in 
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food supplies.100 Local qiaowu officials were thus instructed that while they were not to 
deny that there were food shortages (albeit due to natural disasters, they said), they were 
to advise any haiwai huaqiao who enquired, that the Party was tackling the problem, and 
would soon resolve it by gaining a big harvest, and clamping down on grain hoarders.101 
This was a propaganda exercise to be sure, but it also suggests that the OCAC knew that 
the huaqiao were unhappy. The same also applied to the Beijing officials who censored 
qiaosheng letters and discovered their complaints about the lack of freedom, opposition 
to labour-as-education in the GLF, parental pressure, and a profound resentment against 
Anti-Rightist Rectification.102 
 Yet, as to whether the party-state itself recognised the problems with the GLF, 
there is a substantial historiographical debate regarding the period between late 1958 and 
the Lushan Conference (July 1959), on whether the party-state was prepared to slow down 
the GLF and ‘correct left’ deviations [纠左 jiu zuo]; or whether the party-state was in 
fact, preparing not only to continue, but to intensify socialist transformation by targeting 
Rightism [反右倾 fan youqing] again.103 To be fair, there is evidence on both sides.104 
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But, at the same time, insofar as the OCAC was concerned, qiaowu was incontrovertibly 
in favour of the jiu zuo. 
 The OCAC chose jiu zuo by May 1959 because of the overwhelming evidence 
that the GLF, and the People’s Communes in particular, was even more destructive 
towards huaqiao remittances than had been previously conceived. In February 1959, 
when confronted with reports revealing that 1958 had seen a 7.84% fall in remittances 
compared to 1957 figures, the OCAC and PBOC equivocated, blaming everyone and 
everything except the GLF. Yet on 29 May 1959 the OCAC Party Group reported that 
for January–April, while the remittance inflow was at US$25.55 million, this represented 
a sum 42.4% less compared to the same period in 1958.105 This made the 1959 yearly 
target (of US$95 million) now essentially unreachable, and the Party Group thus sought 
‘to enjoin all regions to seriously implement the Centre’s policies on protecting huaqiao 
remittances’ and to solve certain ‘other questions’.106 
 The OCAC Party Group’s oblique reference to ‘other questions’ was actually a 
subtle criticism of the failures of the GLF, and especially of the People’s Communes. 
Though the Party Group did not specify what the ‘other questions’ were, the reforms that 
it proposed were all explicitly linked to the GLF and the People’s Communes. Firstly, the 
Party Group suggested that ‘huaqiao remittances and its associated income were to be 
considered private property in perpetuity’, and all the contributions not from ‘genuine 
volunteerism’ were to be returned forthwith.107 If the communes were not able to return 
the money, then proper explanations were to be given to the huaqiao, and their consent 
sought for a schedule for future repayment. This move was not unprecedented since the 
CCP Politburo had agreed at the Shanghai Conference (April 1959) to similar reforms.108 
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But the OCAC went further. Secondly, when banks or remittance agencies released funds, 
they were to maintain recipients’ privacy, to respect their right to deposit (or not, as they 
chose), and to guarantee their receipt of remittances. Under no circumstances were banks 
to convert remittances to deposits without permission, or to use ‘methods of mobilisation’ 
to coerce huaqiao deposits, or to apportion quotas for huaqiao in pingbi comparisons.109 
Thirdly, on huaqiao philanthropy, all donors’ wishes were to be respected always, 
particularly regarding how funds were used. Fourth, huaqiao investments (whether from 
abroad or in-country) were to be directed to the Overseas Chinese Investment 
Corporations—and not to the communes or any lower-level cooperatives, who were 
banned from soliciting investments from the huaqiao. Fifthly, the State Council decree 
permitting remittances to be used for purchase of goods and foodstuffs from the special 
(foreign currency) stores was to implemented, since 1958 had seen its neglect in many 
cases. Sixth, if the huaqiao had received permission and allocation of building materials 
for their construction projects, absolutely no one was to confiscate them for use in other 
projects (i.e. GLF construction). Furthermore, unless there were other, more pressing 
demands, workers and building materials were not to be denied to huaqiao projects. 
Seventh, all the local Party Committees were to pay serious attention to remittance issues, 
and to guide related agencies, so that they could be dealt with, and the larger objective of 
gaining remittances carried out and fulfilled.110 Thus it is very clear that the OCAC Party 
Group had come to view the GLF as being in need of jiu zuo reforms. 
 The OCAC Party Group also identified certain State Farms (or plantations) for 
the huaqiao (particularly in Guangdong) which had failed, ever since they underwent 
Communisation, to solve the problems regarding the settlement of guiqiao, allocation of 
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work, planting and harvesting of cash crops, and food production. These Farms had 
‘contradictions that increased daily’ and were in fact, incurring ‘huge losses’. The GPPC 
thus determined to hive off the huaqiao State Farms from the Communes, and to return 
them to their previous autonomy. The OCAC Party Group approved of this move, and 
recommended that other regions consider similar steps for their huaqiao State Farms—
‘which should no longer be included in the People’s Communes’.111 
While it is thus obvious that the OCAC Party Group sought jiu zuo for qiaowu in 
1959, it was also the first time in a while (certainly since late 1957) that the OCAC had 
attempted to assert a distinct qiaowu agenda in apparent contrast (and indeed, as a 
corrective) to larger party-state policy. Not since the heyday of the youdai in 1956 had 
the OCAC so actively attempted to rectify aspects of overall party-state policy that had—
as it conceived—negatively affected the practice of qiaowu. Indeed, and rather than being 
subject to ‘the whole people’, here was qiaowu making a stand for the huaqiao. Yet, in 
this, the OCAC Party Group was doubtlessly emboldened by similar sentiments in the 
CCP CC. After all, the report was approved by the CC on 7 June 1959, which suggests 
that there was—at least—some support for a jiu zuo in qiaowu.112  
 On 26 June 1959, the OCAC Party Group issued a new report on the People’s 
Communes that was distinctly in the jiu zuo spirit, which proposed to return ‘freedom and 
security’ to huaqiao in communes. Hence, huaqiao property—houses, animals, fruit 
trees, farming implements and so on—was to be returned to its previous owners instead 
of being considered collective property. Rent or compensation should be paid if huaqiao 
houses had been used or damaged. If communes wanted or needed to use huaqiao 
property, the owner’s express consent was required.113 All huaqiao labour was to be 
voluntary and reasonable; those with labour deficiencies had to be properly managed, 
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while those that wanted to live off remittances (and not labour) should be free to do so.114 
Communes’ allocation of food and other necessities was to be a separate issue entirely 
from how much in remittances a huaqiao received. Moreover, where a commune had 
damaged or destroyed huaqiao ancestral graves, the huaqiao were to be consulted about 
re-burial and given every assistance. Additionally, the Party Group suggested other ‘small 
freedoms’ for the huaqiao: special leave from work for qiaojuan and guiqiao when their 
relatives visited from abroad; permissions to travel overseas to visit relatives; allowance 
for voluntary huaqiao participation in communal canteens, since they were allowed to 
buy provisions with remittances; and the allowance of huaqiao with urban property to 
relocate from rural areas.115 These ‘small freedoms’, the Party Group believed, would 
encourage huaqiao support for the communes, positively influence the haiwai huaqiao, 
and effect ‘togetherness’ with the peasants.116 And at the very least, they would arrest the 
decline in remittances, and return qiaowu to a rational political economy.117 
The OCAC was thus clearly in favour of a mid-course correction for the GLF in 
mid-1959. Moreover, the jiu zuo reforms proposed by the OCAC also seemed, in many 
ways, like a return to some form of youdai, particularly insofar as it thought to offer ‘small 
freedoms’ to the huaqiao, to renew protections of their private property, to allow for their 
‘labour deficiencies’ in the communes, and to reassert their rights and interests regarding 
remittances. This proposal to re-introduce at least some aspects of youdai policies was in 
a way, an admission that the ‘Great Leap Forward for qiaowu’ that Liao Chengzhi and 
Fang Fang had heralded in February 1958 was failing, and that its drive to make qiaowu 
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serve ‘the whole people’ had been misguided.118 Yet, despite what the OCAC had come 
to realise about the GLF, and of the need for a mid-course correction, none of this would 
actually amount to anything.  
Originally, when the CCP leadership first gathered at the Lushan Conference in 
July 1959, the idea had been to hold a wide-ranging discussion on the future of the GLF, 
and this was a sentiment that even Chairman Mao had been open to.119 Indeed, the Lushan 
Conference was expected to ‘push further for economic reforms’ along the line indicated 
by earlier moves towards reform of the People’s Communes.120 Yet, as the conference 
progressed, criticism of the GLF not only increased, but also intensified, to the point that 
Mao began to see it as a direct attack on his leadership. In particular, in what would 
become infamously known as the ‘Peng Dehuai Affair’, Mao interpreted Marshal Peng 
Dehuai’s criticisms of ‘leftist deviations’ in the GLF as a very personal attack.121 Peng 
had, in a letter to Mao, criticised unidentified Party leaders and cadres ‘who casually 
rejected the laws governing economics and science’ in blind adherence to ‘politics in 
command’. Indeed, as Peng sharply admonished: ‘‘Politics in command’ cannot possibly 
replace economic laws, let alone replace the taking of specific and measured steps in 
economic work.’122 Mao was livid, and distributed the private letter to the Conference, 
claiming that the GLF was now under attack by rightists in the Party.123 
 At the CCP CC’s Eighth Plenum that began on 2 August, the Party leadership 
united behind Mao. The CCP CC, in fact, endorsed Mao’s allegations of rightist enemies 
hidden within the Party’s ranks. As the CC’s directive on ‘opposing Rightist tendencies 
in thinking’ on 7 August suggested, rightists and conservatives within the Party had 
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sought to capitalise on issues in the GLF, taking every opportunity to ‘attack socialist 
construction’.124 Such people were ‘not with the masses’—indeed, as the CC declared, 
they were standing ‘outside the masses’ with their criticism of the People’s Communes, 
the steel and iron production drive, and of the GLF.125 They, the CC promised, would be 
dealt with severely and quickly so that the General Line would not be compromised. In 
this new (indeed, renewed) anti-Rightist mood, all who had once criticised the GLF—or 
indeed, Mao—were obviously guilty of being ‘rightist opportunists’ who had taken 
advantage of momentary setbacks, or even the mere rumours of setbacks, to plot against 
and oppose the working class and the labouring masses.126 The immediate result was that 
Peng and his allies were purged from the CCP and removed from all their positions. But 
the larger, and more significant consequence was the evident affirmation of the 
correctness of the GLF. Whatever the problems with the GLF, the Party declared that 
they ‘had all been or were being quickly solved’ by the leadership of Mao and the CCP.127 
There would—and indeed, could—be no reform. 
 For the OCAC and qiaowu, the CCP CC’s Eighth Plenum made it exceedingly 
clear that jiu zuo was dead on arrival. Certainly, and given that the OCAC Party Group 
had clearly identified the People’s Communes as the cause of the decline in remittances, 
the OCAC was itself dangerously close to being accused of ‘rightist opportunism’. Thus 
the OCAC had to re-state support for the GLF, or be ‘outside the masses’. It did not matter 
that the OCAC’s reforms regarding qiaowu in the People’s Communes and GLF had been 
an attempt to arrest the decline in the party-state’s foreign exchange, or for that matter, 
that the hard currency that the OCAC was trying to secure (through its reforms) was 
desperately needed by the GLF—not to mention, the party-state. After all, as the CCP CC 
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declared, ‘right opportunism’ simply failed to see ‘that in all pursuits undertaken by the 
people under the leadership of the Party, the achievements are the main things, while 
defects and mistakes are secondary and merely one finger out of the ten’.128 
 The CCP CC’s assertion that ‘the achievements are the main things’ brings to 
mind Fang Fang’s statement in May 1958 that qiaowu ‘for the whole people’ meant that 
‘the one finger that is uncomfortable, should not be allowed to obstruct the movement of 
the other nine’.129 In effect, that is exactly what happened after the Lushan Conference as 
qiaowu tried to let the nine fingers’ worth of achievements (so to speak) cover the one 
finger of huaqiao discontent and qiaowu problems. Thus rather than rectify the huaqiao 
situation in the People’s Communes, the imperative was on propaganda and socialist 
education to encourage huaqiao patriotism, and hence, contribution. 130  To be sure, 
remittances for 1959 had missed qiaowu’s US$95 million target by a mile—with one 
estimate for the year at US$80.24 million.131 The recognition of this failure had first 
motivated the jiu zuo sentiments in the OCAC, but even though none of those reforms 
had actually taken place, the OCAC declared in November 1959 that it would aim for 
US$100 million in remittances in 1960.132 
 For the OCAC, the post-Lushan approach presumed that if the achievements of 
the GLF were stressed to the huaqiao, then qiaowu would somehow be able to meet its 
objectives. Hence, the OCAC suggested that to enable the huaqiao in China ‘to realise 
the advantages of socialism, and the glorious future that communism offered’, would also 
enable them to influence, and to be effective conduits of positive information towards 
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their haiwai huaqiao friends and family.133 Indeed, as the OCAC instructed the ACFROC 
before its Congress in November 1959: 
Through the meeting’s political influence, to encourage the guiqiao, qiaojuan and 
qiaosheng to an even greater Great Leap Forward in production work and studies; 
to establish even more Red Flag Model Soldiers, to share experiences, and to 
make a positive contribution to the homeland’s socialist construction.134 
 
Yet, despite the OCAC’s emphasis on propagandising the GLF and its achievements, it 
was well aware of the hollowness of such instructions. After all, the worsening situation 
in China had already become common knowledge. As a Xinhua report suggested in late 
1959, even the Indonesian huaqiao—who were themselves facing an increasingly hostile 
situation in Indonesia—had been reported as saying that: ‘to stay in Indonesia is to wait 
for death, to go to Taiwan is to court death, but to go to the Mainland is to starve to 
death’.135 Yet, propaganda and platitudes about the GLF was all that the OCAC could do. 
Constrained by the CCP CC’s order that ‘the achievements are the main things’, qiaowu 
was helpless. Thus by the end of 1959, and regardless of the negative huaqiao experience 
of the GLF, the surrender of economic rationality, and the catalogue of broken promises 
to the huaqiao—the simple reality was that politics was in command. 
 
Conclusion: 
 On 1 January 1960, and as New China entered a new decade, the People’s Daily 
declared that after the ‘great and profound transformation’ that had taken place over the 
preceding decade, the next ten years promised ‘limitless light and  hope’.136 Not so. Or at 
least, not so for qiaowu. The Hundred Flowers and the Anti-Rightist Campaign had, at 
the end of 1957, been portents of impending changes in qiaowu, and in 1958, the party-
state radically transformed its qiaowu—but it was not for the better. 
                                                
133 Ibid., 603. 
134 OCAC to ACFROC, ‘Guanyu zhaokai quanguo qiaolian di yi jie di si ci weiyuanhui (kuoda) huiyi de 
buchong tonghzi’, 14/11/1959, BMA #002-011-00049, 19-21. 
135 ‘Yinni huaqiao zijin dapi yitou Xianggang’, 26/11/1959, NBCK. 
136 People’s Daily editorial, ‘Zhanwang liushi niandai’, 01/01/1960, JYZW, 13: 1-8 (1). 
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 Mao had, in late 1957, proclaimed a return to his older ‘socialist high tide’ vision 
of accelerated and intensified socialist transformation—except that it was now called a 
Great Leap Forward. Yet, as Mao saw it, if this GLF was to succeed, and overcome the 
obstructions—even from within the CCP—that had plagued his last attempt at instigating 
rapid revolutionary progress, the party-state—indeed, the PRC in its entirety—needed a 
new governing paradigm: ‘politics in command’. Thus the party-state was required by 
early 1958, and certainly after the Hangzhou and Nanning Conferences, to conform to 
Mao’s political ideology, and to strive to achieve his vision for a GLF. 
 For qiaowu, the advent of the ‘politics in command’ era and the GLF meant, first 
and foremost, the eradication of the older youdai approach in policy. Previously, youdai 
policies had so often contradicted aspects of socialist transformation, and had in fact, been 
allowed to do so by a party-state too permissive—as Mao saw it—of rightist deviations. 
Thus in 1958, the party-state swiftly resolved that contradiction in favour of revolutionary 
socialism. All the special considerations, positive discrimination, and privileges for the 
huaqiao were repealed, and the continued practice of Anti-Rightist Rectification ensured 
that this ideological conformity was enforced, not just amongst the huaqiao, but also—
and perhaps, especially—amongst qiaowu practitioners themselves. 
Thus driven to rectify its previous Rightism, and to re-align the socio-economic 
structures and relations of the huaqiao with the interests ‘of the whole people’, the party-
state’s qiaowu increasingly became the vise by which the huaqiao were squeezed, on one 
side by a demand for ideological conformity, and on the other, by a distinctly exploitative 
economic utilitarianism. Of course, qiaowu had always rested on an economic base; or 
on the view that the huaqiao were necessary components of a united front because of the 
economic value they represented. Yet, in the GLF, the imperative to adhere to ‘politics in 
command’ rejected the idea that this economic value required the positive management 
of huaqiao interests, so as to efficiently capitalise on huaqiao utility. Instead, qiaowu was 
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to employ socialist methods and mobilisation to turn the huaqiao into useful contributors 
to ‘the whole people’ and the majority interest. But this, in reality, turned into blunt and 
open extraction from, and exploitation of the huaqiao. The huaqiao remittances had long 
been the centrepiece of the political economy of qiaowu, and while the onset of the GLF 
actually increased the relative economic importance and utility of the remittances, the 
politics of the time—indeed, the ideological milieu—ensured that the huaqiao would now 
suffer greatly for what they were thought to have been able to give. 
 Thus by 1959, qiaowu had been successfully aligned with the dictates of the GLF 
and ‘politics in command’. But it had also become clear to the party-state by early 1959 
that the GLF was heading towards a socio-economic disaster. This was by no means the 
uniform view amongst the CCP leadership, but it was a significant one nonetheless, and 
it certainly counted qiaowu practitioners—especially the OCAC—amongst its supporters. 
For qiaowu, the resolution of the contradiction with socialist transformation seemed to 
have created a new contradiction; qiaowu in line with ‘politics in command’ undermined 
its political economy. This view was motivated by the stark realisation that there had been 
drastic falls in huaqiao remittances, which were assessed to have been a consequence of 
the People’s Communes, and specifically, a result of the coercion, repression and abuse 
that the huaqiao had suffered. Faced with the impending collapse of the remittance flow, 
qiaowu practitioners scrambled to rectify the situation. There was thus a brief period in 
mid-1959 where the OCAC led an attempt to reform the excesses of the GLF in qiaowu, 
and a fleeting flirtation with a re-introduction of a semblance of the youdai policies—or 
at least, a set of provisions for huaqiao in the communes to arrest the fall in remittances, 
and to stabilise their morale, by restoring their ‘freedom and security’. 
Yet, the attempt to reform qiaowu in the GLF never materialised. Indeed, whereas 
many within the party-state leadership had thought to engage in jiu zuo in mid-1959, and 
to rectify the excesses of the GLF, this inclination quickly floundered in the wake of an 
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even greater shift to the left by the CCP. While the Lushan Conference in July 1959 had 
initially offered a forum for a reconsideration of the GLF, it had instead ended up in 
acrimony, with Mao accusing critics of the GLF of being anti-Party and anti-socialist 
‘rightist opportunists’. Thus with Mao’s vilification (again) of ‘rightist enemies’, all 
proposals to jiu zuo had to be quickly abandoned, lest their proponents end up on the 
wrong side of history—and on the wrong side of Mao.  
By August 1959, the transitory attempt at reforming the GLF had given way to 
both a renewal of Anti-Rightism, and of the GLF vision. For qiaowu, this meant that its 
earlier reform attempts had to be abandoned, even if the causes of the remittance decline 
remained unaddressed. The OCAC knew that this post-Lushan direction was disregarding 
of economic rationality, since failing to improve the huaqiao situation in the GLF would 
be counterproductive to attempts to convince the huaqiao to support the PRC—let alone 
remit more money. Yet, there was no other choice for qiaowu, since the renewal of Anti-
Rightism ensured that qiaowu had to conform to the GLF. Thus in returning to Mao’s 
orthodoxy, qiaowu turned away from the reforms intended at solving huaqiao discontent, 
and returning qiaowu to a more rational political economy. This turn would prove to be 
decisive, and inasmuch as it represented the abandonment of New China’s original 
promise to protect huaqiao rights and interests, it set qiaowu on a path defined by Mao’s 
ideological and political imperatives, that would eventually lead to a delayed, but 
calamitous reckoning in the Cultural Revolution. 
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Over the course of 1959, and faced with increasingly overt racial discrimination 
by the Indonesian government, along with intensifying threats and acts of anti-Chinese 
violence, quite a few of the huaqiao in Indonesia ‘decided it was time to leave’.1 In this, 
they were aided by the PRC, which sent ships to Indonesia to repatriate the Chinese 
refugees. The despatch of the ships after December 1959 was actually—as far as the PRC 
was concerned—the least it could do, and the most it was willing to venture, since it was 
keen to ‘adopt a constrained manner’ in dealing with the Indonesian government’s anti-
Chinese discrimination, so as to avoid offending President Sukarno.2 Yet, portraying the 
PRC as both the benevolent homeland, and the mighty guardian of the huaqiao, also 
offered an opportunity for a useful corrective to negative reports about China. Hence an 
OCAC directive in February 1960 stated that: ‘At present, the main content of patriotic 
education for the new guiqiao should be focused on the General Line, the Great Leap 
Forward, the People’s Communes, the great construction of the last ten years, and the 
superiority of the socialist system, and etc.’3 Such propaganda reflected the party-state’s 
renewed emphasis on Mao’s vision in 1960, especially after the attacks on Rightism in 
the wake of the Lushan Conference.4 But the reality was that the PRC was already in a 
crisis by then, as the intensified application of the GLF drove China’s food production 
down to new record lows—and sent millions to their graves.5  
                                                
1 Around 130,000 Indonesian huaqiao had returned to China by 1961. See Michael R. Godley, ‘The 
Sojourners: Returned Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China’, Pacific Affairs, 62:3 (1989), 
330-352 (334). 
2 And even then, the repatriation exercise barely lasted half a year. Due to its ‘prohibitively high economic 
costs’, the PRC cancelled the program after July 1960. See Zhou Taomo, ‘Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese 
Policy towards Indonesia, 1960–1965’, CWIHP Working Paper, No. 67 (2013), 15. 
3 OCAC, ‘1960 nian zhunbei jiedai anzhi daliang guiguo huaqiao de xuanchuan jiaoyu gongzuo jihua’, 
18/02/1960, SMA B20-2-243-1. 
The GLF, the People’s Communes and the General Line, would later be known as the ‘Three Red Banners’ 
[三面红旗]. The first use of this term was probably in CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quandang 
dongshou, daban nongye, daban liangshi de zhishi’, 10/08/1960, JYZW, 13: 456-464 (456). 
4 From August 1959 to January 1960, 7.5% of Party Committee members from the party-state organs under 
the CCP CC were ‘singled out to be criticized’. Moreover, in January 1960, Mao declared that the GLF 
would ‘not be inferior to last year, and may even be a bit better’. See Yang, Tombstone, 390, 451. 
5 Grain output in 1960 (143.5 billion kilos) was 26.5 billion kilos less than 1959, and was even lower than 
that of 1951. Indeed, 60% of all deaths because of starvation in the ‘Great Famine’ (Yang Jisheng estimates 
36 million) occurred from late 1959 to late 1960. See Yang, Tombstone, 326-339. 
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 The deteriorating situation in China therefore made it all the more imperative for 
qiaowu to engage in ‘patriotic education’ towards the huaqiao, to convince them that all 
the increasingly negative stories of hardship and suffering emanating from the PRC were 
not true, but also—and perhaps, more importantly—to reassure the huaqiao both in and 
out of China, that the PRC was still the guarantor of all their rights and interests.  Indeed, 
Liao Chengzhi, at a reception for some of the newly-returned Indonesian refugees in 
Guangdong, told them that: 
Whenever the huaqiao found themselves facing persecution, or difficult 
circumstances, they naturally had an earnest expectation that their strong 
homeland would step forward to protect their legitimate rights and interests, and 
solve their problems. But in the old China, whether it was the feudal dynasties, or 
the reactionary Guomindang government, they only knew how to persecute and 
exploit the people, and they were never able to provide a solution to any huaqiao 
problems—much less send ships to repatriate them. Thus, the huaqiao have 
historically lamented that they were: ‘Overseas orphans.’  
 
Dear qiaobao, your homeland is fully aware of your suffering and hardship, and 
we welcome all those Indonesian qiaobao who are now destitute and homeless, 
to come back, and to join in the homeland’s great socialist construction.6 
 
The irony of Liao’s assertions is that by his own standards, and certainly by his own 
accusations against the previous ruling regimes of China, the exact same charge of 
seeking ‘to persecute and exploit’ the huaqiao could legitimately have been laid right at 
the entrance to the Zhongnanhai complex by 1959. For all Liao’s rhetoric, and for all his 
overt attempts to display party-state benevolence, the fact was that those huaqiao refugees 
who returned to the PRC in 1959–1960 were actually returning to a country that was far 
less interested in helping them, than it was in using them. Indeed, to consider New China’s 
overall treatment of the huaqiao through its qiaowu in 1949–1959—as this thesis has 
done—necessarily leads to rather stark conclusions about the PRC’s qiaowu as: a failed 
political economy; a contradiction with socialist transformation; and as a paradox, and a 
betrayal of the huaqiao. 
                                                
6 Liao Chengzhi, ‘Qiangda de zuguo shi huaqiao de kaoshan’, 01/03/1960, DHGLR, 252-253 (253). 
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Political Economy: 
 This thesis argues that the PRC’s policies towards the huaqiao in 1949–1959 
should be understood as a political economy. Here, the party-state’s qiaowu was a 
political function of economic imperatives—particularly to secure the foreign exchange 
that huaqio remittances offered. In that sense, the imperative to gain remittances was the 
touchstone for qiaowu, and was the basis of the youdai [favourable treatment] approach 
in 1950–1956 which defined policy based on the rationalisation that catering to the 
huaqiao interests served the party-state’s interests. Yet, this interplay between political 
manoeuvring and economic rationality was not to last, since the advent of the GLF and 
‘politics in command’ in 1957–1958, forced qiaowu to embrace an ideological purity 
(après Mao) that made youdai untenable, and its political economy a failure by 1959. Of 
course, the supremacy of Mao’s ideology did not remove the underlying economic 
imperatives to qiaowu. Yet, there was a distinct asymmetry where qiaowu and its 
economic ends were subjected to the dictates of Mao Zedong Thought. This ultimately 
made qiaowu a failed political economy, since even though the party-state soon realised 
that the practice of ideologically-purer qiaowu undermined its own economic objectives, 
it could, and would not adjust its counterproductive politics. 
 Yet, despite the eventual abandonment of the youdai approach to qiaowu by 1959, 
the fact that it had even existed, and that it had been allowed (if not enabled) to contradict 
the larger demands of socialist transformation in the 1950s, might seem counterintuitive 
to certain perceptions of Maoist China.7 But even so, it was certainly not as if the party-
state’s revolutionary ideology and its quest to achieve communism in China, precluded it 
from recognising that its economic interests—and hence, the security and future success 
of the revolution—might sometimes actually be better served by policies that temporarily 
                                                
7 The OECD is fairly typical in its suggestion that ‘the ideological commitment to a socialist economy and 
rejection of capitalism was very strong’ in the PRC, prior to Reform (post-1978). See Angus Maddison, 
Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run: Second Edition, Revised and Updated: 960–2030 AD 
(Paris: Development Centre of the OECD, 2007), 18. 
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diverged from the revolutionary path.8  Such thinking was of course at the very heart of 
the New Democracy that was established with the PRC in 1949, and it was also the crux 
of the qiaowu that followed in the early-to-mid-1950s. 
 The centrality of the economic perspective to the PRC’s qiaowu—especially on 
the perceived utility of the huaqiao and their remittances—was in many ways, the product 
of a long Chinese tradition of utilitarian views of huaqiao remittances. This ‘historical 
political economy’ predated New China, but it was the post-1949 party-state that 
institutionalised it. The fact was that the CCP’s New Democracy was an economic 
rationalisation, and the united front that it instituted was but a reluctant compromise, so 
as to capitalise on the broadest range of resources available. The CCP held the real power 
in the CPG after October 1949, but the semblance of democracy was a necessary pretence. 
Thus contrary to CCP conventionalism, the New Democracy and its CPPCC was about 
economic utility—and so was the huaqiao place in that united front.9 
The origins of qiaowu were as a fulfilment—or at the very least, part of the 
‘organised hypocrisy’—of the New Democracy.10 This was evident in the creation of the 
CPPCC, its Common Program, and the OCAC—all to make qiaowu the conduit for the 
party-state’s self-proclaimed duty of care towards the huaqiao. Yet, the reality was that 
the policy-practitioners (the OCAC, but also the CFEC, PBOC and BOC) were primarily 
concerned with huaqiao economic utility, mainly in terms of remittances. Given the sums 
of hard currency involved, this was logical—and after 1950, desperately vital, not least 
                                                
8 ‘Yet at a time when Chinese policymakers did not act ‘pragmatically’ on so many occasions, they 
appeared to have behaved ‘pragmatically’ in pursuing policies towards Japan that favoured China’s 
economic interests.’ See Amy King, China-Japan Relations after World War II: Empire, Industry and War, 
1949–1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 14. 
See also Dorothy J. Solinger, ‘Economic Reform Via Reformulation in China: Where do Rightist Ideas 
come from?’, Asian Survey, 21:9 (1981), 947-960. 
9  See General Affairs Office of the CPPCC National Committee, The Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2004), 2. 
10 The term ‘organised hypocrisy’ is defined ‘saying one thing but doing another, endorsing a logic of 
appropriateness while acting in ways consistent with a logic of consequences’ in international relations. 
Given the CCP’s united front ‘appropriateness’ that served economic ‘consequences’, the term can certainly 
be applied here as well. See Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Organized hypocrisy in nineteenth-century East Asia’, 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 1:2 (2001), 173–197 (176). 
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because of the ‘economic Cold War’.11 Yet, remittances, as qiaowu practitioners realised, 
represented fundamentally transnational issues. For the party-state, remittances were 
simply foreign exchange. Yet, remittances were also both a livelihood (especially for the 
qiaojuan), and a (if not, the) pillar of transnational relations between the haiwai huaqiao 
remitters and the huaqiao recipients in China. The money came from abroad; but the 
motivations for, and interests in sending that money were domestic.12 
The political economy of qiaowu in the early 1950s thus involved a recognition 
that securing remittances was intrinsically linked to its transnationality, and in convincing 
overseas remitters that remittances served both their interests, and that of the recipients. 
Thus the need for qiaowu to buttress the huaqiao’s interests. Yet, since the centre of 
gravity for huaqiao interests was inside China (defined by mostly familial, but sometimes 
commercial concerns), qiaowu embraced a primarily domestic approach in 1950–1956, 
to set the huaqiao in China apart as a special demographic, and to incentivise remittances. 
Consequently, qiaowu systematically instituted youdai policies, with notable leniency for 
huaqiao landlords, early revision of class statuses, extra food for households in qiaoxiang, 
exemptions from collectivisation and labour, legislative protections of private property—
and many other manifestations of youdai all the way to 1956, that were guided in each 
instance by the unifying thread of the imperative to gain more remittances. 
To be sure, this approach to qiaowu required balancing between economic and 
political imperatives, sometimes even to the point of contradiction. Yet, the party-state 
regularly favoured the youdai, and qiaowu practitioners (especially in the OCAC and 
PBOC) consistently advocated and defended huaqiao interests, against CCP cadres and 
officials who did not follow youdai provisions. But this was never really about huaqiao 
‘rights and interests’ per se; they were only relevant insofar as they served to gain 
                                                
11 Zhang, Economic Cold War, 79-102. 
12 The transnationality of interests, and the role of domestic motivations for foreign remitters are not unique 
to the Chinese diaspora. See Bharati Basu and James T. Bang, International Remittance Payments and the 
Global Economy (New York: Routledge, 2015), 112-142. 
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remittances. Whether it was the suppression of women’s rights (especially to divorce) to 
keep the haiwai huaqiao (men) happy; or the encouragement of qiaosheng to maintain 
traditional Confucian ties, and to ignore what their socialist education implied about their 
bourgeois families, it was the maintenance (or increase) of remittances that defined the 
underlying logic of qiaowu in 1950–1956.13 
 The party-state’s practice of the youdai approach to qiaowu therefore depended 
on both the primacy that it assigned to gaining ever-more huaqiao remittances, and also 
on the centrality of economic rationality to its policymaking towards the fulfilment of that 
remittance imperative. Yet, when the party-state turned—or perhaps, was forced—to the 
left after 1957, it was ideological purity that took over as the primary consideration. Thus 
in 1958, Chinese politics—and qiaowu—underwent radical change. The advent of the 
GLF and ‘politics in command’ now meant that all policy was now held to an ideological 
standard defined by Maoist principles which emphasised revolutionary advance, mass 
mobilisation in politics and economics, and rapid, intense socialist transformation. Thus 
qiaowu had to submit to a new governing paradigm for all its work. 
On the surface, ‘politics in command’ did not detract from qiaowu’s political 
economy; after all, the GLF necessitated greater imports of capital equipment, and thus, 
more demand for hard currency. Yet, ‘politics in command’ also required qiaowu to 
conform to the dictates of socialist transformation and the interests of ‘the whole people’, 
instead of minority huaqiao interests. Whereas qiaowu had once adopted a rationalisation 
                                                
13 This gendered youdai contradicts positive portrayals of the CCP’s approach to feminism. See Lin Chun, 
‘Citizenship in China: The Gender Politics of Social Transformation’, Social Politics: International Studies 
in Gender, State & Society, 3:2-3 (1996), 278-290; Tina Mai Chen, ‘Female Icons, Feminist Iconography? 
Socialist Rhetoric and Women’s Agency in 1950s China’, Gender & History, 15:2 (2003), 268-295. 
Party-led dampening of socialist enthusiasm in favour of Confucian ethics contradicts the idea of a ‘collapse 
of the Confucian value system’ in the 1950s. See Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Great Transformation: China in 
the Long 1970s’ in, Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J. Sargent (eds), The Shock of 
the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 65-79 (66). 
See also the view that: ‘Mao Zedong had no desire to rid his people of the Confucian virtues of self-denial 
and compliance, but he wanted to replace Confucianism with himself and his own thought—Mao Zedong 
Thought—as the object and beneficiary of these virtues’, in Ci Jiwei, Dialectic of the Chinese Revolution: 
From Utopianism to Hedonism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 63. 
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that political flexibility enabled the fulfilment of economic ends, qiaowu now abandoned 
youdai and ‘bourgeois tendencies’ to more closely align with ‘politics in command’, and 
this led to the eradication of huaqiao privileges, provisions and protections, and a turn 
towards outright exploitation. But it also led to significant losses, as the main effect of 
this qiaowu approach was a sharp fall in remittances. Yet, even when it was confronted 
with the counterproductive nature of its policies, the party-state proved unable and 
unwilling to alter course. By 1959, though qiaowu still had a key economic role, its 
politics no longer served that imperative, but were instead undermining it. Though 
qiaowu practitioners were well aware of this, there was nothing they could do. Thus by 
the end of New China’s first decade, its qiaowu had become a failed political economy, 
and subservient to a Maoist fantasy. 
 
Contradiction: 
 Curiously—and ironically—the CCP after Mao has not been opposed to the idea 
of contradictions in its qiaowu; indeed, the modern party-state rather prefers this view. 
Of course, pace Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Xi Zhongxun et al., the main contradiction 
in the narrative of New China’s qiaowu was the Cultural Revolution, and specifically, 
was made manifest by Lin Biao and the ‘Gang of Four’.14 In this narrative, qiaowu since 
1949 was a series of enlightened policies, benevolently and correctly catering to the 
‘rights and interests’ of the huaqiao, until it was tragically—albeit only temporarily—
interrupted in the late 1960s. This narrative suited post-Mao politics, but it also suits the 
CCP’s self-portrayal of the post-1978 period as a resolution of preceding contradictions, 
and also matches the current CCP nostalgia for dialecticism.15  Yet, this narrative is 
                                                
14 Deng Xiaoping, ‘Jiejian canjia guoqing de qiao tai gang ao tongbao luxingtuan de jianghua’, 29/09/1977, 
DHGLR, 328-330; Jiang Zemin, ‘Zai disici quanguo guiguo huaqiao daibiao dahui shang de jianghua’, 
18/12/1989, DHGLR, 345-348; Xi Zhongxun, ‘Zai sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi qiaoban zhuren huiyi shang de 
jianghua (zhaiyao)’, 21/04/1984, DHGLR, 364-368. 
15 Frank Dikotter, The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962–1976 (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 
312-322; ‘Xi stresses adherence to dialectical materialism’, 24/01/2015, Xinhua News Agency; ‘Xuexi 
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inaccurate. The basic fact was that qiaowu in 1949–1959 was almost always in a difficult 
dialogue, competition, and contradiction with other, ideological impulses. 
 To be sure, given this thesis’ analysis of the political economy of qiaowu, the 
narrative of a correct—even rational—practice of qiaowu that was sabotaged by the turn 
towards hyper-ideological policymaking in the late 1960s, is particularly tempting. 
Especially if seen also in terms of a variant ‘plan-rational’ and ‘plan-ideological’ political 
economy. 16  But to be sure, rationalised policy and ideological imperatives are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive.17 On a basic level, there was no contradiction between 
qiaowu and the CCP’s revolution. After all, the huaqiao were in the New Democracy 
precisely because the socialist state had an economic need; qiaowu—and the hard 
currency it secured—funded ‘socialist construction’, and the capital imports needed to 
transform China into a modern industrial economy, and thus safeguard and carry forward 
the revolution to its glorious, classless end. 
 Yet, even if qiaowu served the (Chinese) revolution and an ideologically-defined 
end, the reality was also that qiaowu’s practice and the revolution’s progress were 
contradictory, because qiaowu relied—or at least, was perceived to rely—on seemingly 
counter-revolutionary practices to achieve its objectives. Thus while qiaowu served the 
socialist revolution, it also contradicted socialist transformation. In a way, this 
contradiction was inevitable. The New Democracy—and its united front—was intended 
for the practical leveraging of resources for the socialist state’s strengthening, and indeed, 
its survival in 1949. This intention underpinned the huaqiao inclusion, and it gave qiaowu 
its governing remittance imperative. This then led to the youdai approach to fulfil the 
                                                
yunyong bianzheng weiwu zhuyi zengqiang xietiao tuijin ‘sige quanmian’ de nengli’, Qiushi, No. 4 (2015), 
11-12. 
16 See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 18; Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional 
Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 7. 
17 See Nigel Gould-Davies, ‘Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War’, 
Journal of Cold War Studies, 1:1 (1999), 90-109; Douglas J. Macdonald, ‘Formal Ideologies in the Cold 
War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: 
Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 180-204 (184). 
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transnational huaqiao interests, precisely in order to incentivise and increase remittances. 
But crucially, this also meant a policy approach, and a whole system, that was predicated 
on the preservation, manipulation, and expansion of existing huaqiao networks, 
relationships, social structures and conventional (if not to say, traditional) practices. Or, 
in other words, the youdai approach relied on an inherently conservative social dynamic. 
And this was obviously a contradiction to the CCP’s (and certainly Mao’s) agenda for the 
socialist transformation of China.18 
To be fair, and in the halls of Zhongnanhai, there was probably no contradiction 
in the mind of the CCP leadership and the qiaowu practitioners in the OCAC and related 
institutions. Since the failure to gain remittances would have sent the PRC’s precarious 
finances over the precipice, qiaowu was not only a revolutionary imperative, but an 
existential one. Yet, here was the root of the contradiction. The survival of the revolution 
required remittances—and thus youdai—but (and certainly for Mao) the revolution also 
required the transformation of China’s politics, society and economy, into purer 
socialism—and thereafter, communism. 
The first evidence of the contradiction between qiaowu and socialist 
transformation was during the Land Reform, and in terms of the lenient provisions for 
huaqiao landlords—to protect remittances. This early youdai saw opposition even within 
the CCP, but the party-state proffered a discourse of huaqiao special [teshu] 
characteristics and circumstances to justify its positive discrimination. Of course, this was 
about economic pragmatism, but here was the start of a pattern of contradiction. The 
youdai policies were frequently resisted, especially by lower-level cadres and officials, 
because the policies seemingly pandered to bourgeois interests, or exempted the huaqiao 
from socialism. At the same time, the youdai policies were also consistently endorsed by 
                                                
18 This brings to mind a famous remark that ‘the most radical revolutionary will become a conservative on 
the day after the revolution’. See Hannah Arendt, ‘Civil Disobedience’, Crises of the Republic: Lying in 
Politics; Civil Disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on Politics and Revolution (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1972), 49-102 (78). 
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qiaowu practitioners, who legitimised them with public discourse on huaqiao teshu, even 
as the party-state justified the policies unto itself through economic rationalisations. Thus 
in 1950–1956, the party-state juggled the youdai and socialist transformation—especially 
after Mao’s General Line (1952)—even while it knew that the youdai was ideologically 
counter-intuitive, since it had to regularly order rectifications of ‘leftist deviationist’ 
behaviour, and force recalcitrant cadres to comply. Yet, as OCAC and CCP CC archives 
show, the party-state always chose the youdai over revolutionary struggle. 
To be sure, the contradiction became more pronounced during the ‘socialist high 
tide’ in 1955–1956, when Mao called for the end of capitalism, an accelerated 
collectivisation campaign, and anti-bourgeois struggle. Yet, the youdai and its economic 
rationality found support amongst, and had a resonance in, the negative reaction to Mao’s 
‘high tide’ and its irrational ‘rash advance’, and thus both the OCAC’s Fourth Expanded 
Conference, and the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 endorsed the youdai. But even as the 
Congress marked the peak of the youdai, it also marked the high-point of contradiction, 
since its approval demonstrated a clear preference for economic rationalisation, over a 
distinctly ideological program for socialist transformation.  
Given the undeniable linkages between the youdai and the criticisms of the ‘high 
tide’, Mao’s resurgence in 1957–1958 was always going to bring a backlash. Mao, 
emboldened and enabled by the political crises that besieged the CCP, now alleged that 
‘Contradictions Among The People’ threatened the revolution. This was partly to 
entrench his leadership, partly to shore up the Party’s authority (after the Hundred 
Flowers saw attacks on its legitimacy), and partly to effect ideological purity. The ensuing 
Anti-Rightist Campaign thus cemented the supremacy of Mao’s leadership, his Thought, 
and his political program. Thus, the youdai—so tainted by the Eighth Party Congress and 
a running sore for earlier attempts at socialist transformation—was now evidence of 
Rightism in qiaowu, and by the OCAC and its partners. 
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Anti-Rightism in late 1957 thus sounded the death-knell for the youdai, and the 
advent of Mao’s ‘politics in command’ in 1958 marked the end of this particular era of 
qiaowu. Mao’s intention was for a sweeping ideological conformity that would—to his 
mind—bring China into the revolution’s next stage. This prioritisation of revolutionary 
struggle underpinned the launch of the GLF in 1958, but it also ensured that qiaowu would 
not be permitted to contradict socialist transformation. Thus qiaowu post-1958 eradicated 
the youdai approach in its policies, and forsook economic rationality—especially in terms 
of the most efficient means of securing remittances. Whereas the youdai had sought to 
incentivise remittances, qiaowu now turned to direct exploitation and extraction of 
huaqiao utility. Of course, qiaowu practitioners quickly realised by 1959 that these newer 
policies, while obedient to ‘politics in command’, were actually economically counter-
productive. Yet, while qiaowu practitioners briefly attempted to address this problem, the 
party-state’s inability to change course meant that in the end, and rather ironically, the 
party-state simply traded one contradiction for another. 
 
Paradox: 
 Back in 1949, New China’s proto-constitutional Common Program made the 
huaqiao two promises: that the CPG would protect huaqiao rights and interests (Article 
58); and also ‘adopt the measures necessary’ to ‘facilitate remittances’ from the huaqiao 
(Article 37).19 Yet, qiaowu failed to fulfil either promise. Paradoxically, although the 
party-state practiced positive discrimination for the huaqiao through its youdai approach 
to qiaowu in 1950–1956, this failed to effectively guarantee the rights and interests that 
it was supposed to protect, and worse, was abandoned after 1958 in a turn that thoroughly 
undermined huaqiao interests. Furthermore, for all that qiaowu intended to facilitate (and 
grow) remittances for both the huaqiao and the party-state’s foreign reserves, it was 
                                                
19 Article 37, Article 58. See ‘The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference’, 
29/09/1949, The Important Documents, 15, 20. 
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singularly unsuccessful in doing so. Yet, the irony and tragedy is that even if qiaowu 
failed to expand remittances, the party-state was still relatively better off for it—which 
leaves the huaqiao as the real (and only) losers in this story. 
 The party-state’s youdai approach in its policies towards the huaqiao was 
premised on the rationalisation that catering to the huaqiao interest would also serve to 
secure and expand the flows of remittances. The practice of youdai in policymaking and 
implementation therefore depended on an entire system of positive discrimination for the 
huaqiao in 1950–1956 that essentially made them a special demographic—carved out of 
the masses—that was entitled to extra allowances and lenient provisions, permitted to 
distinct separateness, differentiation and exemptions, and given legal protections and 
guarantees that were sometimes counter-intuitive to the very logic of the PRC’s socialist 
identity itself. In other words, qiaowu in its youdai form was a veritably pecuniary 
pluralism, wherein the tolerance of special interests, for a particular minority 
demographic, was a function of a financial incentive. 
 Regardless of the pecuniary premise of the youdai policies, that the CCP sought 
the satisfaction of huaqiao interests might reasonably be seen as evidence of convergent 
interests for the party-state and the huaqiao. In reality, theory and practice were not so 
easily reconciled. Of course, it is true that the party-state’s youdai approach did offer real 
benefits to huaqiao, which included things like extra allowances of food and consumer 
goods in ‘unified sale and purchase’ rationing, state-sponsored employment and 
settlement of the new guiqiao, generous scholarships for the qiaosheng in higher 
education, or even the differentiation between types (special, honorary, normal) of 
membership in cooperatives that allowed qiaojuan participation in collectivisation 
without actual labour. All of these—and much else—were very real policy initiatives that 
explicitly catered to the huaqiao interest. Yet, the efficacy of youdai was tempered by the 
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fact that in many cases, such policies faced resistance and very often caused resentment.20 
Indeed, it was not just CCP cadres and officials in lower-level, local jurisdictions who 
actively opposed, or violated youdai provisions and qiaowu policies because they seemed 
to contradict the ideological demands (if not, principles) of socialist transformation. It 
was also the masses (in both rural and urban areas) who resented the privileging of the 
huaqiao. Whether this was manifest in rent and property disputes, none-too-subtle 
grumbling, or extortion of remittances—the masses simply did not appreciate the youdai 
provisions. Of course, the party-state justified itself by harkening to a discourse of 
huaqiao specialness, but the fact was that the favourable treatment of huaqiao came at a 
cost to the non-huaqiao. After all, if the huaqiao did not labour in the cooperatives, then 
someone else had to make up the shortfall. Or, if the huaqiao received extra food, then 
the surplus available for others would obviously be decreased. 
 Furthermore, and against the backdrop of popular resistance and resentment to 
youdai policies and provisions, the fact was that party-state was utterly insincere about 
huaqiao ‘rights and interests’. The governing principle of youdai—as pecuniary 
pluralism—was the financial incentive, but whereas this could (and did) motivate positive 
discrimination for the huaqiao where the incentive was clear, it also followed that the 
party-state could undertake qiaowu that was distinctly against the huaqiao interest, if it 
was profitable to do so. For instance, while one youdai policy permitted remittance 
deposits denominated in foreign currency—as a hedge against RMB fluctuation—
withdrawals were only permitted in RMB and at fixed rates that meant significant losses 
to the real value. Yet, this also meant that the party-state profited from the arbitrage. Thus, 
while the youdai policies seemed to typify a convergence between the party-state’s 
economic interests, and its promise to protect huaqiao ‘rights and interests’, the special 
                                                
20 In that sense, the youdai was not dissimilar to other forms of positive discrimination around the world, 
in the provocation of resentment amongst those who did not benefit. See Thomas Sowell, Affirmative Action 
Around the World: An Empirical Study (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 1-22. 
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provisions for the huaqiao in the half-a-decade or so of the youdai era must be weighed 
against both the backlash that was brought on the huaqiao, and the fact that the party-
state itself was willing to undermine huaqiao interests when it served its own financial 
purposes. In any case, as far as the narrative of the whole of New China’s first decade is 
concerned, the point is moot. After all, post-1958 and the advent of ‘politics in command’, 
the party-state abandoned the youdai approach altogether, and all pretences at even the 
slightest concern for huaqiao ‘rights and interests’. 
 Yet, in some sense, that the PRC had even practiced the youdai in the 1950s was 
itself a relative innovation. In contrast, and despite a large diaspora of its own, ‘India took 
little interest in overseas Indians’ after 1947, and ‘successive Indian governments adopted 
an attitude of studied indifference to the overseas Indians lest they should be appear to be 
interfering in the internal affairs of another country’.21 Indeed, while qiaowu had derived 
the youdai approach to huaqiao rights and interests from a perception of their economic 
utility that dated all the way back to the PRC’s establishment (and beyond), India only 
began to pay attention to this political economy of diaspora in the mid-1980s.22 Thus, in 
effect, the PRC’s pecuniary pluralism was in a league of its own. And it was admired as 
such by other socialist bloc countries who thought it worthy of emulation. Even as late as 
1964, long after the collapse of qiaowu’s political economy in the GLF, Hungary’s 
Ambassador in Beijing enquired with the MFA if it could offer any advice on diasporic 
policy, because, as the Hungarians believed, their Chinese comrades had created qiaowu 
policies that were ‘quite good and enlightened’.23 But of course, the Hungarians did not 
quite realise that qiaowu had not been good for everyone. 
                                                
21 Aparajita Gangopadhyay, ‘India’s Policy towards its Diaspora: Continuity and Change’, India Quarterly: 
A Journal of International Affairs, 61:4 (2005), 93-122 (98). 
22 Rina Agarwala, ‘Tapping the Indian Diaspora for Indian Development’, in Alejandro Portes, and Patricia 
Fernandez-Kelly (eds), The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four 
Continents (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 84-110; Zhu Zhiqun, ‘Two Diasporas: Overseas Chinese 
and Non-resident Indians in their Homelands’ Political Economy’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 
12:3 (2007), 281-296. 
23 MFA, ‘Guanyu Xiongyali zhuhua dashi ni liaojie wo dui huaqiao zhengce deng wenti’, 04/01/1964, 
MFAA #117-01380-02, 3. 
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 The point of the pecuniary pluralism, the youdai approach, and even the party-
state’s marginalisation of huaqiao interests in the 1950s had always been about the 
remittances, hence the Common Program’s promise to ‘facilitate remittances’. One would 
have expected that that promise would have been the one that the party-state would have 
kept, and yet, even that was not the case. Paradoxically, though the party-state went to 
great lengths in the 1950s to secure (and expand) the remittance flows, the evidence 
actually demonstrates that it was singularly unsuccessful in doing so. In 1950, the PRC 
had a net inflow of US$122.57 million in hard currency via huaqiao remittances; in 1959 
the figure was US$80.24 million, which thus meant a comparative decrease of the yearly 
intake of remittances of around 34.5% after ten years.24 Of course, the record low for 
1959 was in part due to the early effects of the GLF, but then again, the figure for 1957 
was itself only US$108.28 million—which suggests that even the six preceding years of 
the youdai era had not fulfilled its primary goal. Perhaps this was the consequence of the 
party-state’s failure to keep its first promise, or perhaps it was also a reflection of the 
disruption to huaqiao relationships as China underwent socialist transformation. Either 
way, here was another promise that the party-state failed to keep. 
 Yet, despite the fact that the party-state was obviously unsuccessful in securing 
and expanding the remittance flows, it is important to distinguish between that failure, 
and the rather ironic fact that the party-state was still relatively better off despite its 
failure. After all, remittances in 1950–1957 (around US$1.17 billion in one estimate) 
nearly covered the PRC’s trade deficit for the same period (around US$1.38 billion).25 
This very impressive figure raises important questions for future research—chief among 
which must surely be to ask how much worse off would New China have been without 
the huaqiao and their remittances. But it also means that, despite the fact that the party-
                                                
24 See Appendix I. ‘Overseas Chinese Remittances to the People’s Republic of China, 1950–1960’. 
25 Lin Jinzhi et al., Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe, 271; Peterson, Overseas Chinese in 
the People’s Republic of China, 66-67. 
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state’s qiaowu was far from successful in its quest to ‘facilitate remittances’, there were 
more than a billion reasons why qiaowu was still to the benefit of the PRC. So, 
paradoxically, the party-state was still better off. Yet, while this was all very well and 
good for the party-state, the corollary to all of this must also be the realisation that if the 
party-state still benefitted (and immensely so), though its qiaowu had failed to keep its 
promises to the huaqiao, then the only victims of its qiaowu failures were actually the 
huaqiao. New China had made the huaqiao certain promises, and the party-state had 
failed to keep them, and thus by 1959, the huaqiao were in a far more tenuous position, 
and certainly worse off, than in 1949.  
 
Caveat Emptor: 
This thesis has offered a narrative of the ways in which the PRC viewed and 
treated the huaqiao in its first decade, and it argues for an understanding of qiaowu as a 
political economy that ultimately failed, in the wake of ideological radicalisation by 1959. 
This analysis allows an understanding of how the party-state conceived and used the 
huaqiao, but it also enables an understanding of the huaqiao experience of New China 
under the CCP. This thesis is thus important as a contribution to the existent, even if rather 
lacking, historiography on the huaqiao and their relationship with, and experience of the 
early PRC. Indeed, given its specific arguments, the thesis is also a refutation of CCP 
propaganda, and a revision of conventional wisdoms about the huaqiao in New China 
proffered by official and proto-official narratives. Given the significance of the huaqiao 
to modern China—indeed, as Odd Arne Westad describes, they ‘were, and are, the glue 
that holds China’s relations with the world together, in good times and bad’—this thesis’ 
contribution to more accurate, evidence-based understandings of the huaqiao place in 
modern Chinese history, is surely a positive historiographical development.26 
                                                
26 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750 (London: The Bodley Head, 2012), 
216. 
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 This thesis also exerts a contemporary relevance precisely because of the modern 
party-state’s re-politicisation of the Overseas Chinese (writ large). For the post-1978 
Chinese party-state, the political economy of qiaowu has been no less—perhaps even 
more—important than that of its predecessors.27 More recently, and in myriad ways 
ranging from claims about the support of the ‘Overseas Chinese communities’ for the 
PRC’s claims to the Diaoyu Islands; to suggestions that the greater political 
representation and status of the ethnic Chinese abroad (as with the American 
Congresswoman, Judy Chu) is because ‘China’s national strength is constantly 
enhancing’; and to demands that Chinese students abroad embrace ‘patriotic education’—
the party-state has brought diaspora back into fashionable discourse.28 The modern PRC 
is not just interested in looking for capital investment from the Chinese abroad; it is also 
very keen on solidifying the transnational connections between all Chinese for its own 
ends. Indeed, as PRC President Xi Jinping’s dramatic and shrill pronouncements often 
claim: ‘the fulfilment of the Chinese nation’s great rejuvenation is the common dream of 
all Chinese sons and daughters at home and abroad’.29 But then again, such sentiments 
are not new, except that the similar claims and promises of New China in 1949 led only 
to hardship and disappointment by 1959. So perhaps the Chinese ‘at home and abroad’ 
today would be wise to be wary about buying into a ‘common dream’—again.
                                                
27 After all, it was foreign direct investment (FDI) from the Chinese abroad (no longer huaqiao, but huaren 
or huayi) that powered the economy post-1978, with 70-80% of total FDI coming from them (66% from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan; 10-15% from Southeast Asia). See Maria Hsia Chang, ‘Greater China and the 
Chinese ‘Global Tribe’’, Asian Survey, 35:10 (1995), 955-967; Paul J. Bolt, ‘Looking to the diaspora: the 
overseas Chinese and China’s economic development, 1978–1994’, in Liu Hong (ed.), The Chinese 
Overseas, Vol IV: Homeland Ties and Agencies of Interaction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 76-104. 
28 Lia Zhu, Niu Yue, ‘Overseas Chinese urged to support sovereignty for South China Sea’, 13/07/2016, 
China Daily; ‘Overseas Chinese’s participation in politics becomes irresistible trend’, People’s Daily 
Online, 03/11/2012 [http://en.people.cn/90785/8003362.html] Accessed 30 May 2016; Chris Buckley, 
‘China Says Its Students, Even Those Abroad, Need More ‘Patriotic Education’, New York Times, 
10/02/2016 [http://nyti.ms/1SHMKxw] Accessed 30 May 2016; MFA, ‘Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zijun 
Gave Briefing to Chinese and Foreign Journalists on the Diaoyu Dao Issue’, 27/10/2012 
[http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t983015.shtml] Accessed 30 May 
2016. 
29 Xi Jinping, ‘Shixian zhonghua minzu weida fuxing shi hai nei wai zhonghua er nu gongtong de meng’, 
06/06/2014, Renmin wang [http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0717/c397563-27322408.html] 
Accessed 30 May 2016; Xi Jinping, ‘Xi Jinping zongshuji gei Xiamen shi Jimei xiaoyou zonghui huixin’, 
22/10/2014, Fujian ribao. 
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Appendix I. 
 
Overseas Chinese Remittances to the People’s Republic of China, 1950–1960 
         (in units of US$1 million)1 
 Lin Jinzhi et al. (1993)2 Wu Chun-hsi (1967)3 Contemporary PRC4 
1950 105.526 60.10 122.570 
1951 185.268 56.81 169.230 
1952 182.982 41.05 161.276 
1953 144.490 45.34 120.999 
1954 131.166 41.22 118.461 
1955 143.715 46.49 116.000 
1956 139.382 45.85 ****** 
1957 138.040 45.42 108.280 
1958 117.385 41.69 99.800 
1959 89.218 36.05 80.240 
1960 117.596 41.69 96.510 
Total 1494.768 501.71 1193.366 (w/o 1956) 
                                                
1 US$ values for Contemporary PRC column as per archival documents; both Lin and Wu do not suggest a 
base year for their calculations, suggesting that their figures also correspond to their contemporaneous data. 
2 Table: ‘1864–1988 nian huaqiao hui kuan tongji yi lan biao’, in Lin Jinzhi et al. (eds), Huaqiao huaren 
yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 228-231. 
3 Table 47: ‘Total Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China, 1950 to 1964’, in Wu Chun-hsi, 
Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China (Stanford: The 
Hoover Institution, 1967), 142. 
4 PRC data: 
1950 is from a PBOC chart for 1950-1952. See Table 43: ‘1950 zhi 52 nian dui ziben zhuyi guojia waihui 
shouzhi tongji biao’, in PBOC, ‘San nian lai guoji shouzhi yu waihui gongzuo zongjie’, 12/1952, CASS, 
CA (eds), 1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian: jinrong juan (Beijing: 
zhongguo wuzi chubanshe, 1996) 896-904 (902). 
1951-1954 is from a 1951 value of US$169.23 million (100%) and 1952 (95.3%), 1953 (71.5%) and 1954 
(70%). See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang 
dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao’, 03/01/1955, CCP CC Party Literature Research 
Office, CA (eds), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, Vols. 1-50 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2013), 
18: 135-151 (135). 
1955 from: PBOC to Mao Zedong, ‘Zhongguo renmin yinhang huibao tigang’, 11/04/1956, CASS, CA 
(eds), 1953-1957 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian: zonghe juan (Beijing: 
Zhongguo wujia chubanshe, 2000), 677-703 (701). 
1956 is the only year the official archives have no clear data for. The only indication comes from a balance 
sheet for 1956-1957 denominated in RMB. In this estimate, 1956 is at RMB 312 million, and 1957 at RMB 
325 million. In theory, at a fixed rate of US$1: RMB 2.4, this should mean US$ 130 million for 1956. But 
comparison of 1957 figures (see below) does not support the 1:2.4 rate. Based on the PBOC figure for 1957, 
the conversion is around 1:3 (from 325/108.28), which makes 1956 a far more sensible US$104 million. 
See PBOC, ‘1957 nian quanguo waihui shouzhi pingheng biao’, 23/11/1957, CASS, CA (eds), 1953-1957 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian: zonghe juan (Beijing: Zhongguo wujia 
chubanshe, 2000), 925. 
1957-1958 from: Table 1: ‘1958 nian dui ziben zhuyi guojia qiaohui he fei maoyi waihui shouru fen diqu 
tongji’, in PBOC, ‘Guanyu yi jiu wu ba nian dui ziben zhuyi guojia fei maoyi waihui shouru difang 
fencheng zhixing qingkuang he yi jiu wu jiu nian fei maoyi waihui shouru difang fencheng yijian de baogao 
[jielu]’, 17/02/1959, CASS, CA (eds), 1958–1965 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: jinrong juan (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1989), 592-594 (593). 
1959 from: Ministry of Finance, PBOC Head Office, ‘Shangbao yi jiu liu ling nian fei maoyi waihui shouzhi 
jihua’, 03/03/1960, CASS, CA (eds), 1958–1965 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: jinrong juan (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1989), 554-555 (554). 
1960 from: Ministry of Finance, PBOC Head Office, ‘Shangbao yi jiu liu yi nian fei maoyi waihui shouzhi 
jihua’, 06/05/1961, CASS, CA (eds), 1958–1965 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao 
xuanbian: jinrong juan (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1989), 557-562 (557). 
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